Operation Featherweight: Month 30, Week 4, Day 3.

On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

As I mentioned in my previous post a key part of the plan for this operation was to leave the west of Mosul undefended in order to allow ISIL to flee back into Syria. Particularly their de facto capital of Raqqa.

There are many, many things wrong with this plan. However possibly the most important one occurs some 620km (370 miles) west of Mosul where Syria borders Turkey. Specifically the roughly 100km (60 mile) area between Azaz/Kilis to the west and the Euphrates River in the east. This has become known as either; "Garvaghy Road" or "Erdogan's Pocket."

Garvaghy Road is ISIL's main supply route with Turkey. ISIL oil flows up Garvaghy Road into Turkey. In return weapons, fighters and other equipment flow from Turkey to Raqqa and beyond - possibly as far as the Iraqi border town of Qaim. Therefore if ISIL fighters can flee from Mosul to Raqqa they can also quite easily flee from Raqqa to Turkey and from there to the rest of the world.

To the east of Garvaghy Road you have a vast 12,000kmsq (7,200milesq) buffer/safe-zone controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) - the most effective anti-ISIL force within Syria. To the west of the Garvaghy Road you have another area under SDF control. Centred around the city of Afrin this has become known as; "The Afrin Canton."

Therefore the logical thing would be for the SDF to advance across Garvaghy Road linking the eastern buffer-zone with the Afrin Canton.

However under outgoing US President Barack Obama the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve - has repeatedly blocked the SDF from making this advance by starving them of ammunition and air support. 

On August 25th 2016 (25/8/16) Obama took things even further by giving Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan permission to militarily invade and occupy Garvaghy Road. This was done specifically to protect ISIL's supply lines from the SDF.

This plan to allow Erdogan to flood - particularly Europe - with ISIL fighters did not go down at all well with the US' other NATO partners. So following what I gather was a heated NATO meeting in late October 2016 the Obama attempted to bodge together a solution. The SDF would launch an operation to liberate Raqqa.

As with the operation to liberate Mosul the first stage would be to encircle Raqqa.

The first phase of this first stage was launched on November 6th 2016 (6/11/16). It focused on the SDF advancing south towards Raqqa from the town of Ayn Issa. At the time marking the southern boundary of the SDF's eastern buffer-zone Ayn Issa sits around 60km (35 miles) east of the Euphrates and around 50km (30 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey. Crucially it sits around 70km (40 miles) north of Raqqa.

On November 25th 2016 (25/11/16) this first phase was declared to be complete. The SDF had advanced roughly 45km (27 miles) south of Ayn Issa putting them within 25km (15 miles) north of Raqqa. As they advanced they'd liberated around 600kmsq (360 milesq) of predominately farmland from ISIL control. It was during this advance that Chief Petty Officer Scott Dayton was killed on November 24th 2016 (24/11/16) - the US first combat fatality within Syria.

On December 10th 2016 (10/12/16) the second phase of the operation was launched. This would see the SDF advance along the Euphrates River from essentially the town of Sarrin to liberate the area between Raqqa and the Euphrates River.

By January 5th 2017 (5/1/17) the SDF had reached within 8km (5 miles) of the Tabqa Dam which forms Lake Assad out of the Euphrates River and is around 55km (30 miles) west of Raqqa. On January 6th 2017 (6/1/17) the SDF succeeded in liberating Jabour Castle (Qalat Jabar) which sits in a peninsula on the northern side of Lake Assad approximately 45km (27 miles) west of Raqqa.

It was during this phase of the operation that two members of the SDF's Quinta Brigada international brigade gave their lives. They were Ryan Lock aged 20 from Chichester, UK and Nazzareno Tassone aged 24 from Edmonton, Canada.

Although the advance towards Raqqa has ended this phase of the operation is technically still underway. The focus is now on linking the western advance up with the northern advance. When complete it will have succeeded in liberating approximately 600km (360 milesq) from area.

This will bring the total area liberated to 1,200kmsq (720 milesq) expanding the SDF's eastern buffer-zone to 13,200kmsq (7, 920 milesq).

Even before this second phase is complete there has been talk of soon launching a third phase. This is said to be planned for the east of Raqqa and seems to be focused on cutting Raqqa off from Deir-ez-Zour. An oil rich area Deir-ez-Zour sits around 160km (95 miles) south-east of Raqqa along the Euphrates Basin.

Perhaps telegraphing a possible focus for this third phase last Sunday (8/1/17) US SOF's conducted a raid in Madan. This is approximately 55km (33 miles) south-east of Raqqa and 70km (40 miles) north of Deir-ez-Zour. Although the details are being kept quiet it seems the objective of the mission was the capture of ISIL finance minister Abu Anas and at least 25 ISIL fighters were killed in the process. 

The first two phases of the SDF's Raqqa operation have succeeded in liberating 113 villages along with countless farms and civilians from ISIL's rule. Therefore it is impossible to describe it as meaningless. However it has certainly not succeeded in the main objective of cutting Raqqa off from Garvaghy Road.

In December 2015 Tishrin Dam - close of Sarrin - was liberated. Since then ISIL's main way to cross the Euphrates River and therefore access Garvaghy Road has been the Tabqa Dam. 

Although the SDF have advanced within 8km (5 miles) of the Tabqa Dam the US has so far declined the SDF permission to liberate the dam itself. Therefore ISIL's ability to access Garvaghy Road via the H4 Highway and the town of al-Bab remains unchanged.

My main concern though is that once the encirclement stage is complete the SDF will then come under immense US pressure to launch an assault on Raqqa itself. The SDF are simply not equipped to mount such an operation.

In launching an operation of similar scale to liberate Mosul the combined forces of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) initially committed a force of 40,000. They are equipped with thousands of armoured HUMVEE's, tanks and the latest Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) armoured vehicles. They are supported by US and French Special Operations Force (SOF) heavy artillery and advanced aircraft such at the AH-64 Apache gunship.

In contrast the SDF have committed just 3,500 troops to the Raqqa operation. That force has no tanks, no armoured vehicles and no close air support. They are limited to old unarmoured civilian vehicles, rusty Soviet era weapons and continue to be starved of ammunition by CJTFOIR.

As the Mosul operation has progressed the combined ISF, Peshmerga force has seen some 10% of its force killed. That represents some 4,000 fatalities - 500 more than the total the SDF has available for the entire Raqqa operation. With the Mosul operation having reached the point of no return the ISF and the Peshmerga have been forced to commit ever more forces and equipment to the operation until they finally succeed.

ISIL are likely to fight even harder for Raqqa than they have been for Mosul.

Therefore I am extremely concerned that if an assault on Raqqa is launched the SDF will quickly see their initial force of 3,500 wiped out forcing them to commit more and more of their total force of around 70,000 to the operation. Quite quickly that drain on the SDF's resources will cause the eastern buffer-zone to collapse meaning that all the progress of the last, nearly three years will be wiped out.

The prospect of an SDF collapse already seems to have Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan rubbing his hands with glee.

Since early November 2016 Erdogan has been focused on cycling control of the town of al-Bab from ISIL to both his regular and irregular forces. Sitting 40km (25 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey and 70km (40 miles) west of the Euphrates al-Bab links Raqqa with Turkey via the H4 Highway and the Tabqa Dam. Therefore Erdogan's hope is that anything travelling between Turkey and al-Bab will be dismissed as supplies to Turkish forces rather than supplies to ISIL in Raqqa.

It is certainly no secret that once Erdogan's forces have taken control of al-Bab he wants them to attack SDF positions at the town of Manbij which sits around 50km (30 miles) north-east of al-Bab along the M4 Motorway. Having captured Manbij from the SDF it seems likely that Erdogan intends to capture the Tishrin Dam and press on into the SDF's eastern buffer-zone. To this end Erdogan has been extensively building up his forces in and around al-Bab.

Although they have not yet been condemned Erdogan's aspirations have struggled to find support from CJTFOIR. Up until December 28th 2016 (28/12/16) CJTFOIR had declined to provide air support to Erdogan's forces around al-Bab. Then on December 29th 2016 (29/12/17) Erdogan used this proposed Russian-led peace process to force Russia to provide his forces with air support around al-Bab.

This represented the first time that Russia had provided military support to a NATO member in combat. With NATO being formed to fight Russia it is hard to overstate how dramatic this development is. It would seem to indicate that Erdogan intends to pull Turkey out of NATO in order to form a military alliance with Russia.

This fear prompted CJTFOIR to provide Erdogan's forces around al-Bab with air support for the first time on December 30th 2016 (30/12/16). Since then Erdogan has continued to play CJTFOIR and Russia off against each other with both air forces seeming to provide Erdogan's forces with air support on alternate days. In a development that should worry all on Thursday (12/1/17) Erdogan appear to have reached a formal military co-operation agreement.

Obviously faced with this opposition to his plans Erdogan has embarked on a frantic effort to build up pressure to overcome that opposition.

On January 1st 2017 (1/1/17) there was the gun attack on the Reina nightclub in Istanbul. I covered this in detail here; http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2017/01/operation-featherweight-month-30-week-2.html

Although he has so far eluded capture attacker was identified last Sunday (8/1/17) as Abdulkadir Masharipov from Uzbekistan. That followed a week of speculation that he was from Kyrgyzstan which borders China. Specifically China's semi-autonomous Xinjiang region.

Thanks to the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest entry "1944" by Jamala there has been lots of talk recently about Josef Stalin's decision to exile ethnic Turks from what used to be Ukraine in 1944. Stalin exiled those ethnic Turks to what at the time was the southern USSR - now Turkmenistan - and to China's Xinjiang region where they are known as; "Uighurs."

These ethnic Turks have been a source of tension between China and Erdogan for some time now. Back in June 2015 Erdogan falsely accused China of forbidding these ethnic Turks from participating in the holy Muslim month of Ramadan. This sparked such fury amongst Erdogan's Islamist supporters that on July 4th 2015 (4/7/15) they attacked a group of South Korean tourists in Istanbul in a misguided act of revenge.

Due to this perceived persecution by China it is reasonably common for these Uighurs to sneak across the border from Xinjiang to Kyrgyzstan. Recently there has been a growing problem of these Chinese ethnic Turks travelling to Turkey and then onto Syria and Iraq to join ISIL using Kyrgz passports.

China is of course one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Particularly in the wake of the UNSC meetings following the liberation of Aleppo City on December 12th 2016 (12/12/16) there has been some discussion amongst the permanent members of the UNSC about whether China has been engaged in fight against ISIL in a way that is in keeping with the responsibility of being a permanent member. Turkey is of course not a permanent member of the UNSC.

So while Erdogan has been threatening everyone else this Kyrgz element of the Reina attack has been an enquiry to China over this discussion. An enquiry that carries with it an air of menace.

While Erdogan was trying to convince everyone the Reina attacker was Kyrgz/Chinese the manhunt focused of Istanbul's Izmir district. During that manhunt on January 5th 2017 (5/1/17) there was a foiled suicide attack on Izmir's Courthouse. With a number of Kyrgz/Chinese suspects in the Reina attack scheduled to appear in that Courthouse later in the day that certainly added an extra element of drama to discussions.

Responsibility for the Izmir attack has since been claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK). If the western media is unable to realise the distinction between TAK and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) there is absolutely no chance of Turkey's Erdogan controlled media picking up on it. Therefore domestically the attack contributes to demands for Erdogan to deploy more forces to Garvaghy Road to defend ISIL against the SDF.

Last Saturday (7/1/17) there was a large bombing in the Syrian city of Azaz which killed at least 43 people. Azaz of course makes up the western border of Garvaghy Road. 

The crucial element of this attack is that the bomb was delivered in an oil tanker. Prior to their recent rapprochement Russia collected extensive evidence of not only Turkey but the Erdogan family's role in the ISIL oil trade. As the Russian-led negotiations continue Erdogan is obviously interested to know if this oil trade will be allowed to continue. However it seems clear that Erdogan is an ideological ally of ISIL rather than merely an economic one so his support for the group will likely continue even if he is not being paid in return.

The attack on what is currently a Turkish occupied town obviously triggered demands that more is done to increase security to protect civilians. That provides Erdogan with opportunity to build up forces in Azaz ahead of an attack westward on the SDF controlled Afrin Canton.

In a further effort to convince the Turkish people that the World is just one giant conspiracy against Erdogan yesterday (13/1/17) Turkey arrested 4 serving soldiers over the December 17th 2016 (17/12/16) bombing of a military bus in Kayseri. Following the July 15th 2016 (15/7/16) Turkish rising the Turkish military have largely been dismissed as part of what Erdogan calls the Gulen Terrorist Organisation (FETO). The Kayseri bombing has previously been blamed on the PKK. 

Therefore this seems to be an attempt to further link FETO and the PKK in the minds of the Turkish people. Particularly as Erdogan's constitutional reform bill begins its journey through Parliament amid - by Turkish standards - moderate opposition.

Although Erdogan was finally forced to admit that the Reina attacker was from Uzbekistan rather than Kyrgz/Chinese yesterday (13/1/17) two Chinese suspects were arrested accused of assisting him. So it seems that Erdogan is really interested in this China discussion.

Switching back to the Mosul operation for a moment there has been some dramatic progress in just the last three days.

In my previous post on the topic I mentioned that in the area north of the M2 Hawler Road the ISF had liberated the al-Muhafazan,  al-Sukkar and al-Baladiyat neighbourhoods. This established a forward line along the Hawler Road as it runs north to south alongside the Nineveh Ruins and the Mosul University complex.

I also mentioned that in the area to the south of the Hawler Road the ISF had secured control of Mosul's so-called "Fourth Bridge" and reached Jonah's tomb. The ISF had also liberated the Mosul communication and post centre which sits between the M80 Road and the al-Horia roundabout which leads onto the al-Jamhuriya bridge.

Yesterday (13/1/17) the ISF crossed the Hawler Road and entered the Mosul University complex. Today they have confirmed that they have liberated if not fully secured this sprawling complex.

Also yesterday the ISF succeeded in liberating the Mosul Governate buildings. Today they have confirmed they have secured the al-Faisaliah neighbourhood where it is located. This gives them partial control of not only the Fourth Bridge and the al-Jumhuriya Bridge but also the so-called "Old Bridge."

In my post on Wednesday (11/1/17) I said that ISIL were in control of just nine of eastern Mosul's neighbourhoods. That has now fallen to just five one of which is just forest and another two are essentially marsh land.

The clearest sign that ISIL's defences in eastern Mosul are now in collapse came yesterday when ISIL themselves attempted to demolish all five of Mosul's bridges following a retreat. That suggests that the ISIL fighters remaining in the east of the city have been abandoned to fight to the death or until their ammunition runs out.

Due to the complex nature of urban warfare I can't really give a prediction of when Mosul's left bank will be liberated. However I will be extremely surprised if I'm still talking about fighting on that side of the Tigris at this time next week. 

17:30 on 14/1/17 (UK date).

Edited at around 20:15 on 16/1/17 (UK date);

I initially wrote that Masharipov had alluded capture. It will haunt me forever.