Operation Featherweight: Month 54, Week 1, Day 2.

Really a direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2018/11/operation-featherweight-month-54-week-1.html

In that post I explained why September 11th 2018 (11/9/18) was the wrong time to choose to launch phase three of the SDF's Round Up operation.

The US element of CJTFOIR were either totally unaware of those reasons. Or they just wanted to launch an offensive against ISIL on the 9/11 anniversary.

Equally the French element of CJTFOIR were also totally unaware of those reasons. Or the just wanted to launch an offensive against ISIL as they were working hard to protect ISIL and Al Qaeda in the Sudetenland.

So on September 11th (11/9/18) phase three of Operation: Round Up was launched. It's objective was to completely defeat ISIL in the Hajin Pocket.

ISIL continue to maintain a presence on the Safa Plateau. However this is a desolate rock in the middle of nowhere.

ISIL also continue to maintain a small, around 1000 strong, presence in the Sudetenland. Close to Idlib City. However there they and everyone else are desperately trying to pretend that they're no longer members of ISIL. They're now the; 'Moderate Opposition.'

This leaves the Hajin Pocket as really the last population centre under ISIL control anywhere in the World. Whether it fulfils their twisted religious prophecy or not this is where they will make their last stand. Meaning that you would expect them to fight with every last man for every remaining inch and every remaining grain of sand.

The Hajin Pocket is made up of around 10 small and sparsely populated spread over roughly 240kmsq (144milesq). The largest of these is the town of Hajin itself. This only around 12kmsq (7 milesq) in area containing just five main roads.

To give you some perspective Hajin is roughly twice the size of the just the Old City district of ISIL's former de facto capital Raqqa City. The Old City district makes up only about 1/10th of Raqqa City.

Therefore the challenge of the Hajin Pocket is not really the urban areas themselves. Instead it is the layers of defences ISIL has built up around the urban areas.

These are made up of dug in fighting positions, trenches and tunnel networks. They are interwoven with large numbers of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) and landmines.

This third phase of Operation Round Up is being conducted on three axis; 

The north-western axis is focused on Hajin. 

The south-western axis is focused on Baghuz Fawqani. 

The third axis is a northern one focused on the town of Sousse/As-Susah. This is located around 8km (5 miles) north-west of Baghuz Fawqani and around 12km (7 miles) south-east of Hajin.

Hajin is believed to be ISIL's current de facto capital. As a result the fighting on the north-western Hajin axis has been the heaviest and slowest moving.
  
Despite this over the course of the 29 days of operations the SDF's north-western axis advanced a little over 12km (7 miles) towards Hajin. 

Within that distance the SDF have liberated nearly 70 ISIL fighting positions including two complex trench networks. One around 3km (1.8 miles) in length.

As of October 9th (9/10/18) the SDF seemed to have pushed up against ISIL's main line of defence around Hajin. Leading to extremely fierce fighting.

The northern Sousse axis has seen similarly slow progress. For the first five days of operations - September 11th (11/9/18) to September 15th (15/9/18) it seemed to be serving as a diversion for the other two axis.

 However on September 16th (16/9/18) the SDF managed to advance 2km (1.2 miles) on the Sousse axis. Liberating 11 ISIL fighting positions. On September 23rd (23/9/18) the SDF advanced 1km (0.6 milesq) on the axis. Liberating 4 ISIL fighting positions in the process.

The SDF's main progress has been made on the south-eastern Baghuz Fawqani axis. 

On September 14th (14/9/18) the SDF reached ISIL's main defensive ring around Baghuz Fawqani. By September 16th (16/9/18) the SDF had broken through that main defensive layer. 

On September 20th (20/9/18) the SDF completely liberated Baghuz Fawqani.
Directly to the north of Baghuz Fawqani you have the town of al-Shalja. Directly to the north of al-Shalja you have Sousse.
  
So on September 24th (24/9/18) both the SDF's south-western Baghuz Fawqani axis and the SDF's northern Sousse axis both turned their attention to al-Shalja. The Sousse axis advanced to the west of the town while the Baghuz Fawqani axis advanced to the east of al-Shalja. 

Almost without a fight al-Shalja was liberated from ISIL on September 25th (25/9/18). 

This saw the SDF's south-eastern Baghuz Fawqani axis and the SDF's northern Sousse axis merge and effectively become one single axis.

Directly to the west of al-Shalja you have the town of as-Safafinah. To the west of as-Safafinah you have the town of al-Marashidah.
On September 28th (28/9/18) the SDF's now combined south-western axis began to advance out of al-Shalja. In the direction of Safafinah and Marashidah.

On October 2nd (2/10/18) the SDF entered Safafinah itself. On October 7th (7/10/18) the SDF entered Marashidah.

This focus by the SDF on Shalja, Safafinah and Marashidah did seem to have temporarily relieve some of the pressure on ISIL around Sousse. On September 29th (29/9/18) ISIL were able to recapture Mozan. This is a small area of canals directly to the south-east of Sousse.

However this seems to have a tactical move on the part of the SDF. Having focused their pressure on ISIL in those three other areas the SDF were quickly able to re-liberate Mozan on October 5th (5/10/18).

On October 10th (10/10/18) there were reports that the SDF had managed to liberated all of Marashidah. Amid a sudden withdrawal of ISIL forces from the town.

Unfortunately those reports were shortlived as on October 10th (10/10/18) the SDF suffered their first major setback of the operation. As it tends to do when September gives way to October the weather turned bringing with it heavy rain storms.

If you think that it never rains in the desert it most certainly does. When it rains in the desert what you get is wet, glue-like sand and massive flooding. This bout of storms has been particularly bad across the entire region. As far south as Jordan's Dead Sea coast 20 children were killed in flash flooding on October 25th (25/10/18).

Alongside rainstorms the weather also brought with it sandstorms which gave me a particular headache. To relax I've been streaming a US TV Show called; "Blindspot" online. It has emerged as something of a codebook. The premise of the show is that the FBI are hunting down a terrorist organisation. A terrorist organisation called; "Sandstorm."

In all the battles that have been fought against them one of ISIL's main weapons has been the Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (S-VBIED's). These are essentially large truck bombs which are driven at speed towards formations of enemy troops and then detonated by the driver.

Traditionally S-VBIED's have been combated using infantry weapons. 

One particularly ingenious thing the SDF have been doing is to modify the 12.7mm (0.51) calibre DShK heavy machine gun to fire as a massive single shot Hard Target Interdiction (HTI) sniper rifle. Guided anti-tank weapons such as the MILAN and BGM-TOW systems have also proved highly effective.

However, for some reason, CJTFOIR has decided to listen to Turkish demands for restrictions on what weapons can be supplied to the SDF. That along with good old fashioned laziness has meant that infantry units have come to rely too much on CJTFOIR airstrikes to defeat S-VBIED's.

CJTFOIR strike aircraft can operate in all weather conditions. However they find it much harder to operate in conditions of poor visibility. When there are clouds, rain, smoke or a haze of sand in the way. This is particularly true when they're trying to strike targets which are moving at speed.

So this poor weather and loss of visibility allowed ISIL to use S-VBIED's to launch a large-scale coordinated counter-attack. Across all fronts. So not just against the SDF's three axis but also against the town of al-Bahrah. Sitting around 5km (3 miles) north-west of Hajin this is where the SDF's Hajin axis launched from.

The worst day of SDF losses of this five day ISIL counter-offensive came on October 12th (12/10/18). 

The SDF were forced to withdraw entirely from Safafinah and Marashidah. ISIL were then able to cut the SDF supply lines between al-Shalja and Baghuz Fawqani. Leading to heavy fighting in al-Shalja, Baghuz Fawqani and Mozan.

Between Sousse and Mozan ISIL able to break through the SDF's lines completely. This allowed them to make a dash from the Syria/Iraq border where they clashed with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) including the Iranian backed Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militias.

Most alarmingly ISIL were able to mount an attack on the Bahrah Internally Displaced People's (IDP) camp. Located just outside al-Bahrah this is home predominately to civilians who have fled ISIL in the Hajin Pocket.

The attack which was coordinated with ISIL fighters hidden amongst the camps residents was brought to an end following a full day of fighting. However not before ISIL had been able to kidnap 100 families from within the camp. Based on the average family size that translates to around 700 individuals.

On October 15th (15/10/18) the bad weather lifted. This allowed the SDF to quickly recover all lost positions meaning it was as if the ISIL counter-attack had never happened.

That is apart from the roughly 700 civilians hostages ISIL had kidnapped and the roughly 100 SDF fighters killed. Tribal forces from the Shaddadi area which fight as part of the Deir-ez-Zour Military Council (DEZ-MC) were particularly hard hit. Losing around 40 fighters.

Another round of bad weather blew in on October 18th (18/10/18). This again allowed ISIL to launch S-VBIED led counter-offensive across all fronts. However on this occasion they were much less successful. ISIL were though able to launch sabotage attacks against the Shaheel and Omar Oil & Gas Fields burning several well heads.

This round of bad weather lifted on October 20th (20/10/18). However the ISIL counter-offensive continued on the Baghuz Fawqani and al-Bahrah fronts. Although with little impact.

On October 22nd (22/10/18) the SDF repelled the ISIL counter-offensive on the Baghuz Fawqani front. They then went of the offensive to liberate Sousse.

This involved the SDF attacking ISIL in Sousse on three sub-axis. One of these advanced on Sousse from the north while the second advanced on Sousse from the north-east. The third advanced from the south to encircle Sousse to the west. Cutting it off from Marashidah.

This new tactic was remarkably effective. By the following day (23/10/18) the SDF were in control of around 70% of Sousse. 

On October 24th (24/10/18) ISIL attempted to break through the SDF's lines to escape both Sousse and Marashidah. Presumably towards the Syria/Iraq border. This failed completely and by the end of the day the SDF were again in full control of Marashidah.

By October 25th (25/10/18) the SDF had almost completely liberated all of Sousse. Amid conflicting reports of a small ISIL pocket holding out in the town.

Then the bad weather set in again. Allowing ISIL to launch another large-scale, coordinated counter-offensive across all fronts.

The worst day of SDF losses came on October 27th (27/10/18). 

Having been unable to consolidate their control over Sousse the SDF were forced out of the town. ISIL then concentrated their attacks on the SDF to the south of Sousse. The line dividing it from Marashidah and Safafinah. 

This isn't trench warfare. So when we talk about the SDF's line we're not talking about soldiers standing shoulder-to-shoulder in a long line. Instead you have different units which are known in the jargon as; "Echelons." These echelons may have gaps between them but it is the different echelons which form the line.

ISIL concentrated their attacks on the echelon made up of the DEZ-MC. 

For some reason this echelon had radios which allowed them to communicate with other members of the DEZ-MC and CJTFOIR. However they did not have radios which allowed them to communicate with the wider SDF. Including the YPG echelons which were either side of them. 

Under this sustained ISIL attack the DEZ-MC echelon appears to have panicked and run away. Having lost their shape ISIL were then very easily able to pick them off one-by-one effectively massacring them all.

The collapse of the DEZ-MC echelon also created a gap in the SDF line. This allowed ISIL to break through and move to outflank the other echelons. That left those elements of SDF with no choice other than to retreat. Or face being encircled and massacred.

Even the French Wagram artillery units who have been such a driving force behind the operation were forced to retreat. Not because they were at particular risk of being overrun. Artillery guns are designed to engage targets over large distances. At shorter distances they're very little use at all.

What exacerbated this outflanking problem was ISIL's use of tunnels to pop-up behind the SDF's lines. Or more accurately it was exacerbated by the SDF's failure to deal with these tunnels earlier.

In the future when the SDF uncover one of these tunnel entrances they need to make destroying it a priority. Either by blowing it up or simply pushing earth into it. Ideally they'd use something like a remote control car with a webcam attached to map the tunnel system. That would allow them to identify the points to bring in an airstrike to do the most damage to the entire system.

Amid those still missing in action it is hard to say exactly how many members of the SDF were killed over those three days of fighting. 

However the current best guess is 80. Of which 78 were members of the DEZ-MC and 2 were members of the YPG. On top of the 40 they lost in the ISIL counter-offensive of October 10th (10/10/18) this means the DEZ-MC have now been all but wiped out as a fighting force.

This enforced retreat saw the SDF lose all positions within the Hajin Pocket. 

Crucially it also saw the SDF lose Baghuz Tathani. Which they'd liberated back on May 14th (14/5/18). This is strategically important because it sits right on the Syria/Iraq border. Given ISIL access to Iraq.

Over the course of the entire Round Up operation the SDF have lost around 300 fighters in total. I for one am really not happy about giving back the territory they gave their lives to win.

However this is very far from a crushing defeat of the SDF. Nor is it the start of an ISIL resurgence. Once the Baghuz Tathani problem has been solved the SDF can keep ISIL contained within the Hajin Pocket.

If I'd planned the operation I'd have planned to leave ISIL contained in the Hajin Pocket until the spring of 2019. So I'm not seeing this as a great loss.

Believe it or these is even more I have to add to this string of posts. Which will have to wait until tomorrow.

The main points though are that I would have waited to launch the Hajin Pocket operation. At least until the results of the pressure on Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Sudetenland.

Led primarily by France the international community decided not to put pressure on Erdogan. Instead rewarding him with the DMZ agreement.

Erdogan has then boosted his own confidence through his Khashoggi campaign. He even thinks that today that will put the Democrats who have long protected him back in power in the US.

As a result Erdogan has become extremely aggressive in Shangri-La. These ISIL attacks have gone hand-in-hand with HaQ/MIT attacks against the SDF.

On October 12th (12/10/18) Erdogan pledged a fullscale Turkish invasion of Shangri-La. Since October 28th (28/10/18) the Turkish military have been periodically shelling Shangri-La from within Turkey.

As a result the SDF have been forced to redeploy their forces to Shangri-La's northern border with Turkey and its western boundary with the Garvaghy Road area. 

This means the SDF can't even contemplate mounting another operation in the Hajin Pocket until that Turkish threat is eliminated.

20:15 on 6/11/18 (UK date).