COP 20: Section E - Adaptation and Loss & Damage.

This is the section I've left until last because it's the one I've found the most problematic with often none of the options being sufficient to be adopted into a final agreement.

Paragraph 24: Here Options 3&4 are clearly too vague with 4 requiring no action and 3 only acknowledging the need for action without providing any mechanism. Option 5 is needed to establish the concept of universal commitments/actions but does not go into enough detail. Option 1 does go into more detail but is binary therefore something I cannot support for the host of reasons I have already mentioned on numerous occasions. Also Option 1 talks about linking the need for adaptation to global temperature increases. While I appreciate that in diplomatic terms there is still some need to get nations to accept the link between increased temperatures and the need for adaptation in order to get the agreement to work on a practical level adaptation will need to be linked to actual, quantified risk rather then the more vague notion of temperature increases. Therefore here I would support Option 1 provided that the sub-paragraphs are struck through and it is re-written to make reference to Option 5.

Paragraph 25: Here I think that Option 2 is sufficient because it establishes the need for all nations to draw up National Adaptation Plans (NAP's) but I'm worried that it doesn't go into enough detail. Option 1 on the other hand goes into so much, often contradictory detail it is simply unreadable not to mention unworkable. Therefore here I would support strengthening Option 2 by including large elements of a dramatically streamlined Option 1.

To start with throughout Option 1 there is a choice of language between "All Parties" and "Developed/Developing Parties." This is a throwback to the binary approach which I cannot support. Here I very specifically cannot support it because by stating that only Annex I Parties can help Annex II Parties you are preventing Annex II Parties from helping each other - the so-called "South/South" approach. As such the term "All Parties" needs to be used throughout because the document already acknowledges Common But Different Responsibilities (CBDR).

Sub-paragraph 25.3 again sets the figure of USD100bn per year which I've already addressed in the Section G - Finance. Again for the same reasons it cannot appear in this section either because it's hugely impractical and nations will simply refuse to sign up to it.

Although its inclusion will provide reassurance to less capable nations sub-paragraph 25.4 massively undermines national sovereignty by making specific less capable nations dependent on specific more capable nations. This risks turning those less capable nations into client states and experience tells me that if they end up being partnered with the UK the advice they'll receive will be worse then useless. Therefore this concept needs to be abandoned in its entirety.

As I've mentioned before the concerns over the predictability of finance are better addressed by allowing the GCF to build up a capital reserve rather then relying on constant nation-to-nation donations. Therefore I see sub-paragraph 25.5(d) as totally unnecessary because the GCF can distribute grant based funding and this binary approach is going to prevent an agreement being signed.

More capable nations are also going to be strongly discouraged from signing an agreement that includes sub-paragraph 25.5(e) which demands that no extra burdens are placed on less capable nations while those nations continue to demand that huge extra burdens are placed on the more capable nations. This is a particular problem here because requiring that less capable nations improve their reporting methodologies provides them with an opportunity to build their capacity. So rather then trying to avoid these requirements I think less capable nations would be better off dropping this sub-paragraph and spending their time getting assurances that they will be given help to meet the requirements.

In sub-paragraph 25.6 Option (a) provides a very strong framework for NAP's to be integrated into all nations wider development plans which provides all nations with an great opportunity for capacity building. Being substantially watered down Option (b) simply robs them of that opportunity and seems to be the product of an irrational fear amongst less capable nations. For example once NAP's have been integrated into wider planning policy it becomes impossible for them to duplicate work that is already been done and in fact could possibly provide extra support for the work that is also being done. Also nations might be able to negotiate an opt out of NAP's in this agreement but if they're going to seek alternative sources of finances - billionaires like Mike Bloomberg and Bill Gates are just giving money away - they're going to discover that properly draw up NAP's are going to be mandatory for funding. Therefore here I support Option (a) all the way.

And with 2 paragraphs covered at around 17:50 on 15/1/15 (UK date) I'll be back later to cover the other 5 paragraphs.

Edited at around 19:50 on 15/1/15 (UK date) to add;

Paragraph 27: Here Option 1 provides a framework to allow nations to build their capacity in the field of monitoring and evaluation. This is vitally important of increasing our understanding of the natural environment to allow us to better quantify risk and resolve issues of compensation. Option 3 simply robs nations of that framework. Therefore here I support Option 1 although I would like to see the language of Option 2 regarding experience, lessons learned and good process included to further strengthen the framework.

Paragraph 29: Here Option 1 is simply not strong enough to provide assurance that suitable arrangements will be implemented. Option 2 however is more then sufficient although I'm not happy of the inclusion of a fixed date of 2017 in 29.1(a) which seems unnecessarily limiting especially as the agreement won't come into force until 2020. Therefore here I support Option 2 although for the sake of simplicity I would prefer for 29.1(a) not to be included in the final text because it will immediately become redundant.

Paragraph 29.3: Here Option 1 provides a framework for capacity building that as with Paragraph 27 is vital to increase our understanding. Again Option 2 simply robs nations of that opportunity for capacity building. Therefore here I support Option 1 but I still think it needs some streamlining. For example 29.3(b) establishes an adaptation registry while 29.3(c) establishes a clearing house and a registry. If the Secretariat can provide both a registry and a clearing house we should definitely do that but then the registry doesn't need to be mentioned twice in the final text.

Paragraph 30: Here there needs to be a reference to loss & damage so Option 3 is automatically out. Option 1 provides ample opportunity for capacity building which as I've mentioned throughout this section is vital. However sub-paragraph 30.2 requires the establishment of a mechanism to award compensation for loss & damage. This is going to be extremely complicated. After all through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) we already have a mechanism where one nation can claim compensation from another over wrongdoing.

The reason why the ICJ mechanism has not yet been used for climate change related loss & damage is because our understanding of the natural environment is not yet at a point where we can establish that a specific incidence of loss & damage is the result of climate change. For example we can prove that climate change is causing desertification across the Sahel belt in Africa. However even within the same nation the range of damage is not consistent due to some reasons we do understand such as better land management in some areas and some reasons we do not yet understand. Even if we were able to establish that a specific incidence of loss & damage is the result of climate change we then still face the incredibly complex problem of trying to work out which specific nations ghg emissions were responsible for the change in temperature. Therefore I think that our time would be better spent on capacity building so cases can be brought before ICJ while at the same time dealing with loss & damage collectively through the GCF.

Therefore here I support Option 1 on the provision that 30.2 is removed and the text is altered to included the reference to the Warsaw mechanism mentioned in Option 2.

Paragraph 31: Essentially here the choice here is between simply making the Warsaw mechanism part of this agreement (Option 2) and making the Warsaw mechanism part of the agreement whilst including specific provisions to strengthen the Warsaw mechanism. I have to say that generally I am happy with the Warsaw mechanism so would be prepared to support Option 2. However I am also aware that it is not fully developed and operational so would prefer the final text to include some guidance of how to improve it. That said I cannot support some of the suggestions in Option 1. For example sub- paragraph 31.1 is rooted in the binary approach and all problems that creates. I am also deeply concerned about sub-paragraph31.3(a) which places a burden on the UNFCCC to provide emergency relief for natural disasters.

As with loss & damage our knowledge of the natural environment is not yet at the point where we can say for certain that a specific natural disaster is the result of climate change and we certainly can't do so in an emergency scenario. Take typhoon Haiyan as an example. It is widely believed that being the strongest typhoon ever to make landfall by quite some margin Haiyan was caused in part by an increase in heat energy in the climate system. However the Philippines has been hit by much smaller typhoons both before and after Haiyan which are less likely to be the result of climate change. My concern is that if the UNFCCC takes on a emergency relief role then natural disasters will become ghettoised with the other UN bodies and NGO's that normally help refusing to do so and the UNFCCC having to do all the work regardless of whether climate change was a factor or not. This will quickly overwhelm the UNFCCC's limited resources meaning that none of the work on adaptation and mitigation will get done.

Therefore here I don't know which option to recommend although I do know what area I will have to do more research on and think more about in the run-up to the next meeting. If I had to choose now though I would go for Option 2 because although it's not ideal it allows us to develop the Warsaw mechanism separately once this agreement is in place.

20:55 on 15/1/15 (UK date).