Operation Featherweight: Month 31, Week 4, Day 7.

On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

This was a joint operation between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) who are a coalition of around 40 militias who operate as part of the ISF. However it was the ISF alone who were tasked with entering Mosul itself

On January 25th 2017 (25/1/17) the ISF had succeeded in liberating the entire eastern half of Mosul from ISIL. Since then the operation has been in pause to allow the ISF to consolidate their position and plan how best to go about liberating the western half of Mosul.

A similar operational pause was declared on December 9th 2016 (9/12/16) for twenty days until December 29th (29/12/16). This allowed ISIL to re-group and mount a counter-offensive which saw them seize back at least partial control of six neighbours that the ISF had liberated just days earlier.

As a result there is obvious concern that this current pause cannot be allowed to go on for too long in case it again provides ISIL with an opportunity to re-group.

Obviously on this occasion you have the advantage of a clear physical barrier between the ISIL occupied west and the liberated east in the form of the Tigris River. However the Tigris River is only around 250metre/yards wide as it flows through Mosul. ISIL artillery has a range of around 24km (15 miles).

In the 23 days of this latest pause there have been a few incidents of ISIL launching attacks in eastern Mosul;

On January 27th (27/1/17) twin Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED's/Truck bombs) struck the northern Rashidiya neighbourhood and the central Forest neighbourhood. However coming just two days after the east of the city had been liberated these seem to have been the result of ISIL's fighters left behind after the battle rather than a fresh offensive.

On February 1st (1/2/17) ISIL launched into three days of shelling of northern and central neighbourhoods along the banks of the Tigris. That forced around 1,300 civilians to flee from their homes.

On February 5th (5/2/17) a commercial drone which ISIL had adapted was used to drop hand grenades on the Rashidiya neighbourhood. On the same day ISIL were able to fire rockets on the Somar district. In total these twin attacks killed four people - three civilians and one soldier.

On February 10th (10/2/17) an ISIL suicide bomber attacked a restaurant in the Zahar district killing 10 and wounding 33. On the same day another ISIL suicide bomber attacked an ISF checkpoint in the Nouri neighbourhood killing one soldier.

On Wednesday (15/2/17) a 14 year old ISIL suicide bomber was intercepted in the Nouri neighbourhood before he was able to carry out his attack.

Although not ideal these incidents seem be isolated rather than evidence of wider co-ordinated fight-back by ISIL. As such at the risk of tempting fate it seems that the planners have the luxury of time before having to put the next phase of the Mosul operation into motion.

As with any operation of this type what the ISF want to do is surround western Mosul on all sides. This will allow them to completely control the situation and attack in a way that will do ISIL the most damage. The problem is that the initial plan for the operation was only to surround Mosul from three sides leaving the west of the city open to allow ISIL escape into Syria.

On October 29th 2016 (29/10/16) the PMF broke with this plan and opened a western front to the operation. By November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) the PMF had succeeded in liberating the airport at the town of Tal Afar some 80km (50 miles) west of Mosul. Thus all but cutting off ISIL's escape route and effectively surrounding Mosul on all sides.

As a result the operation to liberate the western half of Mosul really rests on a decision about what the PMF's role will be. Will they participate in the operation itself or will they hang back securing the perimeter as the Peshmerga have done to the east and north of Mosul.

Turkish President/Prime Minister/Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long opposed any PMF involvement in the Mosul operation.

In part that is because Erdogan opposes any action to defeat ISIL. However he particularly fears any action that will reduce his influence over ethnic Turkmen in an area of northern Iraq that he one day hopes to annex as part of his new Ottoman Empire. As part of this effort to block PMF involvement Erdogan has engaged in a huge smear campaign claiming that if they enter Mosul the PMF engage in ethnic cleansing, genocide and other heinous crimes.

I personally have no time for Erdogan's conspiracy theories and horror stories. However I am aware that in this type of operation you need careful coordination between the forces on the ground. Ideally what you want is a single force made up of highly disciplined troops with a clear chain of command all answerable to a single overall commander.

On January 26th (26/1/17) the PMF themselves provided a prime example of the type of problems a lack of coordination can cause. They opened fire on a Peshmerga unit who were stationed close to them in the area between Sinjar and Tal Afar.

The PMF claim that they had simply mistaken the Peshmerga unit for an ISIL unit. However past tension between the PMF and the Peshmerga has led some to speculate that it may have been a warning for the Peshmerga not to get too comfortable in the area around Sinjar.

Whatever the reason it is exactly this sort of lack of discipline that would rule the PMF out of operating inside of Mosul itself. After all we can't have a situation where they panic and start attacking the ISF units while they're both supposed to be fighting ISIL.

Therefore as I've said before I would prefer it if the PMF ceded their positions west of Mosul to the ISF and allow the ISF to take sole control of operations within Mosul. To this end ISF forces have been withdrawing from positions within liberated east Mosul and taking up positions to the south and west of Mosul.

However they seem to be suffering from something of a manpower problem. Where the ISF have withdrawn from eastern Mosul PMF units have been brought in to provide security. As you would expect from any loosely organised militia rather than professional military this has led to a few reported incidents of the PMF engaging in looting both of civilian and public property inside eastern Mosul.

Given that they are enthusiastic rather than well trained and disciplined if there is a manpower issue I would much prefer to see the PMF given a combat role in west Mosul than a security role in east Mosul. They would though have to be prepared to fully accept the ISF's command structure including ISF officers embedded within frontline units.

While awaiting a decision on their role in the Mosul operation the PMF have pressed ahead clearing ISIL from the areas around Tal Afar. On February 1st (1/2/17) this saw them launch a week long operation to clear the area between Tal Afar and Sinjar. This included taking full control of the Tal Afar to Sinjar road and the village of Ayn Talawi to the north of the road.

Having seen their last sliver of an escape route closed on February 12th (12/2/17) ISIL launched a big offensive against PMF positions at Tal Afar in an attempt to reopen the route. This saw a female Algerian journalist severely wounded by ISIL sniper fire on February 13th (13/2/17) and the first confirmed use by ISIL of a tank in battle in Iraq. However the ISIL offensive was broken by the PMF on February 14th (14/2/17).

Being unable to reopen their escape route to Syria ISIL have instead been reduced to lashing out in anger against the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

On Tuesday (14/2/17) ISIL killed four in a bombing in the predominately Shia Baiyaa neighbourhood in the south of the city. This was followed up by another bombing on the famously Shia Sadr City district which killed 18 on Wednesday (15/2/17). Yesterday (16/2/17) ISIL struck the Baiyaa neighbourhood again.

16:55 on 17/2/17 (UK date).