ADP 2015 - February.

Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) there is the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This is charged with producing a replacement to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to be signed at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) in Paris, France in November 2015.

In order for that signing ceremony to take place the ADP must produce a final negotiating text of the agreement by May 31st 2015 (31/5/15). On Sunday (8/2/15) the ADP began its final week long session before that deadline. As such the negotiating text must really be completed by this Friday (13/2/15).

Despite co-chairing this February meeting the US' contribution to the process so far has been everyone's favourite weather controlling popstar Rihanna's performance at last nights Grammy awards and threats to intensify the conflict in Ukraine. Although US President Obama's nonsense may fly in Congress among people of the calibre who attend ADP meetings it is clear that the conflict in Ukraine is entirely one of the US' making. It is being done to provide a pretext for the US to impose beggar-thy-neighbour economic policies on both Russia and the European Union (EU) who are considered economic rivals to the US.

This latest round of American aggression is intended to disrupt the ADP meeting by showing that the US is violently negotiating in bad faith and creating concerns the the elements of the agreement covering financial assistance and capacity building will not be delivered upon.

By turning up more then a month and a half late I succeeded in getting the last word in at COP 20. As a result what I said on the subject less then four weeks ago remains valid at least until someone else speaks. Sadly I think that point is soon going to be upon me because the ADP has already produced and updated version of Section C of the text which covers general provisions.

Although it provides plenty of opportunity for negotiation many parties have questioned whether this section is really necessary as part of the final text. I'm inclined to agree with them because I can quite easily see this section being folded into a preamble that provides a type of mission statement for the agreement with the specifics being handled in detail within the relevant sections. However discussions over Section C do provide an opportunity to talk about everyone's vision of how the new agreement will function.

For example in the options for Paragraph 2 there is a choice between a binary model (Option 1) that has been suggested by the less capable nations that were considered Annex II parties under the KP and  a so vague as to be irrelevant model (Option 3) that has been suggested by former Annex I parties such as the US, UK and Australia.

As I've said throughout I have my own particular problems with a binary model and here Option 1 really helps to explain why. In short it requires that nations take actions based on their historical responsibilities. However I look at the plans of nations such those within the SIDS grouping in particular and they're talking about moving their economies to becoming 75-100% carbon neutral within the next few years with just small amounts of support. Obviously individually their carbon emissions are not huge but added together they would represent a significant cut to global emissions. Unfortunately though because they don't have a huge historical responsibility the binary approach of Option 1 would prevent us from grasping that low hanging fruit in favour of taking far less cost effective action in former Annex I nations.

I am provided with further cause for concern that those who are supporting a binary approach are doing so not because they want to solve the problem of climate change but because they want to damage the economies of their rivals in Option 2 which is an attempt to bridge the gap between Options 1 & 3. In order to provide less capable nations with assurances that support will be provided this links the type of actions they can take to the amount of support they receive. I fully support the establishment of this link but the wording provides the less capable nations with a loophole by stating their implementation of any policy is dependent on them receiving the amount of support they would like.

This seems dangerously close to blackmail to me because although a less capable nation would be unable to build a solar power grid without support not receiving that support wouldn't prevent them carrying out a low-cost public education campaign to use cleaner cook stoves for example.

However I could support Option 2 if the language was changed read "will be able to effectively implement their commitments" because that's the level of pedantry we're into now.

Similarly the binary Option 1 for Paragraph 3 seems intended to provide less capable nations with an excuse not to take action by making historical responsibility the primary decider of who has to take action. As I've said above there are some very cost effective actions that nations with a low historical responsibility could take that nations with a higher historical responsibility would be more then happy to help them with. As such I think that responsibilities should only be referred to as "Common but different" and should always be "evolving." Sadly I will have to start viewing those who object to that phrasing to be negotiating in bad faith.

Of the sub-options for Paragraph 3 (b)&(d) are far too ambitious. While I appreciate that there needs to be dramatic cuts to emissions if the targets are set too high then they will immediately be missed and an agreement that has been broken by all rapidly becomes of little use. I think that at the low end (a) sounds reasonable but I much prefer (c) because rather then setting specific percentage targets it links to scientific knowledge. This not only allows for negotiation over targets which should help increase ambition in the long run it also roots the discussion in science which is always improving and evolving.

I much prefer Option 2 though because not only does it avoid arbitrary percentage targets in favour of targets linked to the best scientific knowledge available it also gives adaptation equal prominence alongside mitigation within the agreement. Sadly we have to be open to the possibility that mitigation will not arrive in time and a climate tipping point will be reached turning the entire process into a race to see who can adapt fastest to runaway climate change. Under those circumstances less capable nations are really going to want the financial assurances that Option 2 provides.

Again Option 3 is too vague to of any use to anyone so here I would support Option 2.

For the suggested Paragraph 2(b) I should quickly point out that while certain nations still need to be reminded that their actions do damage elsewhere in the World this clause is legally unworkable. It's long accepted that weather and pollution do not respect the artificial national boundaries that humans have drawn on the earth. As such this clause would prevent anyone undertaking any sort of action whatsoever. For example if I stood on Windsor Bridge and shouted really loudly this could be viewed as Canada damaging the US environment through noise pollution.

I think that Paragraph 4 is important because it links mitigation to the need for adaptation. However in this section it doesn't need the specific definitions of who provides support to whom that are mentioned in the brackets.

In Paragraph 5 Option 1 is simply the carbon budget. As I've explained before I like this idea but it clearly isn't developed enough to be included in an agreement that is about to be signed.  Option 3 is simply to loose. Option 2 provides yet another opt out for less capable nations by making green development secondary to their economic development. As I've explained green development will help with many nations economic development. For example if Nigeria and South Africa were use the available assistance to build a green power grid it would also solve their main economic development challenge. Option 1 seems sufficient to me but I would make it in line with Article 4 in order to offer more protection to less capable nations.

In Paragraph 6 Options 1&3 both fall into the binary trap of placing nations in economic conflict with each other rather then trying to co-operate to solve the problem of climate change. Option 2 strikes me as sufficient but again could be strengthened by starting with a reference to Article 4.

In Paragraph 7 Option 2 is back to the binary blackmail of giving less capable nations an opt out. Therefore here I support Option 1 but it could be improved by acknowledging that their circumstances and therefore capabilities could be improved with increased support.

In Paragraph 8 Option 3 is binary and if I'm being honest if there's a difference between Options 1&2 then it is lost on me.

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 are examples of why this section isn't really needed because I don't think there needs to be specific statements on trade, institutional arrangements an non-state actors when they're covered elsewhere in the text.

Similarly for Paragraph 12 I think Option 1 with "But not limited too" is sufficient.


21:20 on 9/2/15 (UK date).