COP 20: Section G - Finance.

I know - better late then never.

Paragraph 32: Here Option 1 is to rooted in the binary approach where the former Annex I parties are expected to do everything and there is little obligation on the Annex II parties to do anything. Therefore I cannot support it for the reasons I have gone into on numerous occasions along with the fact that Annex I nations simply wont sign up to it. Option 2 on the other hand places an equal responsibility on all nations while acknowledging that the more capable nations have an obligation to provide leadership. For the less capable nations their obligations will be fulfilled simply by the money they spend on projects at home. Therefore here I support Option 2.

Paragraph 33.2(a): Here Option 3 almost entirely disregards mitigation efforts in favour of adaptation. This is foolish because it therefore also excludes dual mitigation/adaptation projects such as mangroves. Also mitigation should be the priority because enhanced mitigation is intended to reduce the need for adaptation. Although I understand that there needs to be a balance to ensure that adaptation projects that are already needed aren't forgotten about in the quest for mitigation I think that the 50:50 split featured in Option 1 is too restrictive. For example on a year by year basis a big project may come up that will tip the balance 60:40 either way. Are we then supposed to not fund that project in favour of two less cost effective projects that will maintain the 50:50 balance? By not putting a specific figure on it Option 3 recognises the need for balance but still allows for the little bit of flexibility that real life often requires. Therefore here I support Option 3.

Paragraph 33.2(c): Here Option 2 allows for finance to be drawn from a variety of sources while Option 1 seems focused entirely on government-to-government public funding. By widening the pool from which finance can be drawn it can help increase the amount of available finance which in turn should solve the problems over predictability. Option 2 of course recognises the need for increased predictability but also recognises that many governments draw up their budgets on a yearly basis and governments tend to change every 5-10 years. Therefore here I support Option 2 because it allows for more finance, is more realistic and is something more nations will be prepared to sign up to.

Paragraph 36: Here Option 1(a) is too rigid by setting a 1% of GDP commitment over the 80 year life of the agreement which it will simply not be possible for many nations to sign up to. Option 1(b) provides reassurance that less capable nations will receive some help while providing a framework for all the different finance mechanisms to be streamlined into the GCF. This is important because the myriad of funding mechanisms are producing a lot of duplication and waste which diluting the existing funding that would be more effective if it was concentrated into a single fund. However Option 2 which more nations will be able to sign up to also includes that streamlining framework only in a lot more detail. Therefore here I support Option 2.

Paragraph 39:  Again here Option 1 is far too rigid setting the commitment of USD100bn per year, every year for the 80 year lifespan of the agreement. While I appreciate this provides a much needed assurance of predictability it completely disregards the fact that no government which sets its budget every year and is changed every 5-10 years can make an 80 spending commitment. Therefore if this is included in the final text then many nations will simply refuse to sign it meaning that there will be no agreement and therefore no money. It also seems to completely disregard the issue of inflation which overtime reduces the purchasing power of money. Therefore 20 years down the line we may find that USD100bn isn't enough money and we'll have to renegotiate anyway.

Therefore I think that it's better for spending commitments to be renegotiated at the same time as the mitigation commitments every 5 or 10 years. After all if we adopt a hybrid agreement at the end of every mitigation period certain nations may find that they have to increase their finance commitments to off-set failures to meet mitigation targets. However I am concerned that Option 2 would prevent future finance commitments being negotiated alongside mitigation commitments. Therefore here I would support choosing neither option and instead striking through Paragraph  39 because Paragraph 40 is sufficient.

Paragraph 44: Here Option 1 provides parties with an opportunity to put in place mechanisms to improve their policy/legislative frameworks, attract private investment and set up carbon trading markets. However by respecting their prerogative to set their own domestic policies it doesn't place any obligation upon them to do so. Therefore rather then placing an extra burden on less capable nations I see this as an opportunity for capacity building by giving them the advice needed to set up these mechanisms. Option 2 robs them off that opportunity. Therefore I can see no reason why a less capable nation would sign up to Option 2 and here I support Option 1.

Paragraph 45(5): Here Option (a) allows for nations to obtain finance above and beyond government-to-government public funding. Option (b) doesn't allow for those extra sources of funding. I can think of no reason why any nation would want to deny itself the option of more money. Therefore here I support Option (a).

Paragraph 51: Here Option 2 allows for finance to come from a range or sources while Option 1 attempts to limit the range of sources. Paragraph 51.1 already covers the concerns raised in Option 1 about more capable nations assisting less capable nations in seeking alternative sources of finance in a lot more detail. Therefore here I support Option 2.

20:15 on 14/1/15 (UK date).