Wednesday 11 November 2015

ADP Text 11/6/15 Revision: Section J: Time-Frames & Other Matters

The big decision that has to be made in this section is whether the commitment period will be for 5 years or 10 years.

In the US they limit their President to 8 years in office and it is rare they get rid of them before then. In Russia the President is also limited to 8 consecutive years in office. China which does not elect its leaders still limits it's President and Prime Ministers to 10 years in office. The UK's longest serving Prime Minister was Margaret Thatcher who held office for a little over 10 years.

By contrast although Australia does not have term limits it only has 3 year terms. This is frequently blamed for the political instability that has seen Australia have 5 Prime Ministers in just 8 years.

Therefore I think that politically it is right for the commitment periods last for 10 years because this seems to reflect the natural rate of political change.

On a practical level many of the actions that nations will take under the agreement will involve large construction projects which take a long time to complete.

For example the Mosul hydroelectric dam in Iraq took 5 years to become operational. The Stella series of coal fired power stations in the UK also took 5 years to complete and cleaner, gas fired power stations take a similar length of time. Even the UK's tiny Gnats Mill hydroelectric plant took 3 years to complete.

Therefore under 5 year commitment periods there won't really be enough time for nations to bring a policy online let alone assess it's progress before they're being forced to develop the next set of policies.

Therefore on a practical level it is also right for the commitment periods to last 10 years because this will provide time for projects to be completed and assessed.

The big argument for 5 year commitment periods is that it will boost ambition by constantly asking people to think of what more they can do. However with ambition only really changing with governments - which tends to happen every 10 years or so - I think it's really going to have the opposite effect.

With people being constantly pestered to do more before they've been able to assess what they've done I think they're more likely to do the bare minimum or withdraw from the agreement entirely.

As such in this section I have exclude anything that is built around the idea of a 5 year commitment cycle.

To ensure that everybody knows that I am referring to I have also kept the chaotic layout that sees us jump backwards and forwards through the paragraph list.

Paragraph 172 - Here I've gone with Option 1(b) because this allows the specific provisions to be negotiated separately as part of the technical annex I laid out in the mitigation section.

Paragraph 162 - Throughout the process has been intended to begin on January 1st 2020 (1/1/20) to ensure that there is no gap in action. Therefore if the agreement is signed at COP21 that will be start date. I view the agreement to be durable for ever although I don't want to completely remove the possibility of renegotiation. So here I would adopt;

"The starting date for the implementation of this agreement to be 1 January 2020 and this agreement is intended to be durable forever."

Paragraph 166 - This contradicts the notion of durable agreement made up of successive commitment cycles. As such it will need to be removed.

Paragraph 167 - Here Options (a) through (g) and (i) through (k) all refer to an agreement that has 5 year commitment cycles. As such I've excluded them to adopt (h) where it reads;

"Every 10 years, with a midterm review."

Paragraph 163 - The intention is that nations will submit new contributions every 10 years almost for eternity after this agreement has been ratified. This paragraph completely contradicts that so must be removed.

Paragraph 169 - Here Option (b) is binary and this is not a binary agreement therefore it cannot be adopted. Option (a) is fine but due to the ex ante review submissions need to be made at least 15 months in advance rather then 12. Also I don't think there should be a limit on how early a submission can be made. So here I would adopt;

"Parties to communicate their proposed commitments / contributions / actions at least 15 months prior to their formalization to allow them to be peer reviewed."

Paragraph 173 - Here Option 2 is binary and therefore excluded. Option 3 runs a substantial risk of contradicting the provisions of the technical annex so here I would adopt Option 2 (b) where it makes reference to the technical annex;

"Facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of those commitments / contributions / actions as detailed in technical annex (X)/decision x/CP.x, including a description of why it considers its commitment is an ambitious and fair contribution to reaching the below 2 °C objective in accordance with provisions agreed by the COP."

Paragraph 174 - I consider this to be fine as is.


Paragraph 164 - I consider this fine as is. It merely makes clear that each commitment period is to be viewed as a continuation of the one that proceeded it.

Paragraph 168 - This applies to a 5 year commitment period when the agreement will use a 10 year period. As such it needs to be removed.

Paragraph 170 - Again this refers to a 5 year commitment period so must be removed.

Paragraph 165 - I consider this fine as is. It prevents backsliding.

Paragraph 178 -  Under the agreement there are to be successive commitment cycles. Therefore there is no need to them to be amended so this needs to be removed.

Paragraph 171 - This is already covered by Paragraph 167 so needs to be removed as a duplication.

Paragraph 181 - This is fine with the bracketed section included as a standard clause to prevent decisions from being applied retroactively.

Paragraph 179 -  Although I said above that there is no need for an amendment procedure due to there being successive commitment cycles if a nation discovers they are suddenly able to do more they should be able to increase their submission mid-cycle in order to boost ambition. That aim is best served by;

"Parties may, at any time, make upward adjustments to their commitments / contributions / actions by means of a simplified procedure. The governing body shall adopt modalities of the simplified procedure"

Paragraph 180 -  With parties being allowed to set their own contributions allowing them to then scrap those contribution makes a mockery of the entire process. Therefore this paragraph should be removed entirely and defences for failing to deliver on a contribution can be handled in the compliance section.

Paragraph 182 - While I think it should be dealt with in the compliance section I understand that there may be legitimate reasons for a nation failing to meet it's obligations. Acknowledging Force Majeure here gives an added level of protection. Therefore I consider this fine as is.

Paragraph 177 - Throughout the Mitigation and Adaptation sections it's been established that there will be an online registry. Therefore here it is only possible to adopt Option 10.

Paragraph 161 -  This is fine as is because it prevents there being gaps between commitment cycles.

Paragraph 183 - By allowing nations to set their own commitment levels the bar for participation in the process has been set extremely low. Therefore it is reasonable to limit decision making only to those who are participating in the process. As such I consider this fine as is.

Paragraph 175 - The issues raised here all relate to the ex ante peer review process. I think that needs to be given it's own dedicated section. As such this should be removed.

Paragraph 176 - Again this deals with the peer review process so should be removed and addressed in a dedicated section.

Paragraph 183 -  The purpose of this paragraph is to establish the role of the governing body to conduct a strategic assessment of the aggregate effect of all the INDCs. Option 2 does not serve that purpose. Although it lists a lot of detail Option 3 also misses the point of establishing an assessment of the aggregate effect.

Therefore Option 1 is the only option that can be adopted here. However I would strengthen the protections to less capable nations by including the CBDR provisions from Option 3. So;

"The governing body shall regularly conduct a strategic review of implementation / aggregate ambition assessment in accordance with the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The purposes, modalities, procedures and guidelines of the review will be further elaborated and adopted by the COP / governing body guided by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), Article 7, paragraph 2(e), and Article 10, paragraph 2(a), of the Convention and drawing upon the lessons learned from previous review processes and ambition mechanisms under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the review."

Paragraph 185 - Here Options 2 & 3 are binary going against the collective principle of the agreement and therefore cannot be included. Option 5 is too vague not really providing enough guidance to the review. Option 1 is sufficient but Option 4 is better provided (d) can be removed.

Elsewhere in the agreement it has been accepted that richer nations need to do more then poorer nations. However defining this in terms of historical responsibility creates a loophole for very rich but young nations such as Saudi Arabia to avoid doing their part. Also the purpose of this review is to be forward looking to identify want can be achieved in the future. Therefore it is inappropriate to demand here that the review considers events that occurred not only before this agreement was signed but also before the proceeding KP was signed.


Paragraph 186 - Here Option 2 is binary and therefore cannot be included. Option 3 ties the review to the IPCC process rather then a UNFCCC process such as the ex post review so is likely to cause disruption. Therefore here I would adopt Option 1 with the strategic assessment being carried out alongside the ex post review every 5 years starting in 2025 assuming a 2020 start date for the agreement.

However I think that Paragraph 186 could also be merged with Paragraph 187;

Paragraph 187 -  Here both Option 1 & 3 are both binary so have to be excluded under the collective principle leaving Option 2 as the only one that can be adopted. Merged with Paragraph 186 it should read;

"The review / assessment / mechanism which shall be applicable to all parties and guided by science shall take place in conjunction with the ex post review every five years starting in 2025." 

Paragraph 191 -  By setting a deadline of 2018 Option 1 prevents further refinements being made to a process that should be in effect for at least 80-100 years. That is irresponsible and short sighted. Option 2 is fine where (d) is removed because it is binary.

I am confused by (f) because (c) establishes the IAR and the ICA while (e) establishes the 2013-15 review. Therefore selecting either (a) or (b) under (f) would contradict one of the two. As such it only seems possible to include (f) without either option so it reads;

"The multilateral consultative process for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention, as set out in its Article 13."

Paragraph 188 -  This is better covered as part of the ex post review. Therefore it should be removed from here and addressed in the dedicated section.

Paragraph 189 - As with above this is better covered as part of a dedicated section on the peer review process. Therefore it should be removed from here.

Paragraph 190 - Here Option 4 almost mandates that nations must adjust their contributions according the results of the review. That goes against the consensual nature of the agreement. It also goes against the principle that nations can't make adjustments to their contributions. Therefore it cannot be included. Option 2 is so vague as to have no meaning.

Therefore what I would do here is merge Options 1 & 3 to allow the review to make recommendations and oblige nations to take those recommendations into consideration when making their next contribution but stop short of mandating changes. So;

"The governing body shall recommend adjustments to Parties’ commitments in response to the findings of the review / action, in order to harness unrealized opportunities to mitigate and adapt to climate change and to mobilize the necessary financial support. Those recommendations are to be taken into account by parties in preparing their successive commitments / contributions / actions."

Paragraph 192 - This is fine as is. It just gives the freedom to create or strengthen institutional arrangements as the need arises.

Paragraph 161 - Putting aside the fact this is the second Paragraph 161 in the section and therefore at the very least needs to be re-labelled it deals with issues relating to the ex post review. As such it needs to be removed from here and dealt with in the dedicated section.

20:40 on 11/11/15 (UK date).

No comments: