On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate Mosul from ISIL. This was intended as a combined operation.
The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga along with the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militias would take responsibility for securing the areas around Mosul. The ISF would take responsibility for liberating the city itself.
All aspects of this operation have been supported by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR).
On July 9th 2017 (9/7/17) Mosul was finally liberated.
Throughout the battle it has been apparent that there were many things wrong with the way the operation was planned. Now that the battle and the week of celebrations are over I will now look at the things that were wrong in the planning.
I'm not doing this to detract from the massive achievement of liberating Mosul. I'm doing it in the spirit of learning from the mistakes in order to improve in the future.
Wrong Place:
Roughly 130km (80 miles) south-west of Mosul you have an area designated the Hawija
Triangle.
This has the
town of Hawija at its centre. It's southern tip is the city of Tikrit. Its
northern tip is the town of Baiji. Its eastern tip is the city of Kirkuk.
The Hawija
Triangle was created in the spring of 2015 when the ISF
and the PMF liberated Tikrit and then Baiji. What
then stopped them liberating the Hawija Triangle was tension with the Iraqi
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and their Peshmerga force.
Kirkuk is an
ethnically mixed city with a large Kurdish population. However it sits outside
of the Kurdish Region. When the ISIL invaded northern Iraq in the summer of
2014 the Peshmerga moved into Kirkuk to stop it falling under ISIL control.
The KRG have
made it clear that they want use the Peshmerga's continued presence in Kirkuk
to seize it and its oild fields as part of the Kurdish Region.
As a result the
Iraqi Central Government (ICG) do not want the Peshmerga involved in an
operation in the Hawija Triangle in case they use it as an opportunity to try
and steal more territory.
Likewise the KRG don't want the ISF involved in an
operation in the Hawija Triangle in case it forces them to hand back control of
Kirkuk to the ICG.
The operation to
liberate Mosul was of course a joint operation involving the ISF, the PMF and
the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga. It has been hampered by the same tensions that
have blocked an operation in the Hawija Triangle.
I have to say
that the main problem has come from the KRG and its President Masoud Barzani.
Barzani still clings to this notion that if the KRG can export oil from Kirkuk through Turkey
then the KRG will be able to declare independence from Iraq and become a nation
state. The dependence on Turkey in this rush to statehood has caused the KRG to
repeatedly take actions that have threatened to undermine the liberation of
Mosul.
One of the main
issues has been the presence of Turkish troops at the Bashiqa camp which at the
start of the Mosul operation was on the ISIL side of the frontline.
These are the
troops that Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan
deployed to Iraq in December 2015 in preparation for an invasion of the
Garvaghy Road area of Syria which was originally scheduled for December 16th
2015 (16/12/15).
On October 4th
2016 (4/10/16) the ICG passed a resolution calling for those troops to withdraw
from Iraq and the matter was about to be elevated to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However the KRG then demanded that the troops stay. Something that
wildly exceeded its authority because Bashiqa is not part of the Kurdish
Region.
It was the
Turkish troops at Bashiqa who fired the first shots of the Mosul operation
opening fire on the city over the night of October 15th (15/10/16). This forced
the ICG's hand causing the operation to be launched on October 17th (17/10/16) long before it was ready to start.
Alongside the
Turkish troops presence the KRG has also allowed Turkey to repeatedly carry out
air and artillery strikes against the PMF within Iraq despite the ICG's
objections. This has created a very real threat that Erdogan would conduct
largescale attacks against anti-ISIL forces.
This threat has
been most keenly felt in the town of Tal Afar which is roughly 65km (40 miles) west
of Mosul.
In November 2016
the PMF established a front to the west of Mosul by advancing on Tal Afar
airport from the southern Qarrayah Front. They have since liberated everything
between that western front and Mosul and everything between the western front
and Iraq's border with Syria.
Everything that
is except for Tal Afar itself.
Erdogan has repeatedly threatened that if Tal
Afar is liberated then he will send Turkish troops to attack the PMF. Due to
the KRG's tolerance of Erdogan's aggression this threat has had to be taken
seriously. As a result Tal Afar remains as a pocket of ISIL occupation even
though Mosul itself has now been liberated.
Then of course
there is the issue of the now infamous town of Sinjar/Shingal. Mostly populated
by Kurds who follow the Yezidi religion this sits outside of the Kurdish Region
some 115km (70 miles) west of Mosul.
When Sinjar was
overrun by ISIL in the summer of 2014 it fell to the Syrian Kurdish People's
Protection Units (YPG) to cross the border to rescue Shingal's civilians. They
then organised the local population into the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS).
This went on to be incorporated into the PMF militia structure.
Erdogan's hatred
of the YPG is well established. KRG President Barzani's dream is to rely on
Erdogan's support to build an Iraqi Kurdish nation including the Sinjar/Shingal
region.
So in March 2017
at Erdogan's urging Barzani sent the Peshmerga to attack the YBS element of the
PMF at Sinjar. This created the bizarre situation where two forces who were
supposed to be working together to liberate Mosul from ISIL were instead
fighting each other.
Barzani's
mandate as KRG President actually expired all the way back on August 20th 2015
(20/8/15).
I have
repeatedly defended Barzani's right to continue as KRG President without a
fresh election being held due to the ongoing war. You only need to look at how
the UK's June 2017 election was influenced by two comparatively small terror
attacks to see why holding an election just kilometres from a city entirely
under ISIL control would be very bad idea.
It seems though
Barzani's aversion to elections only applies to his mandate as President.
In
April Barzani declared that he would be holding a referendum on independence
for the Iraqi Kurdish region. Done without consultation with the ICG or even
the Kurdish Regions other political parties this massively increased tensions
between the Peshmerga and the ISF.
It is the absolute last thing that anybody
needs in the middle of a battle.
With the date of the referendum now set for
September 25th (25/9/17) it looks likely that it will take place while raging
in the Hawija Triangle.
With the Hawija
Triangle being much smaller and significantly less complicated than Mosul I
would have thought it would have provided an ideal proving ground for the ISF,
PMF and Peshmerga to work out their differences so those differences didn't interfere with
the Mosul operation in the way that they did.
Wrong Time: The
Mosul operation was launched on October 17th 2016 (17/10/17). This meant that
it was conducted in autumn into winter.
Modern military
aircraft can operate day and night in all sorts of weather conditions. However
for this sort of urban battle against an enemy without air defences they much
prefer lots of clear daylight.
That is
something that even in Iraq is in short supply over the winter months. So
throughout the course of the battle many days were lost because not even the
vast resources of CJTFOIR were able to provide air support.
Although it was
not really predictable in the autumn of 2016 the winter particularly in January
through to March turned out to be a harsh one. Therefore not only were days
lost because aircraft could not effectively fly days and even weeks were lost
because ground troops could not move about.
Unavoidably the
battle for Mosul meant that civilians within the city were subjected to siege
conditions. This meant shortages of essential supplies such as water, food and
medicine. However conducting the operation over the winter months also created
another shortage. Fuel for heating.
Sadly is
impossible to conduct this type of operation without subjecting civilians to
some level of suffering. However you would try and plan the operation for a
time when demand for supplies is at its lowest in order to minimise that
suffering.
Therefore for
these reasons I would've thought that it was only natural that the Mosul
operation was conducted in spring into summer rather than autumn into winter.
The Falls Road
Failure: The original plan for the Mosul operation was to only surround the
city on three sides; North, East and South.
This left a vast 28,000kmsq (16,800milesq) area west
of the city designated; "The Falls Road" totally undefended
The objective of
doing this appeared to be to allow ISIL fighters to flee from Mosul back across
the border to Syria. This was to allow a quick and symbolic victory to be
declared.
However this is
not how you fight a war.
By granting ISIL
an escape route from Mosul you are simply allowing them to regroup and fight on
in Syria. As the Garvaghy Road area of Syria's border with Turkey has still not
been sealed allowing ISIL to escape to Syria is to allow them to flee to Turkey
and from there to anywhere else in the World.
That is not a
plan to defeat ISIL. Instead it is a plan to move them from one location to
another.
By leaving the
Falls Road open ISIL were not only being given the ability to escape from
Mosul. They were also being given the opportunity to bring in reinforcements
and supplies from Syria in order to better defend Mosul.
Finally leaving
the western side of Mosul undefended greatly reduced the tactical options
available to the operation.
In planning an
operation of this type you would want the option to attack from all directions
at once. If only to confuse the enemy into not knowing where the attack was
coming from. Failing to establish a western front made it quite clear to ISIL
that the attack would not be coming from the west.
The PMF did of
course break with the plan and establish a western front by advancing on Tal
Afar airport from the southern Qarrayah Front. However this was not completed
until November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) fifteen days after the assault on the city
itself had begun. Crucially it was also never officially recognised as part of
the battle plan.
Back To Front:
Within the western half of Mosul - the "Right Bank" - there is the
Old City district. With parts dating all the way back to the 9th Century the Old
City district is a maze of tightly packed buildings and narrow alleyways that
is totally unsuited to modern war fighting.
At the centre of
the Old City there is the Grand Mosque of al-Nuri. This is where ISIL leader
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi publicly declared the group to be a Caliphate and he its Caliph. As such it is
of huge importance to the group.
This meant that ISIL
viewed the Old City and the al-Nuri Mosque to be their Castle Keep. They built
their entire defences of the city around protecting the al-Nuri Mosque and
making sure that the Old City was the last area they were ousted from.
Therefore the operation
to liberate Mosul should have been built around making sure the Old City was
the amongst the first places ISIL were ousted from.
The ideal
scenario is that having been ousted from the Old City ISIL's defences would
completely collapse and they would surrender the city.
However failing
that an early liberation of the Old City would mean that ISIL could be pushed
back against their own defences undermining their ability to fight. This would
involve them being forced
into the more modern areas of the east of the city - the "Left Bank"
- where the ISF's advantage in terms of equipment and manpower would be clearer.
If there was any
advantage to leaving the Hawija Triangle under ISIL occupation it’s that ISIL
could have been encouraged to abandon Mosul to make a last stand there.
Therefore my
plan for the Mosul operation would have been to surround the city on all sides.
I would then use the western front to attack the Right Bank of the city first.
This would be done in much the same way that it has been done although I would
have launched the third, northern axis at the same time as the initial southern
and south-westerly axis.
A Lack of
Mobility: This might seem a strange thing to say but the ISF were too focused
on liberating each of Mosul's neighbourhoods.
What the ISF
would do is arrive at a neighbourhood and then try to fight their way through
it. This actually makes it easier for ISIL to defend that neighbourhood. This
type of frontal assault allowed ISIL to see where they were being attacked and
their focus all of their resources on repelling that assault.
The better
tactic would be to concentrate on controlling the roads that divide the
neighbourhoods. This cuts the ISIL fighters off from each other denying them
access to reinforcements, resupply and crucially command and control.
That
changes the dynamic from fighting one large organised army into fighting small
disorganised groups of demoralised fighters with limited resources. As the
small groups of fighters collapse you then back clear the neighbourhoods.
Although it is a
tactic best suited to the Left Bank then the Right Bank the ISF did begin to
deploy this tactic towards the end of the battle.
On May 4th
(4/5/17) the northern axis in the Right Bank was opened. However rather than
clearing down through the neighbourhoods the ISF instead moved to throw a
cordon around the 17 Tammuz, Hay al-Uraybi, Hay ar-Rafai, Zanjili and Old City
districts.
With the ISF enjoying air superiority over the area this was done to
deny ISIL movement between the districts. Once that movement had been denied
all the districts excluding the Old City were liberated in rapid succession.
Not only didn't
make use of their advantage of mobility they or more accurately CJTFOIR
actually seemed to set out to minimise their mobility.
In the early
stages of the battle CJTFOIR bombed all of the bridges crossing the Tigris
River in the centre of Mosul. This was done to prevent ISIL bringing in
reinforcements from western Mosul into eastern Mosul.
As I've said I
would have designed the battle to force ISIL from the Right Bank into the Left
Bank. I certainly would not have destroyed the bridges to prevent them doing
that of their own accord.
The destruction of the bridges also made it harder for
the ISF when they came to fight on the Right Bank.
Although it
looks good in movies sending troops across bridges is often an extremely bad
idea. It leaves them incredibly exposed so all the enemy needs to do is put a
couple of machine guns at the other end of the bridge and the advancing troops
are wiped out.
However when it
was introduced the northern axis was rapidly able to capture the western
bridgeheads of the Third Bridge and Fifth Bridge. If the bridges had not been
destroyed the ISF would have been able to bring in reinforcements across the
bridges.
Likewise if the tactics of the northern axis had been used by the southern axis reinforcements could have been brought in across the remaining bridges once their western bridgeheads had been secured.
Element of Surprise Lost: The entire Mosul operation was designed around the November 8th 2016 (8/11/16) US Presidential Election. The purpose was to propel Hillary Clinton to victory on the back of a swift victory against ISIL.
The date of the 2016 US Presidential Election was laid out in the US Constitution published in 1776. Due to the mass of media coverage you certainly didn't need to be living in the US to know that the election was coming up. As such it was very easy for ISIL to predict that an operation to liberate Mosul would be launched to coincide with the election.
Despite already being hampered by predictability the Mosul operation then set out to remove whatever element of surprise it had left.
In the roughly month before the Mosul operation was launched the fact that it was imminent was being openly and widely discussed. This included very public clashes between the KRG and the ICG over exactly when it would begin.
When the start of the operation was formally announced on October 17th (17/10/16) forces were some 25km (15 miles) away from Mosul at their closest point on the Tel Skuf Front and some 45km (30 miles) away at their furthest point on the Qarayyah Front. To advance from those positions they had to fight their way through numerous sizable towns and villages such as Bartella and Haman al-Alil.
This meant there was a more then three week period between the operation being formally announced and the ISF actually entering Mosul on November 1st (1/11/16). This not only allowed ISIL to know that Mosul would be attacked but gave them a very clear idea of how and where that attack would be coming from. This gave ISIL the advantage of being able to best prepare their defences.
Rather than making a big announcement that Mosul was to be liberated and then advancing troops on the city I would have instead quietly made a series of advances that were barely mentioned. So you would just do a small operation to liberate the villages around Tel Skuf followed by a small operation to liberate the villages around Haman al-Alil etc.
Obviously it is impossible to surround a city with 40,000 troops and their equipment without anybody noticing.
However by doing it discreetly in stages with no stated intent you put the pressure on ISIL to decide whether this meant an operation to liberate Mosul was underway. This subtle pressure grinds away at their commanders and if they're seen to get their decisions wrong it undermines confidence in the entire command structure causing troop morale to collapse.
With the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) operation to liberate the Syrian city of Raqqa this mistake has been repeated on a much larger scale. The start of the Raqqa operation was announced on November 6th 2016 (6/11/16). The SDF did not enter Raqqa until June 6th 2017 (6/6/17) giving ISIL a full seven months to prepare their defences.
The Resistance That Never Was: Amid all the hyperbole in the run-up to Mosul operation we were frequently promised that there was a network of resistance fighters within the city poised to spring into action.
In this type of operation having a resistance movement embedded in the city can be extremely useful. At the most basic level it can be used to provide real time intelligence about the enemies positions allowing them to be destroyed from the air.
Through actors like MosulEye we did see some of this emerge in the later stages of the battle as they tried to gather information from local residents and pass it on to CJTFOIR. However a properly coordinated resistance movement would have been so much more effective in this task.
Rather then CJTFOIR having to scour social media for information from sources they don't know and therefore cannot trust it would be so much easier if trained resistance fighters could simply radio their control room.
If CJTFOIR were able to smuggle equipment in to the resistance fighters it could be even more effective still. There is a piece of equipment called a laser designator. This allows a person on the ground to shine a laser onto a target building. An aircraft can then come along and fire a missile directly onto that laser beam.
Local resistance fighters are also extremely useful when it comes to helping to protect civilians.
A prime example of this which has been in the news a lot recently was the role Polish resistance movement known as the Polish Home Army in the ghettos - particularly the Warsaw Ghetto - during the Second World War.
Prior to establishing the Concentration Camps and then Death Camps the Nazis gathered undesirables - mainly Jews and Gypsies - in into sections of a city which where then cut off from the outside world. In 1943 the Polish Home Army staged an uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto ending Nazi control for almost a month. However they and other European resistance movements spent most of their time quietly smuggling civilians out of the ghettos to safety.
If there was a properly organised resistance movement within Mosul it too could have helped smuggle civilians out of the city. It could also have coordinated with the ISF to help establish humanitarian corridors to help civilians escape areas of the city with were about to come under attack.
If there was a particularly strong resistance movement in Mosul the ISF and CJTFOIR could not only have smuggled weapons into them but also Special Operation Forces (SOF's) in to operate alongside them.
This would have allowed them to carry out attacks on key ISIL buildings such as ammunition depots and prisons and assassinations of key ISIL commanders. This type of behind-the-lines attacks help spread confusion and fear destroying morale and undermining defences.
The first rule of any successful resistance movement though is; YOU DO NOT TALK ABOUT THE RESISTANCE. It must be carried out in absolute secrecy.
By very publicly touting the presence of a resistance movement within Mosul CJTFOIR and the Iraqis prompted ISIL to go on a paranoid rampage to wipe out the resistance fighters. At best this lead to a large number of innocent Moslawi civilians being murdered needlessly.
At worst - from a military perspective - it led to the resistance movement being wiped out before the battle had even begun. However I've always had my doubts as to whether this resistance movement ever existed to begin with.
Part two to follow.
16:30 on 18/7/17 (UK date).
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