Operation Featherweight: Month 25, Week 2, Day 3.

On June 26th (26/6/16) the city of Fallujah was liberated from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

A city of around 275,000 people Fallujah represented the last major population centre occupied in Iraq's vast south-western Anbar province. It sits around 45km (25 miles) east of Ramadi and around 40km (25 miles) west of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.

The operation to liberate Fallujah actually began back on February 1st (1/2/16) when ISF troops moved to cut ISIL's supply lines between the Khalidiya Island region to the west and Fallujah. On February 15th (15/2/16) the ISF began another operation to cut ISIL's supply lines to the north centred around the town of Karma.

The objective of these twin operations was to lay siege to Fallujah.

The Battle of Fallujah itself didn't begin until May 23rd (23/5/16) when Karma was finally liberated with ISF forces not entering the city until May 30th (30/5/16). It then took another 27 days of fierce fighting for the battle to be won.

My main concern about the operation is that although it was significantly better co-ordinated than the Ramadi operation there was still a rush to enter the city itself before the siege had been fully put into place.

For example it wasn't until two weeks after ISF troops had entered Fallujah that the ISF moved to liberate the Fallujah dam on June 14th (14/6/16).  During this time high value ISIL fighters were free to flee in that direction with weapons and equipment. Likewise it wasn't until two days later on June 16th (16/6/16) that the ISF attempted to enter the west of Fallujah from Falahat cutting down another ISIL escape route.

Laying an effective siege to a city before you attempt to liberate is almost essential to the success of that liberation because it carries with it a number of advantages.

Obviously it prevents fresh troops and supplies being brought into the city to reinforce its defences.

It also prevents troops and supplies being evacuated from the city where they can be used to fight another battle. Due to the failure to properly enforce siege conditions in Fallujah it's reported that senior ISIL commanders were able to escape to Mosul carrying with them some USD8million worth of cash an jewellery. Those resources with now likely be deployed in the defence of Mosul making the operation to liberate that city that little bit more difficult.

Perhaps more critically laying an effective siege to a city prior to its liberation allows the liberating force to much better control the city. This lets them build up vital intelligence of where the occupiers are focusing their defences and how those defences are supposed to operate. It also allows the liberating force to attack from multiple directions giving them a much better chance of overwhelming the occupiers defences.

This was a particular problem in Fallujah because having failed to properly secure the outskirts the ISF were forced to attack from only one direction in the south. This allowed ISIL concentrate all their forces on repelling that southern column. A day after the ISF launched their assault it had already ground to a halt on June 1st (1/6/16) raising the very real possibility that the ISF would have to retreat amid heavy casualties.

Fortunately the ISF recovered and were able to liberate the Namiyah district by June 5th (5/6/16). However it wasn't really until a second front was opened from the west on June 16th (16/6/16) that ISIL's defence of Fallujah fully started to crumble and the liberation picked up pace.

My other particular area of concern was the response that the liberation of Fallujah was met with from a number of western self-described humanitarian groups. Particularly the American Human Rights Watch (HRW).

Having secured enough to the south of the city to do so on June 12th (12/6/16) the ISF opened a humanitarian corridor under the supervision of the Norwegian Refugee Council to allow civilians to flee the fighting. As is standard practise the civilians fleeing through this corridor were stopped and searched to make sure that they were in fact civilians rather than ISIL fighters. As per the Geneva convention the particular focus was on men and boys of military age (15 years plus).

Human Rights Watch however decried this standard practise as a gross violation of human rights. They went on to demand that the practise immediately be stopped, an investigation launched and those responsible be prosecuted.

On the first day of the humanitarian corridor being opened the ISF managed to captured 546 ISIL fighters who were trying to flee Fallujah. Human Rights Watch presumably wanted those men to be set free to again take up arms in different parts of Iraq and Syria.

The liberation of Fallujah has been a devastating blow to ISIL. It has immediately removed a population of around 275,000 from the groups 'taxation' significantly damaging the groups finances.

Due to the failure to properly enforce a siege of Fallujah prior and during the liberation I am concerned that ISIL fighters have been able to re-group in the areas south and west of the Euphrates. As such I not yet happy to say that all of Anbar province has been liberated. However ISIL camps in that vast desert area can be dealt with through airstrikes and commando-style raids rather than large scale operations against urban areas.

Likewise due to the failure to properly complete the Tikrit operation prior to the start of the Anbar operation I am concerned that there remains a significant ISIL presence in Saladin and Diyala provinces. Particularly in the Hawija area between Baiji, Tikrit and Kirkuk. Dislodging ISIL from those towns and villages is going to be significantly more difficult than defeating them in the deserts of Anbar. However it will certainly be a lot easier than liberating a major city such as Fallujah or Ramadi.

Once the southern areas of Anbar along with Saladin and Diyala provinces have been fully secured work can begin on liberating Mosul - ISIL's de facto capital in Iraq. Once Mosul has been liberated ISIL will effectively have been completed ousted from Iraq and forced back into Syria.

With their complete removal from Iraq looming large ISIL have come under immense pressure to prove to their supporters that they remain a potent force.

They have largely attempted to do this through a series of bomb attacks in predominately Shia districts of Baghdad. The most significant of these occurred on July 3rd (3/7/16) in the Karrada district of the city and targeted families gathering to celebrate the end of the holy month of Ramadan. Here the initial explosion triggered a series of fires in the surrounding buildings killing more than 275 people making it the worst terror attack in Iraq's history.

Although none of them were that lethal prior to the liberation of Ramadi and then Fallujah ISIL bomb attacks against Baghdad's Shias were common place. Then the purpose seemed to be to inflame tensions between Shias and Sunnis in order to prevent the Shia militias collectively known as the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) being used in the predominately Sunni Anbar province. Thus making it more difficult for an underpowered ISF to defeat ISIL in those areas.

The operation to liberate Fallujah was hailed as a way to end these bomb attacks on Baghdad. At the start of July the ISF made a big point of how they had been able to dismantle an ISIL bomb factory within Fallujah.

As such the attacks on Baghdad following the liberation of Fallujah seem intended to undermine confidence in the Iraq's government's claim that the operation will increase security for Baghdad's civilians. They come at a time when prominent Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is leading Baghdad's Shia residents in protests against the government.

Therefore it seems that ISIL are now trying to trick Baghdad's Shia's into joining al-Sadr's protests. Ultimately I think that ISIL want to bring down the Iraqi government so there is no-one to fight them. Failing that they seem to want to force the government into deploying more troops to guard Baghdad. Those troops then can't be used to defeat ISIL elsewhere in the country.

In a similar vein on Sunday (31/7/16) ISIL launched twin attacks against oil facilities in Kirkuk. One against the AB2 station some 15km (10 miles) north-west of Kirkuk and the other against Bai Hassan station 40km (25 miles) north-west of Kirkuk. Both of these attacks were extremely small in nature involving no more than four ISIL fighters in each case and were quickly repelled.

Obviously the majority of the Iraqi government's revenues come from oil production. Therefore any disruption to their oil facilities will effect the national budget to some extent. However I don't think that on this occasion oil production was the main target.

Despite having large reserves of natural gas Iraq doesn't really have a domestic supply network bring gas to people's homes. As a result many Iraqis have to rely on bottled gas particularly for cooking. Those gas bottles are filled and distributed from facilities such as the AB2 station which seems to have been the main target of Sunday's (31/7/16) attack.

Therefore rather than attacking the national oil revenues ISIL instead seemed to be focused on making life more difficult for ordinary Iraqis by trying to stop the supply of bottled gas. After all when people are unable to cook their dinner they're much more likely to get angry at their government.

Sunday's attacks were of course very small and located close to ISIL's de facto Iraqi capital of Mosul rather than Baghdad. This along with the fact they know seem to be relying on the Iraqi people fighting the Iraqi government rather than being able to fight it themselves indicates to me that these attacks were actually a sign of ISIL's growing weakness in Iraq.

Despite their efforts to appear big and strong to their supporters it seems that following the liberation of Fallujah ISIL's leadership know that the end is coming for them. There have been persistent rumours that senior commanders have been ordered to prepare to abandon not only Iraq but also Syria and head for Libya via Turkey.

This obviously places a huge importance on the roughly 100km (60 mile) wide, 55km (35 mile) deep stretch of the Syria/Turkey border that has become known as "Erdogan's Pocket" or "Garvaghy Road". This stretches from Azaz in the west to the Euphrates River in the east and Aleppo City to the south.

17:15 on 2/8/16 (UK date).