This is really a continuation of what I didn't finish on Monday; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2018/11/operation-featherweight-month-54-week-4.html
There I stated that I think the SDF's battlefield priority should be reestablishing the
containment of ISIL within the Hajin pocket. Both by reinforcing the
network of Control Points to the north and taking back control of the
border positions from the Iraqi PMF.
Unfortunately CJTFOIR seem to see things differently. On November 11th (11/11/18) a meeting was held between the SDF and CJTFOIR. At the really the demand of the French and American elements of CJTFOIR this saw the SDF announcing they were relaunching phase three of the Round Up operation.
Since then there has been little indication of a coherent effort to liberate the Hajin pocket. There has been fighting across the area. However this seems to be the SDF reacting to renewed ISIL attacks rather than the result of a proactive strategy on the part of the SDF.
On November 20th (20/11/18) the SDF did attempt to open a humanitarian corridor to allow civilians to escape from Ash Shafah. A town which sits around 10km (6 miles) south-east of Abu Hassan and around 6km (3.5 miles) north-west of Sousse. However this corridor collapsed on November 22nd (22/11/18) amid a sustained ISIL counter attack.
The lack of strategy seems to be the result of CJTFOIR becoming fixated on liberating Hajin and Hajin alone.
Hajin is a relatively small town. Covering around 12kmsq (7 milesq) and containing just five main roads it is roughly one fifth of the size of Raqqa City. Despite this it is believed to be ISIL's de facto global capital.
It is also believed to be the current location of ISIL's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Suspicions which were increased on November 16th (16/11/18) with reports that two of al-Baghdadi's sons had been killed there. Abu Hafas and Baghdadi's favoured second son Motaz al-Badri.
This apparent obsession by CJTFOIR to liberate Hajin and capture of kill al-Baghdadi at all costs has seen the SDF focus most, if not all of its efforts on advancing from Bahrah to Hajin.
Initially they made some good progress. The mere announcement of the resumption of operations seems to have been enough to prompt 15 ISIL fighters to surrender to the SDF at Bahrah on November 13th (13/11/18).
On November 14th (14/11/18) the SDF made their first advance towards Hajin. Liberating 15 ISIL fighting positions. Along with 2 tunnel systems and 7 buildings used either for weapons production or weapons storage.
With the support of CJTFOIR the SDF's elite Counter-Terrorism Force (YAT) also conducted a raid around Raqqa City which captured the suspect believed to have ordered the killing of Sheikh al-Huwadi. The leader of the Afadalah Tribe the murder of Sheikh al-Huwadi on November 2nd (2/11/18) was intended to get all of the local tribes in Shangri-La to turn against the SDF.
Since November 14th (14/11/18) though progress has slowed. With no significant advances reported.
This Saturday (24/11/18) the weather once again turned against the SDF and CJTFOIR. This loss of visibility allowed ISIL to launch a counter attack from Hajin on Bahrah. It was coordinated with ISIL sleeper cells attempting to overrun Gharanji. The next town after Bahrah sitting around 5km (3 miles) to the north-west.
The attack on Gharanji failed almost as soon as it was launched. The attack on Bahrah though was initially extremely successful. The SDF were forced out of almost all of the town allowing ISIL to ransack and widely loot it.
Following the arrival of reinforcements, from reportedly the Shaitat Tribe, the SDF were able to reestablish full control of Bahrah by Monday (26/11/18). However not before more than 90 SDF fighters had been killed in clashes.
This obsession with liberating Hajin at all costs seems to be CJTFOIR's and CJTFOIR's alone. It is perhaps appropriate then that they have been doing the bulk of the work. Massively increasing their use of airstrikes on almost exclusively Hajin.
For example in the 24hrs leading up to November 9th (9/11/18) CJTFOIR conducted 50 airstrikes. In the 24hrs leading up to November 14th (14/11/18) CJTFOIR conducted 38 airstrikes. In the 24hrs leading up to November 16th (16/11/18) 34 airstrikes were conducted. A figure which seems to have become something of a daily average.
The Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) has also conducted airstrikes in the Hajin pocket. Such as on October 30th (30/10/18) and November 20th (20/11/18). Those periodic strikes on the Mount Baghuz area though seem separate from CJTFOIR's operations and focused on protecting ISF troops guarding the border.
These CJTFOIR airstrikes are being successful in killing ISIL fighters.
For example the 50 airstrikes of November 9th (9/11/18) included one which killed the senior ISIL commander Abu Omar al-Darya and the six bodyguards he was travelling with. Airstrikes on November 11th (11/11/18) killed 55 ISIL fighters. The airstrikes of November 16th (16/11/18) killed 17 ISIL fighters, including al-Baghdadi's two sons.
However these CJTFOIR airstrikes are also killing an increasing number of civilians.
It's reported that 40 civilians were killed in the November 9th (9/11/18) strikes. The November 16th (16/11/18) airstrikes are reported to have killed 23 civilians. While airstrikes on November 17th (17/11/18) are reported to have killed 43 civilians including 17 children.
Those reports can be somewhat misleading though. The November 17th (17/11/18) airstrike actually killed 7 civilians. The other 36 deaths including the 17 children were of ISIL family members.
As an organisation dedicated to destruction and violence all members of ISIL families are trained to and expected to fight. Women in the al-Khansaa religious enforcement brigades and even children in the Cubs of the Caliphate.
Therefore I would not class those 36 ISIL family members killed as civilians. However many of the ISIL members in the Hajin pocket are local to the area and members of local tribes. I think CJTFOIR and the SDF will have a tough time explaining the deaths of those women and children to the other members of their tribes.
My main concern though is that when these airstrikes are killing ISIL fighters they are also destroying buildings. Along with roads and the water and sewage pipes and electrical supply cables that run along them.
This current airstrike filled tantrum by CJTFOIR is something we've seen before. In the 2017 Battle of Raqqa City.
As I've said before I think that CJTFOIR pushed the SDF into the Battle of Raqqa City at completely the wrong time. They should have first properly secured the boundaries of Shangri-La as they are doing now. Then move to liberate what would have then been ISIL's extremely isolated capital.
Even as CJTFOIR were pushing the SDF into the Battle of Raqqa City the Syrians were conducting their own operations to liberate all of the central part of Syria from ISIL. Just four days after the start of the Battle of Raqqa City the Syrians reached the Syria/Iraq border at al-Tanf on June 10th 2017 (10/6/17).
It was at this point CJTFOIR finally seemed to realise that the SDF was in a race against the Syrians to see who would liberate the areas such as Hajin on the north bank of the Euphrates. A race they were in no position to run because they were tied up in the Battle of Raqqa City.
As the Battle of Raqqa City dragged first from July into August and from August into September there was a massive spike in CJTFOIR airstrikes. In an effort to rush the battle to victory.
By the end of the battle 1,300 civilians had been confirmed killed by these CJTFOIR airstrikes. With a further 1,900 civilians suspected of being killed by CJTFOIR airstrikes. The United Nations (UN) declared that a full 80% of Raqqa City had been left uninhabitable by the battle's end.
Some 13 months on not much has changed in Raqqa City. Buildings have not been rebuilt. Roads are still blocked by craters and rubble. Crucially the two main bridges across the Euphrates which link the north and south of the city are still as unusable as when CJTFOIR airstrikes blew them up. Forcing people to cross the river using time consuming barges and boats.
The rubble which still litters the streets of Raqqa City remains packed with rotting corpses and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's). Just last Wednesday (21/11/18) two members of the SDF's Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams were killed while attempting to defuse a leftover IED in the Firdous district of Raqqa City.
Those civilians who do remain in Raqqa City are starting to look back favourably at the time ISIL were in charge. Unlike the SDF it seems ISIL were able to fix the holes in the roads, keep the water running and the electricity on.
The situation in Raqqa City remains so bad that most of its residents have still not returned home. Instead being left in makeshift and poorly supplied Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camps across Shangri-La.
Particularly as the second winter draws in 13 months is a long time to be struck in an IDP camp unable to return home.
People are being reminded of how unpleasant it is to be stuck in an IDP camp by the fact it is shaping up to be a harsh winter. Across the Syria and Iraq region there has been a lot of extreme weather recently.
In the Sudetenland, in the north-west of Syria the Deir Ballut IDP was partially destroyed by heavy rain and flooding on October 27th (27/10/18). In northern Iraq the Duhok IDP camp, for mainly Yezidis, was similarly damaged by heavy rain and flooding on November 23rd (23/11/18). If you've ever been in a tent during a rainstorm you'd know it's pretty unpleasant even if you're not flooded out.
The slow pace of reconstruction and particularly the conditions in the IDP camps have led to some anti-SDF protests across Shangri-La.
Such as by residents of the Mabrouka IDP camp near Tel Abyad/Serekanyie on October 20th (20/10/18). By residents of the Arisha IDP camp near Hasakah City on October 22nd (22/10/18). More recently at Shadaddi on November 20th (20/11/18).
Even in areas which have not seen formal protests there is still much talk of discontent over living conditions.
Although it is their responsibility the slow progress of reconstruction is not really the SDF's fault. They are doing their best with extremely limited resources.
Shangri-La is not a nation state. The political arm of the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) is not a national government. So while it is has resources like farmland and oil and gas fields under its control it cannot export those commodities. Nor can it seek loans from other nations or private lenders such as banks.
Instead the SDF/SDC have to rely on international aid bodies such as the UN and the Red Cross along with donations from national governments.
These international aid agencies and national governments seem to be falling over themselves to provide aid to Al Qaeda controlled camps in the Sudetenland. Or the ISIL controlled Ruqban IDP camp near al-Tanf.
Yet they seem to have little interest in helping civilians in Shangri-La. For example the UN provides 98% funding for the Sudetenland but only 80% funding for Hasakah Province.
Given the challenges the SDF are facing with reconstruction it seem crazy that CJTFOIR would give them even more reconstruction work to do by wildly lashing out with airstrikes in Hajin.
Alongside ISIL the SDF are also having to contend with attacks by the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT). Through the front organisation the Eruption Movement/Harakat al-Qiyam (HAQ).
On November 4th (4/11/18) HAQ who used to be known as Army of Revolutionaries/Jaish al-Thuwar announced they were once again changing their name. They now wish to be known as; "The Counter-Terrorism & Resistance Organisation." Clearly reflecting MIT's view that the SDF are terrorists and ISIL are merely freedom fighters.
Since then HAQ/MIT have carried out 12 attacks on the SDF across Shangri-La. Resulting in the deaths of 19 members of the SDF. Including 4 members of the Ayaish, the SDF's civilian police force. HAQ/MIT also killed a civilian in a gun attack on a Mosque in Hurayji on November 9th (9/11/18).
Of those HAQ/MIT attacks a number were particularly noteworthy.
On November 20th (20/11/18) HAQ/MIT snipers killed one member of the SDF in Tel Abyad/Serekanyie. Sitting right on the border between Shangri-La and Turkey this is the furthest north HAQ/MIT have been known to operate. The town has long been threatened with invasion by the regular Turkish military (TSK). Most recently on October 28th (28/10/18) when the TSK started shelling it from within Turkey.
On November 21st (21/11/18) a HAQ/MIT detonated an IED in Shadaddi. It was this attack which killed four members of the Ayaish. HAQ/MIT released a statement dedicating the attack to Sheikh al-Huwadi. In an attempt to blame the SDF for the killing and present themselves as the defenders of the local Arab tribes.
Prior to announcing their name change HAQ/MIT released fake statements claiming to be from the Waldat, Sabkhat, Hulaysay, Fidan and Emirat Tribes on November 3rd (3/11/18). These fake declarations blamed the SDF for the killing of Sheikh al-Huwadi. They went on to call for all of Shangri-La's tribes to break away from the SDF so Raqqa can be returned to its people. By which they mean HAQ/MIT.
On November 3rd (3/11/18) the Waldat and Sabkhat Tribes issued statements confirming the HAQ/MIT statements in their name were fakes. On November 15th (15/11/18) the al-Faris Tribe went one step further issuing a statement praising the SDF and condemning Turkey for trying to cause instablity.
HAQ/MIT's attempts to sow discord went so far as to claim an attack which never happened. They entirely falsely claimed to have killed three members of the SDF in Manbij on November 20th (20/11/18).
HAQ/MIT went on to claim that this gun attack targeted a secret meeting between the SDF and Syrian government officials. Something they'd completely invented in an attempt to portray the SDF as allied with the Syrian government.
Buoyed by their first military victory since February 2017 ISIL are not just lashing out from the Hajin pocket against the SDF in Shangri-La. They are also lashing out against the Syrians on the south bank of the Euphrates.
On November 2nd (2/11/18) ISIL attack the Syrians at al-Jalaa. A town sitting directly across the Euphrates from Abu Hassan. ISIL attacked it for a second time on November 8th (8/11/18).
The following day on November 9th (9/11/18) ISIL were able to use a roadside IED to attack a Syrian convoy in al-Salihiyah. A town sitting just across the Euphrates from Bahrah.
These attacks have been accompanied by periodic ISIL artillery fire on Syrian positions along the south bank of the Euphrates. Particularly around Abu Kamal.
The Syrians have periodically responded in kind.
20:30 on 29/11/18 (UK date).
Thursday 29 November 2018
Monday 26 November 2018
Operation Featherweight: Month 54, Week 4, Day 1.
Within the conflict in Syria there are currently five main areas;
Shangri-La, Garvaghy Road, Afrin Canton, the Sudetenland and Central Syria.
Keeping track of events across these areas is a time consuming process. The Sudetenland is particularly difficult. As a result this two week gap between my posts has not been spent with me going on holiday. I've been using it to clear the backlog that built up over things like the Khashoggi affair and the US midterm elections.
Also I have to raise a complaint about the numerous US sanctions on Russia. While most people only notice these when they're announced on the news they are now causing me practical problems on a daily basis.
In order to map the conflict I often use Wikimapia. Rather like Wikipedia this allows Internet users to annote Google Maps and satellite images. The problem is that Wikimapia was founded by private citizens in Russia in 2006. US sanctions on Russia mean that Google have been forced to cut off access by Wikimapia to Google Maps.
This is hardly a terminal problem. However things which would have taken me a couple of seconds now take me 10-15 seconds. When you're doing something a few dozen times a day those extra few seconds quickly add up.
Due to the long gap I have to pick up where I left off.
Shangri-La: This is located in north-east Syria. It is essentially everything to the north-east of the Euphrates River. If you look at a map of Syria the Euphrates River is the big blue line.
Shangri-La has long been the main battleground between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) coalition.
The largest element of the SDF coalition is the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). They operate alongside Assyrian/Syriac Christian, Turkmen and Arab Muslim forces.
The Arab element which makes up around 50% of the SDF is comprised of both elements of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) and local tribes indigenous to north-eastern Syria.
The SDF also contains a small International Brigade made up of foreign volunteers.
The SDF is supposedly supported by the US-led coalition, Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). With air power, Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and increasingly conventional ground forces.
The boundaries of Shangri-La were properly established by an SDF operation codenamed; "Operation: Cizre Storm." This was launched in September 2017.
Cizre Storm saw the SDF advance from positions already under their control. Essentially an imaginary line in the desert between the town of Madan on the banks of the Euphrates and the town of Shadaddi.
From this Madan-Shadaddi Line the SDF advanced first to the Khobar River and then to the Syria/Iraq border. Fighting and liberating territory from ISIL as they went.
This was done on two main axis;
One which advanced along the northern bank of the Euphrates liberating the towns and population centres which sit on the river bank.
A second that advanced across the desert area to the north of the Euphrates.
On November 25th 2017 (25/11/17) the SDF reached the Syria/Iraq border. In the area of the Buwarah Salt Pan.
On February 22nd 2018 (22/2/18) the SDF liberated the town of al-Bahrah. This sits around 40km (25 miles) north-west of where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria.
This left ISIL in control of a group of 10 towns stretching across roughly 35km (20 mile) along the north bank of the Euphrates. Centred around the town of Hajin this is known as the; "Hajin Pocket."
On March 6th 2018 (6/5/18) SDF operations against ISIL in Shangri-La had to be suspended. Due to Turkey's invasion of Afrin Canton. An area under SDF control in the north-west of Syria.
On May 1st (1/5/18) the SDF launched a new anti-ISIL operation within Shangri-La codenamed; "Operation: Round Up." This was intended to target and liberate the Hajin Pocket.
This operation began with two concurrent phases.
The first phase focused on the roughly 35km (20 mile) area on the north bank of the Euphrates still under ISIL control. This stretches from the town of Hajin in the north down to Baghuz Tahtani in the south, where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria.
Its objective was to isolate these remaining towns. Both from each other and from the Syria/Iraq border.
This was achieved by the SDF reaching the banks of the Euphrates to the south-east of Hajin and just to the north-east of Abu Hassan on May 4th (4/5/18). Hajin sits around 35km (20 miles) north-west of the Syria/Iraq border while Abu Hassan sits around 8km (5 miles) south-east of Hajin.
At the same time the SDF advanced on the towns of Baghuz Tahtani and Baghuz Fawqani. These sit adjacent to each other stretching around 6km (3 miles) north-west of the Iraq/Syria border. By May 14th (14/5/18) the SDF had liberated Baghuz Tahtani and surrounded Baghuz Fawqani.
The second phase of Round Up which was launched at the same time focused on clearing ISIL from desert areas to the north of the Euphrates River.
Essentially a collection of towns, villages and farms known as the Wadi ash-Shawkh Agricultural Area. Located on the Syria/Iraq border around 240km (145 miles) north of Baghuz Tahtani on the Euphrates River.
On August 7th (7/8/18) the SDF forces who had conducted phase two of Round Up arrived at the al-Omar Oil & Gas Field linking up with the SDF forces who had conducted phase one of Round Up. As a result both of the opening phases of Round Up were declared to be at an end.
On September 11th (11/9/18) phase three of Operation: Round Up was launched. It's objective was to completely defeat ISIL in the Hajin Pocket.
Initially this operation made good progress.
On September 20th (20/9/18) the SDF completely liberated Baghuz Fawqani.
On September 25th (25/9/18) the SDF completely liberated al-Shalja. This sits directly to the north of Baghuz Fawqani.
Directly to the west of al-Shalja you have the town of as-Safafinah. To the west of as-Safafinah you have the town of al-Marashidah.
On October 2nd (2/10/18) the SDF entered Safafinah itself. On October 7th (7/10/18) the SDF entered Marashidah. On October 10th (10/10/18) there were reports that the SDF had managed to liberate all of Marashidah.
Unfortunately the weather then turned against the SDF. This poor weather and loss of visibility for CJTFOIR aircraft allowed ISIL to launch a five day counter-offensive.
This forced the SDF to withdraw entirely from Safafinah and Marashidah. ISIL were then able to cut the SDF supply lines between al-Shalja and Baghuz Fawqani. Leading to heavy fighting in both al-Shalja and Baghuz Fawqani.
ISIL were also able to break through the SDF lines at Sousse. Which sits directly to the north of al-Shalja. From there ISIL made a break for the Syria/Iraq border where they clashed with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Perhaps most alarmingly ISIL were able to break through the SDF's lines between Hajin and Bahrah. This allowed them to reach the Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camp just outside Bahrah. There ISIL were able to kidnap roughly 100 families which works out at around 700 civilian hostages.
On October 15th (15/10/18) the bad weather lifted. This allowed the SDF to quickly recover all lost positions meaning it was as if the ISIL counter-attack had never happened.
On October 25th (25/10/18) bad weather set in again. This allowed ISIL to launch another large, coordinated and highly effective counter-offensive. Across all of the Hajin pocket.
By October 28th (28/10/18) the SDF had been forced out of all of its positions in the Hajin pocket. Wiping out all gains of the previous 47 days of fighting.
Turkey saw this as an opportunity to start shelling SDF positions in the north of Shangri-La amid threats of invasion. As happened with the Cizre Storm operation and the Turkish invasion of Afrin Canton in March 2018 this forced the SDF to suspend the Round Up operation.
Unfortunately the SDF weren't just forced from the positions they'd gained in the Hajin pocket during phase three of Operation: Round Up.
The SDF were also forced from positions along the Syria/Iraq border which they had gained during phase two of Operation: Round Up. Essentially a network of thirty positions stretching from Mount Baghuz in the south to the Mallah Salt Pan to the north.
Here the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and particularly the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) element came to the SDF's aid. Initially they were able to use artillery stationed in Iraq to create a no-go zone along this border area. To put it bluntly this is an area they can saturate with artillery shells meaning nothing and no-one can enter it and survive.
Then on November 6th (6/11/18) Iraqi PMF units entered Syria to take control of the positions abandoned by the SDF. This could create a whole new set of problems for the SDF.
The Popular Mobilisation Force is an umbrella term for more than 60 different Iraqi militias. The ideology, competence and allegiances of these different militias can vary widely.
One militia that used to make up the PMF was the Sinjar Protection Units (YBS). This is an Iraqi Kurdish Yezidi militia formed by the Syrian YPG. After they crossed the border into Iraq to climb Mount Shingal/Sinjar to rescue victims of the Yezidi genocide in the summer of 2014.
As a result the YBS obviously has quite good connections and relationships with the YPG and the SDF. This is why Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded the YBS be removed from the PMF umbrella under threat of a Turkish invasion of Iraq.
However many of the PMF militias are much closer in ideology to the Badr Army. This is a Shia Arab militia that was formed in 1982. By Iraqis who wanted to fight for Iran against Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.
I don't know the specific PMF militia that crossed into Syria on November 6th (6/11/18). However I do know that the Kata'ib Hezbollah militia that been particularly active in the area. Notably crossing into Syria to help Syrian forces liberate al-Bukamal/Abu Kamal across the Euphrates from Baghuz Fawqani in the winter of 2017.
Kata'ib Hezbollah are a Shia Arab militia that is very closely linked to both the Badr Army and Iran. In fact one of their senior leaders Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is a former member of the Badr Army and an adviser to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Quds Force. It is the Quds Force that arm and train Kata'ib Hezbollah.
Iran are also a longstanding ally of Syria. At Syria's invitation Iranian forces including the Quds Force have fought against ISIL and other terrorist groups in the country. As such I think it is fair to assume that PMF militias like the Badr Army and Kata'ib Hezbollah enjoy better connections and relations with the Syrians than they do the SDF.
Up until now Syria and its allies have been extremely reasonable about the activities of the SDF. Although no-one is saying it out loud Syria has pretty much given the SDF its tacit approval to establish Shangri-La to the north-east of the Euphrates. An area that includes a number of valuable Syrian oil fields.
That though could be about to change.
The indications are that the US and CJTFOIR will not be willing to protect the SDF from a Turkish invasion and occupation of Shangri-La. Just as the US and CJTFOIR were unwilling to protect the SDF from a Turkish invasion and occupation of Afrin Canton or the Turkish invasion and occupation of Garvaghy Road.
If Turkey is permitted to invade Shangri-La then Syria really has no option other than to also attack Shangri-La. In order to secure as much territory as possible in order to stop it being seized by Turkey.
The presence of PMF militia's along the Syrian side of the Syria/Iraq border to the north of the Euphrates opens up a possible route for the Syrians into Shangri-La. However I think it's likely that Syria's reasonableness will continue. Provided the US and CJTFOIR can remove the Turkish threat.
How the defeat of October 28th (28/10/18) has affected the SDF's control over the area to the north of the Hajin Pocket is harder to assess.
This area is completely unpopulated desert. The only landmarks and navigation aids are things like salt pans. The area is dominated by the vast Omar Oil & Gas Field. Roughly 2,100kmsq (1,200 milesq) in area the Omar Oil & Gas Field is actually made up of around 14 sub-fields.
The SDF control this area with a network of essentially small bases known as Control Points and positions. Some of these can be extremely small made up of a platoon of between 16 and 44 troops dug in with a handful of vehicles.
Particularly in periods of poor visibility. Such as at night or during the bad weather the area is currently experiencing it is easy for ISIL to sneak between these Control Points unnoticed.
In the grand scheme of things ISIL's recent military victory over the SDF is small and insignificant. However it is the first military victory ISIL have achieved since February 2017. I think it's the first ever military victory ISIL have achieved against the SDF.
As a result the group have been hugely energised and have been mounting widespread attacks against the SDF along the borders of the Hajin pocket and beyond.
On November 4th (4/11/18) ISIL launched a sustained attack against SDF lines between Bahrah and Hajin. This resulted in 12 members of the SDF being killed.
At the same time ISIL launched attacks against SDF positions in the town of Diban and Jarnof Oil Field. Diban sits around 40km (25 miles) north-west of Bahrah. One of the sub-fields in the Omar Oil & Gas Field the Jarnof field sits around 15km (10 miles) outside of Diban.
On November 8th (8/11/18) ISIL attacked SDF positions in the Tanak Oil Field. Again one of the sub-fields in the Omar Oil & Gas Field this sits around 20km (10 miles) north of Bahrah. In repelling this attack the SDF killed some 20 ISIL fighters.
Alarmingly there have also been a number of clashes reported between ISIL and the SDF in the area between the Hajin pocket and the ar-Rawdah Salt Pan. This sits around 90km (50 miles) north of the Hajin pocket. Crucially it also sits around 20km (10 miles) north-west of the Buwarah Salt Pan. Which the SDF liberated back on November 25th 2017 (25/11/17).
However rather than being evidence of ISIL recapturing the area these clashes seem to be the result of ISIL infiltrating through the gaps in the SDF's Control Points.
Therefore I think the SDF's battlefield priority should be reestablishing the containment of ISIL within the Hajin pocket. Both by reinforcing the network of Control Points to the north and taking back control of the border positions from the Iraqi PMF.
As I've said before once that containment of ISIL is back in place the SDF should then wait. Either until the spring when the weather improves or until CJTFOIR equip them with anti-tank weapons to combat ISIL's Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (S-VBIED) attacks from the ground.
18:20 on 26/11/18 (UK date)
Shangri-La, Garvaghy Road, Afrin Canton, the Sudetenland and Central Syria.
Keeping track of events across these areas is a time consuming process. The Sudetenland is particularly difficult. As a result this two week gap between my posts has not been spent with me going on holiday. I've been using it to clear the backlog that built up over things like the Khashoggi affair and the US midterm elections.
Also I have to raise a complaint about the numerous US sanctions on Russia. While most people only notice these when they're announced on the news they are now causing me practical problems on a daily basis.
In order to map the conflict I often use Wikimapia. Rather like Wikipedia this allows Internet users to annote Google Maps and satellite images. The problem is that Wikimapia was founded by private citizens in Russia in 2006. US sanctions on Russia mean that Google have been forced to cut off access by Wikimapia to Google Maps.
This is hardly a terminal problem. However things which would have taken me a couple of seconds now take me 10-15 seconds. When you're doing something a few dozen times a day those extra few seconds quickly add up.
Due to the long gap I have to pick up where I left off.
Shangri-La: This is located in north-east Syria. It is essentially everything to the north-east of the Euphrates River. If you look at a map of Syria the Euphrates River is the big blue line.
Shangri-La has long been the main battleground between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) coalition.
The largest element of the SDF coalition is the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). They operate alongside Assyrian/Syriac Christian, Turkmen and Arab Muslim forces.
The Arab element which makes up around 50% of the SDF is comprised of both elements of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) and local tribes indigenous to north-eastern Syria.
The SDF also contains a small International Brigade made up of foreign volunteers.
The SDF is supposedly supported by the US-led coalition, Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). With air power, Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and increasingly conventional ground forces.
The boundaries of Shangri-La were properly established by an SDF operation codenamed; "Operation: Cizre Storm." This was launched in September 2017.
Cizre Storm saw the SDF advance from positions already under their control. Essentially an imaginary line in the desert between the town of Madan on the banks of the Euphrates and the town of Shadaddi.
From this Madan-Shadaddi Line the SDF advanced first to the Khobar River and then to the Syria/Iraq border. Fighting and liberating territory from ISIL as they went.
This was done on two main axis;
One which advanced along the northern bank of the Euphrates liberating the towns and population centres which sit on the river bank.
A second that advanced across the desert area to the north of the Euphrates.
On November 25th 2017 (25/11/17) the SDF reached the Syria/Iraq border. In the area of the Buwarah Salt Pan.
On February 22nd 2018 (22/2/18) the SDF liberated the town of al-Bahrah. This sits around 40km (25 miles) north-west of where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria.
This left ISIL in control of a group of 10 towns stretching across roughly 35km (20 mile) along the north bank of the Euphrates. Centred around the town of Hajin this is known as the; "Hajin Pocket."
On March 6th 2018 (6/5/18) SDF operations against ISIL in Shangri-La had to be suspended. Due to Turkey's invasion of Afrin Canton. An area under SDF control in the north-west of Syria.
On May 1st (1/5/18) the SDF launched a new anti-ISIL operation within Shangri-La codenamed; "Operation: Round Up." This was intended to target and liberate the Hajin Pocket.
This operation began with two concurrent phases.
The first phase focused on the roughly 35km (20 mile) area on the north bank of the Euphrates still under ISIL control. This stretches from the town of Hajin in the north down to Baghuz Tahtani in the south, where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria.
Its objective was to isolate these remaining towns. Both from each other and from the Syria/Iraq border.
This was achieved by the SDF reaching the banks of the Euphrates to the south-east of Hajin and just to the north-east of Abu Hassan on May 4th (4/5/18). Hajin sits around 35km (20 miles) north-west of the Syria/Iraq border while Abu Hassan sits around 8km (5 miles) south-east of Hajin.
At the same time the SDF advanced on the towns of Baghuz Tahtani and Baghuz Fawqani. These sit adjacent to each other stretching around 6km (3 miles) north-west of the Iraq/Syria border. By May 14th (14/5/18) the SDF had liberated Baghuz Tahtani and surrounded Baghuz Fawqani.
The second phase of Round Up which was launched at the same time focused on clearing ISIL from desert areas to the north of the Euphrates River.
Essentially a collection of towns, villages and farms known as the Wadi ash-Shawkh Agricultural Area. Located on the Syria/Iraq border around 240km (145 miles) north of Baghuz Tahtani on the Euphrates River.
On August 7th (7/8/18) the SDF forces who had conducted phase two of Round Up arrived at the al-Omar Oil & Gas Field linking up with the SDF forces who had conducted phase one of Round Up. As a result both of the opening phases of Round Up were declared to be at an end.
On September 11th (11/9/18) phase three of Operation: Round Up was launched. It's objective was to completely defeat ISIL in the Hajin Pocket.
Initially this operation made good progress.
On September 20th (20/9/18) the SDF completely liberated Baghuz Fawqani.
On September 25th (25/9/18) the SDF completely liberated al-Shalja. This sits directly to the north of Baghuz Fawqani.
Directly to the west of al-Shalja you have the town of as-Safafinah. To the west of as-Safafinah you have the town of al-Marashidah.
On October 2nd (2/10/18) the SDF entered Safafinah itself. On October 7th (7/10/18) the SDF entered Marashidah. On October 10th (10/10/18) there were reports that the SDF had managed to liberate all of Marashidah.
Unfortunately the weather then turned against the SDF. This poor weather and loss of visibility for CJTFOIR aircraft allowed ISIL to launch a five day counter-offensive.
This forced the SDF to withdraw entirely from Safafinah and Marashidah. ISIL were then able to cut the SDF supply lines between al-Shalja and Baghuz Fawqani. Leading to heavy fighting in both al-Shalja and Baghuz Fawqani.
ISIL were also able to break through the SDF lines at Sousse. Which sits directly to the north of al-Shalja. From there ISIL made a break for the Syria/Iraq border where they clashed with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Perhaps most alarmingly ISIL were able to break through the SDF's lines between Hajin and Bahrah. This allowed them to reach the Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camp just outside Bahrah. There ISIL were able to kidnap roughly 100 families which works out at around 700 civilian hostages.
On October 15th (15/10/18) the bad weather lifted. This allowed the SDF to quickly recover all lost positions meaning it was as if the ISIL counter-attack had never happened.
On October 25th (25/10/18) bad weather set in again. This allowed ISIL to launch another large, coordinated and highly effective counter-offensive. Across all of the Hajin pocket.
By October 28th (28/10/18) the SDF had been forced out of all of its positions in the Hajin pocket. Wiping out all gains of the previous 47 days of fighting.
Turkey saw this as an opportunity to start shelling SDF positions in the north of Shangri-La amid threats of invasion. As happened with the Cizre Storm operation and the Turkish invasion of Afrin Canton in March 2018 this forced the SDF to suspend the Round Up operation.
Unfortunately the SDF weren't just forced from the positions they'd gained in the Hajin pocket during phase three of Operation: Round Up.
The SDF were also forced from positions along the Syria/Iraq border which they had gained during phase two of Operation: Round Up. Essentially a network of thirty positions stretching from Mount Baghuz in the south to the Mallah Salt Pan to the north.
Here the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and particularly the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) element came to the SDF's aid. Initially they were able to use artillery stationed in Iraq to create a no-go zone along this border area. To put it bluntly this is an area they can saturate with artillery shells meaning nothing and no-one can enter it and survive.
Then on November 6th (6/11/18) Iraqi PMF units entered Syria to take control of the positions abandoned by the SDF. This could create a whole new set of problems for the SDF.
The Popular Mobilisation Force is an umbrella term for more than 60 different Iraqi militias. The ideology, competence and allegiances of these different militias can vary widely.
One militia that used to make up the PMF was the Sinjar Protection Units (YBS). This is an Iraqi Kurdish Yezidi militia formed by the Syrian YPG. After they crossed the border into Iraq to climb Mount Shingal/Sinjar to rescue victims of the Yezidi genocide in the summer of 2014.
As a result the YBS obviously has quite good connections and relationships with the YPG and the SDF. This is why Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded the YBS be removed from the PMF umbrella under threat of a Turkish invasion of Iraq.
However many of the PMF militias are much closer in ideology to the Badr Army. This is a Shia Arab militia that was formed in 1982. By Iraqis who wanted to fight for Iran against Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.
I don't know the specific PMF militia that crossed into Syria on November 6th (6/11/18). However I do know that the Kata'ib Hezbollah militia that been particularly active in the area. Notably crossing into Syria to help Syrian forces liberate al-Bukamal/Abu Kamal across the Euphrates from Baghuz Fawqani in the winter of 2017.
Kata'ib Hezbollah are a Shia Arab militia that is very closely linked to both the Badr Army and Iran. In fact one of their senior leaders Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is a former member of the Badr Army and an adviser to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Quds Force. It is the Quds Force that arm and train Kata'ib Hezbollah.
Iran are also a longstanding ally of Syria. At Syria's invitation Iranian forces including the Quds Force have fought against ISIL and other terrorist groups in the country. As such I think it is fair to assume that PMF militias like the Badr Army and Kata'ib Hezbollah enjoy better connections and relations with the Syrians than they do the SDF.
Up until now Syria and its allies have been extremely reasonable about the activities of the SDF. Although no-one is saying it out loud Syria has pretty much given the SDF its tacit approval to establish Shangri-La to the north-east of the Euphrates. An area that includes a number of valuable Syrian oil fields.
That though could be about to change.
The indications are that the US and CJTFOIR will not be willing to protect the SDF from a Turkish invasion and occupation of Shangri-La. Just as the US and CJTFOIR were unwilling to protect the SDF from a Turkish invasion and occupation of Afrin Canton or the Turkish invasion and occupation of Garvaghy Road.
If Turkey is permitted to invade Shangri-La then Syria really has no option other than to also attack Shangri-La. In order to secure as much territory as possible in order to stop it being seized by Turkey.
The presence of PMF militia's along the Syrian side of the Syria/Iraq border to the north of the Euphrates opens up a possible route for the Syrians into Shangri-La. However I think it's likely that Syria's reasonableness will continue. Provided the US and CJTFOIR can remove the Turkish threat.
How the defeat of October 28th (28/10/18) has affected the SDF's control over the area to the north of the Hajin Pocket is harder to assess.
This area is completely unpopulated desert. The only landmarks and navigation aids are things like salt pans. The area is dominated by the vast Omar Oil & Gas Field. Roughly 2,100kmsq (1,200 milesq) in area the Omar Oil & Gas Field is actually made up of around 14 sub-fields.
The SDF control this area with a network of essentially small bases known as Control Points and positions. Some of these can be extremely small made up of a platoon of between 16 and 44 troops dug in with a handful of vehicles.
Particularly in periods of poor visibility. Such as at night or during the bad weather the area is currently experiencing it is easy for ISIL to sneak between these Control Points unnoticed.
In the grand scheme of things ISIL's recent military victory over the SDF is small and insignificant. However it is the first military victory ISIL have achieved since February 2017. I think it's the first ever military victory ISIL have achieved against the SDF.
As a result the group have been hugely energised and have been mounting widespread attacks against the SDF along the borders of the Hajin pocket and beyond.
On November 4th (4/11/18) ISIL launched a sustained attack against SDF lines between Bahrah and Hajin. This resulted in 12 members of the SDF being killed.
At the same time ISIL launched attacks against SDF positions in the town of Diban and Jarnof Oil Field. Diban sits around 40km (25 miles) north-west of Bahrah. One of the sub-fields in the Omar Oil & Gas Field the Jarnof field sits around 15km (10 miles) outside of Diban.
On November 8th (8/11/18) ISIL attacked SDF positions in the Tanak Oil Field. Again one of the sub-fields in the Omar Oil & Gas Field this sits around 20km (10 miles) north of Bahrah. In repelling this attack the SDF killed some 20 ISIL fighters.
Alarmingly there have also been a number of clashes reported between ISIL and the SDF in the area between the Hajin pocket and the ar-Rawdah Salt Pan. This sits around 90km (50 miles) north of the Hajin pocket. Crucially it also sits around 20km (10 miles) north-west of the Buwarah Salt Pan. Which the SDF liberated back on November 25th 2017 (25/11/17).
However rather than being evidence of ISIL recapturing the area these clashes seem to be the result of ISIL infiltrating through the gaps in the SDF's Control Points.
Therefore I think the SDF's battlefield priority should be reestablishing the containment of ISIL within the Hajin pocket. Both by reinforcing the network of Control Points to the north and taking back control of the border positions from the Iraqi PMF.
As I've said before once that containment of ISIL is back in place the SDF should then wait. Either until the spring when the weather improves or until CJTFOIR equip them with anti-tank weapons to combat ISIL's Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (S-VBIED) attacks from the ground.
18:20 on 26/11/18 (UK date)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)