Operation Featherweight: Month 29, Week 3, Day 4.

As I've mentioned on November 3rd (3/11/16) my Internet connection was cut. This effectively put me out of action for one of the most intense two week periods in the entire war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and associated groups.

This two week period saw a number of dramatic developments in the effort to liberate the city of Mosul in northern Iraq from ISIL.

There were also dramatic developments in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) attempts both to fight ISIL in northern Syria and Turkey's invasion of northern Syria in order to protect ISIL from the SDF.

The Syrian government with the support of Russia also made significant progress in liberating Aleppo City from the Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) Islamist coalition that is allied to ISIL.

As is often the case this period of intense activity has been followed by a period of relative calm and consolidation. Added to that we have most definitely moved from autumn into winter. This means the region has experienced its first heavy rainfall of the season leading to flooding and sandstorms. Some of the mountainous areas - particularly further north in Turkey - have even experienced their first snowfall of the season.

As a result between my November 24th (24/11/16) post and Sunday December 4th (4/12/16) the frontlines within Mosul did not move at all. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) most advanced positions remained in an arc from the al-Zuhur neighbourhood to the north-east to al-Karamah neighbourhood on the M2 Highway/Hawler Road and in a south-east arc from al-Karamah to the Salam neighbourhood.

However in that time the ISF have been at work consolidating their control of the neighbourhoods to the east of that frontline. On November 24th (24/11/16) the ISF had nominal control over or were fighting within 21 neighbourhoods in the east of Mosul. They now have full control over 18 of those neighbourhoods with only the three most forward such as al-Karamah continued to be disputed.

The ISF and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga have also been working to consolidate their control over the areas surrounding Mosul. The Peshmerga have finally succeeded in fully securing the Bahzani part of the town of Bashiqa & Bahzani while the ISF have succeeded in fully securing a number of small villages that sit to the north-east of Mosul between the city and the Peshmerga's agreed forward line.

To the west of Mosul the ISF affiliated Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militias have been undertaking a similar operation around the key town of Tal Afar.

Having secured Tal Afar airport of November 16th (16/11/16) the PMF have been working to fully secure areas both to the south of Tal Afar and to the west towards the town of Sinjar/Shingal along the H47 Highway that runs towards Iraq border with Syria. Today they have announced that they have fully secured the town of Tal Abta which sits around 50km (30 miles) south of Tal Afar. Containing a citadel this is seen as the last barrier to an operation to liberate Tal Afar itself.

Tal Afar has long been one of the most contentious locations in the operation to liberate Mosul. Although not exclusively it is predominately an ethnic Turkmen town. Those Turkmen are a mixture of both Sunni and Shia Muslims.

Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long said that he will not allow the Shia-Arab PMF to enter Tal Afar. Erdogan claims that this is because the PMF will ethnically cleanse Tal Afar of the Turkmen population. However the real reason is actually twofold;

Firstly Erdogan wanted to block the creation of any western front in the Mosul operation. That is because on behalf of the US he had negotiated a deal with ISIL which would see them mount only a symbolic defence of Mosul while the majority of their forces fled back to Syria via that western route.

Secondly Erdogan is very worried about a loss of Turkish influence within northern Syria. Although they are ethnically Turkish it is likely that - particularly the Shia Turkmen - would switch their allegiance to the PMF if they rescued them from the horrors of the Erdogan backed ISIL. Ideally what I think Erdogan is looking for is just any excuse to invade and then annex northern Iraq the same as he is currently doing in northern Syria.

Erdogan's desire to establish a new Ottoman Empire is having a very serious and very negative effect on civilians in northern Iraq.

This is particularly true for the civilians living in Tal Afar and the villages between Tal Afar and Mosul. With both Mosul and Tal Afar being under siege conditions as part of the liberation operation these people are being forced to live with the risk of simply being murdered by ISIL while vital supplies of things like water, food and medicine are starting to run low. As the Mosul operation is looking as though it is going to last for months rather than weeks this creates a very real risk of creating a humanitarian disaster.

In my post of November 24th (24/11/16) I discussed the need for some plan to be developed to effectively rescue the civilians between Tal Afar and Mosul.

Although I simply do not believe Erdogan's claims that the PMF will engage in inhumane treatment of Turkmen civilians I suggested that it would be best for the Iraqi police to conduct any such operation. My main reasoning for this was that at the time the ISIL presence in and around Tal Afar was light. Therefore there would be no need for the type of intense combat that the PMF are particularly suited for. Instead it would be peacekeeping/policing mission to provide security and basic services.

Since then ISIL have massively increased their forces in and around Tal Afar. This seems to have been done with the specific intention of removing the main reason why the PMF cannot conduct a Tal Afar operation. ISIL's thinking being that as soon as the PMF were launch a Tal Afar operation it would provide Erdogan with all the excuse he needed to send the Turkish military swooping in to protect ISIL.

Erdogan himself seems very supportive of this latest ISIL strategy. On November 26th (26/11/16) the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi travelled to Tal Afar airport to meet with PMF commanders to discuss the next move regarding Tal Afar.

As al-Abadi's convoy was leaving the meeting a Turkish drone struck the meeting venue with a Hellfire-type missile. Although I don't think this was a legitimate Turkish attempt to assassinate the Iraqi Prime Minister it was certainly a strong statement of intent on Erdogan's part.

However since Hillary Clinton failed to secure the US Presidency on November 8th (8/11/16) Erdogan has slowly started to see his international support begin to evaporate.

On November 24th (24/11/16) the European Parliament voted to suspend negotiations with Turkey over its attempts to join the European Union (EU). This was not a binding vote and EU leaders may decide at their December 15th (15/12/16) to continue negotiations with Turkey. However any agreement they may reach will then have to be ratified by the European Parliament before coming into effect.

Then of course there is the issue of the Dakota Access Pipeline in the US.

Officially this deals only with attempts to build an oil pipeline through the US states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa and Illinois. However if you look at the route of this pipeline on a map it does seem similar to ISIL's supply lines in northern Syria running from Turkey down the Euphrates River basin to Syria's border with Iraq.

Also the protests against the pipeline are being led by the Sioux and Meskwaki tribes of indigenous Indians who want to stop it cutting through their Standing Rock Reservation. They have been joined by all the major tribes of Native American indigenous Indian tribes.

As with Tal Afar in northern Iraq Erdogan has long claimed that the SDF cannot be permitted to cut ISIL's supply lines with Turkey because they will conduct ethnic cleansing of the local Arab and Turkmen populations that Erdogan claims are indigenous to the region.

The problem with that is the SDF is predominately made up of Kurds and Assyrians who are indigenous to the region.

The Turkmen only invaded and colonised the region during the days of the Ottoman Empire starting in the 16th Century - roughly the same time that Europeans started colonising North America. Arabs were only moved into areas of norther Syria such as Kobane in the 1960's as part of a government run attempt to change the ethnic make up of the area.

Key to attempts to clear the Standing Rock protest camp has been a bridge running across a river on the site. This could be interpreted as a reference to the Tishrin Dam that crosses the Euphrates River at the boundary of the SDF's area of control. Alternatively it could be interpreted as reference to any one of the five bridges spanning the Tigris River between east and west Mosul.

On Saturday (3/12/16) a group of US military veterans arrived at the Standing Rock protest camp to stand with the indigenous tribes against a planned eviction. This could be interpreted to any one of a number of US military veterans who despite the cowardice of the former Commander-in-Chief who have decided to fight alongside the SDF against ISIL.

On Sunday (4/12/16) the US Army Corp of Engineers announced that they would not be granting a legal easement to the company hoping to build the pipeline. Without this permission to occupy land under the control of the Army Corp of Engineers this brings plan for the pipeline to an end.

Obviously the developments regarding the Dakota Access pipeline refer to the Dakota Access pipeline and they may well be reversed by the incoming President Trump.

However if I was Erdogan I would hardly find that sort of mood music reassuring.

At around 18:20 on 8/12/16 (UK date) I will pick this up tomorrow.