Operation Featherweight: Month 16, Week 1, Day 2.

In my post yesterday I commented on the situation in Syria and how Russia's involvement there has created an urgent need for the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) - to accelerate it's efforts to expel the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from Iraq before they are expelled from Syria.

Quite apart from the strategic need to the US not to be squeezed out of the geo-politically important middle-east region there is an existing urgency for ISIL to be removed from Iraq.

Parts of Iraq have been under ISIL occupation since December 2013 - some 9 months before the US took any action against them. In this time the Iraqi government's efforts have been focused on stopping ISIL's advance and liberating the country. As a result all the things that a government does normally such as managing infrastructure have taken a back seat and after some 22 months of neglect cracks are starting to appear.

Apart from the fight against ISIL life in Iraq this summer has been dominated by anti-government protests attended by people who are angry about falling living standards and electricity shortages leading to blackouts. Policing this type of mass protest when ISIL want to send suicide bombers to attack the protesters is an absolute nightmare which places yet another huge burden on the Iraqi government.

The US' response to ISIL's invasion of Iraq seems to have been to use it as an opportunity to settle old scores with the Iraqi government. For example US President Barack Obama has frequently claimed that ISIL are simply disgruntled Sunni-Arabs who have been forced to take up arms against the oppressive Shia-Arab governments of Syria and then Iraq.

Putting aside the fact that very few ISIL members actually come from either Syria or Iraq Obama has used this excuse first to demand that the Iraqi President steps down and then that Iraq creates a Sunni-Arab state within a state before the US gives it permission to fight ISIL.

Obama's support for a sectarian agenda that he clearly doesn't understand seems to have worsened the tensions within the Iraqi government rather then making the situation any better.

A major fracture point that has arisen is between the Arab central government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government in the north. Fuelled by fears that the Kurdish region could break away the Iraqi central has suspended payments to the KRG.

Starved of cash by the central government the KRG has been unable to pay its public sector workers. Fanned by opposition parties these disgruntled workers have taken to the streets in protest against the KRG. Quite apart from the increased security risk of these protests being attacked by ISIL the protests themselves have occasionally turned violent.

A particularly serious example of this occurred on October 10th (10/10/15) in the Sulaimaniyah province which is a stronghold of the Movement for Change (Gorran) party. Here protesters attacked numerous buildings including the local offices of the governing Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP) killing at 4 people including 2 KDP MP's.

In response Gorran MP's including the Parliamentary Speaker were suspended from the KRG leading to tense scenes as the Kurdish security forces were called in to stop Gorran from storming the Parliament in defiance of the ban.

In the UK Parliament - sometimes referred to as "The Mother of Parliaments" - an MP can be suspended for using what is considered "Unparliamentary Language." There was actually an example of this just on Wednesday (27/10/15) when a Labour MP described a Conservative MP as a "Hypocrite." He was forced to immediately retract the comment or face being suspended for several days.

As such I think that banning an entire party for a minimum of three months for organising riots in which two MP's were killed is entirely reasonable. I would even go so far as to say that Gorran being allowed to return to the KRG was dependent on them rejecting such tactics in the future by apologising for the incident and assisting the authorities in making sure that any party members involved in the violence are brought to justice.

It is against this backdrop that the KRG and their armed force the Peshmerga requested US assistance to rescue 70 hostages from ISIL held Hawija on October 22nd (22/10/15) amid fears that they were about to be executed.

Although now they're not westerners it doesn't get reported on as much ISIL have in no way lost their passion for murdering hostages.

Two days after the Hawija raid on October 24th (24/10/15) ISIL released a video in which they killed a Syrian soldier they'd taken hostage by running him over with a tank. On Sunday (25/10/15) ISIL tied three hostages to the ancient columns in Palmyra and killed them by blowing up the columns. Today reports are emerging that ISIL have beheaded four Peshmerga hostages at the site of the Hawija raid.

As a result I have little doubt that there was a credible threat that ISIL were about to kill the hostages rescued from Hawija because, well, every day there is a credible threat that ISIL are about to murder hostages. However I think what provided the urgency to this particular instance was a desire by the KRG to remind the US that Hawija is still under ISIL occupation.

In March of 2015 - amid fierce opposition from the US - the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched a partially successful operation to liberate Saladin Province including the provincial capital Tikrit which sits around 140km (85 miles) north-west of the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

Although the ISF did eventually succeed in liberating Tikrit and the oil refinery town of Baiji which sits around 50km (30miles) to the north they failed to link up with the Peshmerga controlled city of Kirkuk which sits around 95km (58 miles) north-east of Baiji and around 120km (70 miles) north-east of Tikrit. This left ISIL in control of Hawija from where they have repeatedly attacked both Baiji and Kirkuk with the battle of Baiji oil refinery raging almost continually.

At around 18:15 on 29/10/15 (UK date) I'll pick this up after dinner.

Edited at around 19:50 on 29/10/15 (UK date) to add;

So beyond the rescue of the hostages the KRG seemed to trying to start a conversation about the US using it's superior experience to help a coalition of the Peshmerga and the ISF to devise a battle plan to liberate cities such as Mosul, Ramadi and Hawija in order to completely expel ISIL from Iraq.

Obviously in carrying out such a plan CJTFOIR would be expected to provide tactical air support to the ground forces in the from of AH-64 Apache-type helicopter gunships and A-10 Thunderbolt-type ground-attack jets to destroy ISIL tanks, armed vehicles, firing positions etc.

This would of course be a marked departure from CJTFOIR's current approach of using fast, multi-role jets in largely ineffective strategic strikes.

If I was drawing up a plan I would recommend starting with small targets that produce quick victories. This would help build up momentum and an air of inevitability about ISIL's defeat. This would do a lot to weaken ISIL - particularly amongst it's Internet fanboys that are increasing the terror threat globally.

If the US was aware that it was involved in such a discussion it's suggestion that all of Iraq's forces form up behind a single commander didn't get them off to a good start.

This would be a good idea for the ISF which is made up of the Iraqi army and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) because the lack of co-ordinated leadership within the ISF has caused a lot a problems. For example it was really the PMF that decided to charge off into Anbar province before the Tikrit offensive had been completed. This forced the Iraqi Army to follow them into a battle that ultimately ISIL won with the fall of Ramadi.

Therefore placing the Iraqi army and the PMF under a single commander would certainly make the ISF more unified and effective. As for integrating the Sunni National Guard that the US are insisting on I've always viewed that as a delaying tactic designed to hamper the fight against ISIL so I think it should be abandoned entirely.

However the Kurdish region is considered semi-autonomous from the rest of Iraq and it's fighting force the Peshmerga has proved itself to be the most effective anti-ISIL force in Iraq. I am concerned that plunging them into the arguments between the Iraqi army, the PMF and the Sunni National Guard would undermine their effectiveness.

It should though be possible to set up a command cell in which all forces are represented but with an Iraqi Supreme Commander. The Peshmerga would be given special autonomy in how it carries out that commander's orders. Perhaps in the role of deputy commander.

However by Tuesday's (27/10/15) meeting of the US Senate Armed Forces Committee the US Defence Secretary was doing a much better job of laying out Obama's options;

He can follow the KRG's advice and put together a plan to quickly expel ISIL from Iraq and then provide the resources the Iraqis need to execute that plan. Alternatively Obama can continue to delay by using the spectre of US groundforces being killed in Iraq and it's legal/political implications in an effort to scare the US off the idea of defeating ISIL.

On whether the Hawija raid counts as US troops being used in combat despite Obama's assurances I should point out they were special forces. Special Force units were really developed to operating in exactly this sort of gray area where conventional forces cannot.

However I don't see any need to increase the number of US Special Forces operating in Iraq particularly as no-one is request them. The Iraqis simply need better air-support.

Whatever Obama decides he will have to decide quickly because Russia, Iran and Iraq are already operating a co-ordination cell in Baghdad.

That cell has already given Russian aircraft permission to attack ISIL supply conveys from Syria. Something that CJTFOIR is curiously still refusing to do.

20:40 on 29/10/15 (UK date).