On Saturday (15/12/12) voters in Egypt will go to the polls in a referendum to either approve or reject the nations post-revolution constitution. The official Arabic text of the document can be viewed here; http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/constitution2012.pdf and the English translation that I've been working from can be viewed here; http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated
On reading the proposed constitution the first problem that becomes apparent is that large sections of it would seem more at home in the manifesto of a political party rather then in the constitutional basis for a sovereign state. For example Article 17 puts a constitutional obligation on the Egyptian state to foster small handicraft industries. This may be a very good idea and may be very popular now but in 50, 75 or 100 years the Egyptian economy may well have moved on from small handicraft industries. As a result this article will at best become redundant and at worst might actually prove damaging by forcing the government to spend a portion of money every year on something nobody wants or needs in order to fulfil the constitutional obligation. Therefore I think that this along with things like Article 58 which places an obligation on the state to extend the take up of higher education are things that an elected government should achieve through statute rather then through the constitution. A more serious example of this problem is probably Article 27 which gives workers representation (up to 50%) on the boards of public and private enterprises. One of the driving factors of the Egyptian revolution was high unemployment brought about by a sluggish economy built around outdated and discredited Communist principles. The notion of the workers being able to share in the management and profits of a private enterprise is one of those key Communist principles. So making it a constitutional obligation is only likely to damage Egypt's economy further. That said my political background means I'm actually a big fan of things like workers co-operatives. However while I think that the state most certainly shouldn't legislate against them it shouldn't be making them compulsory and most certainly shouldn't be making them a cornerstone of national identity by including them in the constitution.
Once you delve further into the draft constitution is becomes clear that these populist articles and the noble language of the preamble have been included in a cynical attempt to get people to vote for a constitution that has a thinly veiled Islamist agenda and places a worrying amount of power in the hands of the President. For the most part that Islamist agenda is very subtle such as in the oaths of office to be taken by members of the House of Representatives, the President and the Prime Minister outlined in Articles 86, 137 and 157. These oaths all require the person taking them to swear in front of "Almighty God." With Article 219 referring to the importance of the principles of Sunni Islam it is quite clear that the Almighty God mentioned is the Sunni Muslim interpretation of god making this a difficult oath for a Christian Egyptian or even a Shia Egyptian to take. Even things like Articles 43 and 44 which guarantees freedom of religion and prohibits the insulting of religious messengers which seem fair and balanced conceal an Islamist agenda. Due to very old and restrictive Egyptian laws governing the way that Christian Churches operate far from ensuring religious freedom the inclusion of the "as regulated by law" phrase of Article 43 actually makes it much easier for the Egyptian state to persecute religious minorities. Although it doesn't say it explicitly Article 44 is clearly designed to stop people insulting the Prophet Mohamed and paves the way for something similar to Pakistan's controversial anti-blasphemy laws. In fact as an article of the constitution it actually probably goes further then Pakistan's laws. Similarly Articles 10 and 11 which place religion and morality as the basis for Egyptian society and place and obligation on the state to uphold public morality respectively seem to be paving the way for Saudi, Pakistani or Iranian style morality police who patrol the streets making sure that women adhere to strict dress codes and unmarried couples don't speak to each other.
The Islamist agenda even extends to areas you would not expect such as Article 117 which requires the national budget to achieve a balance between income and expenditure and Article 121 which prevents the Executive Authority from obtaining any sort of loan without the approval of the House of Representatives. Although Egypt's debt to GDP ratio is a bit on the high side at around 75% and the Eurozone crisis has led to national debt being unpopular the world over this seems to be an attempt to force Egypt to run it's economy in line Sharia banking principles that prevent the charges of interest on loans and generally discourages the taking out of loans all together. Again if this is an economic policy that an elected Islamist government wants to follow they should be free to. However by making it a constitutional obligation it makes things very difficult for any future government that hasn't been elected with an Islamist mandate. This article is likely to cause very immediate problems for Egypt because the nation is currently in the process of negotiating crisis loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help ease it's economic turmoil. As Egypt's House of Representatives is currently suspended Article 121 if passed will make it impossible for Egypt to take up any IMF loan.
The Islamist agenda is probably at it's most overt in Article 4 which places a obligation on the Egyptian state and by extension people to provide the Al-Azhar Mosque/University with sufficient funds to "achieve it's objectives" which appear to be advising the government on Islamic law. From a secular perspective the most alarming articles are Article 2 and Article 3. Article 2 sets out Islamic Sharia as the principle source of legislation while Article 3 sets out the principles of Christianity and Judaism for the personal status laws Egypt's Christians and Jews. In these few simple lines Egypt's constitution will, if adopted, create a two tier society with Sunni Muslims at the top and Christians and Jews in a lower class. From a secular perspective this is simply unacceptable and although it seems to have become a dirty word in Egypt Secularism does not mean Atheism. Instead it means creating a separation between religion and politics so people be they Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Sufi Muslims, Salafi Muslims, Christians, Buddhists or Jews can all practise their religion (all of which worship the same God) without the interference of the state.
As with the Islamist agenda the biggest problem with the draft constitution - the sweeping powers given to the President - are shown in a number of small and subtle articles. These include Article 54 which gives Egyptian citizens the right to address public authorities under their own names. This is obviously a right that Egyptians have gained through the revolution. However the stipulation that this must be done in the name of the individual rather then in the name of a group seems like a recipe for the state building a database of known trouble makers which is the first step towards political oppression. The right to public assembly/demonstration based on notification by law guaranteed by Article 50 is a prime example of this. The provision of Article 54 means that in order to lawfully exercise their right to public demonstration the protest organisers must apply for permission under their own names rather then semi-anonymously as part of a protest group. That makes it very easy for the state's authorities to identify protest organisers in order to arrest, harass and intimidate them and you only need to look at the revolution to see how badly that can end. Another example of the state trying to suppress political dissent is Article 53 which stipulates that there can only be one trade union per profession. If there is only one trade union it makes it very easy for agents of the state to infiltrate and control the actions of that trade union. This is actually something my father did in Britain's National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) in the 1970's.
The much more significant power grabs the draft constitution gives to the President are the almost sovereign powers it grants the President over the main apparatus of state security - the police and the military. Article 146 makes the President the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and Article 147 gives him sole power to appoint and dismiss members of the military leadership. While Article 146 stipulates that the President must receive the approval of the House of Representatives to declare war or deploy the military outside of Egypt's borders there is no such requirement for military operations within Egypt's borders. This very much leaves the military as a play thing of the President which can be used against the Egyptian people - something that was a significant problem under Mubarak. A better alternative would be to make the military the property of the Egyptian people sworn to protect the constitution and the values of the revolution. It's Supreme Commander should be someone chosen by the military itself but approved by both the President and the House of Representatives. In order to declare war or deploy outside of Egypt's borders there must be triple agreement between the President, the House of Representatives and the Supreme Commander. For deployment within Egypt's borders there need only be agreement between the Supreme Commander and the President or agreement between the Supreme Commander and the House of Representatives. This would allow the Egyptian military to side with the Egyptian people against any future President who starts behaving like a dictator. The same problem exists with the police with Article 199 making the President the Supreme Chief of police. This is a recipe for a political police force. A far better alternative would be to make the police an independent body sworn to uphold the constitution and the law which selects it's own Supreme Chief with the approval of the Minister for the Interior. This would make Egypt's police force an apolitical body better able to uphold the law regardless of who may be trying to break it.
The most serious and fundamental problem with Egypt's draft constitution is the way it envisions Egypt's political system working. Having a Head of State (the President) overseeing a partially elected upper house (the Shura Council) and a fully elected lower house (the House of Representatives) Egypt seems to be modelling itself on a British style Parliamentary democracy only with an elected Head of State rather then a Monarch. In order for this system of government to work there needs to be a strong lower house led by a strong Prime Minister to protect the interests of the people and counter-balance the power of the Head of State. The semi-elected upper house is supposed to act as a buffer between the two helping to negotiate compromise. Egypt's draft constitution simply has no intention of doing any of this. Article 139 gives the President the power to appoint the Prime Minister turning the office into nothing more then the President's deputy. Article 140 makes the President responsible for all policy and leaves the Cabinet appointed by the Prime Minister as simple tools tasked with doing the President's bidding. Article 128 grants the President the power to appoint 10% (15 members) of the Shura Council. Assuming that the President's party will be represented in the elected membership of the Shura Council this 10% guarantees the President a majority on every vote turning the Shura Council into a simple rubber-stamping body. A more democratic alternative would be for the largest party/bloc in the House of Representatives to choose the Prime Minister who would then appoint the Cabinet and work with the President to shape and implement policy. The President and the Prime Minister should both be able to appoint 6% (9 members) of the Shura Council to ensure balance.
So for this very long list of quite complicated reasons I urge Egyptians to vote to reject this draft constitution and they will have to vote. As with the Presidential election the Muslim Brotherhood will mobilise their members to vote for the draft constitution in large numbers. Therefore the opposition must vote in equally large numbers to stop them and prevent the constitution being adopted.
17:20 on 13/12/12.
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