Operation Featherweight: Month 34, Week 1, Day 2.

This really should be read as a direct continuation of yesterday's post; http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2017/04/operation-featherweight-month-34-week-1.html

Within Syria the town of Tabqa sits on the southern banks of the Euphrates River around 40km (25 miles) west of Raqqa - the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) de facto capital within Syria. However what makes Tabqa so strategically important is the adjoining Tabqa Dam which spans the Euphrates creating Lake Assad. It provides ISIL with one of their few remaining points to cross the Euphrates between Raqqa and the rest of Syria.

In November 2016 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched Operation: Wrath of Euphrates. The second phase of this operation launched on December 10th 2016 (10/12/16) saw the SDF advance south along the eastern bank of the Euphrates from Tishrin Dam to Jabour Castle (Qalat Jabar). On January 6th 2017 (6/1/17) the SDF succeeded in liberating Jabour Castle which sits on a peninsula in Lake Assad some 10km (6 miles) west of the Tabqa Dam.

Over the night of March 21st (21/3/17) into March 22nd (22/3/17) the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) airdropped members of the SDF along with US Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and US Marines on the southern banks of the Euphrates around 12km (7 miles) west of Tabqa.

This was the start of an operation to liberate both Tabqa and its dam. The plan was for the SDF to advance from both the north and the south.

On the northern front the SDF's first objective was to advance from Jabour Castle onto the Tabqa Dam. This was achieved on March 24th (25/3/17) with the SDF entered the dam complex. On March 26th (26/3/17) they were able to secure partial control of the dam itself. This allowed SDF engineers to inspect the dam, ensure it was structurally sound and open a spillway to relieve water pressure on the dam from Lake Assad.

On the southern front the SDF's task was slightly more complex. Their first objective was to liberate Tabqa Airfield which is around 12km (7 miles) east of their landing site. This objective was achieved on March 27th (27/3/17) with the SDF also liberating a small number of villages between their landing site and the airfield.

The second objective on the southern front was to surround Tabqa. This was achieved on March 29th (29/3/17) with the SDF advancing north from the airfield to liberate the M4 Motorway linking Tabqa to Raqqa via Abu Arif. Again the SDF liberated a small number of villages and farms as they advanced.

On March 30th (30/3/17) the SDF announced that their plan was to sit and wait for ISIL fighters to surrender Tabqa.

ISIL responded to this suggestion they should surrender on April 2nd (2/4/17) by launching a sustained counter-attack on the SDF in the direction of the airfield. Over the course of three days the SDF repelled this counter-attack and ISIL were unable to break the siege of Tabqa.

On April 4th (4/4/17) the SDF decided to increase the pressure on ISIL by liberating the village of Safafah which is 1.5km (0.9 miles) east of Tabqa. Following a 38 hour battle Safafah was liberated on April 6th (6/4/17) further tightening the noose on ISIL in Tabqa.

On April 11th (11/4/17) the SDF took control of the H6 Raqqa to Damascus Highway south of Abu Arif - around 18km (10 miles) east of Tabqa. This further isolates Raqqa from the rest of Syria.

On April 15th (15/4/17) the SDF got tired of waiting for ISIL to surrender and launched an operation to liberate Tabqa itself. This has seen them advance on the town both from the south-west in the direction of their landing site and from the south-east in the direction of the airfield

At not quite 20kmsq (12 milesq) Tabqa is quite a small town. For comparison the Old City district of Mosul is around 12kmsq (7 milesq) and significantly more densely populated. As such it is difficult to talk about the SDF's progress in Tabqa in terms of districts or neighbourhoods. There is pretty much only one district - Tabqa.

However on the first day (15/4/17) of the operation the SDF succeeded in liberating the Alexandria neighbourhood. This sits on the south-east of Tabqa slightly separated from the rest of Tabqa by a distance of all of 200metres/yards.

On that first day (15/4/17) the SDF were also able to liberate the Ayd as-Saghir neighbourhood, This sits on the south-west of Tabqa also slightly separated from the rest of the town by all of 500metres/yards.

Since then the SDF seem to have focused most of the efforts on Tabqa's western side. On April 19th (19/4/17) they took control of Tabqa's Hotel which sits just north of the as-Saghir neighbourhood and just south of the Third Quarter neighbourhood which sits directly on the banks of Lake Assad.

What is stopping the SDF pushing north-west from the Alexandria neighbourhood into the main part of Tabqa is that they are learning the lessons from the Mosul operation.

For a host of reasons the Mosul operation centred on this strange idea that civilians could safely remain in their homes while battle raged around them. As a result no provision was made to evacuate the civilians from Mosul. This has allowed ISIL to use those civilians as human shields and tensions have increased as Mosul's residents have been - accidentally I must stress - killed by the forces sent to liberate them.

What the SDF have done is establish humanitarian corridors from the main part of Tabqa to the Alexandria neighbourhood. Before launching a push north-west into the town they are now waiting for as many civilians as possible to escape.

In another sign the SDF are learning the lessons of Mosul on Tuesday (18/4/17) they established a civilian council to administer Raqqa once it has been liberated from ISIL. This is despite an operation to liberate Raqqa not being expected to be launched possibly until the autumn of 2017.

One of the other big problems with the Mosul operation is that no authority was established to look after the civilian population both during and after the city's liberation. As a result there is no single authority to provide for the civilians who escape nor is there an authority to coordinate things like restoring basic services like electricity to a liberated Mosul and assist with clearing away and repairing the battle damage.

One of the things that struck me during the early stages of the Mosul operation was that there were suddenly thousands of sheep and goats wandering around the battlefield. This seemed almost comically surreal until you realised that many of the people living around Mosul were sheep and goat farmers. Now those animals have escaped those people have lost their livelihood making it much harder for them to put their lives back together when ISIL are gone.

Whether is from natural disaster or war it's long been established that the priority for reconstruction is to get people back to their old lives as quickly as possible. If someone can get back to work earning their own money they're much more likely to rebuild their own house rather than waiting forever for the government or some aid agency to come and do it for them.

So I would not be happy to support an operation to liberate Raqqa until someone can show me their plan for the goats.

On April 11th (11/4/17) there was an unfortunate incident in which 17 SDF fighters were killed in a CJTFOIR airstrike. My understanding is that they fighters were members of the Arab Raqqa Hawks Brigade/Liwa Suqur al-Raqqa who have now withdraw from the Tabqa operation in protest. However they have been replaced by Arab members of the Manbij Military Council.

If nothing else this sad incident highlights the problem facing CJTFOIR. There is no suggestion that they see the lives of their allied fighters as being worth more than civilians. However in the heat of battle they still do make mistakes that end up killing the people they're working with.

Finally I would just like to turn back to Thursday's (20/4/17) attack in Paris, France.

As I've said the attack was quickly claimed by ISIL. However with them naming the wrong attacker it is clear that ISIL did not direct the attack. The attacker did though leave a not at the scene praising ISIL so it certainly seems to be an ISIL inspired attack.

The problem is that the investigators have so far found no link between the attacker and ISIL showing that he was inspired via the Internet. Therefore I can't help but wonder whether he was accidentally inspired by the mainstream media and even the French authorities.

You don't need to follow ISIL or Al Qaeda on the Internet to see how badly they're currently doing both in Syria and Iraq. It is on the TV news almost every night and certainly at least once a week.

Just on Tuesday (18/4/17) French police raided an apartment in Marseille. They arrested two men and seized firearms and 3kg of TATP - the explosive commonly used in suicide vests. This seems to have been an ISIL directed attempt to carry out a spectacular attack just before the French election.

Obviously having foiled the plot the French authorities were happy to hold press conferences trumpeting their success. The story was also all over the news. Therefore its possible the attacker simply heard about ISIL's failure and decided he'd better step in to help. 

However I certainly don't think that should be used by any journalist or politician as an excuse to suppress the truth of what is happening in Syria and Iraq.

21:40 on 22/4/17 (UK date).