Monday, 1 May 2017

Operation Featherweight: Month 34, Week 2, Day 4.

For the past week my coverage has been dominated not by the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Instead it has been focused on Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Since April 17th (17/4/17) Erdogan has been using the regular Turkish military to conduct attacks against groups fighting against ISIL both in Syria and Iraq. This violence seemed to peak on April 25th (25/4/17).

Here Erdogan used the Turkish Air Force to conduct airstrikes against Sinjar/Shingal in northern Iraq. These airstrikes killed five members of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and five members of the Sinjar/Shingal Resistance Units (YBS) who are one of the militias making up the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).

Erdogan coordinated his attacks on Sinjar/Shingal with no fewer then 20 airstrikes against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) within Syria. Specifically Erdogan struck the SDF's General Command centre in al-Malikiyah/Derik in north-east Syria. These strikes killed 28 members of the SDF and damaged part of the communication infrastructure they use to fight ISIL.

On April 27th (27/4/17) Erdogan seemed to expand his attacks on the SDF to the town of Tel Abyad/Gire Spi.

Located directly on Syria's border with Turkey Tel Abyad/Gire Spi is widely recognised as the centre-point of the vast 15,200kmsq (9,100milesq) area the SDF control in north-east Syria between the Euphrates River in the west and Syria's border with Iraq in the west. Erdogan has long threatened to invade this area - designated; "Shangri-La" - in order to re-establish a supply-line between Turkey and Raqqa - ISIL's de facto capital within Syria.

In response the Erdogan's aggression against Tel Abyad/Gire Spi the US has been forced to deploy some of the Marines it currently has deployed in Syria away from the fight against ISIL to act as a buffer between Erdogan's forces and the SDF.

Those US Marines did not deter a Turkish attack close to the border town of Darbasiya - around 200km (120 miles) east of Tel Abyad/Gire Spi the following day (28/4/17). However with that dawn attack being repelled by the SDF for the last three days at least Erdogan does seem to have been deterred from launching further attacks against the SDF within Syria.

Fortunately Erdogan's attacks, the losses they've caused and the forces they've seen redeployed have not yet had any significant impact on the SDF's current operation to liberate the town of Tabqa from ISIL.

Tabqa is located roughly 40km (25 miles) west of Raqqa on the southern bank of the Euphrates. It's main strategic importance is the adjoining Tabqa Dam which spans the Euphrates forming Lake Assad. This provides drinking water and hydroelectric power for much of the surrounding area.

On January 6th 2017 (6/1/17) the SDF liberated Jabour Castle (Qalat Jabar). This sits on a peninsula on the northern shore of Lake Assad around 10km (6 miles) west of Tabqa Dam and around 50km (30 miles) west of Raqqa.

Over the night of March 21st (21/3/17) into March 22nd (22/3/17) the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) airdropped members of the SDF along with US Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and US Marines on the southern banks of the Euphrates around 12km (7 miles) west of Tabqa.

This was the first stage of an operation that would see the SDF and CJTFOIR advance on Tabqa and Tabqa dam from the north and the south.

On March 25th (25/3/17) the northern axis entered the Tabqa Dam complex. This allowed them to send engineers onto the dam the following day to confirm that it was structurally sound and open a spillway to reduce the water pressure on the dame from Lake Assad.

The southern axis' first objective was to liberate Tabqa Air Field which sits around 12km (7 miles) east of their landing site and around 7km (4 miles) south of Tabqa itself. This objective was achieved on March 27th (27/3/17).

The southern axis' second objective was to surround Tabqa on three side - the Euphrates being to the north. This objective was achieved on March 29th (29/3/17).

In completing both of these objectives the SDF also liberate the small villages and farms surrounding Tabqa.

Having surrounded Tabqa the SDF then decided to wait before attacking the town itself in order to allow ISIL to surrender. By April 15th (15/4/17) ISIL had still not surrendered so the SDF entered Tabqa to liberate it by force.

On that first day the SDF managed to liberate the Alexandria neighbourhood of Tabqa. This sits to the south-east of the town and is separated from the main town by a space of all of 200 metres/yards. The SDF also succeeded in liberating the Ayd as-Saghir neighbourhood which sits to the south-west of the town separated from the main part of the town by a distance of around 500 metres/yards.

In the initial phases of the liberation of Tabqa the SDF concentrated their efforts on the western side of the town. On April 19th (19/4/17) they took control of Tabqa's hotel and communication complex. This sits directly north of the Ayd as-Saghir neighbourhood and just south of the Third Quarter neighbourhood which sits on the banks of Lake Assad.

On April 20th (20/4/17) the SDF entered the al-Wahhab neighbourhood from the Alexandria neighbourhood. This sits at the southern most tip of the main town. Since then the SDF have been advancing north from al-Wahhab first into the central neighbourhood and then into the al-Qaryah neighbourhood.

Today (1/5/17) the SDF have fully liberated the al-Qaryah neighbourhood and are currently fighting ISIL in the Wadi ash-Shubah farm area and the industrial/train depot area to the north-east of the al-Qaryah neighbourhood.

This limits ISIL to just the so-called Three Neighbourhoods - the Third, Second and Third Quarter neighbourhoods - which sit on the banks of Lake Assad directly adjacent to Tabqa Dam.

What delayed the SDF entering the main area of Tabqa is that they first established humanitarian corridors to allow civilians to escape the fighting. This endeavour has been successful with a significant number of civilians being evacuated from the Tabqa area to the more secure Shangri-La area.

It is believed that the number of civilians evacuated from Tabqa is around 5,000. However it is impossible to put an exact figure on them because although they opened the humanitarian corridors the SDF still lack proper infrastructure to account for and then provide for these Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP's).

At last count there were no fewer then 11 IDP camps being operated by a variety of international aid agencies including the International Commission of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) operating within Syria's Idlib Province.

However despite stretching across both Syria's Raqqa and Hasakah Provinces there is only a single IDP within the Shangri-La area. This is the Newroz camp located in al-Malikiyah/Derik where Erdogan's forces attack on April 25th (25/4/17). Although it receives some funding from the UNHCR the Newroz camp is operated entirely by the SDF with both the ICRC and the UNHCR refusing to operate within the Shangri-La area.

The reason why the ICRC and the UNHCR are absent from Shangri-La is that due to its proximity to ISIL's heartlands it is deemed too dangerous for them to operate. Therefore in order to bring in the aid agencies which will be needed during the liberation of large population centres such as Raqqa City and Deir ez-Zour City CJTFOIR need to designate what has long acted as a de facto safe-haven as a formal safe-haven.

Guaranteeing both civilians and aid agencies safety within Shangri-La shouldn't be a particularly difficult task. ISIL are a significantly weakened enemy. Although they remain able to do battle to repel the SDF's advances they are no longer capable of mounting advances of their own.

ISIL are realistically now limited to the areas directly on the banks of the Euphrates. That is a good 250km (150 miles) away from areas such as Darbasiya and al-Malikiyah/Derik. The only real threat to those areas come from Erdogan across the border in Turkey.

Although they have been equally unaffected by Erdogan's aggression operations to liberate the northern Iraqi city of Mosul have coincidentally moved into something of a tactical. Hopefully I'll be able to speak more freely about the reasons for that pause as soon as tomorrow.

17:15 on 1/5/17 (UK date).


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