Operation Ostrava: Month 14, Week 3, Day 1.

As it has been crunch week I have little idea of what has been happening on the ground in Syria this week.

On crunch day itself - Thursday (19/4/12) the Syria Contact Group held it's third meeting in Paris, France. However co-inciding as it did with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting in Washington, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) Summit in Brighton, the Indian missile test, the Breivik trial in Norway, preparations for the first round of the French Presidential election and preparations for the Bahrain Formula 1 Grand Prix this received little media attention. That though seems to indicate that very little happened. The Syria Contact Group's main objective is to turn the disparate groups that make up the Saudi Irregular Army (SIA) into a credible alternative to the Syrian government. This is proving to be a difficult task that is going to take quite some time. The other problem presented to the Syria Contact Group is that it is also meant to provide momentum to the SIA. The plan was that the third meeting would do this by expressing outrage at the Syrian governments defiance of the international community by refusing to agree to a ceasefire. As the Syrian government has already agreed to and begun to implement a ceasefire this left the Syria Contact Group without a clear purpose.

On Saturday (21/4/12) the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2043(2012). However rather then being something directly affecting the Syrian government this was more for the United Nation's (UN) benefit. It authorises the UN Secretary General to deploy up to 300 unarmed observers and an unspecified number of civilian and political experts to Syria for up to 90 days under the banner of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) if he sees the need to do so, nations volunteer personnel to the mission and the Syrian government gives it's permission.

The Russian authored text that can be read here; http://www.rusemb.org.uk/foreignpolicy/74 is much more balanced then last Saturday's (14/4/12) resolution 2042(2012). For example the second paragraph of the main body of the text beginning; "Calls on the Syrian government to implement visibly it's commitments" points out that rather then agreeing to implement Annan's six point plan (S/PRST/2012/6) in it's entirety the Syrian government has so far only agreed to implement the first three parts of the second point relating the cessation of troops movements, the use of heavy weapons and a pull back of troops. Therefore it can't be held to parts of the plan that it hasn't agreed to implement. Although 2043(2012) does go on to call on the Syrian government to fully implement S/PRST/2012/6 it also states that this along with the operation of UNSMIS must be done with the agreement of the Syrian government. Therefore the Syrian government has the right not to agree without risk of automatic sanction by the UNSC.