On Saturday October 7th (7/10/23) the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) launched a surprise attack against Israel from the Gaza Strip. Under the cover of some 3,000 rockets this attack saw Hamas temporarily take control of 480km² (260miles²) of Israeli territory alongside the Gaza Strip.
Within that area Hamas set about systematically slaughtering a large number of they believed to be Jews. Simply because they believed them to be Jews.
At first sight (prima facie) this constitutes multiple offences of the Crime Against Humanity of; "Murder" contrary to Article 7.1(a) of The Rome Statute of 1998. Prima facie it also constitutes the Crime Against Humanity of; "Extermination" commonly referred to as; "Genocide" with the purpose of persecuting a Religious Group. Contrary to articles 7.1(b)(h) of the Rome Statute.
Hamas also took hostage a large number of people, both civilian and military, which it believed to be Jews. Prima facie each hostage taken constitutes the multiple Crimes Against Humanity of; "Imprisonment," "Forced Displacement" and "Other Inhumane Acts [...] Causing Serious Injury to Body or to Physical or Mental Health." With the purpose of persecuting a Religious Group. Contrary to Article 7.1(e)(i)(k)(h) of the Rome Statute.
Following a humiliatingly long period of trying to ignore the fact. International bodies such as the United Nations Entity For Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) and the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) have now acknowledged that Hamas also committed widespread and systematic acts of; "Rape and/or Sexual Violence." Further Crimes Against Humanity contrary to Article 7.1(g) of the Rome Statute.
In committing its crimes Hamas used some of the most wanton and horrific violence ever seen. Going to great lengths to mutilate the corpses of those it killed. Seemingly in an attempt to maximise the suffering of their relatives individually and nation of Israel collectively. By violating a key tenet of Jewish religious law. That if a body is less then whole then it cannot be returned to God through Jewish mourning rites. As a result it is still impossible to give an accurate number of those killed on October 7th (7/10/23).
In a further effort to cause maximum
suffering Hamas has still not provided a comprehensive list of the
hostages it has taken. Each failure to do, prima facie, represents a War Crime contrary to Article 25 of the Geneva Convention of 1949. Hamas certainly hasn't allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) to visit them, let alone render them Humanitarian Aid. Further War Crimes, contrary to Article 140 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
Not that the ICRC has expressed any interest in contacting the hostages or providing them with any sort of aid. Even going so far as to refuse to accept deliveries of vital medicines for the hostages. Let alone ask Hamas to allow it to deliver it to the hostages. The rendering of medical aid to prisoners in conflict really being the ICRC's core, founding function under International Humanitarian Law.
Hamas' failure to provide a comprehensive list of the hostages it holds along with its wanton and gruesome violence also makes it impossible to give an exact number of those kidnapped on October 7th (7/10/23). However the current estimate is that Hamas and associated groups are still holding 121 live hostages. Constituting 484 Individual, Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity.
The difficulties of calculating the number of hostages taken are highlighted by the case of Gadi Haggai. A US-Israeli dual-national who was in the Nahal Oz Kibbutz on October 7th (7/10/23).
In October 1986 and Israeli warplane was conducting airstrikes against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Maghdouche in Lebanon when it crashed. The pilot, Yishai Aviram, was quickly rescued by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). However the plane's weapons officer, Ron Arad, was captured by the Amal Movement. It's believed he was then handed to the Lebanese Hezbollah and then the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). Thirty seven years later it is still not known whether Ron Arad is alive or dead.
In an effort to spare the families of the October 7th victims the trauma and uncertainly experienced by Ron Arad's family Israel quickly established panels of medical experts. Their task is to examine the footage and other evidence from October 7th (7/10/23) to determine those who were taken alive by Hamas and those who were killed on the day only for their corpses to be taken hostage by Hamas.
Last Friday (22/12/23) that panel declared that Gadi Haggai had been killed on October 7th (7/10/23). Each individual set of human remains that Hamas fails to return constitutes, prima facie, a War Crime, contrary to Article 16 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
In launching its attacks on October 7th (7/10/23) Hamas seems to have had two main aspirations. The first being that this would be the start of the war which wipes Israel from the map. Short of that Hamas' secondary aspiration was that Israel would be forced into long, torturous, negotiations. Negotiations which would see all Hamas combatants held in Israeli prisons released in return for some vague promise that some of the Israeli hostages might be released.
In the summer of 2014 Hamas and the IDF fought a short skirmish in the Gaza Strip. During the course of this fighting two IDF solidiers, Oran Shaul and Hadar Goldin, were killed by Hamas and their bodies taken hostage. For nearly 10 years Hamas has been trying to ransom those two sets of human remains. The Shaul and Goldin families can only console themselves with the fact they're in a slightly better position than Ron Arad's family. At least they know their loved ones are dead.
Almost immediately as Hamas attacked the IDF launched a counter-offensive. This included airstrikes against military targets within the Gaza Strip. On October 28th (28/10/23) this counter-offensive expanded to include IDF ground operations within the Gaza Strip.
This initial phase of the IDF's ground operations saw them divide the Gaza Strip into two zones, broadly along the Wadi Gaza river. The southern Non-Combat Zone and the northern Combat Zone. Instructing and assisting civilians to move out of the Combat Zone and into the Non-Combat Zone.
By around November 13th (13/11/23) it seemed that the IDF had all but defeated Hamas in the Combat Zone in the North. Advancing from Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun it had encircled and entered Gaza City, the main city in the Combat Zone. Hamas' main defensive positions in the Jabaliya and Shati districts of Gaza City had been overrun and it was assessed that 10 of Hamas' 24 battalions in the Combat Zone had lost Combat Effectiveness.
This left Hamas in control of the Shejaiya, Rimal, Tuffah and Daraj districts of Gaza City. Along with Jabaliya and the accompanying Jabaliya Refugee Camp, a city sitting just 4km (2.4 miles) from Gaza City. Although given how densely populated the Gaza Strip is all of the urban areas do tend to blur into one.
Beyond those areas IDF operations in the Northern Combat Zone had moved from combat to mopping up operations. That is to say indentifying remaining Hamas fighters and capturing or, frankly, killing them. Along with dismantling Hamas infrastructure such as its weapons stores, bases and underground tunnels.
On November 24th (24/11/23) it looked as though Hamas may be successful in its secondary aspiration. A ceasefire was declared as Israel exchanged Hamas combatants held in Israeli prisons for civilian hostages held by Hamas. This ceasefire was extended several times with 81 Israeli civilian hostages being exchanged for 210 Hamas combatants. Alongside but separate from that agreement Hamas also released 21 non-Israeli civilian hostages, without obtaining any concession in return.
That ceasefire brokedown on December 1st (1/12/23). With both Hamas and then the IDF resuming airstrikes and artillery fire.
On December 3rd (3/12/23) the IDF launched a new phase of its ground operations. Attacking the Rimal and Shejaiya districts of Gaza City along with Jabaliya and Jabaliya Refugee Camp. This was closely coordinated with ground operations against Khan Younis, essentially the Gaza Strip's second city, which is located on the Southern Zone around 6km (3.5 miles) North of the Rafah Border Crossing with Egypt.
On December 19th (19/12/23) the IDF completed the combat phase of its operation in Jabaliya and the Jabaliya Refugee Camp (est. 1948). On December 21st (21/12/23) the IDF completed the combat phase of its operation in the Shejaiya district of Gaza City. In both Jabaliya and its refugee camp and the Shejaiyia district the IDF moved onto mopping up operations.
This comes after the IDF completed the mopping up phases of its operations in Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun on December 16th (16/12/23)and December 18th (18/12/23). In those areas the IDF's operations have progressed to a lower intensity phase. In which they simply hold the areas they have gained and secured.
In many ways this type of lower intensity holding operation can be more deadly than combat operations. While killing people is always a big part of war in conventional warfare it is really only a tool. The main objective is to secure territory. Killing is simply one of the most effective ways to either remove your enemy from territory or prevent your enemy from removing you from territory.
This is something we've seen in the combat phases of the IDF's ground operations in the North of the Gaza Strip. Hamas would establish fighting positions, often in civilian buildings, then attack IDF troops in an effort to keep them away from those fighting positions.
Now Hamas has lost all of its territory in Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun and most of its territory in Jabaliya and Gaza City it has shifted more towards Guerrilla warfare. In this type of warfare killing is no longer a tool, it is the main objective. It doesn't matter to Hamas is the IDF are quickly able to overrun a position Hamas has fired from as long as Hamas has been able to kill IDF troops with that fire.
This shift has been reflected in the number of IDF troops killed. Back on December 11th (11/12/23) the number of IDF troops killed since October 8th (8/10/23) stood at 103, including 20 who were killed in friendly fire incidents and accidents. Between December 12th (12/12/23) and December 25th (25/12/23) 49 IDF troops were killed in the Gaza Strip.
Those figures include the one and two individual fatalities which are inevitable in conventional battle. However they also include large single incidents. Such as the December 12th (12/12/23) ambush in Shejaiya in which 9 IDF troops were killed. Along with the 5 killed and two seriously wounded in a lucky hit from an Anti-Tank missile on their armoured vehicle on December 24th (24/12/23).
The IDF does seem to understand that in order to protect its troops during these holding operations it needs to increase its tempo to establish full control over all of the Gaza Strip. On December 21st (21/12/23) it expanded combat operations from Rimal into the Tuffah and Daraj districts of Gaza City expanding to the area between the South of Gaza City and Wadi Gaza. On December 23rd (23/12/23) the IDF conducted airstrikes in Deir al-Balah, South of Wadi Gaza. IDF ground operations now appear to have expanded South of Wadi Gaza into the centre of the Gaza Strip with 4 IDF troops being killed in the area on December 24th (24/12/23).
There are also strong indications that the IDF intends to expand its ground combat operations beyond Khan Younis in the South. On December 15th (15/12/23) it conducted its first airstrikes in the Philadelphi Corridor, a buffer-zone running the length of the Egypt/Gaza Strip border which is currently patrolled by Egyptian forces with Israel's permission. On December 23rd (23/12/23) Israel advised Egypt to withdraw its forces from the Philadelphi Corridor as the IDF could no longer guarantee their safety.
Meanwhile the IDF's ground combat operations in Khan Younis continue. Attacking from multiple directions the IDF were able to overrun Hamas main defences in the city within three days. After just eight days of fighting the IDF's control of the centre of the city was such that its Chief-of-Staff, Herzi Halevi, was able to hold meetings with ground commanders there on December 11th (11/12/23).
Since then the IDF have been engaging the in the heavy, grinding, combat of clearing the city house-by-house, street-by-street all while at risk of ambush by Hamas. The IDF estimate that four of Hamas' seven battalion commanders in Khan Younis have now been killed.
The IDF has also been able to move onto some limited mopping up operations in Khan Younis. Such as destroying the home of Mohammed Deif - the head of Hamas' Qassam Brigades - on December 23rd (23/12/23). The IDF were even able to take journalists on the tour of the site of the ruins of the home of Yahya Sinwar - Hamas's head within the Gaza Strip - which had been captured on December 6th (6/12/23) and then destroyed.
As the IDF's operations have shifted the nature of the airstrikes it has been conducting has evolved. Initially these were focused on so-called; "Suppressive Fire" destroying Hamas military assets within the Gaza Strip to prevent those military assets being used in the invasion of Israel.
With Hamas having been expelled from Israel the airstrikes then shifted to more strategic objectives. Such as killing senior Hamas commanders and destroying Hamas' defences ahead of the ground operation. Once the ground operation had begun air operations shifted again to focus, primarily, on providing close air support to troops on the ground.
That close air support role has continued, with the IDF averaging around 250 strikes per day. However as combat operations in the North of the Gaza Strip have largely come to an end it has shifted back to including more of a strategic element. Subhi Farwani - a key Hamas financier - was killed on December 19th (19/12/23), Bassem Ghaben - Hamas director of the Karem Shalom border crossing - was killed on December 20th (20/12/23) and Hassan Atrash - a key Hamas weapons smuggler - was killed on December 23rd (23/12/23). All in airstrikes in and around the southern city of Rafah.
Hamas's ability to commit the War Crimes, contrary to Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, of indiscriminately firing rocket artillery into civilian areas across Israel also seems to have been significantly reduced.
On October 7th (7/12/23) Hamas fired some 3,000 rockets and other projectiles into Israel. Once Hamas had been expelled from Israeli territory that rocket fire dropped to an average of a 100 or so per day. Once the IDF ground operation began that average dropped again to around 30-40 per day.
Following the resumption of fighting on December 1st (1/12/23) that figure has dropped even further. With Hamas seeming to have to forgo daily rocket fire in order to preserve its ammunition for big barrages on alternative days. Hamas now seems no longer able to do that. The last big barrage came on Saturday (23/12/23), the Jewish Sabbath. Indicating a clear religious/ethnic element to Hamas' rocket fire. Meaning that Hamas' War Crimes have to be viewed within the wider context of Crimes Against Humanity.
Despite the IDF's progress in securing areas of the Gaza Strip. There seems to be no corresponding progress from international bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and the ICRC in increasing Humanitarian Aid to Palestinian civilians within the Gaza Strip.
The UN and the ICRC are still flatly refusing to provide Humanitarian Aid to civilians in the designated Al-Marwasi Safe-Zone. Let alone attempting to establish a Humanitarian Bridgehead in either the South or the North of the Gaza Strip.
Today the UN actually ordered Israel to close the Karem Shalom border crossing to Humanitarian Aid.
18:46 on 28/12/23 (UK date).
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