This should be read as a direct continuation of yesterday's post; https://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/operation-featherweight-month-43-week-3_29.html
Shangri-La is not the only area of Syria under SDF control. They also
control a roughly 2,400kmsq (1,400 milesq) area in the north-west of
Syria. Centred around the city of Afrin this has been designated; "The
Afrin Canton."
Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long
wanted to annex part or all of Syria as part of a New Ottoman Empire. To
this end he has backed various terror groups including ISIL and Al
Qaeda to fight against the Syrians.
One of the key groups Erdogan has backed at the United Turkmen Army
(UTA). Sometimes known as the Syrian Turkmen Brigades (STB) this is the
paramilitary wing of the fascist Turkish Nationalist Movement Party
(MHP) known as the Grey Wolves. Within Syria they operate as an
irregular and therefore illegal branch of the Turkish military.
In August 2016 Erdogan sent regular Turkish forces to invade and occupy a
roughly 100km (60 mile) stretch of northern Syria between Azaz/Kilis in
the west and the Euphrates River in the east. The purpose was to stop
the SDF linking Shangri-La with Afrin Canton cutting off ISIL and Al
Qaeda's supply lines with Turkey in the process. As such this area has
been designated; "Garvaghy Road."
Within Garvaghy Road and the area to the south of Afrin Canton Erdogan
has been steadily absorbing fragments of the long defunct FSA into the
UTA. On October 25th 2017 (25/10/17) Erdogan attempted to give the UTA
legitimacy by renaming them the Syrian National Army. Despite the fact
they're fighting Syria's national army.
The SDF's success against particularly ISIL puts them at odds with Erdogan.
On January 15th 2018 (15/1/18) the UTA and regular Turkish forces within Turkey started intensely shelling Afrin Canton.
Amid continuous shelling Erdogan announced on January 19th 2018 (19/1/18)
that he would be sending regular Turkish forces to invade and occupy
Afrin Canton. This announcement was apparently coordinated with ISIL's
attacks against the SDF at Gharanji and Shafah.
On January 20th 2018 (20/1/18) Erdogan launched his invasion of Afrin Canton.
The first stage of the operation was massive Turkish airstrikes across Afrin Canton. Using 72 strike aircraft this is said to be the largest air attack the Turkish military has ever undertaken.
On January 21st 2018 (21/1/18) the ground phase of the operation was launched.
This began with an attack by regular Turkish forces and the irregular UTA on the west of Afrin Canton.
In this area the key navigation point is the town of Rajo. This is located around 25km (15 miles) north-west of Afrin City and around 5km (2 miles) from Syria's western border with Turkey.
However Erdogan's forces did not attack Rajo directly. Instead they launch a two pronged or "branched" attack to the north of Rajo.
The northern branch launched from Mount Pomza which sits on the Turkish side of the border. It attempted to capture Mount Qarah Baba which sits on the Syrian side of the border roughly 30km (20 miles) north-west of Rajo.
The southern branch attempted to capture a ridge known as Point 740. This sits around 12km (7 miles) west of Rajo just some 5km (2 miles) inside Syria's western border with Turkey.
By January 22nd 2018 (22/1/18) Erdogan's invasion had expanded to include an attack by regular Turkish forces and the UTA on the north of Afrin Canton.
In this area the key navigation point is the town of Bulbul. This sits around 30km (20 miles) north of Afrin City and around 20km (12 miles) north-east of Rajo. Bulbul sits at the foot of Mount Domrik which straddles the border between Syria and Turkey.
However again Erdogan's forces are not attack Bulbul or Mount Domrik directly. Instead they are focusing their efforts on a roughly 10km (6 mile) stretch of border to east.
On January 23rd 2018 (23/1/18) Erdogan's invasion expanded to include attacks by regular Turkish forces and the UTA to the east of Afrin Canton from Garvaghy Road.
Here the two key navigation points are the towns of Azaz and Marea. Together they mark the boundary between the SDF's Afrin Canton and Turkish occupied Garvaghy Road.
Azaz is located around 20km (12 miles) north-east of Afrin City and around 35km (20 miles) south-east of Rajo. From Azaz Erdogan's forces have been attempting to capture Mount Barsaya located around 5km (3 miles) to the north-west.
Marea is located around 30km (20 miles) east of Afrin City and around 20km (12 miles) south-east of Azaz. From Marea Erdogan's forces have been attempt to capture the town of Tal Rifat located around 10km (6 miles) to the south-west.
Directly to the south of Afrin Canton you have what is known as the; "Atmeh-Salwa Access Area."
This is territory occupied by Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate The Support Front/Jabhat al-Nusra who in an effort to disguise their links to Al Qaeda changed their name to The Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in June 2017.
Despite being under Al Qaeda control the Atmeh-Salwa Access Area is home to 10 control points or small bases belonging to regular Turkish forces.
In fact one event that may have triggered Erdogan's attack on Afrin Canton is that on January 12th (12/1/18) Turkish troops with the support of Al Qaeda attempted to establish a further control point close to al-Eis which is around 25km (15 miles) south-east of the Atmeh-Salwa Access Area. They were shelled by Syrian forces and several Turkish troops were wounded.
On January 24th 2018 (24/1/18) Erdogan's invasion of Afrin Canton was expanded to include an attack by regular Turkish forces and Al Qaeda on the south of Afrin Canton.
Here the two key navigation points are the city of Cindirese/Jandairis which sits around 20km (12 miles) south-west of Afrin City and the town of Salwa which sits around 10km (6 miles) south-east of Cindirese just inside the Atmeh-Salwa Access Area.
In this area Erdogan's forces have been attempting to capture Mount Qalat. This sits around 5km (3 miles) north of Salwa.
After 10 days of what has been extremely fierce fighting Erdogan's forces have yet to significantly advance from those starting positions. The only confirmed gain by those forces has been Point 740 a mere 5km (3 miles) inside of Afrin Canton.
Turkish media however has reported a number of great successes.
Some of these reports are simply false. For example just today (30/1/18) the state-run Anadolu news agency reported that Erdogan's forces had captured the villages of Sati Ushaghi & Suleiman Khali. These are located some 15km (10 miles) east of Rajo. For Erdogan's forces to have advanced that far overnight the SDF's defences would have had to collapse completely. That is the sort of thing that people would notice.
However what is more common is that Erdogan's forces have attacked an area making short-term gains. The SDF have then responded with a counter-offensive which has completely forced Erdogan's forces out of the area. A prime example of this would be Mount Barsaya.
On January 24th 2018 (24/1/18) Erdogan's forces announced that they'd captured Mount Barsaya. The SDF then launched a counter-offensive and had recaptured all of the mountain by that evening.
On January 28th 2018 (28/1/18) Erdogan's forces announced they'd captured Mount Barsaya and invited selected members of the international media to inspect the peak. The SDF then launched a counter-offensive and had recaptured the mountain by that evening.
Apart from resisting the assaults by Erdogan's forces the SDF have also been able to conduct a number of nighttime raids of their own.
On January 24th 2018 (24/1/18) they raided a regular Turkish military base at Marea. They succeeded in killing three regular Turkish soldiers and destroying an number of armoured vehicles.
On January 27th 2018 (27/1/18) the SDF conducted coordinated raids against eight regular Turkish military bases at Tawis, Azaz, Marea, Kafra and Tal Mated all to the east of Afrin Canton. They killed a number of regular Turkish soldiers and destroyed armoured vehicles and artillery positions.
Alongside a lack of progress on the ground Erdogan's forces have been suffering a high rate of casualties.
So far in the operation the SDF have destroyed seven regular Turkish military tanks. This included by Avesta Khabur a 20 year old member of the SDF's elite Anti-Terrorism Unit (YAT). On January 27th 2018 (27/1/18) she single-handedly placed an explosive charge on an advancing Turkish tank destroying it. Sadly she was killed in the explosion.
The type of tank regular Turkish forces use is the German made Leopard II. This has a crew of four. In all of the seven tanks Turkey has lost so far all crew members have been killed. That gives the regular Turkish military a deathtoll of 28 from its losses of tanks alone.
Over the night of January 25th (25/1/18) Erdogan's forces attempted attacks on the east of Afrin Canton. Those attacks were repelled of the SDF and seven regular Turkish soldiers were killed.
Photographs of those dead Turkish soldiers rapidly appeared online challenging Erdogan's claim that only two Turkish soldiers have been killed in the entire operation. Erdogan's response was to block websites providing information about the Syria conflict across Turkey.
The Turkish deathtoll is such that it is rumoured that in the last few days Turkey has attempted to open negotiations with the SDF.
This lack of progress by Erdogan's forces or perhaps more accurately the deluge of false information from the Turkish media puts me in something of a difficult position.
This attack on Afrin Canton seems to have been launched only because Erdogan lost a bet. He gambled that the threat of an attack on Afrin Canton would be enough to get Russia to pressure Syria to stop an offensive of its own against Al Qaeda to the south of the Atmeh-Salwa Access Area. He was wrong.
In diplomacy normally what you do in a situation like this is offer a way for someone to quietly back out of a mistake they've made while avoiding embarrassment in the eyes of their domestic supporters.
As such I can't help but think it would be better for me to not point out that almost all of the claims made by the Turkish media are entirely false. Then when they've falsely reported enough 'victories' Erdogan can declare the operation a success and end it without anything actually changing on the ground.
Erdogan himself however does not seem keen to take up this option. Despite his forces lack of progress Erdogan continues to make aggressive statements about expanding the operation beyond Afrin Canton to Shangri-La.
For all his bluster though signs of desperation are clearly starting to show.
Domestically Erdogan has placed 15 Turkish towns and villages under curfew to prevent protests. Erdogan has also prosecuted members of the opposition People's Democratic Party (HDP) for criticising the attack on Afrin Canton. Just today (30/1/18) eight members of the executive committee of the Turkish Medial Association have been arrested over their refusal to support Erdogan's aggression.
The tactics used by the Turkish military have also become more wild and reckless;
On January 25th 2018 (25/1/18) they conducted airstrikes against Manbij and Tal Abyad/Gire Spi. These are located within Shangri-La some 100km (60 miles) and 200km (120 miles) east of Afrin Canton.
In this area the US, France and the UK has Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and regular forces based with the US alone having some 2,000 troops stationed there. These Turkish airstrikes create a very real risk that those troops will be killed or injured giving the CJTFOIR nations no option to intervene.
In their effort to cling on to Mount Barsaya on January 28th 2018 (28/1/18) the Turkish air force deployed Napalm against the SDF's advance. Something which is wholly illegal under international law.
Also on January 28th (28/1/18) the Turkish air force conducted multiple airstrikes targeting the Maydanki Dam. Those airstrikes were repeated on January 29th 2018 (29/1/18).
Located around 15km (10 miles) north of Afrin City the Maydanki Dam holds back the Maydanki Reservoir. If Erdogan's forces were to succeed in blowing up the dam it would send floodwater crashing down towards Afrin City killing potentially 200,000 civilians in the process.
In March 2017 the SDF were forced to undertake an operation to liberate the city of Tabqa on the Euphrates River from ISIL. The reason for this operation was to deny ISIL the opportunity to blow up Tabqa Dam in order to protect civilians living in the Euphrates River basin.
If Erdogan's forces continue to threaten Maydanki Dam then CJTFOIR have no option other than to deploy aircraft and air defence systems to totally eliminate that threat.
At around 18:50 on 30/1/18 (UK date) I'll have to pick this up later.
Edited at around 20:05 on 30/1/18 (UK date) to add;
Also on January 28th 2018 (28/1/18) Erdogan's forces conducted an airstrike against the Gubli. There they killed 13 civilians.
In their resistance of Erdogan's forces the SDF have also suffered significant casualties.
Although it is subject to change minute-by-minute, second-by-second the SDF's deathtoll currently stands at 34. Earlier in the week this was misreported as 43 by people who'd miscounted the 10 killed in the battle of Gharanji.
The Turkish military however are reporting that they have killed 649 members of the SDF.
Erdogan of course is prone to just completely making things up. However the large disconnect of 615 deaths raises concern that Erdogan's are simply listing civilians they have killed as members of the SDF.
Obviously any deaths or injuries the SDF sustain at the hands of Erdogan's forces undermine their ability to fight ISIL in the Euphrates River basin. Already the SDF has been forced to redeploy forces from the ongoing Cizre Storm operation to resist Erdogan's attacks.
On January 26th 2018 (26/1/18) British and American members of the SDF's International Brigade volunteered to be redeployed from Shangri-La to Afrin Canton.
On January 29th 2018 (29/1/18) the Assyrian/Syriac Military Council (MFS) element of the SDF also redeployed part of their force to Afrin Canton.
20:20 on 30/1/18 (UK date).
Tuesday 30 January 2018
Monday 29 January 2018
Operation Featherweight: Month 43, Week 3, Day 7.
In the summer of 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were at their most powerful.
They controlled large swathes of both Iraq and Syria. They'd declared themselves to be an Islamist Caliphate. Their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to be it's Caliph and the Syrian city of Raqqa to be its capital.
On November 3rd 2017 (3/11/17) Iraq was able to declare itself functionally liberated from ISIL. Although the group does retain a small clandestine presence in the country it no longer controls any areas or population centres.
Within Syria ISIL have been reduced to several small areas. In the border area between Homs, Hama and Idlib Provinces and the Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian Refugees in the suburbs of the Syrian capital Damascus.
ISIL are also allied with Army of Khalid Ibrahim al-Walid/Jaish Khalid Ibn al-Walid group. They operate in the south-western Daraa Province along the basin of the Yarmouk River close to the Golan Heights United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) zone.
The main focus though has been on ousting ISIL from their traditional heartland. This is in the north-west of the country centred around the Euphrates River basin.
In the latter half of 2017 the Syrians themselves have been working to removing ISIL from the areas on the south bank of the Euphrates River. This began in August 2017 with the liberation of as-Suknah. The Syrians then went on to liberate the major cities of Mayadin, Deir-ez-Zour City and Abu Kamal/Abu Bukamal.
Having cleared all the areas between those cities the Syrians were able to declare the south bank of the Euphrates completely liberated on December 5th 2017 (5/12/17).
The job of liberating the area north-east of the Euphrates has fallen to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD). This is a coalition of forces that was created in October 2015.
The largest element of the SDF coalition is the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). They operate alongside Assyrian/Syriac Christian, Turkmen and Arab Muslim forces. The Arab element which makes up around 50% of the SDF is comprised of both elements of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) and local tribes indigenous to north-eastern Syria.
The SDF is supported by the US-led coalition; Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) both with air power and Special Operations Forces (SOF's). The SDF also contains a small International Brigade made up of foreign volunteers.
Although the SDF did not formally come into being until October 2015 the YPG have been operating alongside fragments of the FSA since the Battle of Kobane in the winter of 2014/15.
In July 2015 this unnamed combined force liberated the town Tel Abyad/Gire Spi from ISIL. Tel Abyad sits right on the border between Syria and Turkey around 45km (25 miles) east of the Euphrates.
In August 2015 this precursor to the SDF liberated the city of Hasakah from both ISIL and Syrian forces. Hasakah sits around 60km (35 miles) west of the Syria/Iraq border and around 75km (45 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey.
The liberations of Tal Abyad and Hasakah put what became the SDF in control of a vast area of north-eastern Syria from the Euphrates to Syria's borders with Turkey and Iraq. For operational reasons this area which cuts across parts of several of Syria's provinces has been designated; "Shangri-La."
In November 2016 the SDF launched an operation codenamed; "Wrath of Euphrates." It's ultimate objective was to liberate the city of Raqqa from ISIL. However before it could do that it had to expand Shangri-La to Raqqa City.
In late November 2016 the SDF took up positions around 25km (15 miles) north of Raqqa having liberated around 600kmsq (360 milesq) of territory.
In early January 2017 the SDF took up positions at Lake Assad around 55km (30 miles) west of Raqqa. In the process the SDF liberated around 3,200kmsq (1.920 milesq) of territory along the eastern bank of the Euphrates from where the river enters Syria from Turkey.
In March 2017 the SDF took up positions at Karamah around 30km (20 miles) east of Raqqa. In the process the SDF liberated around 1000kmsq (600 milesq) of territory.
In early May the SDF liberated the town of Tabqa and took control of the Tabqa Dam. This sits on the southern banks of the Euphrates around 50km (30 miles) west of Raqqa. Tabqa Dam forms Lake Assad out of the Euphrates.
On June 6th 2017 (6/6/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate the city of Raqqa itself. Raqqa was fully liberated on October 19th 2017 (19/10/17).
While the operation to liberate Raqqa City was ongoing the SDF were also advancing south-east along the north bank of the Euphrates from Karamah.
On September 9th 2017 (9/9/17) the SDF launched a second operation along the Euphrates basin. This was codenamed; "Cizre Storm."
At the time Cizre Storm was launched the only area of Syria north-east of the Euphrates River which did not fall under SDF control as part of Shangri-La is a roughly 1500kmsq (860 milesq) area stretching across the Khobar River.
Roughly in the shape of a triangle this area had as its tip the point where the Euphrates River enters Iraq. It's base is an imaginary line stretching between the towns of Madan and al-Shadaddi.
Madan sits on the Euphrates River roughly 70km (40 miles) south-east of Raqqa and 110km (70 miles) north-west of Mayadin. Al-Shadaddi sits on the Khobar River roughly 150km (90 miles) east of Raqqa and roughly 130km (75 miles) north of Mayadin.
The objective of the Cizre Storm operation is to advance from the Madan-Shadaddi Line, across the Khobar River to where the Euphrates River enters Iraq. This will liberate the area from ISIL and properly establish Shangri-La with the Euphrates River as its southern boundary.
Although the technical aspects of the operation are more complex put simply it has two phases; To advance from the Madan-Shadaddi Line to the Khobar River. Then cross the river and advance to the Syria/Iraq border.
Within both of those phases there are two strands; Liberating the largely unpopulated areas of desert north of the Euphrates. Liberating the population centres that sit directly on the north bank of the Euphrates.
On September 26th 2017 (26/9/17) the SDF reached and liberated the town of as-Suwar. This sits on the western bank of the Khobar roughly 95km (60 miles) south-east of the Madan-Shadaddi Line.
On October 4th 2017 (4/10/17) the SDF reached the town of Markadah. This sits on the western bank of the Khobar roughly 30km (20 miles) south-east of the Madan-Shadaddi Line and around 30km (20 miles) north-east of as-Suwar. Markadah went on to be liberated on October 20th 2017 (20/10/17).
On October 10th 2017 (10/10/17) the SDF reached and liberated the town of Zuwaymiah. This sits on the western bank of the Khobar right where it meets the Euphrates. It is around 100km (60 miles) south-east of the Madan-Shadaddi Line and around 40km (25 miles) south-west of as-Suwar.
The liberation of Zuwaymiah meant that the SDF had reached the Khobar River at three points and the first phase of the Cizre Storm operation had been completed.
On October 14th 2017 (14/10/17) the SDF advanced from Karamah arrived at the outskirts of Deir-ez-Zour City. This linked the Cizre Storm and Wrath of Euphrates operations.
On October 20th 2017 (20/10/17) the Cizre Storm operation crossed the Khobar.
On November 25th 2017 (25/11/17) the desert strand reached the Syria/Iraq border roughly at the village of Mallah and its associated Salt Pan. This sits roughly 45km (25 miles) north-east of where the Euphrates River enters Iraq from Syria.
The task of liberating the urban areas along the north bank of the Euphrates is more complicated than liberating the unpopulated desert areas. Therefore this river strand has understandably made slower progress.
However because the SDF control the area to the north of those urban areas they have been able to advance south to the Euphrates. This has allowed them to cut the urban areas off from each other and liberate them in what to the untrained eye seems a haphazard way.
The immediate focus was on liberating the town of Busayrah. This sits almost on an island where the Euphrates and Khobar Rivers meet. Busayrah was liberated by the SDF on November 11th 2017 (11/11/17).
Having liberated Busayrah the SDF then advanced south-east towards the town of Diban. This sits around 20km (10 miles) south-east of Busayrah and was liberated on November 17th 2017 (17/11/17). En route from Busayrah to Diban the SDF also liberated Shuhyal and al-Gharbi which sit between the two.
The SDF advance then leapfrogged to liberate the town of Abu Hamman on December 1st 2017 (1/12/17). This sits around 25km (15 miles) south-east of Diban.
The SDF advance leapfrogged again to liberate the town of Hajin and the nearby village of Grennig on December 7th 2017 (7/12/17) and December 8th 2017 (8/12/17). Hajin sits around 45km (30 miles) south-east of Diban. It is actually closer to the Syria/Iraq border which sits 30km (20 miles) south-east of Hajin.
On December 2nd (2/12/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate the towns of Darnaj, Suwaydan Jazirah, al-Jurdi al-Gharbi and al-Jurdi ash-Sharqi. These all sit in the area between Diban and Abu Hamman.
Suwaydah was reported liberated on December 12th 2017 (12/12/17). Al-Jurdi al-Gharbi was reported liberated the following day on December 13th 2017 (13/12/17). On December 17th (17/12/17) al-Jurdi ash-Sharqi was reported liberated.
On November 15th 2017 (15/11/17) the SDF's river strand launched an operation to liberate the roughly 225kmsq (135milesq) area between Abu Hamman and Hajin. Prior to the ISIL takeover this area was under the control of the Sheitat Tribe who are traditionally very loyal to the Syrian government.
By December 30th 2017 (30/12/17) the SDF had liberated the towns of Marsama Gharbi and al-Khuskiyah. This left the town of Gharanji as the only town under ISIL control within the Sheitat Tribal Area.
At the same time the SDF had been advancing north-west from Hajin towards the Sheitat Tribal Area. By December 29th 2017 (29/12/17) they had liberated the villages of Jubb al-Bahrah, al-Qahawi, al-Jabal and Kashkiyan.
This left only al-Bahrah directly bordering the Sheitat Tribal Area and the towns between Hajin and Abu Kamal under ISIL control.
Amid all of the recent big battles such as for the cities of Raqqa and Mosul in Iraq ISIL have to some extent fled. They take their most precious resources such as their leader al-Baghdadi and move them to fallback positions.
The final stages of this Cizre Storm operation mean that ISIL have now run out of places to flee to. With ISIL being forced to make their last stand the fighting in this area has intensified significantly.
On January 19th 2018 (19/1/18) ISIL forces at both Gharanji and Shafah launched largescale coordinated attacks against the SDF. Shafah is located around 20km (12 miles) south-east of Hajin and around 15km (10 miles) north-west of Abu Kamal.
At Gharanji SDF resisted the assault by ISIL and launched a counter-offensive which succeeded in liberating the town on January 24th 2018 (24/1/18). Ten members of the SDF gave their lives in this operation. In the process they killed high profile German ISIL member Denis Cuspert. Using the stage name; "Deso Dogg" Cuspert had become known as the Jihadi Rapper.
At Shafah the SDF have also resisted ISIL's attacks however they do not appear to have launched a counter-offensive to liberate the town. They did though direct a US airstrike on January 23rd 2018 (23/1/18) which succeeded in killing between 145 and 150 ISIL fighters.
Shangri-La is not the only area of Syria under SDF control. They also control a roughly 2,400kmsq (1,400 milesq) area in the north-west of Syria. Centred around the city of Afrin this has been designated; "The Afrin Canton."
Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long wanted to annex part or all of Syria as part of a New Ottoman Empire. To this end he has backed various terror groups including ISIL and Al Qaeda to fight against the Syrians.
One of the key groups Erdogan has backed at the United Turkmen Army (UTA). Sometimes known as the Syrian Turkmen Brigades (STB) this is the paramilitary wing of the fascist Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) known as the Grey Wolves. Within Syria they operate as an irregular and therefore illegal branch of the Turkish military.
In August 2016 Erdogan sent regular Turkish forces to invade and occupy a roughly 100km (60 mile) stretch of northern Syria between Azaz/Kilis in the west and the Euphrates River in the east. The purpose was to stop the SDF linking Shangri-La with Afrin Canton cutting off ISIL and Al Qaeda's supply lines with Turkey in the process. As such this area has been designated; "Garvaghy Road."
Within Garvaghy Road and the area to the south of Afrin Canton Erdogan has been steadily absorbing fragments of the long defunct FSA into the UTA. On October 25th 2017 (25/10/17) Erdogan attempted to give the UTA legitimacy by renaming them the Syrian National Army. Despite the fact they're fighting Syria's national army.
The SDF's success against particularly ISIL puts them at odds with Erdogan.
On January 15th 2018 (15/1/18) the UTA and regular Turkish forces within Turkey started intensely shelling Afrin Canton.
Amid continuous shelling Erdogan announced on January 19th (19/1/18) that he would be sending regular Turkish forces to invade and occupy Afrin Canton. This announcement was apparently coordinated with ISIL's attacks against the SDF at Gharanji and Shafah.
On January 20th 2018 (20/1/18) Erdogan launched his invasion of Afrin Canton.
At around 18:20 on 29/1/18 (UK date) I will have to pick that up after dinner.
They controlled large swathes of both Iraq and Syria. They'd declared themselves to be an Islamist Caliphate. Their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to be it's Caliph and the Syrian city of Raqqa to be its capital.
On November 3rd 2017 (3/11/17) Iraq was able to declare itself functionally liberated from ISIL. Although the group does retain a small clandestine presence in the country it no longer controls any areas or population centres.
Within Syria ISIL have been reduced to several small areas. In the border area between Homs, Hama and Idlib Provinces and the Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian Refugees in the suburbs of the Syrian capital Damascus.
ISIL are also allied with Army of Khalid Ibrahim al-Walid/Jaish Khalid Ibn al-Walid group. They operate in the south-western Daraa Province along the basin of the Yarmouk River close to the Golan Heights United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) zone.
The main focus though has been on ousting ISIL from their traditional heartland. This is in the north-west of the country centred around the Euphrates River basin.
In the latter half of 2017 the Syrians themselves have been working to removing ISIL from the areas on the south bank of the Euphrates River. This began in August 2017 with the liberation of as-Suknah. The Syrians then went on to liberate the major cities of Mayadin, Deir-ez-Zour City and Abu Kamal/Abu Bukamal.
Having cleared all the areas between those cities the Syrians were able to declare the south bank of the Euphrates completely liberated on December 5th 2017 (5/12/17).
The job of liberating the area north-east of the Euphrates has fallen to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD). This is a coalition of forces that was created in October 2015.
The largest element of the SDF coalition is the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). They operate alongside Assyrian/Syriac Christian, Turkmen and Arab Muslim forces. The Arab element which makes up around 50% of the SDF is comprised of both elements of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) and local tribes indigenous to north-eastern Syria.
The SDF is supported by the US-led coalition; Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) both with air power and Special Operations Forces (SOF's). The SDF also contains a small International Brigade made up of foreign volunteers.
Although the SDF did not formally come into being until October 2015 the YPG have been operating alongside fragments of the FSA since the Battle of Kobane in the winter of 2014/15.
In July 2015 this unnamed combined force liberated the town Tel Abyad/Gire Spi from ISIL. Tel Abyad sits right on the border between Syria and Turkey around 45km (25 miles) east of the Euphrates.
In August 2015 this precursor to the SDF liberated the city of Hasakah from both ISIL and Syrian forces. Hasakah sits around 60km (35 miles) west of the Syria/Iraq border and around 75km (45 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey.
The liberations of Tal Abyad and Hasakah put what became the SDF in control of a vast area of north-eastern Syria from the Euphrates to Syria's borders with Turkey and Iraq. For operational reasons this area which cuts across parts of several of Syria's provinces has been designated; "Shangri-La."
In November 2016 the SDF launched an operation codenamed; "Wrath of Euphrates." It's ultimate objective was to liberate the city of Raqqa from ISIL. However before it could do that it had to expand Shangri-La to Raqqa City.
In late November 2016 the SDF took up positions around 25km (15 miles) north of Raqqa having liberated around 600kmsq (360 milesq) of territory.
In early January 2017 the SDF took up positions at Lake Assad around 55km (30 miles) west of Raqqa. In the process the SDF liberated around 3,200kmsq (1.920 milesq) of territory along the eastern bank of the Euphrates from where the river enters Syria from Turkey.
In March 2017 the SDF took up positions at Karamah around 30km (20 miles) east of Raqqa. In the process the SDF liberated around 1000kmsq (600 milesq) of territory.
In early May the SDF liberated the town of Tabqa and took control of the Tabqa Dam. This sits on the southern banks of the Euphrates around 50km (30 miles) west of Raqqa. Tabqa Dam forms Lake Assad out of the Euphrates.
On June 6th 2017 (6/6/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate the city of Raqqa itself. Raqqa was fully liberated on October 19th 2017 (19/10/17).
While the operation to liberate Raqqa City was ongoing the SDF were also advancing south-east along the north bank of the Euphrates from Karamah.
On September 9th 2017 (9/9/17) the SDF launched a second operation along the Euphrates basin. This was codenamed; "Cizre Storm."
At the time Cizre Storm was launched the only area of Syria north-east of the Euphrates River which did not fall under SDF control as part of Shangri-La is a roughly 1500kmsq (860 milesq) area stretching across the Khobar River.
Roughly in the shape of a triangle this area had as its tip the point where the Euphrates River enters Iraq. It's base is an imaginary line stretching between the towns of Madan and al-Shadaddi.
Madan sits on the Euphrates River roughly 70km (40 miles) south-east of Raqqa and 110km (70 miles) north-west of Mayadin. Al-Shadaddi sits on the Khobar River roughly 150km (90 miles) east of Raqqa and roughly 130km (75 miles) north of Mayadin.
The objective of the Cizre Storm operation is to advance from the Madan-Shadaddi Line, across the Khobar River to where the Euphrates River enters Iraq. This will liberate the area from ISIL and properly establish Shangri-La with the Euphrates River as its southern boundary.
Although the technical aspects of the operation are more complex put simply it has two phases; To advance from the Madan-Shadaddi Line to the Khobar River. Then cross the river and advance to the Syria/Iraq border.
Within both of those phases there are two strands; Liberating the largely unpopulated areas of desert north of the Euphrates. Liberating the population centres that sit directly on the north bank of the Euphrates.
On September 26th 2017 (26/9/17) the SDF reached and liberated the town of as-Suwar. This sits on the western bank of the Khobar roughly 95km (60 miles) south-east of the Madan-Shadaddi Line.
On October 4th 2017 (4/10/17) the SDF reached the town of Markadah. This sits on the western bank of the Khobar roughly 30km (20 miles) south-east of the Madan-Shadaddi Line and around 30km (20 miles) north-east of as-Suwar. Markadah went on to be liberated on October 20th 2017 (20/10/17).
On October 10th 2017 (10/10/17) the SDF reached and liberated the town of Zuwaymiah. This sits on the western bank of the Khobar right where it meets the Euphrates. It is around 100km (60 miles) south-east of the Madan-Shadaddi Line and around 40km (25 miles) south-west of as-Suwar.
The liberation of Zuwaymiah meant that the SDF had reached the Khobar River at three points and the first phase of the Cizre Storm operation had been completed.
On October 14th 2017 (14/10/17) the SDF advanced from Karamah arrived at the outskirts of Deir-ez-Zour City. This linked the Cizre Storm and Wrath of Euphrates operations.
On October 20th 2017 (20/10/17) the Cizre Storm operation crossed the Khobar.
On November 25th 2017 (25/11/17) the desert strand reached the Syria/Iraq border roughly at the village of Mallah and its associated Salt Pan. This sits roughly 45km (25 miles) north-east of where the Euphrates River enters Iraq from Syria.
The task of liberating the urban areas along the north bank of the Euphrates is more complicated than liberating the unpopulated desert areas. Therefore this river strand has understandably made slower progress.
However because the SDF control the area to the north of those urban areas they have been able to advance south to the Euphrates. This has allowed them to cut the urban areas off from each other and liberate them in what to the untrained eye seems a haphazard way.
The immediate focus was on liberating the town of Busayrah. This sits almost on an island where the Euphrates and Khobar Rivers meet. Busayrah was liberated by the SDF on November 11th 2017 (11/11/17).
Having liberated Busayrah the SDF then advanced south-east towards the town of Diban. This sits around 20km (10 miles) south-east of Busayrah and was liberated on November 17th 2017 (17/11/17). En route from Busayrah to Diban the SDF also liberated Shuhyal and al-Gharbi which sit between the two.
The SDF advance then leapfrogged to liberate the town of Abu Hamman on December 1st 2017 (1/12/17). This sits around 25km (15 miles) south-east of Diban.
The SDF advance leapfrogged again to liberate the town of Hajin and the nearby village of Grennig on December 7th 2017 (7/12/17) and December 8th 2017 (8/12/17). Hajin sits around 45km (30 miles) south-east of Diban. It is actually closer to the Syria/Iraq border which sits 30km (20 miles) south-east of Hajin.
On December 2nd (2/12/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate the towns of Darnaj, Suwaydan Jazirah, al-Jurdi al-Gharbi and al-Jurdi ash-Sharqi. These all sit in the area between Diban and Abu Hamman.
Suwaydah was reported liberated on December 12th 2017 (12/12/17). Al-Jurdi al-Gharbi was reported liberated the following day on December 13th 2017 (13/12/17). On December 17th (17/12/17) al-Jurdi ash-Sharqi was reported liberated.
On November 15th 2017 (15/11/17) the SDF's river strand launched an operation to liberate the roughly 225kmsq (135milesq) area between Abu Hamman and Hajin. Prior to the ISIL takeover this area was under the control of the Sheitat Tribe who are traditionally very loyal to the Syrian government.
By December 30th 2017 (30/12/17) the SDF had liberated the towns of Marsama Gharbi and al-Khuskiyah. This left the town of Gharanji as the only town under ISIL control within the Sheitat Tribal Area.
At the same time the SDF had been advancing north-west from Hajin towards the Sheitat Tribal Area. By December 29th 2017 (29/12/17) they had liberated the villages of Jubb al-Bahrah, al-Qahawi, al-Jabal and Kashkiyan.
This left only al-Bahrah directly bordering the Sheitat Tribal Area and the towns between Hajin and Abu Kamal under ISIL control.
Amid all of the recent big battles such as for the cities of Raqqa and Mosul in Iraq ISIL have to some extent fled. They take their most precious resources such as their leader al-Baghdadi and move them to fallback positions.
The final stages of this Cizre Storm operation mean that ISIL have now run out of places to flee to. With ISIL being forced to make their last stand the fighting in this area has intensified significantly.
On January 19th 2018 (19/1/18) ISIL forces at both Gharanji and Shafah launched largescale coordinated attacks against the SDF. Shafah is located around 20km (12 miles) south-east of Hajin and around 15km (10 miles) north-west of Abu Kamal.
At Gharanji SDF resisted the assault by ISIL and launched a counter-offensive which succeeded in liberating the town on January 24th 2018 (24/1/18). Ten members of the SDF gave their lives in this operation. In the process they killed high profile German ISIL member Denis Cuspert. Using the stage name; "Deso Dogg" Cuspert had become known as the Jihadi Rapper.
At Shafah the SDF have also resisted ISIL's attacks however they do not appear to have launched a counter-offensive to liberate the town. They did though direct a US airstrike on January 23rd 2018 (23/1/18) which succeeded in killing between 145 and 150 ISIL fighters.
Shangri-La is not the only area of Syria under SDF control. They also control a roughly 2,400kmsq (1,400 milesq) area in the north-west of Syria. Centred around the city of Afrin this has been designated; "The Afrin Canton."
Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long wanted to annex part or all of Syria as part of a New Ottoman Empire. To this end he has backed various terror groups including ISIL and Al Qaeda to fight against the Syrians.
One of the key groups Erdogan has backed at the United Turkmen Army (UTA). Sometimes known as the Syrian Turkmen Brigades (STB) this is the paramilitary wing of the fascist Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) known as the Grey Wolves. Within Syria they operate as an irregular and therefore illegal branch of the Turkish military.
In August 2016 Erdogan sent regular Turkish forces to invade and occupy a roughly 100km (60 mile) stretch of northern Syria between Azaz/Kilis in the west and the Euphrates River in the east. The purpose was to stop the SDF linking Shangri-La with Afrin Canton cutting off ISIL and Al Qaeda's supply lines with Turkey in the process. As such this area has been designated; "Garvaghy Road."
Within Garvaghy Road and the area to the south of Afrin Canton Erdogan has been steadily absorbing fragments of the long defunct FSA into the UTA. On October 25th 2017 (25/10/17) Erdogan attempted to give the UTA legitimacy by renaming them the Syrian National Army. Despite the fact they're fighting Syria's national army.
The SDF's success against particularly ISIL puts them at odds with Erdogan.
On January 15th 2018 (15/1/18) the UTA and regular Turkish forces within Turkey started intensely shelling Afrin Canton.
Amid continuous shelling Erdogan announced on January 19th (19/1/18) that he would be sending regular Turkish forces to invade and occupy Afrin Canton. This announcement was apparently coordinated with ISIL's attacks against the SDF at Gharanji and Shafah.
On January 20th 2018 (20/1/18) Erdogan launched his invasion of Afrin Canton.
At around 18:20 on 29/1/18 (UK date) I will have to pick that up after dinner.
Tuesday 23 January 2018
Operation Featherweight: Month 43, Week 3, Day 1.
This should be read as a continuation of yesterday's post; https://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/operation-featherweight-month-43-week-2_22.html
As you would expect the collapse of his Army of Conquest in both the Hama and Sudetenland Astana Zones has left Erdogan even more furious than usual.
On January 6th 2018 (6/1/18) Tahrir al-Sham conducted coordinated drone attacks against the Russian Khmeimim Air Base in Syria's Latakia Province and against the Russian Naval Base at Tartus - capital of Syria's Tartus Province.
Normally when we talk about drones we're actually talking about remote control aircraft. Although there is no pilot on board the aircraft are being piloted by a person on the ground. As the US learnt during the Battle for Mosul in Iraq all you need to do to stop this type of attack is jam the electronic signal between the aircraft and the pilot. Gravity takes care of the rest.
The drones used by Tahrir al-Sham in the attacks against Khmeimim and Tartus were true drones. They had no pilots. Instead they'd been programmed to take-off, drop bombs on their targets and return to base all without any further human involvement.
Doing this is extremely complicated. The drone not only needs to know exactly where it's target is it also needs to know exactly where it is while travelling at speed over distance. This requires an extremely complicated satellite guided navigation similar to what the US uses for its Tomahawk Cruise Missiles.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) you might use on your Satnav or cellphone is actually provided by the US military. Specifically to prevent it being used as this type of weapons guidance system they actually fuzzy up the signal so while it's accurate enough to get you to your destination it's not accurate enough to guide a missile onto a target.
As far as we know neither Al Qaeda nor ISIL have established their own network of navigation satellites. Blasting multiple ballistic missiles into orbit is the sort of thing that gets noticed in military circles.
Therefore one of only a handful of nation states must have provided Tahrir al-Sham with the complex navigation system needed to guide their drones. I think it is extremely unlikely that Russia did this in order to attack its own bases. Despite the tension over reconstruction contracts I think that it is also extremely unlikely that China did it.
That only leaves Erdogan and Turkey who are known to be closely allied with both Al Qaeda and ISIL. Turkey itself only has access to this type of complex navigation system because the US provides it to them as a member of NATO.
The threat from Erdogan Russia was quite clear; Either cease the operations in the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones or Erdogan will attack Russia. That risks the confrontation people worked to avoid throughout the Cold War between NATO and Russia.
Russia identified the base in western Idlib Province used in the attack and destroyed it on January 12th 1018 (12/1/18).
In case Russia did not get the message on January 10th 2018 (10/1/18) both the Russian and Iranian Ambassadors were summoned by Turkey. There the message was made explicit; Erdogan demands that Al Qaeda be protected in both the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones.
The following day on January 11th 2018 (11/1/18) Erdogan publicly threatened to invade the Afrin Canton controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) unless operations against Al Qaeda in the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones ceased.
The SDF are backed by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). Not only with airpower but also through Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and regular forces on the ground.
However particularly under former President Barack Obama those US troops have been forced to rely on Russia to protect them from attacks by Erdogan.
In August 2016 Erdogan sent regular Turkish to illegally invade and occupy an area of northern Syria designated; "Garvaghy Road." This stretches for roughly 100km (60 miles) from the towns of Azaz/Kilis in the west to the Euphrates River in the east.
Erdogan's objective here was to prevent the SDF from linking Afrin Canton with the Shangri-La area they control east of the Euphrates. Such a move by the SDF would cut Turkey's supplies with both ISIL to the south-east and Al Qaeda to the south-west.
In October 2016 Erdogan launched a series of attacks against the SDF both in Afrin Canton an Shangri-La. These were predominately air and artillery strikes but also saw the use of chemical weapons by Erdogan's forces on October 25th 2016 (25/10/16).
The US offered no response to these attacks. They were only brought to a halt when Syrian aircraft struck Erdogan's forces killing four Turkish soldiers. The following day (26/10/16) Syria turned on its air defence systems effectively grounding Turkish aircraft.
Between November 2016 and February 2017 Erdogan continued these sporadic attacks against the SDF with no response from the US.
On February 14th 2017 (14/2/17) it fell to Russia to establish a "Security Line" by moving its forces in between Erdogan's forces at al-Bab and the SDF at Manbij. Erdogan's immediate response was to conduct an airstrike on those Russian forces on February 20th 2017 (20/2/17) killing four.
On September 6th 2017 (6/9/17) Russia established another "Security Line" by moving its forces between Erdogan's forces in the Sudetenland and the SDF in Afrin Canton.
Therefore Erdogan's January 11th 2018 (11/1/18) threat to attack Afrin Canton was not so much a threat to attack the SDF. Instead it was a threat to attack the Russian forces on the Security Line unless Russia ceased operations against Al Qaeda in both the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones.
On January 13th 2018 (13/1/18) the US announced plans to turn the SDF into a border force. I read about this at the time and found it to be amongst the most banal of that day's news.
The US' plan is not to create a new force. Instead it is to take existing members of the SDF and train them in border security techniques such as manning checkpoints, searching vehicles and the sort of human rights training that goes along with dealing with the civilian public.
Yesterday (22/1/18) I said that re-tasking the SDF as a border force will undermine its ability to conduct offensive military operations. That's not quite true.
Members of the SDF will still have the combat experience they already possess. However this shift signals that the SDF will not attempt to expand their territory any further and is the first step towards them being equipped with light weapons rather than heavy, combat weapons.
The only way that Erdogan could be offended or alarmed by this move is if he thinks he has the right to enter Syrian territory at any time he likes. International law is quite clear on this point; Erdogan does not have that right.
Obviously though - particularly now Obama has gone - Erdogan can't turn around to the other members of NATO and say that he wants to attack Afrin Canton as a way to blackmail Russia into protecting Al Qaeda in both the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones.
So instead Erdogan has latched his existing threat to attack Afrin Canton onto these US plans to re-task the SDF as a border force. The hope being the US is so caught up in its own vanity that it won't notice Erdogan's true motive.
Also I don't think it is particularly a secret that US President Donald Trump is a big fan of border security and border walls in particular.
Ending yesterday (22/1/18) the US government was shutdown over a budget dispute. The Democrats want to keep effectively an amnesty for illegal immigrants called DACA. In return Trump and the Republicans want funding for a border wall between Mexico and the US.
Reforming the US immigration is a complex issue which really warrants a post of its own. If we can go five minutes without a crisis.
However if you renew DACA or any other amnesty for illegal immigrants already in the US without building a border wall you are turning US citizenship into a commodity. One that can be sold by criminal cartels to weak and vulnerable people.
In fact when former President Obama introduced DACA it triggered a mass increase in illegal immigration into the US. This caused a completely avoidable humanitarian crisis all along the US southern border.
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) especially deals with children. That turns children into the most valuable commodity for people trafficking cartels.
In this war I have seen many horrific things. Being prepared to buy and sell children still stands out as the lowest of the low.
By illegitimately framing his desire to invade Afrin Canton as a border security issue Erdogan is hoping that President Trump will confuse it with his own legitimate desire to secure the US' southern border.
Of course while US Democrats were having palpitations over Candidate Trump's desire to build a border well former President Obama was actually helping Erdogan to build a massive border wall between not just Turkey and Syria but also Turkey and Iraq.
Unlike President Trump's plans Erdogan has actually built his border wall inside of Syrian and Iraqi territory.
In launching his attack on Afrin Canton Erdogan is telling the Turkish public that this border wall has not worked. Turkey is no more secure then it was before it build the wall. So now he has to invade.
It's almost as if Erdogan is writing the US Democrats mid-term campaign for them.
On Thursday (18/1/18) Russia called Erdogan's bluff. They removed their forces from Afrin Canton while operations against Al Qaeda continued in both the Sudetenland and the Hama Astana Zones unabated.
Following a short delay for bad weather Erdogan was left with really no other choice than to launch his operation on Saturday (20/1/18).
That operation has been codenamed; "Operation Olive Branch." Although the operation itself is appalling I suppose we should congratulate Erdogan with finally coming up with a halfway decent codename.
The purpose of codenames is to disguise your purpose and confuse your enemy. So I talk in terms of Shangri-La, Garvaghy Road and the Bobby Sands.
I have designated operations in Syria and Iraq in their entirety; "Featherweight." That is in reference to the lightest and softest hitting weight class in combat sports and the practice of giving a white feather signifying cowardice to draft dodgers who refused to fight against the German and Ottoman Empires in the First World War.
It is really in honour of former President Obama. He efforts to strike ISIL always seemed more like a loving caress.
Throughout 2015 Erdogan very much wanted to invade the Garvaghy Road area of Syria at the town of Jarablus. He codenamed this operation; "Operation; Jarablus" or Cereblus in Turkish. He couldn't even conjure up the creativity to go with Cerberus - the Hound of Hades who prevented the dead from escaping hell.
In Greek mythology Poseidon - father of Pegasus - battled Athena for control of Athens. Poseidon struck the ground with his trident cause water to spring forth. Athena used the water to plant and Olive tree. This led to Athena being given control over Athens by the council of gods. Since then an Olive branch has been used as a symbol of peace through victory.
By choosing Olive Branch as the name for his invasion of Afrin Canton Erdogan is clearly trying to convince people his victory will bring peace. The moral of Athena securing victory over the father of Pegasus by using constructive rather than destructive force is clearly lost on him.
Also Afrin Canton is large olive producer contributing to significantly to Syria's pre-war exports of around US$630m. Through the choice of codename Erdogan is signally that he intends to branch out to steal that olive production. Unusually the Turkish Finance Minister has been providing daily updates on how the operation is going to boost Turkey's economy.
Finally the operation has been planned upon multiple axis or branches across this olive producing region - the north-west, the north-east, the south-east and the south-west.
The first stage of the operation which began on Saturday (20/1/18) was a massive barrage of air and artillery strikes which killed at least 18 civilians.
Ground operations began on Sunday (21/1/18). I am still trying to get a handle on Erdogan's exact military objectives.
Initially the operation was planned to seize all of Afrin Canton. This would effectively make it part of Garvaghy Road. The objective then would be to seize Manbij on the western bank of the Euphrates and the starting point of Shangri-La.
Since the operation has been scaled back simply to seize all of Afrin Canton.
It has since been scaled back even further to establish just a 30km (20 mile) Turkish zone within Afrin Canton. However with the city of Afrin at the heart of Afrin Canton being just 20km (10 miles) from the border with Turkey even that would undermine Afrin Canton as SDF controlled territory.
Sunday's (20/1/18) ground operation focused around the town of Rajo in the north-west of Afrin Canton. The key strategic location there is Adah Mandil Hill. The Turkish media were keen to report that the hill was captured. However they seem to have failed to report that it was liberated and back under SDF control by the end of the day.
On Monday (21/1/18) the ground operation shifted entirely to the north-east of Afrin Canton focusing on Azaz where Afrin Canton meets Garvaghy Road. The key strategic location there is Barsayah Hill. Again Turkish media were quick to report its capture but have yet to report that it was liberated and back under SDF control by the end of the day.
Today (22/1/18) the ground operation has shifted entirely again. It is now focusing on the south-west of Afrin Canton where it borders Turkey and the Sudetenland. I am still awaiting updates of how that fighting is progressing.
Since then bad weather has set in again. So apart from Erdogan launching airstrikes against Afrin Canton's Maydanki Reservoir killing six civilians on Wednesday (24/1/18) not much has happened.
Again suggesting this might not have been the most well planned military operation in history.
18:35 on 23/1/18 (UK date).
Edited at around 16:45 on 25/1/18 (UK date) to include above the paragraphs I omitted because I was in a rush.
17:30 on 25/1/18 (UK date)
As you would expect the collapse of his Army of Conquest in both the Hama and Sudetenland Astana Zones has left Erdogan even more furious than usual.
On January 6th 2018 (6/1/18) Tahrir al-Sham conducted coordinated drone attacks against the Russian Khmeimim Air Base in Syria's Latakia Province and against the Russian Naval Base at Tartus - capital of Syria's Tartus Province.
Normally when we talk about drones we're actually talking about remote control aircraft. Although there is no pilot on board the aircraft are being piloted by a person on the ground. As the US learnt during the Battle for Mosul in Iraq all you need to do to stop this type of attack is jam the electronic signal between the aircraft and the pilot. Gravity takes care of the rest.
The drones used by Tahrir al-Sham in the attacks against Khmeimim and Tartus were true drones. They had no pilots. Instead they'd been programmed to take-off, drop bombs on their targets and return to base all without any further human involvement.
Doing this is extremely complicated. The drone not only needs to know exactly where it's target is it also needs to know exactly where it is while travelling at speed over distance. This requires an extremely complicated satellite guided navigation similar to what the US uses for its Tomahawk Cruise Missiles.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) you might use on your Satnav or cellphone is actually provided by the US military. Specifically to prevent it being used as this type of weapons guidance system they actually fuzzy up the signal so while it's accurate enough to get you to your destination it's not accurate enough to guide a missile onto a target.
As far as we know neither Al Qaeda nor ISIL have established their own network of navigation satellites. Blasting multiple ballistic missiles into orbit is the sort of thing that gets noticed in military circles.
Therefore one of only a handful of nation states must have provided Tahrir al-Sham with the complex navigation system needed to guide their drones. I think it is extremely unlikely that Russia did this in order to attack its own bases. Despite the tension over reconstruction contracts I think that it is also extremely unlikely that China did it.
That only leaves Erdogan and Turkey who are known to be closely allied with both Al Qaeda and ISIL. Turkey itself only has access to this type of complex navigation system because the US provides it to them as a member of NATO.
The threat from Erdogan Russia was quite clear; Either cease the operations in the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones or Erdogan will attack Russia. That risks the confrontation people worked to avoid throughout the Cold War between NATO and Russia.
Russia identified the base in western Idlib Province used in the attack and destroyed it on January 12th 1018 (12/1/18).
In case Russia did not get the message on January 10th 2018 (10/1/18) both the Russian and Iranian Ambassadors were summoned by Turkey. There the message was made explicit; Erdogan demands that Al Qaeda be protected in both the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones.
The following day on January 11th 2018 (11/1/18) Erdogan publicly threatened to invade the Afrin Canton controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) unless operations against Al Qaeda in the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones ceased.
The SDF are backed by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). Not only with airpower but also through Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and regular forces on the ground.
However particularly under former President Barack Obama those US troops have been forced to rely on Russia to protect them from attacks by Erdogan.
In August 2016 Erdogan sent regular Turkish to illegally invade and occupy an area of northern Syria designated; "Garvaghy Road." This stretches for roughly 100km (60 miles) from the towns of Azaz/Kilis in the west to the Euphrates River in the east.
Erdogan's objective here was to prevent the SDF from linking Afrin Canton with the Shangri-La area they control east of the Euphrates. Such a move by the SDF would cut Turkey's supplies with both ISIL to the south-east and Al Qaeda to the south-west.
In October 2016 Erdogan launched a series of attacks against the SDF both in Afrin Canton an Shangri-La. These were predominately air and artillery strikes but also saw the use of chemical weapons by Erdogan's forces on October 25th 2016 (25/10/16).
The US offered no response to these attacks. They were only brought to a halt when Syrian aircraft struck Erdogan's forces killing four Turkish soldiers. The following day (26/10/16) Syria turned on its air defence systems effectively grounding Turkish aircraft.
Between November 2016 and February 2017 Erdogan continued these sporadic attacks against the SDF with no response from the US.
On February 14th 2017 (14/2/17) it fell to Russia to establish a "Security Line" by moving its forces in between Erdogan's forces at al-Bab and the SDF at Manbij. Erdogan's immediate response was to conduct an airstrike on those Russian forces on February 20th 2017 (20/2/17) killing four.
On September 6th 2017 (6/9/17) Russia established another "Security Line" by moving its forces between Erdogan's forces in the Sudetenland and the SDF in Afrin Canton.
Therefore Erdogan's January 11th 2018 (11/1/18) threat to attack Afrin Canton was not so much a threat to attack the SDF. Instead it was a threat to attack the Russian forces on the Security Line unless Russia ceased operations against Al Qaeda in both the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones.
On January 13th 2018 (13/1/18) the US announced plans to turn the SDF into a border force. I read about this at the time and found it to be amongst the most banal of that day's news.
The US' plan is not to create a new force. Instead it is to take existing members of the SDF and train them in border security techniques such as manning checkpoints, searching vehicles and the sort of human rights training that goes along with dealing with the civilian public.
Yesterday (22/1/18) I said that re-tasking the SDF as a border force will undermine its ability to conduct offensive military operations. That's not quite true.
Members of the SDF will still have the combat experience they already possess. However this shift signals that the SDF will not attempt to expand their territory any further and is the first step towards them being equipped with light weapons rather than heavy, combat weapons.
The only way that Erdogan could be offended or alarmed by this move is if he thinks he has the right to enter Syrian territory at any time he likes. International law is quite clear on this point; Erdogan does not have that right.
Obviously though - particularly now Obama has gone - Erdogan can't turn around to the other members of NATO and say that he wants to attack Afrin Canton as a way to blackmail Russia into protecting Al Qaeda in both the Sudetenland and Hama Astana Zones.
So instead Erdogan has latched his existing threat to attack Afrin Canton onto these US plans to re-task the SDF as a border force. The hope being the US is so caught up in its own vanity that it won't notice Erdogan's true motive.
Also I don't think it is particularly a secret that US President Donald Trump is a big fan of border security and border walls in particular.
Ending yesterday (22/1/18) the US government was shutdown over a budget dispute. The Democrats want to keep effectively an amnesty for illegal immigrants called DACA. In return Trump and the Republicans want funding for a border wall between Mexico and the US.
Reforming the US immigration is a complex issue which really warrants a post of its own. If we can go five minutes without a crisis.
However if you renew DACA or any other amnesty for illegal immigrants already in the US without building a border wall you are turning US citizenship into a commodity. One that can be sold by criminal cartels to weak and vulnerable people.
In fact when former President Obama introduced DACA it triggered a mass increase in illegal immigration into the US. This caused a completely avoidable humanitarian crisis all along the US southern border.
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) especially deals with children. That turns children into the most valuable commodity for people trafficking cartels.
In this war I have seen many horrific things. Being prepared to buy and sell children still stands out as the lowest of the low.
By illegitimately framing his desire to invade Afrin Canton as a border security issue Erdogan is hoping that President Trump will confuse it with his own legitimate desire to secure the US' southern border.
Of course while US Democrats were having palpitations over Candidate Trump's desire to build a border well former President Obama was actually helping Erdogan to build a massive border wall between not just Turkey and Syria but also Turkey and Iraq.
Unlike President Trump's plans Erdogan has actually built his border wall inside of Syrian and Iraqi territory.
In launching his attack on Afrin Canton Erdogan is telling the Turkish public that this border wall has not worked. Turkey is no more secure then it was before it build the wall. So now he has to invade.
It's almost as if Erdogan is writing the US Democrats mid-term campaign for them.
On Thursday (18/1/18) Russia called Erdogan's bluff. They removed their forces from Afrin Canton while operations against Al Qaeda continued in both the Sudetenland and the Hama Astana Zones unabated.
Following a short delay for bad weather Erdogan was left with really no other choice than to launch his operation on Saturday (20/1/18).
That operation has been codenamed; "Operation Olive Branch." Although the operation itself is appalling I suppose we should congratulate Erdogan with finally coming up with a halfway decent codename.
The purpose of codenames is to disguise your purpose and confuse your enemy. So I talk in terms of Shangri-La, Garvaghy Road and the Bobby Sands.
I have designated operations in Syria and Iraq in their entirety; "Featherweight." That is in reference to the lightest and softest hitting weight class in combat sports and the practice of giving a white feather signifying cowardice to draft dodgers who refused to fight against the German and Ottoman Empires in the First World War.
It is really in honour of former President Obama. He efforts to strike ISIL always seemed more like a loving caress.
Throughout 2015 Erdogan very much wanted to invade the Garvaghy Road area of Syria at the town of Jarablus. He codenamed this operation; "Operation; Jarablus" or Cereblus in Turkish. He couldn't even conjure up the creativity to go with Cerberus - the Hound of Hades who prevented the dead from escaping hell.
In Greek mythology Poseidon - father of Pegasus - battled Athena for control of Athens. Poseidon struck the ground with his trident cause water to spring forth. Athena used the water to plant and Olive tree. This led to Athena being given control over Athens by the council of gods. Since then an Olive branch has been used as a symbol of peace through victory.
By choosing Olive Branch as the name for his invasion of Afrin Canton Erdogan is clearly trying to convince people his victory will bring peace. The moral of Athena securing victory over the father of Pegasus by using constructive rather than destructive force is clearly lost on him.
Also Afrin Canton is large olive producer contributing to significantly to Syria's pre-war exports of around US$630m. Through the choice of codename Erdogan is signally that he intends to branch out to steal that olive production. Unusually the Turkish Finance Minister has been providing daily updates on how the operation is going to boost Turkey's economy.
Finally the operation has been planned upon multiple axis or branches across this olive producing region - the north-west, the north-east, the south-east and the south-west.
The first stage of the operation which began on Saturday (20/1/18) was a massive barrage of air and artillery strikes which killed at least 18 civilians.
Ground operations began on Sunday (21/1/18). I am still trying to get a handle on Erdogan's exact military objectives.
Initially the operation was planned to seize all of Afrin Canton. This would effectively make it part of Garvaghy Road. The objective then would be to seize Manbij on the western bank of the Euphrates and the starting point of Shangri-La.
Since the operation has been scaled back simply to seize all of Afrin Canton.
It has since been scaled back even further to establish just a 30km (20 mile) Turkish zone within Afrin Canton. However with the city of Afrin at the heart of Afrin Canton being just 20km (10 miles) from the border with Turkey even that would undermine Afrin Canton as SDF controlled territory.
Sunday's (20/1/18) ground operation focused around the town of Rajo in the north-west of Afrin Canton. The key strategic location there is Adah Mandil Hill. The Turkish media were keen to report that the hill was captured. However they seem to have failed to report that it was liberated and back under SDF control by the end of the day.
On Monday (21/1/18) the ground operation shifted entirely to the north-east of Afrin Canton focusing on Azaz where Afrin Canton meets Garvaghy Road. The key strategic location there is Barsayah Hill. Again Turkish media were quick to report its capture but have yet to report that it was liberated and back under SDF control by the end of the day.
Today (22/1/18) the ground operation has shifted entirely again. It is now focusing on the south-west of Afrin Canton where it borders Turkey and the Sudetenland. I am still awaiting updates of how that fighting is progressing.
Since then bad weather has set in again. So apart from Erdogan launching airstrikes against Afrin Canton's Maydanki Reservoir killing six civilians on Wednesday (24/1/18) not much has happened.
Again suggesting this might not have been the most well planned military operation in history.
18:35 on 23/1/18 (UK date).
Edited at around 16:45 on 25/1/18 (UK date) to include above the paragraphs I omitted because I was in a rush.
17:30 on 25/1/18 (UK date)
Monday 22 January 2018
Operation Featherweight: Month 43, Week 2, Day 7.
This should be read as a continuation of Saturday's post; https://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/operation-featherweight-month-43-week-2_20.html
Directly to the south of the Sudetenland you have the Hama Astana Zone. Due to the way that Syria's provinces are arranged this not only includes all of Hama Province but also large parts of Homs and Aleppo Provinces.
This zone is unusual. The Astana Zones Agreement was intended to apply the Astana Ceasefire to areas where the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are not present. However ISIL have maintained a presence within the Hama Astana Zone on the border with Hama, Homs and Aleppo Provinces meet.
Despite this the Hama Astana Zone went into effect on August 3rd 2017 (3/8/17).
However it collapsed on August 29th 2017 (29/8/17). The Al Qaeda element of the Army of Conquest - Tahrir al-Sham/Jabhat al-Nusra - teamed up with ISIL to launch an offensive against the Syrians.
This combined Al Qaeda/ISIL offensive primarily targeted the area around the town of Ltamenah. This sits around 25km (15 miles) north-west of Hama City which is under Syrian control.
In an effort to save the Astana Zones Agreement the Syrians initially did not respond to this offensive. This allowed Tahrir al-Sham and ISIL to seize control of Ltamenah and the town of Kafr Zita which sits roughly 6km (3.5 miles) north of Ltamenah.
However as more areas under Syrian control an Syrian civilians became threatened by the Al Qaeda/ISIL advance the Syrians were forced to suppress the offensive. This was done by artillery and airstrikes.
On September 18th 2017 (18/9/17) the Syrians were able to re-liberate Ltamenah and Kafr Zita. By September 21st 2017 (21/9/17) the combined Al Qaeda/ISIL offensive had been halted completely.
On October 7th 2017 (7/10/17) Tahrir al-Sham launched a fresh offensive against the Syrians. This time focused on the town of Abu Dali. This sits just on the Hama side of the border between Hama and Homs Provinces. It is roughly 70km (40 miles) north-east of Homs City and around 55km (30 miles) south-east of Hama City.
On October 8th (8/10/17) Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Dali and the surrounding villages of Musherifa and Tamat al-Khalifa.
This fresh Tahrir al-Sham offensive occurred just a day after regular Turkish forces had entered the Sudetenland on October 6th (6/10/17).
At this time Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan was desperate to show both that Tahrir al-Sham were separate from Al Qaeda and that they were not allied with ISIL.
So on October 9th 2017 (9/10/17) ISIL helpfully announced that they were at war with Tahrir al-Sham. This again took the form of the shoving match between Al Qaeda and ISIL which became so familiar when Erdogan wanted to send regular Turkish forces to invade the Garvaghy Road area throughout much of 2015 and 2016.
Despite this supposed conflict between Tahrir al-Sham and ISIL there have actually been only a handful of occasions on which the two groups have clashed.
On October 9th 2017 (9/10/17) ISIL seized the villages of Buyud, Andarin, Qasr Ibn Warden and Muslokhah from Tahrir al-Sham. These all sit on the border between Hama and Aleppo Provinces around 50km (30 miles) north-east of Hama City. ISIL returned control of the villages to Tahrir al-Sham that same day.
On November 22nd 2017 (22/11/17) ISIL seized several villages around Suruj from Tahrir al-Sham including Suruj itself. Suruj is located around 10km (6 miles) south-west of Qasr Ibn Warden. Again ISIL returned control of these villages to Tahrir al-Sham that same day.
On November 29th 2017 (29/11/17) ISIL seized the village of Abu Awjah from Tahrir al-Sham. A tiny hamlet Abu Awjah is located around 25km (15 miles) north-west of Homs City and around 40km (25 miles) south-west of Hama City. Again ISIL returned control of the village to Tahrir al-Sham that same day.
On December 8th 2017 (8/12/17) ISIL seized a number of villages around Suruj from Tahrir al-Sham. On this occasion ISIL's offensive lasted a full day coming to an end on December 9th (9/12/17). ISIL then waited all the way until December 22nd 2017 (22/12/17) before returning the territory to Tahrir al-Sham.
This shoving match was intended to serve two purposes for Erdogan. The first is to convince people that Al Qaeda and ISIL are fighting each other rather than allied with each other.
Secondly it was intended to convince primarily the local population that ISIL are allied with the Syrians.
Apparently the Syrian offensive against ISIL in the Euphrates River basin which killed tens of thousands of ISIL fighters and liberated several large cities was just an elaborate ruse to allow ISIL to temporarily seize a handful of villages in and around Hama Province.
Mainly though within the Hama Astana Zone ISIL have focused on fighting the Syrians alongside Tahrir al-Sham.
On December 5th 2017 (5/12/17) ISIL bombed a civilian bus in Homs City killing 10.
Since January 13th 2018 (13/1/18) ISIL have been conducting a sustained offensive against Syrian forces close to Abu al-Duhur. This seems to be a deliberate attempt to relieve pressure on Tahrir al-Sham who have been collapsing in the area in the face of a Syrian advance.
In response to Tahrir al-Sham's Abu Dali offensive launched on October 7th 2017 (7/10/17) the Syrians have not launched a counter offensive. Instead they've moved to suppress Tahrir al-Sham through an increased use of artillery and airstrikes.
Rather than countering Tahrir al-Sham at Abu Dali the Syrians instead launched a largescale operation of their own against the group on October 25th 2017 (25/10/17).
This began from positions close to the town of Ithriyah where Hama, Homs and Aleppo Provinces meet. Ithriyah itself is around 95km (60 miles) north-east of Hama City and around 120km (70 miles) south-east of Idlib City. Although was not revealed the time its ultimate objective was the military airbase at the town of Abu Duhur. This sits around 45km (30 miles) south-east of Idlib City.
One of the groups that make up Tahrir al-Sham are the Turkistan Islamist Party (TiP). They are original Al Qaeda.
The group's founder Zeydin Yusup fought alongside Osama bin Laden against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 1989 the TiP established their headquarters in Kabul under the protection of the Taliban before being evicted by US forces in 2001. They continue to be closely allied with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Pakistani Taliban.
Not to be mistaken with Turkmenistan the TiP wish to establish the Islamist state of Turkistan. They believe this should exist in parts of Mongolia and Tajikistan. Primarily though they wish to locate Turkistan within China's north-eastern Xinjiang Province.
Islamist groups in east and central Asia has been something of a recurring theme within the conflict;
On June 12th 2016 (12/6/16) an Islamist terrorist gun attack was carried out at the Pulse gay Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, US. This resulted in the murder of 49 people.
The gunman Omar Mateen was from Afghanistan. Amongst other reasons he was chosen because within Afghan society he would be considered not an Afghan but as a member of the Pushtu ethnic group. Uzbeks, Turks, Tajiks are also large ethnic groups within Afghanistan.
On October 31st 2017 (31/10/17) an Islamist terrorist conducted a run-over terror attack in New York City, US. This killed 8. The attacker was identified as Sayfullo Saipov - a 28 year old immigrant from Uzbekistan.
On January 1st 2017 (1/1/17) an Islamist gunman attacked the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. This recreation of the Pulse nightclub attack killed 39.
The attack was followed by several weeks of intense speculation other whether he was a Tajik or even a Uighur from China's Xinjiang Province. After Erdogan decided he'd got his money's worth it was confirmed that Abdulkadir Masharipov was in fact from Uzbekistan.
During the Syrians Abu Duhur Air Base operation a senior member of the Syrian government - Bouthaina Shaaban - visited China on November 25th 2017 (25/11/17). During the visit China congratulated Syria on its work combating the TiP and offered support against what China sees as a mutual enemy.
On November 28th 2017 (28/11/17) Russia started a rumour that China had deployed Special Operations Forces (SOF's) - specifically the Night Tigers and the Siberian Tigers - to Syria to battle the TiP. If true this would be the first combat deployment by China since the Korean War of the 1950's.
However it is worth pointing out that this rumour has circulated before and found to be untrue. Also there is currently a degree of tension between Russia and China over Syria.
The mantra from western nations has long been; "There is no military solution in Syria!"
Meanwhile Russia, China and Iran are jostling over how best to profit from the military solution that is clearly working. Around the time of the Chinese SOF's rumour Russia secured an exclusive reconstruction contract at China's expense.
Whatever the truth of the rumours Shaaban's visit to China spelled extremely bad news for the TiP in Syria.
November 30th 2017 (30/11/17) saw intense and coordinated strikes against their command and control structures. Two TiP headquarters were wiped out in Jisr al-Shugour around 30km (20 miles) south-east of Idlib City. TiP headquarters were also destroyed in Khirbet al-Jawz and Bedama.
There have also been a number of unclaimed bomb attacks in and around Idlib City. For example of January 8th 2018 (8/1/18) the headquarters of a Chechen group Soldiers of the Caucasus/Ajnad al-Kavkaz mysteriously blew up in the Thawra district.
While the Syrians were conducting their Abu Duhur Air Base operation Tahrir al-Sham attempted to continue their offensive at Abu Dali. With the Syrians focus elsewhere Tahrir al-Sham managed to capture the villages of Oum Turikiyah, Balil and Tell Oum Khazim all south of Abu Dali on November 6th 2017 (6/11/17).
However on November 23rd 2017 (23/11/17) the Syrians Galilee Brigade joined the Abu Duhur Air Base operation. They were quickly able to secure control of the main highway running to the airbase. This forced Tahrir al-Sham to abandon their Abu Dali offensive and throw their full resources into an effort to resist the Syrian advance on November 29th 2017 (29/11/17).
However Tahrir al-Sham were unable to halt the Syrians advance. On December 12th (12/12/17) they liberated the strategically important Zahraa Hill. On December 18th 2017 (18/12/17) they liberated Syriatel and Khinizir Hills. On December 19th 2017 (19/12/17) they liberated Aghad Hill.
On December 20th 2017 (20/12/17) Syria's elite Tiger Force joined the Abu Duhur Air Base operation fresh from their successes against ISIL in the Euphrates River Basin. This decisively tipped the balance of fighting in the Syrians favour.
On December 28th 2017 (28/12/17) they liberated Ward Hill and the surrounding villages. On January 4th 2018 (4/1/18) the Syrians reached the villages directly surrounding Abu Duhur Airbase.
By this time Tahrir al-Sham were in full collapse. They opened their armouries so they could force civilians to fight for them against the Syrians. On January 5th 2018 (5/1/18) they opened their central prison in Idlib City to force their captives to fight the Syrians.
On January 9th 2018 (9/1/18) Tahrir al-Sham retreated en mass from the entire Hass Plateau. This vast 2,100kmsq (1,260 milesq) area begins around 15km (10 miles) south of Aleppo City and 60km (35 miles) east of Idlib City.
On January 10th 2018 (10/1/18) the Syrians entered Abu Duhur Airbase. By January 20th (20/1/18) they had fully liberated and secured it.
To make matters worse for Tahrir al-Sham the Syrians have also been able to reclaim the territory lost during Tahrir al-Sham's Abu Dali offensive. On December 21st 2017 (21/12/17) Abu Dali itself was liberated. The Syrians then pressed on to liberate areas north of Abu Dali such as Moushfra on December 28th (28/12/17).
The Syrians have also been able liberate Tahrir al-Sham held villages close to the now infamous town of Khan Sheikhoun. This sits around 40km (25 miles) north of Hama City and around 55km (30 miles) south of Idlib City.
At around 18:35 on 22/1/18 (UK date) I will have to check & tidy this after dinner.
Edited at around 19:35 on 22/1/18 (UK date) to tidy and add;
As you would expect the collapse of his Army of Conquest in both the Hama and Sudetenland Astana Zones has left Erdogan even more furious than usual.
Frustratingly I will have to address his response in more detail at a later date. However the abridged version is;
January 6th 2018 (6/1/18) - Erdogan provides Tahrir al-Sham with satellite navigation capability to allow them to attack the Russian Air Base at Khmeimim in Syria's Latakia Province with true drones. It is likely Turkey itself was supplied with that capability by the US through NATO.
January 10th 2018 (10/1/18) - Erdogan summons Russian and Iranian Ambassadors to demand that operations in the Hama and Sudetenland Astana Zones cease immediately.
January 11th 2018 (11/1/18) - Erdogan threatens to attack SDF controlled Afrin Canton unless operations in Hama and the Sudetenland cease immediately. The threat being that he will attack Russian troops within Afrin Canton as part of the Astana Process.
January 13th 2018 (13/1/18) - US announces intention to re-task SDF from a combat force to a border security force. Restricting its ability to conduct offensive military operations.
January 16th 2018 (16/1/18) - Erdogan attaches his threat to attack Afrin Canton to US announcement of reduction of SDF's offensive capabilities. The intention being to disguise the threat already made to Russia and dazzle the US by equating issue to President Trump's legitimate need to secure the US' southern border.
January 19th 2018 (19/1/18) - Russia simply withdraws its forces from Afrin Canton while operations in Hama and the Sudetenland continue.
January 20th 2018 (20/1/18) - Erdogan launches attack on Afrin Canton. US Democrats shutdown US government including military spending and organise mass protests over the issue of Trump's legitimate need to secure US border.
20:00 on 22/1/18 (UK date).
Edited at around 16:35 on 25/1/18 (UK date) to correct;
Al Qaeda believe that Turkistan is made up of China's Xinjiang Province along with parts of Mongolia and
Kyrgyzstan. Erdogan spent weeks speculating that the Reina attacker was Kyrgz before confirming he was Uzbek attack with the support of Chinese Uyghurs.
16:40 on 25/1/18 (UK date).
https://twitter.com/RT_com/status95532415968435404
Directly to the south of the Sudetenland you have the Hama Astana Zone. Due to the way that Syria's provinces are arranged this not only includes all of Hama Province but also large parts of Homs and Aleppo Provinces.
This zone is unusual. The Astana Zones Agreement was intended to apply the Astana Ceasefire to areas where the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are not present. However ISIL have maintained a presence within the Hama Astana Zone on the border with Hama, Homs and Aleppo Provinces meet.
Despite this the Hama Astana Zone went into effect on August 3rd 2017 (3/8/17).
However it collapsed on August 29th 2017 (29/8/17). The Al Qaeda element of the Army of Conquest - Tahrir al-Sham/Jabhat al-Nusra - teamed up with ISIL to launch an offensive against the Syrians.
This combined Al Qaeda/ISIL offensive primarily targeted the area around the town of Ltamenah. This sits around 25km (15 miles) north-west of Hama City which is under Syrian control.
In an effort to save the Astana Zones Agreement the Syrians initially did not respond to this offensive. This allowed Tahrir al-Sham and ISIL to seize control of Ltamenah and the town of Kafr Zita which sits roughly 6km (3.5 miles) north of Ltamenah.
However as more areas under Syrian control an Syrian civilians became threatened by the Al Qaeda/ISIL advance the Syrians were forced to suppress the offensive. This was done by artillery and airstrikes.
On September 18th 2017 (18/9/17) the Syrians were able to re-liberate Ltamenah and Kafr Zita. By September 21st 2017 (21/9/17) the combined Al Qaeda/ISIL offensive had been halted completely.
On October 7th 2017 (7/10/17) Tahrir al-Sham launched a fresh offensive against the Syrians. This time focused on the town of Abu Dali. This sits just on the Hama side of the border between Hama and Homs Provinces. It is roughly 70km (40 miles) north-east of Homs City and around 55km (30 miles) south-east of Hama City.
On October 8th (8/10/17) Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Dali and the surrounding villages of Musherifa and Tamat al-Khalifa.
This fresh Tahrir al-Sham offensive occurred just a day after regular Turkish forces had entered the Sudetenland on October 6th (6/10/17).
At this time Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan was desperate to show both that Tahrir al-Sham were separate from Al Qaeda and that they were not allied with ISIL.
So on October 9th 2017 (9/10/17) ISIL helpfully announced that they were at war with Tahrir al-Sham. This again took the form of the shoving match between Al Qaeda and ISIL which became so familiar when Erdogan wanted to send regular Turkish forces to invade the Garvaghy Road area throughout much of 2015 and 2016.
Despite this supposed conflict between Tahrir al-Sham and ISIL there have actually been only a handful of occasions on which the two groups have clashed.
On October 9th 2017 (9/10/17) ISIL seized the villages of Buyud, Andarin, Qasr Ibn Warden and Muslokhah from Tahrir al-Sham. These all sit on the border between Hama and Aleppo Provinces around 50km (30 miles) north-east of Hama City. ISIL returned control of the villages to Tahrir al-Sham that same day.
On November 22nd 2017 (22/11/17) ISIL seized several villages around Suruj from Tahrir al-Sham including Suruj itself. Suruj is located around 10km (6 miles) south-west of Qasr Ibn Warden. Again ISIL returned control of these villages to Tahrir al-Sham that same day.
On November 29th 2017 (29/11/17) ISIL seized the village of Abu Awjah from Tahrir al-Sham. A tiny hamlet Abu Awjah is located around 25km (15 miles) north-west of Homs City and around 40km (25 miles) south-west of Hama City. Again ISIL returned control of the village to Tahrir al-Sham that same day.
On December 8th 2017 (8/12/17) ISIL seized a number of villages around Suruj from Tahrir al-Sham. On this occasion ISIL's offensive lasted a full day coming to an end on December 9th (9/12/17). ISIL then waited all the way until December 22nd 2017 (22/12/17) before returning the territory to Tahrir al-Sham.
This shoving match was intended to serve two purposes for Erdogan. The first is to convince people that Al Qaeda and ISIL are fighting each other rather than allied with each other.
Secondly it was intended to convince primarily the local population that ISIL are allied with the Syrians.
Apparently the Syrian offensive against ISIL in the Euphrates River basin which killed tens of thousands of ISIL fighters and liberated several large cities was just an elaborate ruse to allow ISIL to temporarily seize a handful of villages in and around Hama Province.
Mainly though within the Hama Astana Zone ISIL have focused on fighting the Syrians alongside Tahrir al-Sham.
On December 5th 2017 (5/12/17) ISIL bombed a civilian bus in Homs City killing 10.
Since January 13th 2018 (13/1/18) ISIL have been conducting a sustained offensive against Syrian forces close to Abu al-Duhur. This seems to be a deliberate attempt to relieve pressure on Tahrir al-Sham who have been collapsing in the area in the face of a Syrian advance.
In response to Tahrir al-Sham's Abu Dali offensive launched on October 7th 2017 (7/10/17) the Syrians have not launched a counter offensive. Instead they've moved to suppress Tahrir al-Sham through an increased use of artillery and airstrikes.
Rather than countering Tahrir al-Sham at Abu Dali the Syrians instead launched a largescale operation of their own against the group on October 25th 2017 (25/10/17).
This began from positions close to the town of Ithriyah where Hama, Homs and Aleppo Provinces meet. Ithriyah itself is around 95km (60 miles) north-east of Hama City and around 120km (70 miles) south-east of Idlib City. Although was not revealed the time its ultimate objective was the military airbase at the town of Abu Duhur. This sits around 45km (30 miles) south-east of Idlib City.
One of the groups that make up Tahrir al-Sham are the Turkistan Islamist Party (TiP). They are original Al Qaeda.
The group's founder Zeydin Yusup fought alongside Osama bin Laden against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 1989 the TiP established their headquarters in Kabul under the protection of the Taliban before being evicted by US forces in 2001. They continue to be closely allied with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Pakistani Taliban.
Not to be mistaken with Turkmenistan the TiP wish to establish the Islamist state of Turkistan. They believe this should exist in parts of Mongolia and Tajikistan. Primarily though they wish to locate Turkistan within China's north-eastern Xinjiang Province.
Islamist groups in east and central Asia has been something of a recurring theme within the conflict;
On June 12th 2016 (12/6/16) an Islamist terrorist gun attack was carried out at the Pulse gay Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, US. This resulted in the murder of 49 people.
The gunman Omar Mateen was from Afghanistan. Amongst other reasons he was chosen because within Afghan society he would be considered not an Afghan but as a member of the Pushtu ethnic group. Uzbeks, Turks, Tajiks are also large ethnic groups within Afghanistan.
On October 31st 2017 (31/10/17) an Islamist terrorist conducted a run-over terror attack in New York City, US. This killed 8. The attacker was identified as Sayfullo Saipov - a 28 year old immigrant from Uzbekistan.
On January 1st 2017 (1/1/17) an Islamist gunman attacked the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. This recreation of the Pulse nightclub attack killed 39.
The attack was followed by several weeks of intense speculation other whether he was a Tajik or even a Uighur from China's Xinjiang Province. After Erdogan decided he'd got his money's worth it was confirmed that Abdulkadir Masharipov was in fact from Uzbekistan.
During the Syrians Abu Duhur Air Base operation a senior member of the Syrian government - Bouthaina Shaaban - visited China on November 25th 2017 (25/11/17). During the visit China congratulated Syria on its work combating the TiP and offered support against what China sees as a mutual enemy.
On November 28th 2017 (28/11/17) Russia started a rumour that China had deployed Special Operations Forces (SOF's) - specifically the Night Tigers and the Siberian Tigers - to Syria to battle the TiP. If true this would be the first combat deployment by China since the Korean War of the 1950's.
However it is worth pointing out that this rumour has circulated before and found to be untrue. Also there is currently a degree of tension between Russia and China over Syria.
The mantra from western nations has long been; "There is no military solution in Syria!"
Meanwhile Russia, China and Iran are jostling over how best to profit from the military solution that is clearly working. Around the time of the Chinese SOF's rumour Russia secured an exclusive reconstruction contract at China's expense.
Whatever the truth of the rumours Shaaban's visit to China spelled extremely bad news for the TiP in Syria.
November 30th 2017 (30/11/17) saw intense and coordinated strikes against their command and control structures. Two TiP headquarters were wiped out in Jisr al-Shugour around 30km (20 miles) south-east of Idlib City. TiP headquarters were also destroyed in Khirbet al-Jawz and Bedama.
There have also been a number of unclaimed bomb attacks in and around Idlib City. For example of January 8th 2018 (8/1/18) the headquarters of a Chechen group Soldiers of the Caucasus/Ajnad al-Kavkaz mysteriously blew up in the Thawra district.
While the Syrians were conducting their Abu Duhur Air Base operation Tahrir al-Sham attempted to continue their offensive at Abu Dali. With the Syrians focus elsewhere Tahrir al-Sham managed to capture the villages of Oum Turikiyah, Balil and Tell Oum Khazim all south of Abu Dali on November 6th 2017 (6/11/17).
However on November 23rd 2017 (23/11/17) the Syrians Galilee Brigade joined the Abu Duhur Air Base operation. They were quickly able to secure control of the main highway running to the airbase. This forced Tahrir al-Sham to abandon their Abu Dali offensive and throw their full resources into an effort to resist the Syrian advance on November 29th 2017 (29/11/17).
However Tahrir al-Sham were unable to halt the Syrians advance. On December 12th (12/12/17) they liberated the strategically important Zahraa Hill. On December 18th 2017 (18/12/17) they liberated Syriatel and Khinizir Hills. On December 19th 2017 (19/12/17) they liberated Aghad Hill.
On December 20th 2017 (20/12/17) Syria's elite Tiger Force joined the Abu Duhur Air Base operation fresh from their successes against ISIL in the Euphrates River Basin. This decisively tipped the balance of fighting in the Syrians favour.
On December 28th 2017 (28/12/17) they liberated Ward Hill and the surrounding villages. On January 4th 2018 (4/1/18) the Syrians reached the villages directly surrounding Abu Duhur Airbase.
By this time Tahrir al-Sham were in full collapse. They opened their armouries so they could force civilians to fight for them against the Syrians. On January 5th 2018 (5/1/18) they opened their central prison in Idlib City to force their captives to fight the Syrians.
On January 9th 2018 (9/1/18) Tahrir al-Sham retreated en mass from the entire Hass Plateau. This vast 2,100kmsq (1,260 milesq) area begins around 15km (10 miles) south of Aleppo City and 60km (35 miles) east of Idlib City.
On January 10th 2018 (10/1/18) the Syrians entered Abu Duhur Airbase. By January 20th (20/1/18) they had fully liberated and secured it.
To make matters worse for Tahrir al-Sham the Syrians have also been able to reclaim the territory lost during Tahrir al-Sham's Abu Dali offensive. On December 21st 2017 (21/12/17) Abu Dali itself was liberated. The Syrians then pressed on to liberate areas north of Abu Dali such as Moushfra on December 28th (28/12/17).
The Syrians have also been able liberate Tahrir al-Sham held villages close to the now infamous town of Khan Sheikhoun. This sits around 40km (25 miles) north of Hama City and around 55km (30 miles) south of Idlib City.
At around 18:35 on 22/1/18 (UK date) I will have to check & tidy this after dinner.
Edited at around 19:35 on 22/1/18 (UK date) to tidy and add;
As you would expect the collapse of his Army of Conquest in both the Hama and Sudetenland Astana Zones has left Erdogan even more furious than usual.
Frustratingly I will have to address his response in more detail at a later date. However the abridged version is;
January 6th 2018 (6/1/18) - Erdogan provides Tahrir al-Sham with satellite navigation capability to allow them to attack the Russian Air Base at Khmeimim in Syria's Latakia Province with true drones. It is likely Turkey itself was supplied with that capability by the US through NATO.
January 10th 2018 (10/1/18) - Erdogan summons Russian and Iranian Ambassadors to demand that operations in the Hama and Sudetenland Astana Zones cease immediately.
January 11th 2018 (11/1/18) - Erdogan threatens to attack SDF controlled Afrin Canton unless operations in Hama and the Sudetenland cease immediately. The threat being that he will attack Russian troops within Afrin Canton as part of the Astana Process.
January 13th 2018 (13/1/18) - US announces intention to re-task SDF from a combat force to a border security force. Restricting its ability to conduct offensive military operations.
January 16th 2018 (16/1/18) - Erdogan attaches his threat to attack Afrin Canton to US announcement of reduction of SDF's offensive capabilities. The intention being to disguise the threat already made to Russia and dazzle the US by equating issue to President Trump's legitimate need to secure the US' southern border.
January 19th 2018 (19/1/18) - Russia simply withdraws its forces from Afrin Canton while operations in Hama and the Sudetenland continue.
January 20th 2018 (20/1/18) - Erdogan launches attack on Afrin Canton. US Democrats shutdown US government including military spending and organise mass protests over the issue of Trump's legitimate need to secure US border.
20:00 on 22/1/18 (UK date).
Edited at around 16:35 on 25/1/18 (UK date) to correct;
Al Qaeda believe that Turkistan is made up of China's Xinjiang Province along with parts of Mongolia and
Kyrgyzstan. Erdogan spent weeks speculating that the Reina attacker was Kyrgz before confirming he was Uzbek attack with the support of Chinese Uyghurs.
16:40 on 25/1/18 (UK date).
https://twitter.com/RT_com/status95532415968435404
Saturday 20 January 2018
Operation Featherweight: Month 43, Week 2, Day 5.
This should be read as a continuation of Wednesday's post; https://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/operation-featherweight-month-43-week-2.html
If the southern Astana Zone along the Golan Heights was the easiest for the Astana Parties to agree upon then the northern zone centred around Idlib Province and designated; "The Sudetenland" has been the most controversial.
This is the zone that Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been desperate to invade and annex as part of his new Ottoman Empire. That alone is a grotesque violation of international law of a scale not seen since, well, Adolf Hitler invaded and annexed Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland in 1938.
It is also the heartland and main base of operations for Al Qaeda in Syria.
Erdogan would very much like to send the Turkish military to protect and assist Al Qaeda within the Sudetenland. However that is not something that the other Astana Parties can agree to.
You would hope it is something that the NATO nations lead by the US would also strongly oppose.
As a result through the negotiation Erdogan has repeatedly been forced to review and scale back his plans.
Erdogan initially wanted to invade the Sudetenland immediately following the liberation of Aleppo City for the Army of Conquest in December 2016. However the formation of the Astana Process forced him to put his plans on hold.
The Astana Zones plan was agreed in theory at the fifth round of meetings in the Astana Process held in May 2017. However it wasn't until the sixth round of meetings in the Astana Process held in September 2017 (14/9/17) Erdogan received theoretical permission to send regular Turkish troops to the Sudetenland.
Despite that theoretical permission in mid-September 2017 it took until October 6th 2017 (6/10/17) for Erdogan to actually send in troops. By that time the nature of their mission had become seriously reduced.
Rather then sending troops into all of Idlib Province Erdogan's invasion force was limited to a small area that that has become known as the; "Atmeh-Salwa Access Area."
Approximately 400kmsq (240milesq) in area this stretches from the Turkey/Syria border in the west to roughly the town of Anadan in the east and from the Simeon Highlands in the north to the Al Kafr Mountain in the south.
Within this area regular Turkish forces have established 10 control points or small bases. Crucially these Turkish control points are at the very north of Idlib Province. They sit far closer to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) controlled Afrin Canton directly to the north then they do to any areas under control of ISIL, Al Qaeda or even the Syrians themselves.
At the second round of meetings in the Astana Process held in July 2017 - prior to the Astana Zones Agreement - attempts were made to have the Army of Conquest included in the Astana Ceasefire.
This involved Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate The Support Front/Jabhat al-Nusra (ANF) rebrand themselves as; The Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The intention being to disguise the fact that they are part of Al Qaeda.
With no-one believing this name change it actually served to have the opposite effect.
Within the Army of Conquest all members of the coalition including various fragments of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) retained their own identity only agreeing to co-operate with each other. The formation of Tahrir al-Sham required all groups to formally pledge allegiance to Al Qaeda and take orders from the group.
Many of the extreme Islamist fragments of the FSA were only too happy to do this.
Probably the most high profile of these grouplets is the Movement of Nour al-Din al-Zenki/Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. Under former US President Barack Obama they were trained and armed by the US and fled en mass to the Sudetenland following the liberation of Aleppo City.
Probably the most high profile members of Nour al-Zinki are Ghassan al-Abed and Fatemah al-Abed. They are the parents of Bana al-Abed - the 7 year old girl who supposedly live Tweeted the horrors of the siege of Aleppo City. Having signed a book deal the al-Abeds are now living in Turkey under Erdogan's protection.
Nour al-Zinki were also responsible for the photographs of Omar Daqneesh which were widely circulated in particularly the western media in August 2016. What has been less well publicised is the video in which al-Zinki member Mahmoud Raslan - who took the Omar Daqneesh photograph - beheading a 13 year old Shia Muslim child as an infidel.
As part of the negotiation between the Astana Zones Agreement in May 2017 and Turkish troops invading the Sudetenland in October 2017 Erdogan has been trying to separate these FSA fragments from Tahrir al-Sham by bringing them under the control of the United Turkmen Army (UTA).
Sometimes known as the Syrian Turkmen Brigades (STB) the UTA are the paramilitary wing of the fascist Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) known as the Grey Wolves. Within Syria they function as an irregular and therefore illegal branch of the Turkish military.
Nour al-Zinki led what Erdogan hoped would become a wave of defections when it publicly broke ties with Tahrir al-Sham in June 2017.
In July 2017 Islamic Movement of the Freemen of the Levant/Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (Ahrar al-Sham) followed suit by publicly breaking off ties with Tahrir al-Sham. Ahrar al-Sham are closely linked to Erdogan in Turkey, Qatar and ISIL through the Muslim Brotherhood.
After defecting from Tahrir al-Sham Ahrar al-Sham then announced their intention to fighting the group. Ahrar al-Sham were quickly defeated by Tahrir al-Sham.
This type of shoving match between the two Sham groups is something we've become very familiar with. Particularly within the Garvaghy Road area.
To the north of the Sudetenland you have the SDF controlled Afrin Canton. Directly to the east of Afrin Canton you have Garvaghy Road.
Stretching or roughly 100km (60 miles) from Azaz/Kilis in the west and the Euphrates River in the east Garvaghy Road was invaded and annexed by regular Turkish forces in August 2016. Specifically to prevent the SDF cutting ISIL and Al Qaeda's supply lines with Turkey by linking Afrin Canton with the Shangri-La area under the SDF's control to the north-east of the Euphrates.
In the year prior to the formal Turkish invasion it was extremely common for the Army of Conquest and ISIL to swap control of towns in Garvaghy Road such as Azaz, Marea and Cobanbey. Thinking it would give Erdogan pretence to invade Al Qaeda would seize control of a town. When Erdogan realised it wouldn't Al Qaeda would simply return control of the town of ISIL and vice versa.
Over the course of several months the UTA established numerous new FSA grouplets to encourage defections from Tahrir al-Sham. The most notable of these being the Battalion of God/Faylaq al-Majid who emerged in September 2017.
On October 25th 2017 (25/10/17) Erdogan organised these Islamist defectors into the so-called; "Syrian National Army" which is supposedly the military wing of the; "Syrian Interim Government. With Syria already having a national army and a national government those names are only likely to spread confusion.
Tellingly the lead battalion in this so-called Syrian National Army is the Sultan Murad Battalion. Named after the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV they are one of the main divisions of the UTA or Turkish Grey Wolves.
However on November 17th 2017 (17/11/17) Nour al-Zinki forgot that they were supposedly no longer linked to Al Qaeda. They announced a joint offensive against the Syrians with Tahrir al-Sham.
At the same time as attempting to separate Islamist FSA fragments from Tahrir al-Sham Erdogan, Al Qaeda and Tahrir al-Sham themselves have been working hard to distance Tahrir al-Sham from Al Qaeda.
In mid-September 2017 Hamza bin Laden - son of Osama bin Laden, you may have heard of him - claimed to be in Syria's Sudetenland.
On behalf of Al Qaeda he condemned Tahrir al-Sham as traitors to Al Qaeda and called on Al Qaeda supporters to desert to Tahrir al-Sham to join a new true Al Qaeda group in Syria. Although much talked about and rumoured to have the name; Supporters of the Levant Group/Ansar Al-Furqan Fi Bilad al-Sham has yet to materialise.
On November 27th 2017 (27/11/17) Tahrir al-Sham arrested a number of senior figures in the group with very close links to Al Qaeda.
This prompted Al Qaeda's worldwide leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to release an audio message giving a stinging rebuke of Tahrir al-Sham's actions. The only problem was that it was recorded in late-September/early-October long before Tahrir al-Sham had made the arrests.
On December 1st 2017 (1/12/17) Al Qaeda used the messaging app Telegram to compare Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Then went on to call for Al Qaeda supporters to desert Tahrir al-Sham to join this new true Al Qaeda group in Syria. This Ansar al-Furqan group has still yet to materialise.
The fact I able to tell you what is being said in Al Qaeda message groups on Telegram should tell you all you need to know about how secure this Russian owned messaging app really is. It is a long established fact within intelligence circles that people are more inclined to believe information if they think they've been clever in stealing it.
These supposed splits between the UTA, Tahrir al-Sham have been accompanied by a large number of tit-for-tat bombings and assassinations.
Assassinations supposedly carried out by Tahrir al-Sham but most likely really carried out by Turkish intelligence have particularly targeted the White Helmets group. This is a clear and deliberate effort to try and convince people that the White Helmets aren't part of Al Qaeda and their extremely untrustworthy claims can be trusted.
On December 18th 2017 (18/12/17) Al Qaeda, Tahrir al-Sham, the UTA, Ahrar al-Sham etc all forgot they're trying to convince us they're separate from each other. They announced a joint offensive to fight the Syrians.
In short they confirmed that the Army of Conquest never went away. It just tried to change its name a few times.
Directly to the south of the Sudetenland you have the Hama Astana Zone. Due to the way that Syria's provinces are arranged this not only includes all of Hama Province but also large parts of Homs and Aleppo Provinces.
The plan is that I will provide a more detailed update on recent developments in that zone possibly on Monday (22/1/18). However the abridged version is that it came into force on August 3rd 2017 (3/8/17).
It then ceased to exist on August 29th 2017 (29/8/17) when Army of Conquest forces based in the Sudetenland launched an offensive against Syrian forces. This prompted several months of offensives and counter-offensives between the Syrians and the Army of Conquest.
On October 25th 2017 (25/10/17) the Syrians launched a big offensive of their own with the ultimate objective of liberating the Abu al-Duhur Airbase. This sits deep inside Idlib Province around 45km (25 miles) south-west of Idlib City.
On December 20th (20/12/17) the Syrian Tiger Forces joined the offensive fresh from their victory against ISIL in the Euphrates River Basin.
Since around January 4th (4/1/17) the Army of Conquest have been in full retreat arming local civilians and prisoners in an effort to hold off the Syrian advance. Today (20/1/17) the Syrians arrived at the airbase.
With Army of Conquest defences collapsing across Hama and the Sudetenland Erdogan has been threatening to send regular Turkish forces to attack the SDF within Afrin Canton.
In part this is to put pressure on Russia to put pressure on the Syrians to halt the Abu al-Duhur Airbase offence. Also if that doesn't work and it appears not to short of running home to daddy in Turkey the Army of Conquest are fast running out of places to retreat too.
The SDF are of course backed by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). Not only with airpower but also American ground forces including Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and conventional forces.
As such a Turkish attack on the SDF in Afrin Canton can only be viewed as an attack on CJTFOIR and against the US' interests in Syria.
Unfortunately the US' response to Erdogan's aggression has been rather hampered.
Yesterday (19/1/18) the Democrat Party shutdown the US government including military funding.
Today (20/1/18) the Democrat Party are staging anti-Trump "(Muslim) Sister Marches" in several US cities.
18:30 on 20/1/18 (UK date).
If the southern Astana Zone along the Golan Heights was the easiest for the Astana Parties to agree upon then the northern zone centred around Idlib Province and designated; "The Sudetenland" has been the most controversial.
This is the zone that Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been desperate to invade and annex as part of his new Ottoman Empire. That alone is a grotesque violation of international law of a scale not seen since, well, Adolf Hitler invaded and annexed Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland in 1938.
It is also the heartland and main base of operations for Al Qaeda in Syria.
Erdogan would very much like to send the Turkish military to protect and assist Al Qaeda within the Sudetenland. However that is not something that the other Astana Parties can agree to.
You would hope it is something that the NATO nations lead by the US would also strongly oppose.
As a result through the negotiation Erdogan has repeatedly been forced to review and scale back his plans.
Erdogan initially wanted to invade the Sudetenland immediately following the liberation of Aleppo City for the Army of Conquest in December 2016. However the formation of the Astana Process forced him to put his plans on hold.
The Astana Zones plan was agreed in theory at the fifth round of meetings in the Astana Process held in May 2017. However it wasn't until the sixth round of meetings in the Astana Process held in September 2017 (14/9/17) Erdogan received theoretical permission to send regular Turkish troops to the Sudetenland.
Despite that theoretical permission in mid-September 2017 it took until October 6th 2017 (6/10/17) for Erdogan to actually send in troops. By that time the nature of their mission had become seriously reduced.
Rather then sending troops into all of Idlib Province Erdogan's invasion force was limited to a small area that that has become known as the; "Atmeh-Salwa Access Area."
Approximately 400kmsq (240milesq) in area this stretches from the Turkey/Syria border in the west to roughly the town of Anadan in the east and from the Simeon Highlands in the north to the Al Kafr Mountain in the south.
Within this area regular Turkish forces have established 10 control points or small bases. Crucially these Turkish control points are at the very north of Idlib Province. They sit far closer to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) controlled Afrin Canton directly to the north then they do to any areas under control of ISIL, Al Qaeda or even the Syrians themselves.
At the second round of meetings in the Astana Process held in July 2017 - prior to the Astana Zones Agreement - attempts were made to have the Army of Conquest included in the Astana Ceasefire.
This involved Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate The Support Front/Jabhat al-Nusra (ANF) rebrand themselves as; The Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The intention being to disguise the fact that they are part of Al Qaeda.
With no-one believing this name change it actually served to have the opposite effect.
Within the Army of Conquest all members of the coalition including various fragments of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) retained their own identity only agreeing to co-operate with each other. The formation of Tahrir al-Sham required all groups to formally pledge allegiance to Al Qaeda and take orders from the group.
Many of the extreme Islamist fragments of the FSA were only too happy to do this.
Probably the most high profile of these grouplets is the Movement of Nour al-Din al-Zenki/Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. Under former US President Barack Obama they were trained and armed by the US and fled en mass to the Sudetenland following the liberation of Aleppo City.
Probably the most high profile members of Nour al-Zinki are Ghassan al-Abed and Fatemah al-Abed. They are the parents of Bana al-Abed - the 7 year old girl who supposedly live Tweeted the horrors of the siege of Aleppo City. Having signed a book deal the al-Abeds are now living in Turkey under Erdogan's protection.
Nour al-Zinki were also responsible for the photographs of Omar Daqneesh which were widely circulated in particularly the western media in August 2016. What has been less well publicised is the video in which al-Zinki member Mahmoud Raslan - who took the Omar Daqneesh photograph - beheading a 13 year old Shia Muslim child as an infidel.
As part of the negotiation between the Astana Zones Agreement in May 2017 and Turkish troops invading the Sudetenland in October 2017 Erdogan has been trying to separate these FSA fragments from Tahrir al-Sham by bringing them under the control of the United Turkmen Army (UTA).
Sometimes known as the Syrian Turkmen Brigades (STB) the UTA are the paramilitary wing of the fascist Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) known as the Grey Wolves. Within Syria they function as an irregular and therefore illegal branch of the Turkish military.
Nour al-Zinki led what Erdogan hoped would become a wave of defections when it publicly broke ties with Tahrir al-Sham in June 2017.
In July 2017 Islamic Movement of the Freemen of the Levant/Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (Ahrar al-Sham) followed suit by publicly breaking off ties with Tahrir al-Sham. Ahrar al-Sham are closely linked to Erdogan in Turkey, Qatar and ISIL through the Muslim Brotherhood.
After defecting from Tahrir al-Sham Ahrar al-Sham then announced their intention to fighting the group. Ahrar al-Sham were quickly defeated by Tahrir al-Sham.
This type of shoving match between the two Sham groups is something we've become very familiar with. Particularly within the Garvaghy Road area.
To the north of the Sudetenland you have the SDF controlled Afrin Canton. Directly to the east of Afrin Canton you have Garvaghy Road.
Stretching or roughly 100km (60 miles) from Azaz/Kilis in the west and the Euphrates River in the east Garvaghy Road was invaded and annexed by regular Turkish forces in August 2016. Specifically to prevent the SDF cutting ISIL and Al Qaeda's supply lines with Turkey by linking Afrin Canton with the Shangri-La area under the SDF's control to the north-east of the Euphrates.
In the year prior to the formal Turkish invasion it was extremely common for the Army of Conquest and ISIL to swap control of towns in Garvaghy Road such as Azaz, Marea and Cobanbey. Thinking it would give Erdogan pretence to invade Al Qaeda would seize control of a town. When Erdogan realised it wouldn't Al Qaeda would simply return control of the town of ISIL and vice versa.
Over the course of several months the UTA established numerous new FSA grouplets to encourage defections from Tahrir al-Sham. The most notable of these being the Battalion of God/Faylaq al-Majid who emerged in September 2017.
On October 25th 2017 (25/10/17) Erdogan organised these Islamist defectors into the so-called; "Syrian National Army" which is supposedly the military wing of the; "Syrian Interim Government. With Syria already having a national army and a national government those names are only likely to spread confusion.
Tellingly the lead battalion in this so-called Syrian National Army is the Sultan Murad Battalion. Named after the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV they are one of the main divisions of the UTA or Turkish Grey Wolves.
However on November 17th 2017 (17/11/17) Nour al-Zinki forgot that they were supposedly no longer linked to Al Qaeda. They announced a joint offensive against the Syrians with Tahrir al-Sham.
At the same time as attempting to separate Islamist FSA fragments from Tahrir al-Sham Erdogan, Al Qaeda and Tahrir al-Sham themselves have been working hard to distance Tahrir al-Sham from Al Qaeda.
In mid-September 2017 Hamza bin Laden - son of Osama bin Laden, you may have heard of him - claimed to be in Syria's Sudetenland.
On behalf of Al Qaeda he condemned Tahrir al-Sham as traitors to Al Qaeda and called on Al Qaeda supporters to desert to Tahrir al-Sham to join a new true Al Qaeda group in Syria. Although much talked about and rumoured to have the name; Supporters of the Levant Group/Ansar Al-Furqan Fi Bilad al-Sham has yet to materialise.
On November 27th 2017 (27/11/17) Tahrir al-Sham arrested a number of senior figures in the group with very close links to Al Qaeda.
This prompted Al Qaeda's worldwide leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to release an audio message giving a stinging rebuke of Tahrir al-Sham's actions. The only problem was that it was recorded in late-September/early-October long before Tahrir al-Sham had made the arrests.
On December 1st 2017 (1/12/17) Al Qaeda used the messaging app Telegram to compare Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Then went on to call for Al Qaeda supporters to desert Tahrir al-Sham to join this new true Al Qaeda group in Syria. This Ansar al-Furqan group has still yet to materialise.
The fact I able to tell you what is being said in Al Qaeda message groups on Telegram should tell you all you need to know about how secure this Russian owned messaging app really is. It is a long established fact within intelligence circles that people are more inclined to believe information if they think they've been clever in stealing it.
These supposed splits between the UTA, Tahrir al-Sham have been accompanied by a large number of tit-for-tat bombings and assassinations.
Assassinations supposedly carried out by Tahrir al-Sham but most likely really carried out by Turkish intelligence have particularly targeted the White Helmets group. This is a clear and deliberate effort to try and convince people that the White Helmets aren't part of Al Qaeda and their extremely untrustworthy claims can be trusted.
On December 18th 2017 (18/12/17) Al Qaeda, Tahrir al-Sham, the UTA, Ahrar al-Sham etc all forgot they're trying to convince us they're separate from each other. They announced a joint offensive to fight the Syrians.
In short they confirmed that the Army of Conquest never went away. It just tried to change its name a few times.
Directly to the south of the Sudetenland you have the Hama Astana Zone. Due to the way that Syria's provinces are arranged this not only includes all of Hama Province but also large parts of Homs and Aleppo Provinces.
The plan is that I will provide a more detailed update on recent developments in that zone possibly on Monday (22/1/18). However the abridged version is that it came into force on August 3rd 2017 (3/8/17).
It then ceased to exist on August 29th 2017 (29/8/17) when Army of Conquest forces based in the Sudetenland launched an offensive against Syrian forces. This prompted several months of offensives and counter-offensives between the Syrians and the Army of Conquest.
On October 25th 2017 (25/10/17) the Syrians launched a big offensive of their own with the ultimate objective of liberating the Abu al-Duhur Airbase. This sits deep inside Idlib Province around 45km (25 miles) south-west of Idlib City.
On December 20th (20/12/17) the Syrian Tiger Forces joined the offensive fresh from their victory against ISIL in the Euphrates River Basin.
Since around January 4th (4/1/17) the Army of Conquest have been in full retreat arming local civilians and prisoners in an effort to hold off the Syrian advance. Today (20/1/17) the Syrians arrived at the airbase.
With Army of Conquest defences collapsing across Hama and the Sudetenland Erdogan has been threatening to send regular Turkish forces to attack the SDF within Afrin Canton.
In part this is to put pressure on Russia to put pressure on the Syrians to halt the Abu al-Duhur Airbase offence. Also if that doesn't work and it appears not to short of running home to daddy in Turkey the Army of Conquest are fast running out of places to retreat too.
The SDF are of course backed by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). Not only with airpower but also American ground forces including Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and conventional forces.
As such a Turkish attack on the SDF in Afrin Canton can only be viewed as an attack on CJTFOIR and against the US' interests in Syria.
Unfortunately the US' response to Erdogan's aggression has been rather hampered.
Yesterday (19/1/18) the Democrat Party shutdown the US government including military funding.
Today (20/1/18) the Democrat Party are staging anti-Trump "(Muslim) Sister Marches" in several US cities.
18:30 on 20/1/18 (UK date).
Wednesday 17 January 2018
Operation Featherweight: Month 43, Week 2, Day 2.
Since the spring of 2017 Syrian forces have been steadily liberating the centre of the country from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
In early June 2017 the Syrians liberated the town of al-Tanf. This is located directly on the Syria/Iraq border. Its liberation marked the completion of a 280km (170 mile) advance east from the Syrian capital Damascus across the centre of the country.
In August 2017 the Syrians northern and southern advances converged on the town of as-Suknah. This sits around 130km (75 miles) south of Raqqa, 65km (40 miles) north-east of Palmyra and around 200km (120 miles) west of Syria's border with Iraq.
From as-Suknah the Syrians proceeded to liberate all of the main population centres on the south bank of the Euphrates River. This included the cities of Deir-ez-Zour and Mayadin along with the towns of Madan and Abu Kamal/Al-Bukamal.
On December 5th (5/12/17) the Syrians liberated Qataa, Jalaa, Ramadi and Buqan. These all sit in an roughly 65kmsq (40 milesq) area between Mayadin and Abu Kamal. The liberation of this area allowed the Syrians to declare that the entire southern bank of the Euphrates had been liberated from ISIL.
What has made this Syrian anti-ISIL operation possible is what is known as the; "Astana Zones Agreement."
In December 2016 the Aleppo City - the capital of Aleppo Province was liberated by the Syrians. This led to the establishment of the Astana Process on Syria.
Taking its name from Astana - the capital city of Kazakhstan - where the majority of its meetings are held this process allows Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iran to meet periodically to discuss the conflict.
At its first meeting held in Moscow, Russia on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16) the Astana Process drew up a ceasefire agreement which has gone on to be known as the Astana Ceasefire.
The Astana Ceasefire has always been clear that it does not apply to ISIL nor does it apply to Al Qaeda whatever name they happen to be using. At the insistence of Turkey the Astana Ceasefire also has never applied to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD).
The problem arises though that aside from ISIL the main militant force operating within Syria is the Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) coalition. This is made up a numerous factions;
One of the largest factions with the Army of Conquest is the Support Front/Jabhat al-Nusra (ANF). They are the Syrian wing of The Base/Al Qaeda (AQ).
The second largest faction within the Army of Conquest is the Islamic Movement of the Freemen of the Levant/Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (Ahrar al-Sham). They are very closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and through the Brotherhood to Qatar and Turkey.
Another significant faction within the Army of Conquest is the United Turkmen Army (UTA) who are sometimes known as the Syrian Turkmen Brigades (STB). This is formed of the paramilitary wing of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) known as the Grey Wolves.
Another influential but fortunately small faction within the Army of Conquest is the Army of Islam/Jaish al-Islam (JAI). They are an extreme Islamist group which in the past has carried out genocide and executed members of ISIL for not being extreme enough in their pursuit of the extermination of racial and religious minorities.
Worryingly within the Astana Process the Army of Islam are recognised as the representative of the 'moderate' opposition to the Syrian government.
The Army of Conquest coalition also includes a large number of small fragments of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA). They include a wide variety of ideologies ranging from the secular to the extreme Islamist.
Therefore it has long been subject to debate whether the Astana Ceasefire applies to all members of the Army of Conquest except for Al Qaeda or whether it doesn't apply to the Army of Conquest as a whole due to Al Qaeda's membership of the coalition.
Initially attempts were made to resolve this question by simply attempting to distance Jabhat al-Nusra and by extension the Army of Conquest from Al Qaeda. This led to Jabhat al-Nusra announcing it had broken ties with Al Qaeda and changing its name numerous times. In July 2017 they settled on the name; The Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Fortunately nobody fell for these rebranding attempts. Whatever name they are using be it Jabhat al-Nusra or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham the group is recognised as Al Qaeda in Syria.
At the fifth round of meetings in the Astana Process on May 3rd (3/5/17) and May 5th (5/5/17) a new approach was taken. Rather than attempting to apply the Astana Ceasefire to specific groups it would be applied to geographic areas where ISIL are not considered active. This led to the creation of what are termed the; "Astana Zones."
Four of these what are termed "Astana Zones" were created.
One was in the north of the country in Idlib Province centred around Idlib City. This area had already being designated; "The Sudetenland." In reference to Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan's desire to annex it as part of his new Ottoman Empire. Exactly like Adolf Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia in 1938.
Another two Astana Zones were created in central Syria. In and around Homs Province and in and around the capital Damascus. Particularly the East Ghouta suburb.
The fourth Astana Zone was created in southern Syria. In Deraa and Quneitra Provinces which border Jordan and Israel including the disputed Golan Heights.
As is often the case with this type agreement different parties have agreed from their own different reasons.
For example the Syrians and the Russians were keen to agree because it would free up resources to allow them to fight ISIL.
Turkey has agreed because they see it as an opportunity to invade and annex the Sudetenland. As with Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia the hope being this could be done under the pretence of a humanitarian intervention to enforce the ceasefire.
The one zone that everybody could agree upon is the southern zone close to the Golan Heights. Fighting in this area has periodically led to stray fire landing in Israel and Israel responding.
With all parties in the Syria conflict being anti-Semitic to varying degrees absolutely no-one wants Israel entering the conflict on their side. As a result they have all been happy to reduce the risk of this happening.
Since that fifth round of Astana meetings the Army of Conquest have grown increasingly frustrated by the process.
Things really boiled over at the seventh round of Astana meetings which took place on October 30th (30/10/17) and October 31st (31/10/17). This resulted in not a single one of the Army of Conquest's long list of demands being met.
Following that seventh round of Astana meetings Al Qaeda and the Army of Islam established the; "Army of Mohammad Operations Room" military force. Within the Astana Process the Army of Conquest are represented by the leader of the Army of Islam - Mohammad Alloush.
The Army of Mohammad then violated the Astana Zones agreement by attacking Syrian forces in two of the zones.
Within the southern zone they launched the; "Break the Chains of Harmon" operation on November 3rd 2017 (3/11/17). The objective of this operation was to advance from an area known as the; "Beit Jinn Pocket" to the nearby Druze town of Hadar.
The Beit Jinn Pocket sits around 30km (15 miles) south-west of the West Ghouta suburb of Damascus. The town of Hadar sits around 5km (3 miles) beyond the Beit Jinn Pocket.
Both of them sit in the Syrian Golan Heights. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) peacekeeping zone actually runs through Hadar and parts of the Beit Jinn Pocket.
The Druze are followers of an ancient and complex religion. Rather like followers of the Yezidi religion groups such as ISIL, Al Qaeda and the Army of Islam view the Druze as devil worshippers. The lowest of the low, worse even than Jews, who must be exterminated.
As a religious rather than an ethnic group the Druze are not limited to any particular country. However the majority of them tend to live in Lebanon, Syria and Israel.
In 1967 Syria and Israel went to war resulting in Israel capturing the Golan Heights area which has a high Druze population. As a result there are extremely close family links between Syrian Druze and Israeli Druze.
Amongst the worst atrocities committed by the Army of Islam was a series of massacres in Druze areas - particularly the village of Qalb Lawza - in the summer of 2015. This genocide sent large numbers of Syrian Druze fleeing to safety in Israel and triggered large scale protest and social unrest amongst Israel's Druze population.
In response to the threat to the town of Hadar Israel took the rare step on November 4th 2017 (4/11/17) of saying that it would intervene directly to prevent the Army of Mohammad conducting genocide.
Therefore the objectives of the Breaking the Chains of Harmon operation were threefold;
To exert pressure on the Astana Process by undermining the one Astana Zone that all parties agreed upon.
Force Israel to enter the conflict in opposition to the Army of Conquest. This would allow them to portray the Syrians as allies of the hated Jews boosting support for the Army of Conquest's cause.
Undermine the Syrians anti-ISIL operation by forcing them to fight multiple enemies on multiple fronts.
In the end Israel allowed Syrian Druze militias to transit through Israeli territory in order to out manoeuvre the Army of Mohammad. This resulted in the Breaking the Chains of Harmon to be completely halted by November 6th 2017 (6/11/17).
On November 16th 2017 (16/11/17) the Army of Mohammad launched a fresh offensive in the southern Astana Zone. This time targeting Syrian forces directly by shelling them at the town of Oum Bashar.
The Syrians immediately responded by shelling the Army of Mohammad at Kafr Hawr, Mazra at Beit Jinn and Beit Jinn itself. The three main towns within the Beit Jinn Pocket. As has become a pattern the Army of Mohammad responded to people standing up to them by falsely accusing the Syrians of using chemical weapons.
With the southern Astana Zone no longer being in place the Syrians pressed ahead with a counter offensive. On November 20th 2017 (20/11/17) they liberated Kafr Hawr and the strategically important surrounding hills.
On November 30th 2017 (30/11/17) the Syrians liberated the strategically important Bardiyah Hill just to the south of the Beit Jinn. On December 5th 2017 (5/12/17) they liberated Shibab Hill in the north-east of the Beit Jinn Pocket.
On December 11th 2017 (11/12/17) the Syrians liberated Maqtoul and Madiwar Hills. On December 15th (15/12/17) they liberated Bayda Hill giving them fire control over the town of Maghar al-Mir.
The Army of Mohammad's only response to this Syrian counter-offensive was an attempt to recapture Bardiyah Hill on December 8th 2017 (8/12/17). This failed the same day.
On December 27th 2017 (27/12/17) the Army of Mohammad offered the Syrians their surrender. On December 29th 2017 (29/12/17) that surrender was accepted.
A deal was agreed for Al Qaeda members of the Army of Mohammad to be transferred to the northern Astana Zone and for Army of Islam members to be transferred to Deraa City - the capital of Deraa Province.
As a result the Beit Jinn Pocket and much of the southern Astana Zone was completely liberated by the Syrians.
In preparation for the seventh round of meetings in the Astana Process the Army of Islam jacked up food prices in across the central Astana Zone. Particularly within the East Ghouta suburb where the Army of Islam are primarily based.
This meant that although there was ample food in the shops the poorer residents could not afford to buy it and a small number began to starve to death. The Army of Islam then took photographs of their victims - particularly the photogenic babies - and circulated them on the Internet.
The intention being to force international aid agencies such as the UN and the Red Cross/Crescent to deliver more food aid. Which the Army of Islam would then sell at a massively inflated price using the proceeds to fund more terror attacks.
Following the the seventh round of Astana meetings the newly formed Army of Mohammad launched an offensive against the Syrians in the central Astana Zone named; "They Were Wronged." On November 16th 2017 (16/11/17) Ahrar al-Sham and the Al-Rahman Legion/Faylaq al-Rahman joined the operation.
Primarily the They Were Wronged offensive has targeted on the Harasta Armoured Vehicle (HAV) Base. This is located within East Ghouta between the Harasta and Irbeen neighbourhoods.
However it has also featured shelling of areas of Damascus itself including Sabaa Bahrat and Abbasiyen Squares. On November 21st 2017 (21/11/17) the Fayhaa Sports Centre was particularly hard hit wounding 50 and killing two members of Syria's national Judo team.
As with the Breaking the Chains of Harmon offensive the They Were Wronged offensive was intended to exert pressure on the Astana Process by blowing apart the central Astana Zone. It was also intended to undermine the Syrians anti-ISIL operation and assist the offensive in the southern Astana Zone by forcing the Syrians to fight multiple enemies on multiple fronts.
Unlike in the southern Astana Zone the Army of Mohammad's They Were Wronged offensive has not triggered a fullscale Syrian counter-offensive.
Instead the Syrians have opted to merely suppress the Army of Mohammad through increase air and artillery strikes. They have though mounted limited ground incursions. Most notably into the Jobar neighbourhood on November 25th 2017 (25/11/17) and the Ayn Tarma district on December 5th 2017 (5/12/17).
As a result despite an marked increase in fighting there have been no real gains made by either side.
On November 17th 2017 (17/11/17) the Army of Mohammad claimed they'd captured part of the HAV Base. However by November 20th 2017 (20/11/17) the Syrians had regained full control of the base killing a senior Faylaq al-Rahman commander in the process.
Likewise on January 3rd 2018 (3/1/18) the Army of Mohammad claimed to have besieged and then captured the HAV Base. However on January 4th 2018 (4/1/18) the Syrians were able to move reinforcements to the base showing that it had neither been besieged nor captured.
On December 27th 2017 (27/12/17) a deal was reached to evacuate 500 civil ans from the fighting in East Ghouta. However on December 29th 2017 (29/12/17) the Army of Mohammad launched a fresh assault on the HAV Base ending the ceasefire with just 29 of the evacuations having taken place.
As the Breaking the Chains of Harmon offensive has been completely defeated and the They Were Wronged offensive has stalled the Army of Conquest have done what they always do when they're losing;
Accused the Syrians of committing atrocities and demand the United Nations (UN) and the Astana Parties stopped the Syrians shooting back at them.
17:10 on 17/1/18 (UK date).
In early June 2017 the Syrians liberated the town of al-Tanf. This is located directly on the Syria/Iraq border. Its liberation marked the completion of a 280km (170 mile) advance east from the Syrian capital Damascus across the centre of the country.
In August 2017 the Syrians northern and southern advances converged on the town of as-Suknah. This sits around 130km (75 miles) south of Raqqa, 65km (40 miles) north-east of Palmyra and around 200km (120 miles) west of Syria's border with Iraq.
From as-Suknah the Syrians proceeded to liberate all of the main population centres on the south bank of the Euphrates River. This included the cities of Deir-ez-Zour and Mayadin along with the towns of Madan and Abu Kamal/Al-Bukamal.
On December 5th (5/12/17) the Syrians liberated Qataa, Jalaa, Ramadi and Buqan. These all sit in an roughly 65kmsq (40 milesq) area between Mayadin and Abu Kamal. The liberation of this area allowed the Syrians to declare that the entire southern bank of the Euphrates had been liberated from ISIL.
What has made this Syrian anti-ISIL operation possible is what is known as the; "Astana Zones Agreement."
In December 2016 the Aleppo City - the capital of Aleppo Province was liberated by the Syrians. This led to the establishment of the Astana Process on Syria.
Taking its name from Astana - the capital city of Kazakhstan - where the majority of its meetings are held this process allows Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iran to meet periodically to discuss the conflict.
At its first meeting held in Moscow, Russia on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16) the Astana Process drew up a ceasefire agreement which has gone on to be known as the Astana Ceasefire.
The Astana Ceasefire has always been clear that it does not apply to ISIL nor does it apply to Al Qaeda whatever name they happen to be using. At the insistence of Turkey the Astana Ceasefire also has never applied to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD).
The problem arises though that aside from ISIL the main militant force operating within Syria is the Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) coalition. This is made up a numerous factions;
One of the largest factions with the Army of Conquest is the Support Front/Jabhat al-Nusra (ANF). They are the Syrian wing of The Base/Al Qaeda (AQ).
The second largest faction within the Army of Conquest is the Islamic Movement of the Freemen of the Levant/Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (Ahrar al-Sham). They are very closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and through the Brotherhood to Qatar and Turkey.
Another significant faction within the Army of Conquest is the United Turkmen Army (UTA) who are sometimes known as the Syrian Turkmen Brigades (STB). This is formed of the paramilitary wing of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) known as the Grey Wolves.
Another influential but fortunately small faction within the Army of Conquest is the Army of Islam/Jaish al-Islam (JAI). They are an extreme Islamist group which in the past has carried out genocide and executed members of ISIL for not being extreme enough in their pursuit of the extermination of racial and religious minorities.
Worryingly within the Astana Process the Army of Islam are recognised as the representative of the 'moderate' opposition to the Syrian government.
The Army of Conquest coalition also includes a large number of small fragments of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA). They include a wide variety of ideologies ranging from the secular to the extreme Islamist.
Therefore it has long been subject to debate whether the Astana Ceasefire applies to all members of the Army of Conquest except for Al Qaeda or whether it doesn't apply to the Army of Conquest as a whole due to Al Qaeda's membership of the coalition.
Initially attempts were made to resolve this question by simply attempting to distance Jabhat al-Nusra and by extension the Army of Conquest from Al Qaeda. This led to Jabhat al-Nusra announcing it had broken ties with Al Qaeda and changing its name numerous times. In July 2017 they settled on the name; The Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Fortunately nobody fell for these rebranding attempts. Whatever name they are using be it Jabhat al-Nusra or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham the group is recognised as Al Qaeda in Syria.
At the fifth round of meetings in the Astana Process on May 3rd (3/5/17) and May 5th (5/5/17) a new approach was taken. Rather than attempting to apply the Astana Ceasefire to specific groups it would be applied to geographic areas where ISIL are not considered active. This led to the creation of what are termed the; "Astana Zones."
Four of these what are termed "Astana Zones" were created.
One was in the north of the country in Idlib Province centred around Idlib City. This area had already being designated; "The Sudetenland." In reference to Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan's desire to annex it as part of his new Ottoman Empire. Exactly like Adolf Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia in 1938.
Another two Astana Zones were created in central Syria. In and around Homs Province and in and around the capital Damascus. Particularly the East Ghouta suburb.
The fourth Astana Zone was created in southern Syria. In Deraa and Quneitra Provinces which border Jordan and Israel including the disputed Golan Heights.
As is often the case with this type agreement different parties have agreed from their own different reasons.
For example the Syrians and the Russians were keen to agree because it would free up resources to allow them to fight ISIL.
Turkey has agreed because they see it as an opportunity to invade and annex the Sudetenland. As with Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia the hope being this could be done under the pretence of a humanitarian intervention to enforce the ceasefire.
The one zone that everybody could agree upon is the southern zone close to the Golan Heights. Fighting in this area has periodically led to stray fire landing in Israel and Israel responding.
With all parties in the Syria conflict being anti-Semitic to varying degrees absolutely no-one wants Israel entering the conflict on their side. As a result they have all been happy to reduce the risk of this happening.
Since that fifth round of Astana meetings the Army of Conquest have grown increasingly frustrated by the process.
Things really boiled over at the seventh round of Astana meetings which took place on October 30th (30/10/17) and October 31st (31/10/17). This resulted in not a single one of the Army of Conquest's long list of demands being met.
Following that seventh round of Astana meetings Al Qaeda and the Army of Islam established the; "Army of Mohammad Operations Room" military force. Within the Astana Process the Army of Conquest are represented by the leader of the Army of Islam - Mohammad Alloush.
The Army of Mohammad then violated the Astana Zones agreement by attacking Syrian forces in two of the zones.
Within the southern zone they launched the; "Break the Chains of Harmon" operation on November 3rd 2017 (3/11/17). The objective of this operation was to advance from an area known as the; "Beit Jinn Pocket" to the nearby Druze town of Hadar.
The Beit Jinn Pocket sits around 30km (15 miles) south-west of the West Ghouta suburb of Damascus. The town of Hadar sits around 5km (3 miles) beyond the Beit Jinn Pocket.
Both of them sit in the Syrian Golan Heights. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) peacekeeping zone actually runs through Hadar and parts of the Beit Jinn Pocket.
The Druze are followers of an ancient and complex religion. Rather like followers of the Yezidi religion groups such as ISIL, Al Qaeda and the Army of Islam view the Druze as devil worshippers. The lowest of the low, worse even than Jews, who must be exterminated.
As a religious rather than an ethnic group the Druze are not limited to any particular country. However the majority of them tend to live in Lebanon, Syria and Israel.
In 1967 Syria and Israel went to war resulting in Israel capturing the Golan Heights area which has a high Druze population. As a result there are extremely close family links between Syrian Druze and Israeli Druze.
Amongst the worst atrocities committed by the Army of Islam was a series of massacres in Druze areas - particularly the village of Qalb Lawza - in the summer of 2015. This genocide sent large numbers of Syrian Druze fleeing to safety in Israel and triggered large scale protest and social unrest amongst Israel's Druze population.
In response to the threat to the town of Hadar Israel took the rare step on November 4th 2017 (4/11/17) of saying that it would intervene directly to prevent the Army of Mohammad conducting genocide.
Therefore the objectives of the Breaking the Chains of Harmon operation were threefold;
To exert pressure on the Astana Process by undermining the one Astana Zone that all parties agreed upon.
Force Israel to enter the conflict in opposition to the Army of Conquest. This would allow them to portray the Syrians as allies of the hated Jews boosting support for the Army of Conquest's cause.
Undermine the Syrians anti-ISIL operation by forcing them to fight multiple enemies on multiple fronts.
In the end Israel allowed Syrian Druze militias to transit through Israeli territory in order to out manoeuvre the Army of Mohammad. This resulted in the Breaking the Chains of Harmon to be completely halted by November 6th 2017 (6/11/17).
On November 16th 2017 (16/11/17) the Army of Mohammad launched a fresh offensive in the southern Astana Zone. This time targeting Syrian forces directly by shelling them at the town of Oum Bashar.
The Syrians immediately responded by shelling the Army of Mohammad at Kafr Hawr, Mazra at Beit Jinn and Beit Jinn itself. The three main towns within the Beit Jinn Pocket. As has become a pattern the Army of Mohammad responded to people standing up to them by falsely accusing the Syrians of using chemical weapons.
With the southern Astana Zone no longer being in place the Syrians pressed ahead with a counter offensive. On November 20th 2017 (20/11/17) they liberated Kafr Hawr and the strategically important surrounding hills.
On November 30th 2017 (30/11/17) the Syrians liberated the strategically important Bardiyah Hill just to the south of the Beit Jinn. On December 5th 2017 (5/12/17) they liberated Shibab Hill in the north-east of the Beit Jinn Pocket.
On December 11th 2017 (11/12/17) the Syrians liberated Maqtoul and Madiwar Hills. On December 15th (15/12/17) they liberated Bayda Hill giving them fire control over the town of Maghar al-Mir.
The Army of Mohammad's only response to this Syrian counter-offensive was an attempt to recapture Bardiyah Hill on December 8th 2017 (8/12/17). This failed the same day.
On December 27th 2017 (27/12/17) the Army of Mohammad offered the Syrians their surrender. On December 29th 2017 (29/12/17) that surrender was accepted.
A deal was agreed for Al Qaeda members of the Army of Mohammad to be transferred to the northern Astana Zone and for Army of Islam members to be transferred to Deraa City - the capital of Deraa Province.
As a result the Beit Jinn Pocket and much of the southern Astana Zone was completely liberated by the Syrians.
In preparation for the seventh round of meetings in the Astana Process the Army of Islam jacked up food prices in across the central Astana Zone. Particularly within the East Ghouta suburb where the Army of Islam are primarily based.
This meant that although there was ample food in the shops the poorer residents could not afford to buy it and a small number began to starve to death. The Army of Islam then took photographs of their victims - particularly the photogenic babies - and circulated them on the Internet.
The intention being to force international aid agencies such as the UN and the Red Cross/Crescent to deliver more food aid. Which the Army of Islam would then sell at a massively inflated price using the proceeds to fund more terror attacks.
Following the the seventh round of Astana meetings the newly formed Army of Mohammad launched an offensive against the Syrians in the central Astana Zone named; "They Were Wronged." On November 16th 2017 (16/11/17) Ahrar al-Sham and the Al-Rahman Legion/Faylaq al-Rahman joined the operation.
Primarily the They Were Wronged offensive has targeted on the Harasta Armoured Vehicle (HAV) Base. This is located within East Ghouta between the Harasta and Irbeen neighbourhoods.
However it has also featured shelling of areas of Damascus itself including Sabaa Bahrat and Abbasiyen Squares. On November 21st 2017 (21/11/17) the Fayhaa Sports Centre was particularly hard hit wounding 50 and killing two members of Syria's national Judo team.
As with the Breaking the Chains of Harmon offensive the They Were Wronged offensive was intended to exert pressure on the Astana Process by blowing apart the central Astana Zone. It was also intended to undermine the Syrians anti-ISIL operation and assist the offensive in the southern Astana Zone by forcing the Syrians to fight multiple enemies on multiple fronts.
Unlike in the southern Astana Zone the Army of Mohammad's They Were Wronged offensive has not triggered a fullscale Syrian counter-offensive.
Instead the Syrians have opted to merely suppress the Army of Mohammad through increase air and artillery strikes. They have though mounted limited ground incursions. Most notably into the Jobar neighbourhood on November 25th 2017 (25/11/17) and the Ayn Tarma district on December 5th 2017 (5/12/17).
As a result despite an marked increase in fighting there have been no real gains made by either side.
On November 17th 2017 (17/11/17) the Army of Mohammad claimed they'd captured part of the HAV Base. However by November 20th 2017 (20/11/17) the Syrians had regained full control of the base killing a senior Faylaq al-Rahman commander in the process.
Likewise on January 3rd 2018 (3/1/18) the Army of Mohammad claimed to have besieged and then captured the HAV Base. However on January 4th 2018 (4/1/18) the Syrians were able to move reinforcements to the base showing that it had neither been besieged nor captured.
On December 27th 2017 (27/12/17) a deal was reached to evacuate 500 civil ans from the fighting in East Ghouta. However on December 29th 2017 (29/12/17) the Army of Mohammad launched a fresh assault on the HAV Base ending the ceasefire with just 29 of the evacuations having taken place.
As the Breaking the Chains of Harmon offensive has been completely defeated and the They Were Wronged offensive has stalled the Army of Conquest have done what they always do when they're losing;
Accused the Syrians of committing atrocities and demand the United Nations (UN) and the Astana Parties stopped the Syrians shooting back at them.
17:10 on 17/1/18 (UK date).
Thursday 11 January 2018
Operation Featherweight: Month 43, Week 1, Day 3.
This should be read as a direct continuation of yesterday's post; http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/operation-featherweight-month-43-week-1.html
I should start by correcting an omission from that post.
ISIL are allied with the Army of Khalid Ibrahim al-Walid/Jaish Khalid Ibn al-Walid group who operate in the Yarmouk River basin. ISIL themselves continue to maintain a presence on the border between Hama and Homs Provinces and the Euphrates River basin. They also maintain control over the Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian Refugees in the suburbs of the Syrian capital Damascus.
Apart from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) the other main force which has been fighting to clear ISIL from the Euphrates River basin are the Syrians themselves. They are backed by longstanding allies Russia and Iran alongside the Lebanese group Hezbollah.
Since the late spring of 2017 the Syrians have been working to liberate central Syria from ISIL. Both in the north and south of the country.
In August 2017 the Syrians north and south advances converged on the town of as-Suknah. This around 130km (75 miles) south of Raqqa, 65km (40 miles) north-east of Palmyra and around 200km (120 miles) west of Syria's border with Iraq.
Having converged on as-Suknah Syrian forces then liberated the cities, towns, villages and other population centres along the south bank of the Euphrates River.
On September 24th 2017 (24/9/17) the Syrians liberated Madan. This sits around 55km (30 miles) south-east of Raqqa and around 65km (40 miles) north-west of Deir-ez-Zour City.
On October 14th 2017 (14/10/17) the Syrians liberated Mayadin. This sits around 60km (35 miles) south-east of Deir-ez-Zour and around 70km (40 miles) of the Syria/Iraq border.
On November 18th 2017 (18/11/17) the Syrians fully liberated Deir-ez-Zour City. The capital of Deir-ez-Zour Province this is the largest city on the Euphrates save for Raqqa.
On November 9th 2017 (9/11/17) the Syrians liberated Abu Kamal/Al-Bukamal. The last major population centre held by ISIL on the south bank of the Euphrates this sits around 80km (50 miles) south-east of Mayadin and just 8km (5 miles) from Syria's border with Iraq.
Following the liberation of Abu Kamal ISIL were able to re-group outside of the town. Along with sleeper cells remaining in the town they were able to launch a counter-offensive which had recaptured around 50-75% of the town by November 12th 2017 (12/11/17).
However bolstered by reinforcements from Mayadin the Syrians were able to launch a fresh attempt to liberate Abu Kamal on November 13th 2017 (13/11/17). By November 19th 2017 (19/11/17) had been once again liberated and remains under Syrian control.
Finally the Syrians set about liberating the areas between Mayadin and Abu Kamal. On December 5th (5/12/17) the Syrians liberated Qataa, Jalaa, Ramadi and Buqan. These all sit in an roughly 65kmsq (40 milesq) area.
The last area under ISIL control the liberation of the Qataa to Buqan area allowed to Syrians to declare that all the territory on the south bank of the Euphrates had been liberated from ISIL.
With the SDF liberating the northern bank of the Euphrates and the Syrians liberating the southern bank there has obviously been some tension between the two.
For example on December 2nd (2/12/17) the Syrians liberated al-Jadlah. This sits around 50km (30 miles) north-west of Abu Kamal and around 30km (20 miles) south-east of Mayadin.
Crucially al-Jadlah sits on the northern bank of the Euphrates which is generally considered to be the SDF's area of operations. It also sits within the area traditionally controlled by the Sheitat Tribe.
As such the Syrians move into al-Jadlah seemed to be an attempt to prevent the SDF from liberating the Sheitat Tribal area instead keeping it under Syrian government control. However the Syrians have not attempted to advance beyond al-Jadlah and although I've not had it confirmed may have withdrawn to their side of the Euphrates.
On December 22nd 2017 (22/12/17) the SDF and the Syrians exchanged fire at Busayrah and Khisham. Busayrah sits almost on an island where the Khobar and Euphrates Rivers meet. Khisham sits almost directly to the south-east of Busayrah.
This exchange of fire was initiated by the Syrians. It occurred during the eighth round of meetings in the Astana Process in Syria.
The main topic for discussion at that eighth round of meetings were efforts to arrange the Syrian National Congress. This provisionally scheduled to be held in Sochi, Russia on January 29th 2018 (29/1/18) and January 30th 2018 (30/1/18).
This was initially agreed upon at the seventh round of meetings in the Astana Process held on on October 30th 2017 (30/10/17) and October 31st 2017 (31/10/17). The congress was supposed to take place on November 18th 2017 (18/11/17). However Turkey backed out of the agreement due to plans to include Syria's Kurds in what is supposed to be a national dialogue of all Syrian people.
Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan's objection seems to be to all Kurds wherever the may be in the World. However he specifically objects to the involvement of the SDF within the Syrian National Congress. Therefore there are certain advantages to the Syrians and the Russians showing they share Erdogan's hostility to the SDF.
The eighth round of meetings in the Astana Process concluded with a much firmer commitment to the Syrian National Congress being held in Sochi at the end of January. As a concession Erdogan has agreed to allow Syria's Kurds to be represented by the Kurdish National Coalition (ENKS).
However the ENKS have little influence amongst Syria's Kurds being an extension of the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Under the Barzanis the KDP has become little more than a puppet regime for Erdogan.
In their sweep across the south of the country the Syrians liberated the town of al-Tanf in early June 2017. This is located right on the Syria/Iraq border around 280km (170 miles) east of the Syrian capital Damascus.
In liberating al-Tanf the Syrians isolated the nearby military base designated; "Bobby Sands." This was being used by American and British Special Operations Forces (SOF's) to train fragments of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) known collectively as; "The Southern Front."
Following the Syrian liberation of al-Tanf the British SOF's - the Special Air Service (SAS) - pulled out of Bobby Sands.
However American SOF's have continued to operate the base in order to train the Revolutionary Commando Army/Maghawir al-Thawra group. With ISIL largely defeated and the group unaffiliated with the SDF it is unclear for what purpose Maghawir al-Thawra continue to be trained.
The presence of American SOF's at the Bobby Sands base prevent the Syrians and Russians conducting airstrikes in the area. Likewise the presence of Syrian and Russian forces prevent CJTFOIR from conducting airstrikes in the area.
This has created an ungoverned corridor through which fleeing ISIL fighters seem able to move freely.
The Syrians and the Russians have made it quite clear that they think it's time for the US to abandon the Bobby Sands base so security can be restored to the area. The British have already left.
Despite the clashes a Busayrah and Khisham the Syrians seem to be happy to leave the SDF to their area of operations north of the Euphrates.
The Syrians most elite ground unit is the Tiger Forces. It was these forces that travelled from Mayadin on November 13th 2017 (13/11/17) to decisively win the second battle for Abu Kamal
Although they are very different in structure the Syrian Tiger Forces name seems to be inspired by the Tiger Force Battalion of the US 101st Airborne. During the Vietnam War the US Tiger Force were notorious for committing war crimes and human rights abuses.
Something that people might need to be reminded off when the US pretends to be appalled by accusations of similar allegations being made against Syrian forces.
On or around December 13th 2017 (13/12/17) the Syrian Tiger Forces were redeployed away from the Euphrates River basin. They handed responsibility for security in the area to the Jerusalem Brigade/Liwa al-Quds and the Fatimiah (daughter of the Prophet) Brigade/Liwa al-Fatemiyoun militias.
These Sunni and Shia militias are clearly not as effective as the Tiger Forces. On December 18th (18/12/17) ISIL conducted a fresh offensive allowing them recapture the Buqan area including Ramadi and al-Hasrat.
Fortunately the militias in Syria received assistance from the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). They crossed into Syria and the Buqan area was once again liberated on December 22nd 2017 (22/12/17).
Since then there have been no clashes reported between either the Syrians and ISIL or the Syrians and the SDF in the Euphrates basin area.
17:45 on 11/1/18 (UK date).
I should start by correcting an omission from that post.
ISIL are allied with the Army of Khalid Ibrahim al-Walid/Jaish Khalid Ibn al-Walid group who operate in the Yarmouk River basin. ISIL themselves continue to maintain a presence on the border between Hama and Homs Provinces and the Euphrates River basin. They also maintain control over the Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian Refugees in the suburbs of the Syrian capital Damascus.
Apart from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) the other main force which has been fighting to clear ISIL from the Euphrates River basin are the Syrians themselves. They are backed by longstanding allies Russia and Iran alongside the Lebanese group Hezbollah.
Since the late spring of 2017 the Syrians have been working to liberate central Syria from ISIL. Both in the north and south of the country.
In August 2017 the Syrians north and south advances converged on the town of as-Suknah. This around 130km (75 miles) south of Raqqa, 65km (40 miles) north-east of Palmyra and around 200km (120 miles) west of Syria's border with Iraq.
Having converged on as-Suknah Syrian forces then liberated the cities, towns, villages and other population centres along the south bank of the Euphrates River.
On September 24th 2017 (24/9/17) the Syrians liberated Madan. This sits around 55km (30 miles) south-east of Raqqa and around 65km (40 miles) north-west of Deir-ez-Zour City.
On October 14th 2017 (14/10/17) the Syrians liberated Mayadin. This sits around 60km (35 miles) south-east of Deir-ez-Zour and around 70km (40 miles) of the Syria/Iraq border.
On November 18th 2017 (18/11/17) the Syrians fully liberated Deir-ez-Zour City. The capital of Deir-ez-Zour Province this is the largest city on the Euphrates save for Raqqa.
On November 9th 2017 (9/11/17) the Syrians liberated Abu Kamal/Al-Bukamal. The last major population centre held by ISIL on the south bank of the Euphrates this sits around 80km (50 miles) south-east of Mayadin and just 8km (5 miles) from Syria's border with Iraq.
Following the liberation of Abu Kamal ISIL were able to re-group outside of the town. Along with sleeper cells remaining in the town they were able to launch a counter-offensive which had recaptured around 50-75% of the town by November 12th 2017 (12/11/17).
However bolstered by reinforcements from Mayadin the Syrians were able to launch a fresh attempt to liberate Abu Kamal on November 13th 2017 (13/11/17). By November 19th 2017 (19/11/17) had been once again liberated and remains under Syrian control.
Finally the Syrians set about liberating the areas between Mayadin and Abu Kamal. On December 5th (5/12/17) the Syrians liberated Qataa, Jalaa, Ramadi and Buqan. These all sit in an roughly 65kmsq (40 milesq) area.
The last area under ISIL control the liberation of the Qataa to Buqan area allowed to Syrians to declare that all the territory on the south bank of the Euphrates had been liberated from ISIL.
With the SDF liberating the northern bank of the Euphrates and the Syrians liberating the southern bank there has obviously been some tension between the two.
For example on December 2nd (2/12/17) the Syrians liberated al-Jadlah. This sits around 50km (30 miles) north-west of Abu Kamal and around 30km (20 miles) south-east of Mayadin.
Crucially al-Jadlah sits on the northern bank of the Euphrates which is generally considered to be the SDF's area of operations. It also sits within the area traditionally controlled by the Sheitat Tribe.
As such the Syrians move into al-Jadlah seemed to be an attempt to prevent the SDF from liberating the Sheitat Tribal area instead keeping it under Syrian government control. However the Syrians have not attempted to advance beyond al-Jadlah and although I've not had it confirmed may have withdrawn to their side of the Euphrates.
On December 22nd 2017 (22/12/17) the SDF and the Syrians exchanged fire at Busayrah and Khisham. Busayrah sits almost on an island where the Khobar and Euphrates Rivers meet. Khisham sits almost directly to the south-east of Busayrah.
This exchange of fire was initiated by the Syrians. It occurred during the eighth round of meetings in the Astana Process in Syria.
The main topic for discussion at that eighth round of meetings were efforts to arrange the Syrian National Congress. This provisionally scheduled to be held in Sochi, Russia on January 29th 2018 (29/1/18) and January 30th 2018 (30/1/18).
This was initially agreed upon at the seventh round of meetings in the Astana Process held on on October 30th 2017 (30/10/17) and October 31st 2017 (31/10/17). The congress was supposed to take place on November 18th 2017 (18/11/17). However Turkey backed out of the agreement due to plans to include Syria's Kurds in what is supposed to be a national dialogue of all Syrian people.
Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan's objection seems to be to all Kurds wherever the may be in the World. However he specifically objects to the involvement of the SDF within the Syrian National Congress. Therefore there are certain advantages to the Syrians and the Russians showing they share Erdogan's hostility to the SDF.
The eighth round of meetings in the Astana Process concluded with a much firmer commitment to the Syrian National Congress being held in Sochi at the end of January. As a concession Erdogan has agreed to allow Syria's Kurds to be represented by the Kurdish National Coalition (ENKS).
However the ENKS have little influence amongst Syria's Kurds being an extension of the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Under the Barzanis the KDP has become little more than a puppet regime for Erdogan.
In their sweep across the south of the country the Syrians liberated the town of al-Tanf in early June 2017. This is located right on the Syria/Iraq border around 280km (170 miles) east of the Syrian capital Damascus.
In liberating al-Tanf the Syrians isolated the nearby military base designated; "Bobby Sands." This was being used by American and British Special Operations Forces (SOF's) to train fragments of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) known collectively as; "The Southern Front."
Following the Syrian liberation of al-Tanf the British SOF's - the Special Air Service (SAS) - pulled out of Bobby Sands.
However American SOF's have continued to operate the base in order to train the Revolutionary Commando Army/Maghawir al-Thawra group. With ISIL largely defeated and the group unaffiliated with the SDF it is unclear for what purpose Maghawir al-Thawra continue to be trained.
The presence of American SOF's at the Bobby Sands base prevent the Syrians and Russians conducting airstrikes in the area. Likewise the presence of Syrian and Russian forces prevent CJTFOIR from conducting airstrikes in the area.
This has created an ungoverned corridor through which fleeing ISIL fighters seem able to move freely.
The Syrians and the Russians have made it quite clear that they think it's time for the US to abandon the Bobby Sands base so security can be restored to the area. The British have already left.
Despite the clashes a Busayrah and Khisham the Syrians seem to be happy to leave the SDF to their area of operations north of the Euphrates.
The Syrians most elite ground unit is the Tiger Forces. It was these forces that travelled from Mayadin on November 13th 2017 (13/11/17) to decisively win the second battle for Abu Kamal
Although they are very different in structure the Syrian Tiger Forces name seems to be inspired by the Tiger Force Battalion of the US 101st Airborne. During the Vietnam War the US Tiger Force were notorious for committing war crimes and human rights abuses.
Something that people might need to be reminded off when the US pretends to be appalled by accusations of similar allegations being made against Syrian forces.
On or around December 13th 2017 (13/12/17) the Syrian Tiger Forces were redeployed away from the Euphrates River basin. They handed responsibility for security in the area to the Jerusalem Brigade/Liwa al-Quds and the Fatimiah (daughter of the Prophet) Brigade/Liwa al-Fatemiyoun militias.
These Sunni and Shia militias are clearly not as effective as the Tiger Forces. On December 18th (18/12/17) ISIL conducted a fresh offensive allowing them recapture the Buqan area including Ramadi and al-Hasrat.
Fortunately the militias in Syria received assistance from the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). They crossed into Syria and the Buqan area was once again liberated on December 22nd 2017 (22/12/17).
Since then there have been no clashes reported between either the Syrians and ISIL or the Syrians and the SDF in the Euphrates basin area.
17:45 on 11/1/18 (UK date).
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