COP 20: Paragraphs 13-23

Rather then providing a grand theory of everything I am trying to keep up with the schedule at which the draft text of December 8th (8/12/14) is being discussed at the COP 20 Summit. Therefore I apologise if this makes no sense to people who aren't familiar with the text and limited sense to those who are.

I have to say that generally, like most people, I am pretty happy with the text much of which is pretty standard and unremarkable. However amongst these paragraphs the areas that need work are;

Paragraph 13.1: Here Option 3 is based on a binary-type agreement similar to the Kyoto Protocol (KP). As I've said throughout I do not support this approach and yesterday Canada effectively added its name to the growing list on nations that won't be signing up to a binary-style agreement. Therefore I cannot support Option 3 because of my own views of how an agreement will work and its inclusion is effectively saying that there won't be an agreement. Option 1 stresses the need for ambition to grow over time and includes reference to nations Common But Different Responsibilities (CBDR) which eliminates the need for a binary approach. Lacking the references to CBDR Option 2 is simply a weaker version of Option 1. Therefore I support Option 1 in this paragraph.

Paragraph 13.2(b): Although not listed as an official option as I pointed out in Monday (8/12/14) this carbon budget clause offers an alternative to the main agreement. As the methodology behind this idea is nowhere near strong enough it creates a loophole that undermines the entire agreement. Therefore I think this clause needs to be excluded not least because historical responsibilities are already effectively referenced in paragraph 13.2(a) lines 113 to 115. I do though think that the carbon budget idea should be expanded upon just not as part of the binding agreement.

Paragraph 15: This is where the draft text has really started to annoy me because by my reading Option 1(a) and Option 2 are the same raising the question of why they've both been included. Option 1(b) differentiates the two by taking a binary approach. As I've explained before I cannot support a binary approach. Option 3 eliminates the need for a binary approach by including reference to CBDR but will allow for backsliding which is equally unacceptable. Therefore in the this paragraph I will support Option 3 but only on the provision that the language from Option 1(a) and Option 2 regarding commitments already undertaken under the Convention or KP is included.

Paragraph 16: Here Option 3 is binary and therefore I don't support it. The only difference between Option 1 and Option 2 is that Option 1 makes reference to Article 4 of the Convention and in doing so locks in the responsibility for more capable parties to assist less capable parties. As such adopting Option 1 here will apply Article 4 to the rest of the clauses in this section simplifying them significantly. Therefore in this paragraph I support Option 1.

Paragraph 16.1: Here Option 3 is binary while Option 2 relies on the carbon budget solution to the binary problem. For the reasons discussed above I can support neither. I actually don't see any problem with Option 1 because it secures NDC's as transparent, comparable and verifiable which is are the essential qualities. Therefore in this paragraph I support Option 1.

Paragraph 16.3: In this paragraph I support Option 1 because it is non-binary so recognises that all nations need to raise their level of ambition over time. However it allows for flexibility for less capable nations.

Paragraph 16.4: Here I don't think there is a viable option. Option 1 is far too vague and therefore open to abuse in particular backsliding. Option 2 by contrast is far too complex and creates numerous loopholes by allowing nations to simply chose the single option from (a) to (e) which is easiest for them to achieve. Assuming Option 1 has been adopted in Paragraph 16 locking in Article 4 responsibilities there needs to be an Option 3 along the lines of "Based on CBDR all parties include all of (a) to (e) with flexibility given based on differing national circumstances."

Paragraph 16.5: Here both Option 1 which is non-binary and Option 2 which is binary both limit ambition by not allowing for a conditional (non-binding) portion of NDC's. Assuming that Option 1 has been adopted in Paragraph 16 locking in Article 4 responsibilities Options 3&4 mean exactly the same thing only with Option 4 being excessively wordy. Therefore in this paragraph I support Option 3.

Paragraph 18: Here Option 2 is binary meaning that I reject it. Option 1 allows for a peer review process that Option 2 does not. Provided it is non-binding and therefore doesn't allow nations to change each others NDC's a peer review process is essential both in terms of capacity building and as a way of making sure that mistakes don't get turned into binding targets. Therefore in this paragraph I support Option 1 with the details of the review process to be dealt with in the relevant section.

Paragraph 20: The issue here seems to be the level of detail and organisation provided by Option 1 versus the simplicity of Option 2 which I can see getting really messy over time as individual nations make ad-hoc changes. I don't really have an opinion on this because I think it is up for the Secretariat to decide whether it has the capability to provide Option 1.

Paragraph 23: As I see it this entire new agreement will revolve around co-operation between parties. Therefore there needs to be new mechanisms completely ruling out Option 2(b). I also think that Option 1 is far to vague to provide for effective capacity building. Therefore in this paragraph I support Option 2(b).

17:30 on 10/12/14 (UK date).

Edited at around 21:10 on 10/12/14 (UK date) to add;

Also up for discussion today are paragraphs 24 through to 36 which cover Adaptation, Loss & Damage and Finance. These are obviously the areas that of the most important to the poor (I prefer "less capable") nations who are at the most extreme risk of climate hazards but lack the resources to do anything about them. Unfortunately it is an area that needs a lot more work.

For example for Paragraph 25 I have notes on the strengths and weaknesses of each option along with possible solutions. However these notes are longer then both of the suggested versions of the Paragraph put together but don't still leave me in a position to recommend either option.  Therefore I will need a lot more time to properly conceptualise the issues involved and turn those notes into something vaguely resembling English.

I appreciate that this will be very frustrating for the less capable nations affect but it fits in with the more general timetable for the negotiations. This requires that for an agreement to be ready for signing at COP21 Paris the more capable nations will have to submit their INDC's during the first quarter of 2015. In order for that to happen the sections of the agreement dealing with mitigation need to be finalised but not fully locked down by the end of COP20 on Friday (12/12/14). While I appreciate that all parts of the agreement need to function in unison it seems prudent to make mitigation the focus of discussions now and for Adaptation, Loss & Damage and Finance to be dealt with during 2015.

However in Paragraph 25.5(e) I did pick on something that involves our old friend Rihanna who is certainly someones favourite topic of conversation. Back in, I think, December 2012 Rihanna donated some medical imaging equipment that she'd brought with her own money to a hospital in her native Barbados. This prompted people to sneer that Rihanna would have been better off putting the money into a fund rather then buying the equipment directly. Rihanna took this on board and set up the Clara Lionel Fund. Thursday's (11/12/14) Diamond Ball is ostensibly to raise money for this fund.

One of the big problems that less capable nations have is the lack of predictability of funding with projects often lasting a minimum of 10 years. However the overwhelming majority of the more capable nations produce their national budgets once a year and change their governments every 5 to 10 years. This makes it impossible for them to provide the sort of long term financing commitments that the less capable nations require.

As such a possible solution to this problem is for the funding bodies - the Green Climate Fund (GCF) being the main one - to act as long term funds setting aside reserves to cover long term projects rather then just handing out cash as soon as it comes in. After all a more capable nation is far more likely to make a one off, yearly donations rather then committing itself to long term spending that continues long after its own government has been changed several times over.