Tuesday 4 December 2018

Operation Featherweight: Month 54, Week 5, Day 2.

A direction continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2018/12/operation-featherweight-month-54-week-5.html

In that post I covered how the Syrians finally freed members of the Druze religious minority that ISIL had been holding hostage since July 2018. I also covered how the Syrians were able to liberate the al-Safa Plateau from ISIL.

These gains have meant that Syria's focus in the Central Syria area are now centred on clearing ISIL from their remote camps within the Syrian Desert/Badiya al-Sham. Particularly from the area bounded by Damascus, Palmyra, Abu Kamal and Syria's south-eastern border with Jordan and Iraq.

Back on September 10th (10/9/18) the Syrians launched a big sweeping operation in this area. It was conducted on two axis. One sweeping west across Deir-ez-Zour Province and one sweeping east across Homs Province.

On September 19th (19/9/18) those two axis met at the town of Bir al-Hijjah. In the process the Syrians had cleared the villages of Nariyah and Rashwani along with the Salhub valley. This sits around 55km (30 miles) south-east of as-Sukhnah.

On October 30th (30/10/18) the Syrians announced another large sweeping operation. This time focused on the area between the T-2 and T-3 Air Bases/Pumping Stations. The T-2 Air Base sits around 40km (25 miles) south-east of Palmyra. The T-3 Air Base sits around 135km (75 miles) beyond that. Around 70km (40 miles) west of Abu Kamal.

Since then I have not heard any further reports on the progress of this sweeping operation. My assumption is that the Syrians have swept through the area but not found any ISIL camps or fighters to engage with.

Sitting along the road between the T-2 and T-3 Air Bases you have the town of Hamima. From where the Druze hostages were rescued on November 8th (8/11/18). Hamima sits around 70km (40 miles) north-east of the exclusion zone the US has established around the Bobby Sands base.

As a result the Syrians renewed focus on ISIL's desert camps has brought with it a renewed focus on the Bobby Sands base. 

In its operation of the Bobby Sands base the US is extremely isolated. The base operated as a CJTFOIR base until the Syrians liberated al-Tanf and encircled the base in June 2017. In response Jordanian and British Special Operations Forces (SOF's) pulled out of Bobby Sands. Leaving it as an exclusively American base.

The Ruqban Camp for Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP's) which is located within the exclusion zone around Bobby Sands has seen a similar withdrawal of international support. 

Throughout the conflict the Ruqban IDP camp has been supported by the United Nations (UN) and other international aid agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC). They would supply aid by first delivering it to Jordan and the using cranes to lift it over the Jordan/Syria border into the camp.

Long before the liberation of al-Tanf in June 2017 it became increasingly obvious that this international aid was simply being used to support ISIL who control the camp. Both directly and through taxes levied by the group on the aid agencies. 

On June 21st 2016 (21/6/16) ISIL fighters fattened up by this international aid attacked Jordanian border troops from within the Ruqban camp killing 6. In response Jordan ended international aid supplies to the camp from across its border with Syria.

In September 2018 a tentative agreement was reached between Jordan, Syria and the UN to gradually withdraw services to and dismantle the Ruqban IDP camp. This included things like the closure of a UN operated medical clinic within the camp on September 15th (15/9/18).

This withdrawal of international support for the Ruqban camp has been accompanied negotiations over the fate of civilians and armed groups holed up there.

For example on September 29th (29/9/18) a Syrian delegation visit the camp to meet with tribal leaders. At that meeting the Syrians offered the residents an Amnesty agreement that goes beyond what has become the standard Amnesty agreement used across the Central Syria area and its expansion into the Yarmouk River Basin area.

Under the standard agreement armed groups and their supporters are not to be arrested or imprisoned. They don't even have to disband as a military force. However they would need to make amends for their past crimes by fighting on behalf of the Syrian government in what are termed; "Amnesty Battalions."

Groups who did not wish to join the Amnesty Battalions are instead given the option of being transferred to another part of the country. Once they had disarmed and disbanded as a fighting force.

The enhanced Amnesty agreement offered to the residents of the Ruqban camp removed the need to make amends by fighting as part of the Amnesty Battalions. It even went so far as to remove any requirement for the camp's residents to fight for Syria at all. Waiving the military conscription which is required of all other Syrian men of military age.

I think the main reason the Syrians were able to make such a generous offer is that they had already made progress in separating the armed groups from civilian residents of the camp.

On September 17th (17/9/18) an agreement was reached for 3,000 members, including family members of the Brigade Martyrs of Qaryatayn/Liwa Shuhada al-Qaryatayn to leave the Ruqban camp for the Garvaghy Road area.

Alongside Maghawir al-Thawra (MaT) Liwa Shuhada al-Qaryatayn are one of the Islamist groups trained by the US at the Bobby Sands base. It is likely that they will now be formally absorbed into the United Turkmen Army (UTA) now they are within Garvaghy Road.

On September 21st (21/9/18) it was rumoured that 700 fighters from Maghawir al-Thawra along with 2,500 family members would also quit the Bobby Sands base for Garvaghy Road and the UTA. That agreement though has since fallen through.

On September 24th (24/9/18) an agreement was reached 400 ISIL fighters plus an unspecified number of family members to leave the Ruqban camp for the Sudetenland. Where they have joined their fellow fighters under the protection of the Army of Conquest.

Sadly this strategy to dismantle the Ruqban camp and eliminate the ISIL presence there has met with strong opposition from Turkey.

Across the Sudetenland, Garvaghy Road and increasingly now Afrin Canton Friday afternoons are set aside for mass public protests. Attendance at these protests is mandated by the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) who set the agenda of what the demonstrations demand.

From late September onwards the agenda that MIT set for these mass demonstrations was calls for the dismantling of the Ruqban camp to be reversed and international support to resume to preserve the camp and the ISIL presence there.

On a related note Friday November 23rd (23/11/18) saw the murder of two secular Syrian journalists in the Sudetenland. Raed Fares and Hammud Junaid were gunned down in the town of Kafr Nabal. Both are famous for producing Friday protest signs which do not keep with and often criticise the Turkish mandated agenda.

The killings came two days after the opposition Syrian Journalists Association released a statement condemning the "sickening culture" of impunity for violence against journalists in the Turkish occupied Garvaghy Road and Afrin Canton areas.

The statement released on November 21st (21/11/18) detailed the kidnapping and torture of 9 journalists by regular Turkish and UTA forces.

On November 30th (30/11/18) even Al Qaeda issued a statement condemning the brutal murders of Raed Fares and Hammud Junaid.

As usual it seems that a Turkish demand is all it took for the UN to spring into action.

On September 20th (20/9/18) the highly conflicted chair of the UN Task Force for Humanitarian Access in Syria Jan Egeland demanded that aid once again be sent the Ruqban Camp. This call was echoed by the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on October 20th (20/10/18).

On October 18th (18/10/18) it was agreed that a UN aid convoy would be sent through Syria to the Ruqban camp.

Even when there is not a war going on coordinating the transit of a convoy of 78 heavy trucks across the desert is a complex task.

The progress of this convoy to the Ruqban camp was further delayed by complex negotiations. The sort of diplomatic negotiations where what's being discussed isn't really what's being discussed.

One of the key areas of debate was over whether the convoy would evacuate the sick and injured from the camp. The people most affected by the closure of the UN medical clinic within the camp. Evacuating the sick and injured from the camp obviously increases the level and quality of medical care available to them. It also has the added advantage of reducing the population of the camp.

On this point the UN made their position quite clear. They would not be evacuating the sick and injured from the camp. Once again underlining that their priority in the operation was to support the ISIL presence at the Ruqban camp. Rather than aiding Syria's civilian population.

The other big area of debate over who would provide security for the convoy. Essentially who would make sure ISIL didn't simply loot the cargo and take the drivers hostage.

On this point the US offered Maghawir al-Thawra (MaT) to provide security. Given MaT's close links to ISIL this was not satisfactory for the UN and the Syrian Arab branch of the ICRC (SARC). Eventually Russian Military Police had to be deployed to secure the convoy.

With that security in place the convoy finally arrived at the Ruqban camp on November 3rd (3/11/18). Having unloaded its cargo and vaccinated camp residents it left again on November 8th (8/11/18).

On November 14th (14/11/18) the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jefferies gave a press conference in which he laid out America's three priorities in Syria.

Bottom of that list was defeating ISIL.

Second of the list was the pursuit of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2249 (2015).

UNSCR 2249 was passed in the chaos of then US President Barack Obama refusing to invoke NATO's Article 5 mutual defence clause in the response to the November 13th 2015 (13/11/15) Paris Massacres. It is essentially France's articles of surrender to ISIL.

It attempts to remove the obligation of UNSCR 2170 (2014) to fight ISIL and Al Qaeda. Instead establishing to a framework to assist those groups in overthrowing the Syrian government.

UNSCR 2249 (2015) contradicts both the Chapter 7 UNSCR 2170 (2014) and the Charter of the UN. As such it lacks any legal or moral validity.

Top of America's priorities in Syria is the defeat of Iran and the ending of any Iranian presence within the country.

The US' desire to cling on to the Bobby Sands base is a key part of this strategy to limit Iranian influence in Syria.

Contained within the exclusion zone around the Bobby Sands base is the al-Walid border crossing. This links Iraq's H12 Highway with Syria's N7 Highway. The US thinks that if it controls this road junction it can prevent Iranian weapons shipments being driven across Iraq into Syria. Then from Syria to Israel's enemies such as Lebanese Hezbollah along Israel's borders.

Obviously US control of part of this so-called Baghdad to Damascus Highway did not stop the upgraded S-300 Air Defence System being flown into Syria on September 29th (29/19/18). Nor has it stopped Iran helping Syria to domestically produce the Golan-1000 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

For Israel's part it does not seem at all impressed by the action America is taking in its name.

Instead Israel has resorted to taking the matter of its security into its own hands. Frequently conducting airstrikes against Iranian weapons shipments which are being flown into Syria.

For example of September 17th (17/9/18) Turkey and Russia agreed a plan to protect the Army of Conquest in the Sudetenland. That evening Israel used the French warship Auvergne as cover to conduct airstrikes close to Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia Province. In the chaos Syrian air defences shot down a Russian Il-20 aircraft with the loss of 15 Russian lives. The incident which prompted the supply of the S-300 Air Defence System to Syria.

Despite the delivery of the S-300 system to Syria Israel has rumoured that it has conducted further operations within Syria. With there being no further airstrikes this has implied that Israel has been conducting covert SOF missions in Syria. Rather like the Israeli SOF mission that went so wrong in Gaza on Sunday November 11th (11/11/18).

November 28th (28/11/18) and November 29th (29/11/18) saw the 11th Round of Meetings in the Astana Process. The main topic on the agenda was the implementation of the Turkish and Russian agreement to protect the Army of Conquest in the Sudetenland.

Israel used that Thursday (29/11/18) as occasion to launch fresh airstrikes against Syria. Their first since the delivery of the S-300 system. Israeli aircraft flying over the Mediterranean used stand-off weapons such as cruise missiles to fire on targets just south of Damascus.

This time Syria was able to use its less advanced S-200 Air Defence system to shot down most, if not all, of the Israeli missiles before they reached their targets. On this occasion the Syrians did manage to avoid shooting down any Russian aircraft. However they were unable to avoid having part of their air defence missiles landing in the Israeli occupied Golan Heights.

Tensions between Syria and the US over the Bobby Sands base have increased recently. Following a number of ISIL attacks on the Syrians which are believed to have been launched from under US protection in the Bobby Sands exclusion zone.

On November 4th (4/11/18) ISIL launched an attack on Syrian forces close to Sukhnah. This attack was quickly repelled but not without significant loss of Syrian lives.

The previous day (3/11/18) ISIL were able to bomb the headquarters of the Syrian "ISIS Hunters" militia in the Panorama area of Deir-ez-Zour City. This resulted in the deaths of six Russians. Believed to be part of the Wagner Private Military Contractor (PMC) rather than the regular Russian military.

As I've mentioned on November 8th (8/11/18) Syrian and Russian SOF's were able to rescue the Druze hostages from an ISIL camp close to Hamima. Although a successful operation this increased anger against the US.

The only way ISIL would have been able to transport the hostages from Suweida City to the Hamima camp is by travelling through or extremely close to the exclusion zone around the Bobby Sands base.

On November 17th (17/11/18) ISIL launched another raid type attack on Syrian forces in an area of desert between Mayadin and Kashmah. Again this was quickly repelled but not without loss of Syrian life.

On November 22nd (22/11/18) ISIL launched an attack on Syrian positions close to the T-2 Air Base. It took the Syrians until November 23rd (23/11/18) to recover all the positions they'd lost in a battle that claimed at least 10 Syrian lives.

In a sign of growing frustration Russian publicly blamed this attack on ISIL fighters the US is sheltering in the exclusion zone around the Bobby Sands base.

This increased tension over the Bobby Sands base has occurred against the backdrop of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) and the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) failure in their operation to liberate the Hajin Pocket. On the north bank of the Euphrates River.

The SDF and CJTFOIR failure in the Hajin Pocket represents ISIL's first military success since they seized Palmyra from the Syrians in February 2017. That victory in Palmyra was actually ISIL's first military success since they first captured Palmyra from the Syrians back in the spring of 2015.

Success is such a rarity to ISIL these days that even this small one has seen them get over excited.

On the north bank of the Euphrates ISIL have been relentlessly attacking the SDF in Shangri-La. However they have also been quite frequently launching artillery attacks against the Syrians on the south bank of the Euphrates in Central Syria.

The Syrians have been periodically responding to this ISIL artillery fire of its own. Rather than being an attempt to capture territory on the Euphrates' north bank this is more a case of if the Syrians identify an ISIL artillery position firing at them they fire back. In order to shut it up and eliminate the threat to them.

The US has publicly been very critical of this Syrian artillery against the Hajin Pocket. Demanding that it stops. Essentially telling the Syrians they should be prepared to die just because CJTFOIR can't do its job properly.

These ISIL attacks on the Syrians from the Hajin Pocket seem to be driven by nothing more the group's exeuberance over its recent success. However the fact they are causing tension between Syria and CJTFOIR certainly gives ISIL incentive to continue with them.

Frustratingly I only have a couple more paragraphs to add to this. However I have hit the point where words have stopped making any sense.

So I will have to continue this here, tomorrow.

18:10 on 4/12/18 (UK date).

Edited at around 17:00 on 5/12/18 (UK date) to add above and below.

I can't resist opening a fresh post for the fresh month. Particularly as it makes it easier to fit in those extra paragraphs.

No comments: