Operation Featherweight: Month 56, Week 4, Day 4.

A direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-4.html

In that post I looked at US President Donald Trump's announcement on December 19th 2018 (19/12/18). That he intended to immediately withdraw US troops from Syria.

I particularly looked at the fact that the Shangri-La area is not the only area of Syria in which US troops are operating. Aside from the supporting the SDF the US also has troops stationed at the Dollywood base. Located close to the town of al-Tanf within the Central Syria area.

The only function US troops are currently performing at the Dollywood base is to protect ISIL. The exclusion zone around the base provides ISIL with a de facto safe haven in which they can operate. That obviously runs counter to the US  mission to defeat ISIL.

So removing US troops from the Dollywood base is not a cause for concern. It is a decision that it is almost two years overdue.

Of the roughly 2,300 US troops deployed in the Shangri-La area a full 2,000 of them belong to two artillery battalions. They were sent into Syria ahead of the Battle of Raqqa City, in the spring of 2017, to perform a specific task. To rain artillery shells down on ISIL defensive positions, destroying them.

With the liberation of the Hajin Pocket area there are now no longer any ISIL defensive positions within Shangri-La. Meaning that those two artillery battalion's task is now complete. So they should be withdrawn and allowed to return to their normal duties.

This changing of the type of resources used as the mission changes is common throughout all wars. It's certainly been common throughout the war against ISIL and associated groups.

In December 2016 Denmark withdrew its seven F-16 fighters jets and support personnel from the CJTFOIR coalition. This wasn't because Denmark suddenly no longer believed in the mission or no longer wished to aid it. CJTFOIR had just found itself in a position where it had far more planes than targets to bomb.

Therefore CJTFOIR was able to allow some of those planes to return to their normal duties. It was easier to stand down all Danish aircraft then stand down, say four Danish and three American planes. Then try to coordinate the remaining aircraft under a unified CJTFOIR command.

Likewise in December 2017 Australia withdrew it's seven F-18 fighter jets and support personnel from the CJTFOIR. Again this was simply because as ISIL's territory shrank CJTFOIR found itself in a position where it had far more planes than targets to bomb.

As recently as January 21st 2019 (21/1/19) the UK announced it was withdrawing its eight GR-4 fighters from the CJTFOIR coalition.

Again this had nothing to do with President Trump's announcement. With there now being so few targets to bomb there was no point keeping the 40 year old aircraft in service beyond its planned retirement in March 2019.

The UK will continue to deploy six of the newer Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as part of CJTFOIR. If the need arises it will deploy more of the newer type of aircraft to CJTFOIR.

However there is a certain level of debate over the costs of deploying the GR4's replacement the F-35 against the Russian S-400 Air Defence System. There's even significant interest in the upgraded S-200 system's capability against aircraft such as the F-35.

The liberation of the Hajin Pocket means that ISIL are now defeated as a conventional military force. They're now forced to operate as an armed insurgency conducting guerrilla attacks.

I do not intend to ignore these ISIL guerrilla attacks. Nor do I mean to detract from their severity.

However I think it is important to take a moment to appreciate just what a massive improvement this is.

Last Thursday, February 21st (21/2/19) ISIL conducted a particularly successful guerrilla attack. An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) hidden in a car was used to ambush a bus carrying workers from the Omar Oil & Gas Field. 24 of those civilian workers were killed and many more were wounded.

That though is still a massive improvement on the Battle of Kobani in the winter of 2014/15. It is also a massive improvement on the Battle of Raqqa City in the summer and autumn of 2017.

It is even a massive improvement on ISIL's November 24th 2018 (24/11/18) two day attack on the town of Bahrah, just outside the Hajin Pocket. In which 92 members of the SDF were killed in the conventional battle.

I should also point out that even if we were to do absolutely nothing about ISIL's insurgency it would likely fade on its own.

Throughout this conflict I've often found myself talking about the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). I particularly talk about their Grey Wolves paramilitary wing as being part of the NATO "Gladio" operation. A secret army to counter Soviet influence and use guerrilla tactics to fight behind the lines in the event of a Soviet invasion.

Operation Gladio has its roots in the GHQ Auxilary Units Britain operated during World War Two. These were the forerunner of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) which was copied by the US to create the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Which became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The GHQ Auxiliary Units were made up of 3,500 volunteers. Often veterans of the International Brigades from the Spanish Civil War. They were divided into eight man autonomous cells, given a stockpile of weapons and a 20kmsq (15 milesq) area of operations.

In the event of Britain being invaded the GHQ Auxiliary Units were tasked with carrying out intense guerrilla attacks against the Nazi forces. Until they were killed. They were instructed to use the last of their weapon stockpiles to conduct one final suicide attack.

Obviously the GHQ Auxiliary Units were never used. However in their planning they had a predicted life expectancy of just 12 days after being activated.

So even without any action being taken against them it is likely that ISIL's own Auxiliary Units or Sleeper Cells will become less effective. Burning themselves out as they run out of ammunition.

Obviously though I have absolutely no intention of leaving ISIL's sleeper cells to simply fade away.

In terms of combating ISIL as a guerrilla force there remains a substantial, conventional military role for the SDF to play. Conducting patrols, sweeping operations and re-sweeping operations of the desert areas to uncover ISIL camps and weapons stores.

As the Syrian military has been doing in the Syrian Desert/Badiya al-Sham. Or at least the areas of the Syrian Desert they're not blocked from entering by the US troops deployed at the Dollywood base.

These type of operations are hugely assisted by surveillance assets. Such as satellites and drones. If you've identified an ISIL camp that may soon move on the best way to destroy it is with an airstrike.

However I don't think there was any suggestion of President Trump's withdrawal announcement apply to this type of US asset. They don't even operate out of either Syria or Iraq.

Primarily though the fight is now going to shift into counter-terrorism operations and raids. Often in otherwise peaceful civilian urban areas. These are Special Operations. So require Special Operations Forces (SOF's).

The SDF have already made significant progress in developing this type of capabilities.

In March 2017 the SDF's own Special Operations Force the Anti-Terror Units (YAT) introduced itself to the World. Participating in an airborne assault on the ISIL occupied town of Tabqa.

An airborne assault is a particularly complex and sophisticated military operation. In the US Army soldiers have to do a special course and receive a special qualification badge before they're allowed to participate in them. So the SDF's ability to conduct such an operation impressed and caught the attention of a lot of people.

The YAT are said to be loosely based on Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service (ICTS/Golden Division). The Golden Division itself is said to be based on the US Army's Green Berets SOF.

From what I've seen of their operations though the YAT seem to operate more along the lines of the US Navy SEAL Teams or the US Army Delta Force. When those SOF's are operating in their counter-terrorism role.

That is to say that the YAT operate almost like a police Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) team. A well equipped and extremely lethal SWAT team.

From the Ayaish neighbourhood police officer up to the YAT itself everyone gathers intelligence on ISIL sleeper cells, how they operate and where they are located. Rather like how a police force would track a drugs gang or a gang of armed robbers.

Once the intelligence has been gathered and collated the YAT move in to raid the targets. Capturing or killing members of the ISIL cells, seizing their weapons and equipment and generally disrupting their ability to operate and conduct attacks.

Alongside the YAT the SDF announced, on January 16th 2019 (16/1/19), the creation of its Commando Forces (Hezen Komandoz). The only thing I really know about them at this point is their name and the first graduating class was made up of 120 members.

I would assume though, from the name, that they are intended to function as what is traditionally recognised as a commando force. That is to say an elite force which is more capable and more specialised than a conventional force. Yet falls just short of the standards of a Special Operations Force.

In an anti-terrorism role they would act in support of the YAT. As the basis of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

A prime example of this comes from the Philippines. In May 2017 two ISIL affiliated groups, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group, overran the Philippine city of Marawi.

If something like this occurred in Shangri-La it would be too large for the YAT to handle alone. So they would lead the operation backed by the Hezen Komandoz. If need be the operation would be further supported by conventional units of the SDF. Likely securing the areas the YAT and Hezen Homandoz had cleared.

It must be said though that to be effective any commando force needs to be of at least battalion sized, 800-1000 strong. The equivalent force in the UK military is the Navy Marine Commandos. That is currently made up of five battalions. Plans to cut it to just three battalions have proved highly controversial.

Also simply calling yourself a SOF or a Commando does not make it true. You need the rigorous selection and training to back it up.

So despite the work the SDF have done to build their own capabilities CJTFOIR does still need to deploy its own SOF's to Shangri-La. In order to provide training help the SDF build up its own capacity and fill in any existing capability gaps.

After all the YAT maybe capable of mounting an airborne assault. However they still require CJTFOIR to provide them with the aircraft. 

In deciding what level of support it can provide the US, and other members of CJTFOIR, will have to consider what impact that support will have on their own forces. Along with what missions their forces will not then be able to carry out because they're deployed in Syria.

The last conventional war the NATO elements of CJTFOIR fought was in 1999. The small, illegal one against Serbia.

Following the September 11th 2001 (11/9/01) attacks the US declared the Global War on Terror. This war is still ongoing and is one which is being fought primarily by Special Operations Forces (SOF).

As a result these past 18 years have seen a massive increase in the public's interest in SOF's. So you have TV shows such as; "The Unit," "SEAL Team" and the far inferior; "Six."

The UK even has a reality TV show called; "SAS: Are You Tough Enough." Currently in its fifth season this puts members of the public through a toned down, softened version of SAS selection. To find out if they're tough enough. The answer is often a resounding; "No."

Under former US President Obama the Global War on Terror became much worse. With Islamist terrorism spreading to previously safe areas such as Libya, Nigeria and across Africa's Sahel Belt.

In October 2017 a number of US Green Beret SOF's were killed in Niger. Including Sgt La David Johnson. Many Americans, particularly Democrats, were shocked to learn that first a country called Niger existed and that US troops were deployed there.

In fact US SOF's have their main, big mission in Afghanistan. Along with a number of smaller deployments in a host of places such as Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Burkina Faso all across Africa. They also conduct response operations such as to rescue hostages or to target senior terrorist leaders.

The problem with this is that the entire US SOF community is only about 70,000 strong. Including support staff such as in logistics and intelligence. The sheer number of missions they're being asked to do is putting a huge stress on them.

Conventional US troops will do a 6 to 9 month deployment in a combat zone. They then won't be asked to do another combat deployment for at least another 12 months. SOF's will return from a three month combat deployment only to be immediately sent out on another one.

Back in January 2019 it emerged that there had been a massive spike in suicides within the US SOF community. They saw 32 suicides per 100,000 people. More than double the national average of 13 per 100,000 people.

Obviously I've not looked at the circumstances of each individual suicide. Dealing with personal medical records I wouldn't be able to. However most seem to be linked to relationship breakdowns and financial worries rather than things like PTSD.

Both of these factors seem to be caused by the high rate of deployment. That obviously puts stress on personal relationships and people often spend money they don't have trying to mitigate those relationship stresses. For example if your spouse is not home to cook dinner your kids would be forced to spend money on take-out.
 
So there is some pressure on the US to reduce the number of SOF deployments it is undertaking. In order to reduce the risk of them being pushed to breaking point. There is certainly significant pressure on the US to pay them more.

Fortunately the type of training and support mission required in Shangri-La can be extremely small.

On January 15th 2019 (15/1/19) there was an Islamist terror attack on a hotel in the Westlands district of the Kenyan capital Nairobi.

In the middle of the effort to bring this attack to an end there was a single British SAS solider. He'd been deployed, on his own, to train and support Kenyan forces. When the attack happened he decided to get stuck in.

It also means that at some point Britain looked at Kenya and wondered how many SAS soldiers would be required to have a significant impact of the Islamist terror threat there. The answer they came up with was; One.

Alongside ISIL's guerrilla attacks the other major challenge facing the SDF is what to do with the large number of ISIL prisoners they have captured. Something that Britain has pushed into the spotlight with the case of Shamima Begum.

Within Britain the tone of the coverage of Shamima Begum has been that she is some sort of almost heroic figure. An innocent victim of the brutality of the cruel SDF.

There have genuinely been calls for her to be allowed to return home and not face any punishment at all. Some people seem to think that if she is to be punished it should only be the mildest telling off by the police and Courts.

As if she'd simply been caught underage drinking or engaging in some light shoplifting.

To those arguments the answer is very simple. Begum, and all of ISIL prisoners have been captured on the battlefield. In a UN designated warzone.

As such civilian law does not apply to them. The only way to deal with them is under the laws of war, essentially the Geneva Conventions. Through a system of military tribunal.

However I should make clear that the Geneva Conventions do not allow for collective punishment. Nor do they allow for summary justice or extrajudicial punishment. In fact they expressly forbid them.

It's worth pointing out though that fighters of the GHQ Auxiliary Units were instructed to commit suicide rather than allow themselves to be captured. That's because they knew that they were acting as illegal combatants so absolutely everything was on the table in terms of what could be done to them if they were captured.

The crimes committed by ISIL are so shocking and so severe there have only been five, possibly six occasions where the international community has been called upon to prosecute crimes of such magnitude.

The Nuremberg Military Tribunal. This addressed the crimes of Nazi Germany committed before and during the Second World War. Including the holocaust.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Associated with the Nuremberg Military Tribunal this addressed the crimes committed by Imperial Japan during the Second World War.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. These addressed the crimes committed by Cambodia's Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979. Much like Shamima Begum the Khmer Rouge was famously made up of many members who were just teenagers.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. This addressed the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This addressed crimes committed during the break up of Yugoslavia and the associated Balkan Wars. Including the 1995 Srebrenica massacre.

If you look at these tribunals in detail you will quickly notice that they are all different in structure from each other. They have been specifically tailored to fit the people who committed the crimes, the crimes themselves and the communities that became the victims of those crimes.

Even the second round of Nuremberg Tribunals was different from the first. The third round was different from them both.

So even this simple answer of how to prosecute the ISIL prisoners is not that simple.

As such I will have to circle back to this complex issue. Dealing with it more fully in an appropriate section.

The immediate priority is ensuring that there is the space and time in which to have these discussions and make appropriate decisions.

Fortunately under the laws of war there is no concept of Habeus Corpus, restrictions of detention without trial.

Lawful combatants, Prisoners Of War (POW's) are never expected to be put on trial. By definition their actions are considered entirely lawful. Instead they are held until the war ends. Or until their captors benevolently decided to release them and send them home.

In the interim though the SDF do need to house and control these ISIL prisoners.

The immediate thing they need to do is screen them.

Amongst the thousands of people emerging for previously ISIL controlled areas there are some who are clearly ISIL members. Such as Shamima Begum. However there are also some who are clearly wholly innocent civilians.

The SDF need to identify those who are clearly innocent civilians and transport them to Internally Displaced People's (IDP) camps. Such as the one at al-Hawl. These people are considered victims, whom nobody has any interest in taking further action against. The SDF therefore has a responsibility to ensure that they receive appropriate care.

The people who have been identified as ISIL members need to be separated from the civilians. They need to be transported and housed in entirely separate camps. In terms of design, for speed, these can be almost exactly the same as the IDP camps. Only with external fencing, guard and watch towers.

I would locate these prisoner camps close to Raqqa City. Where a camp for ISIL family members emerged during the Battle of Raqqa City. It is in this area where ISIL dug the majority of their mass graves. Mass graves which are now slowly being unearthed.

I think it is important that the journalists rushing to give the likes of Shamima Begum a sympathetic ear take a look at those mass graves.

Once they've built prisoner camps and separated ISIL members into them the SDF need to look at what, of limited, resources can be made available to them. Here there is a clear protocol known as the priority of life.

At the top there are the SDF themselves. If they don't get what they need function then everything falls to bits and nobody gets anything.

Coming a very close second behind the SDF you have the civilians.

Last, and very much least you have the ISIL prisoners themselves. They only get what is left after everybody else has gotten what they need.

I should make clear though that the priority of life protocol only comes into effect when there is not enough to go around. It does not advocate starving ISIL prisoners to death.

However neither I, nor the law will stand for innocent civilians being starved to death in order save the lives of ISIL prisoners.

If the prospect of ISIL prisoners starving to death horrifies people, well.

Surely they should take action to make sure that the SDF have everything they need.

21:20 on 27/2/19 (UK date).

Operation Featherweight: Month 56, Week 4, Day 2.

Within Syria there continue to be five main areas of operations.

Reading from right-to-left;

Shangri-La, Garvaghy Road, Afrin Canton, the Sudetenland and Central Syria.

In the period between mid-December 2018 and January 2019 there were major developments in all five of these areas.

Frustratingly this was also the period I was called away to deal with Britain's exit from the European Union (EU). The infamous Brexit.

In an effort to catch up I have started to look at the developments in the Shangri-La area.

Here; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-3.html

Here; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-3_20.html

And here; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-3_21.html

In those posts I looked out how the nature of the operation within Shangri-La has changed.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have been removed from any territory they held in the area. As a result their tactics have shifted from conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare.

Turkey has also emerged as an equal, if not greater threat to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) coalition which controls Shangri-La.

This brings me onto US President Donald Trump's announcement on December 19th 2018 (19/12/18).  That he is immediately withdrawing all US troops from Syria.

I should start by pointing out that moving troops anywhere is an extremely complex business. To the point that a full 20% of the British Army is employed just to do logistics. Their entire job is moving the other 80% of the British Army and its equipment about.

So in terms of military logistics the term; "Immediately" doesn't mean quite the same thing it does in Starbucks.

Troops are at their most vulnerable when they are on the move.

Once you have troops in bases, even on the frontline, you can build strong walls around them to protect them from attack. They're also able to build up large amounts of intelligence and information about the area around the base. Which allows them to stop any attack before it even reaches those walls.

When troops are on the move they are out in the open. They are also constantly travelling through new areas with new enemies and new threats. Ones which are much harder to predict.

At any time the troops which are the most vulnerable are the ones who don't specialise in combat. The people who do logistics, communications, maintenance, catering etc.

Certain combat units, such as artillery units, are also particularly vulnerable when they are on the move. The big guns artillery units use are designed to engage targets a great distance away. Normally at least 1km (0.6 miles) away. Any closer than that and those weapons are useless. Particularly when they've been packed up and loaded onto trucks.

So strange as it sounds if you want to withdraw troops from an area the first thing you have to do is send a load more troops into the area. Their job is to provide force protection. To scout and line the route the troops are travelling along in order to protect them against ambush and attack.

The US military has quite a high state of readiness. However you still need to mobilise this force protection force and make sure it is properly equipped for its task. Before finally moving it to where it's needed.

So in these terms; "immediately" actually means in around 90-100 days.

So an announcement on December 19th 2018 (19/12/18) that troops are being withdrawn immediately means you wouldn't expect to see the first troops withdraw until at least March 6th 2019 (6/3/19). At the earliest.

This isn't something I've worked out using my experience. It is something that was made clear in President Trump's announcement. It was mentioned in all of the reporting surrounding the announcement.

Or at least all the reports written by journalists who don't approach every story asking themselves; "How can I use this to make Trump look bad?"

The second thing that I should make clear is that the US troop presence in Syria is extremely small.

Everyone approaching this mission has been clear that this is Iraq and Syria's fight against ISIL. The US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) is only there to support Iraqi and Syrian forces with capabilities they don't posses.

For example back when the war started in 2014 Iraq didn't have an airforce. Primarily due to then US President Obama blocking the delivery of F-16's that Iraq had ordered and paid for. The SDF still don't have an airforce.

So CJTFOIR's role in the fight against ISIL has been to step in and fill that sort of capability gap.

In terms of ground forces the US only has around 2,500 troops in Syria.

A full 2,000 of those are made up of two artillery battalions. They were brought into Shangri-La in the spring of 2017. Just before the Battle for Raqqa City. To perform a specific task. To rain down artillery shells on ISIL's defensive positions. Destroying them.

The other 500 US troops are Special Operations Forces (SOF). It is the nature of what SOF's do that, at any given point, that number might be slightly higher or it might be slightly lower.

SOF's exist to do missions that conventional military forces can't. In areas where conventional forces can't go. They're often a clandestine force sent to places where nations can't officially admit they have troops.

Britain's most famous SOF is the 22nd Squadron, Special Air Service (SAS). They were founded in 1941. During the North Africa campaign of the Second World War.

It says a lot about SOF operations that initially the SAS were never intended to have anything to do with air operations. However they were given the name 22nd Squadron Special Air Service so any Nazi spies would think Britain had a Special Air Service. Not only that it had at least 22 squadrons of planes the Nazi spies needed to find.

Despite being formed in 1941 Britain did not officially acknowledge, and often denied the existence of the SAS. Right up until 1980. When the SAS ended a siege at the Iranian Embassy in central London. Live on TV.

On December 27th 2018 (27/12/18) Trump visited US troops in Iraq. There he had a photograph taken with the Chaplain of the US SOF unit US Navy SEAL Team Five. Trump then put those photographs on Twitter.

This led to Trump's critics blasting him for undermining national security. By revealing the identities and location of this secret SOF unit.

The thing is that SEAL Team Five are not a clandestine unit. Although not widely publicised their deployment in Iraq is certainly not a secret. They even have their own Twitter account.

It is the Osama bin Laden killing SEAL Team Six which does clandestine and covert work. So I certainly couldn't confirm where they've been deployed throughout the battle for the Hajin Pocket.

I should also probably mention that there is a roughly decade old US TV show about a fictional SOF unit called; "The Unit." This has emerged as something of a codebook in the conflict. Fans of the US TV show; "The Mentalist" will certainly recognise The Unit's Chaplain.

In the TV show the SOF unit are designated as the; "303rd Logisitical Studies Group." To disguise their true purpose.

The third thing I should make clear is that Shangri-La is not the only area of Syria where US troops are based. There is also a small deployment within the Central Syria area. At a base near al-Tanf.

This base sits right on the Syria/Iraq/Jordan border. Around 225km (135 miles) south-west of where the Euphrates River enters Iraq from Syria. Which marks the south-eastern boundary of the Shangri-La.

Up until now this base has been designated; "Bobby Sands." However due to Brexit it has been re-designated; "Dollywood." If I told you why it would take all the fun out of it.

Due to the nature of SOF deployments I can't give you an exact number of US troops there. However assuming a total of 500 there is a roughly 300/200 split between Shangri-La and Dollywood.

Dollywood was established as a place to train the Southern Front. A coalition of fighters active in the south of Syria.

If the SDF had been able to establish the boundaries of Shangri-La more promptly Dollywood would have performed a vital strategic function.

Allowing the SDF and the Southern Front to link up with each other. Eliminating ISIL from not only the entire north-east of Syria but also the south and south-west of Syria. Giving CJTFOIR backed troops control over those vast areas of Syria in the process.

However the Syrians were much more alert to this possibility than CJTFOIR were.

So in May 2017 the Syrians began a west-to-east push across the centre on the country. In the north of the country they set out from Aleppo City. In the south of the country they set out from the capital Damascus.

On June 10th 2017 (10/7/17) Syrian forces arrived at al-Tanf and liberated it. In the process they surrounded the Dollywood base on three sides. Cutting it off from not only the SDF but also the Southern Front.

The Syrians then spent much of 2017 and 2018 clearing ISIL, the Army of Conquest and the Southern Front from the south and south-west of the country. Eliminating the Southern Front as a viable fighting force.

As a result the Dollywood base now serves absolutely no military or strategic purpose.

The US however continues to cling on to Dollywood because it sits on the H2 Highway. Running from Iraq to the Syrian capital Damascus. The US claims it needs to keep control over this road to prevent Iran establishing a land bridge across Iraq and Syria in order to attack Israel.

CJTFOIR only has legal authority to operate within Syria in order to fight ISIL and Al Qaeda. America stationing troops within Syria to obstruct the normal diplomatic and trading relationship between Syria, Iraq and Iran is therefore completely illegal under international law.

Perhaps worse than that the Dollywood base doesn't even achieve this objective.

Losing control of a single road does not cripple a nation's entire road network. If it did every country would grind to a halt every time there is a major vehicle crash.

Losing control of a single road also does not stop supplies being flown into a nation. The Dollywood base certainly hasn't stopped Iran flying large amounts of weapons and equipment into Syria.

What makes the H2 Highway so important to the US is that it runs across the border into Iraq. So if the US wanted to deny Syria control of the road they could do that just as effectively from a base on the Iraqi side of the border.

I don't think it is any secret that US National Security Adviser John Bolton harbours a crazy dream of invading Syria from Iraq. After all in 2003 it was he who harboured the crazy dream of invading Iraq. Which I think we can all agree has been a massive success and an immense strategic victory for the US.

If John Bolton's latest fever dream were to come to fruition the first thing the US would have to do is pull its troops at Dollywood back into Iraq. Or risk leaving them exposed while the rest of the invasion force caught up.

So in military terms the US' Dollywood base is utterly useless.

In fact it is worse than useless.

The Dollywood base is surrounded by a roughly 20,000kmsq (12,000 milesq) exclusion zone. It's petticoats. Syrian troops cannot enter this exclusion zone. While US troops cannot operate outside of this exclusion zone.

The only group that can operate freely amongst these petticoats is ISIL.

So by maintaining the Dollywood base the US is providing ISIL with a 20,000kmsq (12,000 milesq) area where it can operate under de facto US protection. An area which includes the Ruqban Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camp.

CJTFOIR seem well aware of how counter-productive the US' Dollywood base is.

On February 2nd 2019 (2/2/19) CJTFOIR conducted airstrikes against a Syrian barracks on the town of al-Sukkayria.

Sukkayria sits all of 10km (6 miles) north-west of where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria. It sits directly across the Euphrates from the Hajin Pocket town of Marashidah. Where the SDF were battling ISIL.

This CJTFOIR strike on the Syrians allowed ISIL to cross the Euphrates and break out from the Hajin Pocket. In the direction of Dollywood and its petticoats.

I assume that as news of that incident filtered up the chain of command to US politicians someone pointed out how ridiculous the situation was. With the US simultaneously trying to defeat and help ISIL.

The Dollywood base is being maintained entirely in the name of America protecting Israel from Iran.

Israel seems remarkably unimpressed by the US' efforts. Since the Syrians liberated al-Tanf and encircled Dollywood Israel has massively increased its airstrikes against, particularly Iranian interests in, Syria.

On May 10th 2018 (10/5/18) Israel conducted the largest series of airstrikes against Syria it has undertaken since 1974. When a truce brought to end the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The fact that this war has never officially ended means that Israeli strikes against Syria are technically legal. If not morally correct.

This massive wave of Israeli airstrikes began little more than 30 minutes after President Trump withdrew the US from the Iran Nuclear Deal. On the evening of May 9th 2018 (9/5/18).

So the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest, taking place in Israel, looks like it's going to be fun. The Israelis even seem to bring an air of flamboyant performance to their military actions.

The surprise nature of Trump's troop withdrawal announcement on December 19th 2018 (19/12/18) prompted a mass of discussion. Over what troops the US has in Syria, where they're located and what effect their withdrawal would have.

On December 25th 2018 (25/12/18) Israel conducted another dramatic wave of airstrikes against Syria.

With this being Christmas Day it was pretty much the only news story happening anywhere in Europe and America. So you would think that politicians and military leaders in those areas would be talking of nothing else.

I can only strongly recommend that France in particular looks closely at the detail of those December 25th 2018 (25/12/18) Israeli strikes. So they don't receive any nasty surprises when I do look at them in detail. In the section to which they are most relevant.

So, at best, Israel views the US' Dollywood base as completely irrelevant to its security. At worse it is actively lobbying for the US to withdraw its forces and remove the base.

When it was first established Dollywood was a CJTFOIR base. Operated primarily by Britain and Jordan.

However following the Syrians liberation of al-Tanf both Britain and Jordan realised that the base no longer served any purpose. So they both withdraw their forces in the summer of 2017. Leaving it as an exclusively US base.

So President Trump announcing that Dollywood is to be closed and US forces withdrawn is not something to panic about or protest against. It is a move that is almost two years overdue.

The US' hatred of Iran. Which in this case is completely irrational. Stems from something deep within, almost the DNA of the Republican Party.

In February 1979 Iran underwent its Islamic Revolution. Overthrowing the King or Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Whom the US and the UK had installed in charge of Iran's vast oil reserves in a military coup in 1953.

Then US President Jimmy Carter, of the Democrat Party, responded to the Islamic Revolution by imposing sanctions on Iran. Seizing all Iranian assets within the US. In October 1979 then President Carter went one step further. Granting Mohammad Reza Pahlavi asylum in the US.

The Iranians responded to this by storming the US Embassy in Tehran and taking 52 US citizens hostage. For the next 444 days then President Carter's administration failed to secure the release of the hostages. Including through the ill fated Operation: Eagle Claw rescue mission.

President Carter's failure to rescue the hostages was a significant, possibly even the main, factor in him being defeated at the November 1980 US Presidential Election. By that hero of the US Republican Party President Ronald Reagan.

The release of the hostages was actually timed to coincide with President Reagan's inauguration. On January 20th 1981 (20/11/81).

Since then ranting and raving against Iran has been an easy way to win cheap applause at Republican Party rallies.

What everyone seems to forget is how President Reagan secured the release of the hostages.

President Reagan  reversed President Carter's strategy. Scrapping the sanctions and returning Iran's assets. He then spent much of his term of office selling weapons to Iran. In order to fund Contras in Nicaragua. Something you may have heard of.

So Reagan's legacy on Iran is actually one of abandoning hostility in favour of engagement.

This anti-Iran faction of the Republican Party was led by John McCain, Senator for Arizona. Up until his death on August 25th 2018 (25/8/18). Since then leadership of the faction has fallen to his longtime deputy Lindsay Graham. Senator for South Carolina.

Both McCain and Graham have both treasonously long backed both ISIL and Al Qaeda. Something they have seen as a viable and effective strategy to overthrow the Syrian government. Ending the longstanding alliance between Syria and Iran.

Amongst Republicans it is Senator Graham who has been the most vocal in opposition to President Trump's plan to withdraw US troops from Syria.

On December 30th 2018 (30/12/18) Senator Graham met with President Trump at the White House. Senator Graham emerged from the meeting declaring that he had succeeded in getting Trump to slow down and possibly reverse his decision to withdraw US troops.

Here I'm really not sure what Senator Graham thinks that he achieved. In the morning, before the meeting, the withdrawal timeline was 90-100 days. In the evening, after the meeting, the withdrawal timeline remained at 90-100 days.

On January 19th 2019 (19/1/19) Senator Graham travelled to Turkey. Where he met with Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

To give you an idea of the state of US/Turkey relations at the time National Security Adviser Bolton visited Turkey on January 6th 2019 (6/1/19). There he delievered a message from President Trump. Warning Turkey against attacking the SDF. With or without a US troop withdrawal.

In response Erdogan refused to meet with Bolton. Declaring that it was disrespectful to say the SDF represent Syrians and it was irrational to say that Turkey wants to attack the SDF. Despite Erdogan promising, on an almost daily basis, to attack the SDF.

Since then the mainstream Turkish media have bizarrely started to declare Bolton to be part of a Deep State conspiracy against Trump. Attempting to undermine Trump's supposed promise to Erdogan to allow him to attack the SDF.

I say; "Bizarre." Everyone knows there is a US Deep State conspiracy against President Trump. The Turkish government funded CNN tells you all about it, every day.

However the conspiracy was tasked first with ensuring Hillary Clinton replaced Barack Obama as President. Then failing that to bind President Trump to the pro-Turkey, pro-ISIL policies of former President Obama.

Within places like Turkey and Egypt the existence of these type of Deep State conspiracies is well established. They're openly discussed as a normal part of political discourse.

We just never thought American democracy would ever fall so low.

On his visit to Turkey Senator Graham declared the SDF to be nothing more than an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). He pledged his full support to Erdogan's plan to invade Shangri-La and wipe out the SDF.

So Senator Graham's objections to Trump's troop withdrawal plan are most certainly not because he thinks it will led to the SDF being slaughtered in a Turkish invasion of Shangri-La.

In fact Senator Graham seems perfectly happy to see US troops slaughtered as part of that Turkish invasion.

What Senator Graham is concerned about is the withdrawal of US troops leading to the Dollywood base being closed.

Removing the protection it grants to ISIL.

20:10 on 25/2/19 (UK date).

Operation Featherweight: Month 56, Week 3, Day 5.

A direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-3_20.html

In that post I looked how there has been a noticeable shift towards guerrilla warfare tactics within the Shangri-La area. Many of these attacks have particularly clustered around the town of Manbij.

This cluster of attacks highlight that ISIL are not the only threat facing Shangri-La. It's arguable that ISIL are no longer even the main threat.

Turkey presents at least as much of a threat to Shangri-La and the people within it.

In August 2016 Turkish forces illegally invaded the Garvaghy Road area of Syria. Garvaghy Road sits directly adjacent to the west of Shangri-La. Technically the town of Jarablus within Garvaghy Road sits directly to the north of Manbij.

The purpose of Turkey's invasion of Garvaghy Road was to prevent the SDF advancing from Manbij to Afrin Canton. This would cut Turkey's supply lines with ISIL positions in the Central Syria area.

Then US President Barack Obama gave Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan permission to do this. In return for Erdogan giving the US Air Force (USAF) permission to use USAF base Incirlik in Turkey. Provided it was not used to attack ISIL.

Obama was apparently unaware that the USAF does not need Turkey's permission to use a USAF base. So in Britain this incident is known as; "The Shoreham Air Disaster."

The last town in Garvaghy Road Turkish forces captured was al-Bab. This sits around 55km (30 miles) south-west of Manbij.

When the battle for al-Bab began in November 2016 Erdogan made it quite clear that once the town had been captured Turkish forces would move onto to attack Manbij. Including the SDF and CJTFOIR forces stationed there.

It fell to Russia to protect the SDF and CJTFOIR forces at Manbij from Turkish attack. In late December 2016 Russia moved its military police and some Syrian troops into the town of al-Arimah.

Arimah sits around 20km (12 miles) north-east of al-Bab and around 20km (12 miles) south-west of Manbij. This meant that if Erdogan wished to attack Manbij his forces would have to go through the Russian forces at Arimah. Something that would end extremely badly for Erdogan and Turkey.

In response the US President Obama expelled 35 Russian diplomats from the US. On December 29th 2016 (29/12/16). In an apparent attempt to punish Russia for protecting US troops stationed at Manbij.

It's enough to give you the impression that the deep hatred Obama's Democrat Party harbour towards Russia stems from their deep love affair with ISIL.

In the Spring of 2017 Syrian forces set out from Aleppo City pressing east. To clear ISIL from the Central Syria area. In July 2017 they arrived at the town of Dalhah on the southern banks of the Euphrates. Completing the task.

This meant that Erdogan had his Garvaghy Road supply line to ISIL open. He just didn't have any ISIL fighters in the Central Syria area to supply.

Throughout much of 2017 and early 2018 the Syrians completely cleared this Central Syria area of ISIL and associated armed groups.

This forced Erdogan to abandon his dream of overthrowing the Syrian government. In order to annex all of Syria as a province of his New Ottoman Empire.

In response Erdogan launched into a mad rush to seize and annex as much Syrian territory as he could.

In October 2017 Erdogan dispatched Turkish troops into the Sudetenland area of Syria. In order to establish a network of Control Point military bases. Protecting the Al Qaeda-led armed groups there and prevent the Syrians liberating the area. Like they had liberated the Central Syria area.

In January 2018 Erdogan dispatched Turkish troops to attack the SDF in Afrin Canton. Invading and illegally occupying that area of Syria. An occupation which continues to this day.

This was nothing more than a land grab on Erdogan's part. He was particularly interested in Afrin's famous Olive industry. Which is actually worth about US$80m per year.

In launching the invasion of Afrin Canton Erdogan made it quite clear that he next intended to invade and occupy Shangri-La. Annexing that territory as part of his New Ottoman Empire. Including its Oil & Gas Fields.

Throughout 2018 Erdogan has clung on to and often vocalised this belief that he is entitled to invade and annex Shangri-La. Primarily because no-one's yet explained to him that he needs to get the hell out of the Garvaghy Road, Afrin Canton and Sudetenland areas.

Erdogan's desire to invade and occupy Shangri-La has occasionally boiled over into direct military action.

On February 20th 2017 (20/2/17) the Turkish Air Force conducted an airstrike against Russian positions nears Homs City. Killing four Russian troops.

On March 1st 2017 (1/3/17) Turkish jets under Erdogan's command conducted airstrikes against SDF positions at Tal Rifat. This sits around 13km (8 miles) south of Azaz and marks the boundary between Garvaghy Road and the Afrin Canton.

That afternoon Turkish jets also attacked SDF positions at Manbij. Those airstrikes were accompanied by artillery strikes from Turkish military (TSK) positions at al-Bab.

Again it fell to Russia to protect SDF and CJTFOIR forces stationed at Manbij. Russia deployed its aircraft to chase off the Turkish fighters and enforce something of a No Fly Zone around Manbij.

The US House of Representatives Intelligence Committee response was to launch an investigation into claims of Russian interference in the 2016 election. With a view to imposing more sanctions against Russia.

On April 25th 2017 (25/4/17) the Turkish military went on a particularly violent rampage.

The Turkish Air Force conducted airstrikes close to the town of Sinjar/Shingal in northern Iraq. These strikes killed five members of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and five members of the Yezidi Sinjar/Shingal Resistance Units (YBS) who, at the time, were one of the militia's that make up the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).

Erdogan's strikes against Iraq were coordinated with no fewer than 20 airstrikes against the General Command centre of the SDF in al-Malikiyah/Derik in north-east Syria. Apart from damaging the SDF's communications system these strikes killed 28 members of the SDF.

The Turkish airstrikes continued at a lower intensity on April 26th 2017 (26/4/17) and April 27th 2017 (27/4/17). Both in Iraq and Syria.

On April 28th 2017 (28/4/17) the regular Turkish Military (TSK) launched a limited ground assault against Shangri-La. Against the border town of Darbasiya. This sits around 270km (160 miles) east of the famous town of Kobane and around 190km (115 miles) west of Syria's border with Iraq.

The attack came despite US Marines being stationed within Shangri-La. Conducting highly visible show of force patrols along the Syria/Turkey border within the Darbasiya area specifically to deter Erdogan's aggression.

Those US Marines were not involved in repelling the attack. During which the SDF destroyed five Turkish tanks, a radar vehicle and two fighting positions.

Since then the Turkish military have sporadically shelled Shangri-La. Both from within Turkey itself and from within the Garvaghy Road area.

Most notably the TSK shelled wide areas of Shangri-La over the weekend of October 27th 2018 (27/10/18). Attacks which accompanied ISIL launching its counter-offensive which expelled the SDF from the Hajin Pocket.

These were followed by ground clashes between the SDF and Turkey's irregular ground force the United Turkmen Army (UTA).

At Manbij of November 17th 2018 (17/11/18). On December 28th 2018 (28/12/18) at Turkhar, a village just outside Manbij.

On February 4th 2019 (4/2/19) Erdogan was forced to admit that the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) has maintained contact with the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate (Mukhabarat). Despite Turkey have officially broken off all diplomatic ties with Syria back in September 2011.

In making this admission Erdogan also let slip that the MIT operate cells in both Qamishli/Qamishlo and Hasakah City. Two cities where ISIL seems to have suddenly developed the ability to conduct guerrilla attacks.

It's long been known that the Turkish MIT have been conducting guerrilla warfare against the SDF in Shangri-La. Using the front organisation The Eruption Movement/Harakat al-Qiyam (HaQ).

After emerging in August 2017 Harakat al-Qiyam quickly became mocked for the claims of responsibility they published following attacks. It was obvious to all that whomever was writing those Arabic statements clearly didn't speak Arabic.

That is something which is quite embarrassing for a group claiming to be made up of Syrian Arabs. It's even a bit embarrassing for a Turk who claims to be a Muslim.

Eventually the sound of laughter become too much to bear. So Harakat al-Qiyam simply stopped issuing claims of responsibility for their attacks.

On November 4th 2018 (4/11/18) HaQ did break their long silence. To announce that they now wish to be known as the Counter-Terrorism & Resistance Organisation.

On January 10th 2019 (10/1/19) a new MIT front group announced themselves to the World under the name "Tajammu Shuhada" which roughly translates as; "Dignity of the Martyrs." Like Harakat al-Qiyam they claim to be Syrian Arabs and veterans of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Tajammu Shuhada credibly claimed to have carried out an attack against the SDF at Tayyib al-Fal. A village that sits on the Khobar River. Around 20km (12 miles) from where the Khobar meets the Euphrates. The group claim they were forced into carrying out the attack by Turkey apparently abandoning its plans to invade Shangri-La.

This attack which killed for members of the SDF was also claimed by ISIL. Although with far less credibility.

Turkey's MIT have also been conducting extensive propaganda operations within Shangri-La.

As the SDF have expanded Shangri-La along the Euphrates River to the Syria/Iraq border it has created some tension with the Arab Tribes indigenous to the area. Primarily, like everyone, the tribes don't like a bunch of strangers coming in and telling them what to do.

On November 2nd 2018 (2/11/18) the leader of the Afadlah Tribe, Sheikh Bashir Faisal al-Huwaidi was assassinated in Raqqa City. Likely by members of the Afadlah Tribe who had broken away from their leader to join ISIL.

On November 3rd 2018 (3/11/18) Turkey's MIT released a joint statement online purportedly signed by the leaders of Waldat, Sabkhat, Hulaysay, Fidan and Emirat Tribes. This statement accused the SDF of assassinating Sheikh al-Huwaidi and called on all Arabs to break away from the SDF. So Shangri-La ca; "Be returned to its true people."

That joint statement was a complete forgery. On November 6th 2018 (6/11/18) the leaders of the tribes mentioned put out genuine statements declaring it to be a forgery. The leaders of the Fidan and Emirat Tribes certainly didn't hold back in expressing their dislike of Erdogan.

On November 21st 2018 (21/11/18) Harakat al-Qiyam conducted an IED attack in Shadaddi which killed four members of the SDF's civilian police (Asayish). They claimed this attack as retaliation for the SDF's murder of Sheikh al-Huwaidi and called on the Arab tribes to join them in their battle against the SDF.

One specific area of tension between the SDF and the local tribes recently has been over the issue of conscription. Particularly the US' mad rush to liberate the Hajin Pocket at any cost has taken a heavy toll on the Arab elements of the SDF. With many being killed.

This has forced the SDF to increase conscription amongst the Arab tribes. Due to the mad rush these conscripts have been next to no training before being sent into battle. As a result they have been killed in large numbers.

So to the Arab tribes the SDF saying they're coming to conscript their men is the same as the SDF saying they're coming to kill their men.

I have to point out though that following the October 27th 2018 (27/10/18) defeat the SDF and particularly the YPG element wanted to suspend the operation. It was the Shaitat Tribe who threatened to break away and form their own local defence force to continue the battle.

On this issue of conscription tensions boiled over on January 23rd 2019 (23/1/19). Between the SDF and the Albu Khamis Tribe in the town of Mansoura. Which sits on the south bank of the Euphrates around 15km (10 miles) east of the Tabqa Dam.

Amid several days of rioting and the imposition of a curfew there were obviously a few arrests. On February 1st 2019 (1/2/19) Turkey's MIT put around the story that a member of the Albu Khamis Tribe, Habes al-Balikh, had been tortured to death whilst in SDF custody.

This came as quite a surprise to Mr al-Balikh who had just arrived home. Having been released, untortured by the SDF the previous day.

As a result of this high level of Turkish activity within Shangri-La it is likely that many of the attacks attributed to ISIL were actually carried out by Turkey. By my estimates 35 of the 76 attacks I've examined were carried out by Turkey.

The most high profile attack to strike Manbij occurred on January 16th 2019 (16/1/19).

Here an Inghimasi-style suicide bomber struck the Qasr al-Umara cafe in Manbij. Killing 4 Americans and wounding three others. Along with two members of the SDF and five civilians. With a further 19 civilians wounded.

This attack was carried out by ISIL. It was one of the few occasions where their claim of responsibility was genuine.

However it was an incredibly sophisticated attack. Far more sophisticated than anything we've seen so far.

On January 5th 2019 (5/1/19) two British SOF's were wounded at Shafah, in the Hajin Pocket. What happened is that there was a battle going on. As part of that battle ISIL fired a rocket at an SDF vehicle, hitting it. Completely unbeknownst to ISIL that vehicle just happened to contain two British SOF's.

On January 7th 2019 (7/1/19) ISIL conducted an Inghimasi attack against the Personal Affairs Office in Raqqa City. Far from being a secret location the Personal Affairs Office is a public building. So not only are the public aware of it they're actively told to go there. Meaning that it is always crowded.

In Manbij on January 16th 2019 (16/1/19) ISIL didn't detonate an IED next to an SDF convoy. Which happened to contain US troops. Nor did they target a cafe known to be popular with off-duty US troops.

Instead the cafe was targeted during what the US is describing as a; "Local Engagement Operation." One of the Americans killed was a US Navy cryptologist. Another of the Americans killed has been described as a; "civilian contractor." Which is often a euphemistic way of saying; "CIA." A way which ensures they're not bound by the laws which bind the CIA.

So at the time of the attack the US was conducting some sort of secretive intelligence operation. I would not like to speculate on the exact type of the intelligence operation. However its most likely to involve meeting with an informant.

This poses the question of how ISIL were able to find out about what is normally a need-to-know meeting far enough in advance to plot an attack?

One possibility is that ISIL tricked the Americans and the bomber was the person they were meeting with. Another distinct possibility is that ISIL were informed about the meeting by a third party. One with more sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities and better access to CJTFOIR. 

It is the threat Turkey poses to Shangri-La which has recently sent Britain into a mad panic of the ISIL prisoners the SDF currently hold. Such as Shamima Begum.

Across Europe no-one seems to be questioning Erdogan's imagined right to invade Shangri-La. Annexing it as part of his New Ottoman Empire. The US appears to have appointed a Special Counsel to ensure that it happens.

As a result Britain is now rushing to get all these prisoners processed. Before Turkish troops invade and set them free.


21:00 on 21/2/19 (UK date).

Operation Featherweight: Month 56, Week 3, Day 4.

A continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-3.html

In that post I looked at the operation by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) to liberate the Hajin Pocket. From the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

This has seen ISIL reduced to a tiny, 250 yards by 250 yards scrap of wasteland. Designated; "Camp Futility."

So while there is technically an ISIL presence within the Hajin Pocket the battle is over. There are even reports today of ISIL surrendering within Camp Futility.

Sadly it looks as though the end of the battle does not mean that Shangri-La will be left in peace.

Throughout the battle of the Hajin Pocket ISIL showed themselves capable of continuing to conduct conventional military operations.

The battle was not a case of ISIL sitting in defensive positions and attempting to stop the SDF from reaching them. ISIL also mounted counter-offensives in efforts to drive the SDF back and defeat them.

The most notable of which came in late October 2018 when ISIL were able to force the SDF from the Hajin Pocket. Forcing the SDF's operation to be temporarily halted.

On December 5th 2018 (5/12/18) ISIL were able to launch another large counter-offensive across the Hajin Pocket. This though was much less successful for them. With at least 228 ISIL fighters being killed. Including when a 40 vehicle ISIL convoy was destroyed in a single CJTFOIR airstrike.

ISIL also proved themselves capable of launching proactive operations. Outside of the Hajin Pocket.

On November 21st 2018 (21/11/18) ISIL were able to attack the SDF at the Omar Oil & Gas Field. In the vicinity of Al-Busayrah. Around 65km (40 miles) north-west of Hajin. Where the Khobar River meets the Euphrates River.

As previously mentioned on November 24th 2018 (24/11/18) ISIL were able to launch large attacks on the towns of Bahrah and Gharanji. Bahrah is the next town north-west of Hajin, 5km (3 miles) away. Gharanji is directly adjacent to Bahrah at it's north-west tip.

While the attack on Gharanji was a complete failure the attack in Bahrah was highly effective. The SDF were forced out of the town. It took two full days of fighting before it was recovered. With the loss of 92 SDF fighters.

On December 2nd 2018 (2/12/18) ISIL were able to ambush an SDF supply convoy. Close to the town of Diban. Around 50km (30 miles) north-west of Hajin.

January 7th 2019 (7/1/19) saw ISIL apparently use tunnels to launch a so-called; "Inghimasi" attack against Raqqa City. Some 300km (180 miles) north-west of Hajin.

From the Arabic; "to plunge" an Inghimasi attack involves a fighter or fighters wearing a Suicide Vest (S-Vest) going deep within enemy territory and blowing themselves up. In the hope of doing as much damage to the enemy as possible.

Fortunately this attacker was detected and confronted by the SDF.

This forced him to detonate his device on Nur Street before being able to reach his intended target of Personal Affairs Office where civilians were queueing. However one member of the SDF and four civilians were killed.

On January 21st 2019 (21/1/19) ISIL were able to launch a Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) attack against an SDF supply convoy close to Shadaddi. This sits on the Khobar River some 200km (120 miles) north-west of Hajin.

February 3rd 2019 (3/2/19) saw ISIL conduct an attack against a water treatment plant in Tayyanah. This sits on the Euphrates, around 45km (25 miles) north-west of Hajin. 

These most significant attacks have been accompanied by numerous hit and run style attacks. Predominately against SDF positions in the oil and gas fields which sit to the north of the Hajin Pocket.

As the battle of the Hajin Pocket has progressed though ISIL have noticeably shifted towards using guerrilla tactics against the SDF. Ironically in an attempt to ape the tactics being used by the SDF in Afrin Canton. Against the forces of ISIL's main backer Turkey which continue to illegally occupy the area.

ISIL routinely exaggerate and simply lie about the attacks they've carried out.

Adding up every attack claimed by their Amaq propaganda mouthpiece ISIL have succeeded in killing every single member of the SDF. Along with every one of the CJTFOIR troops deployed to Syria. Several times over.

However in the period between November 12th 2018 (12/11/18) and February 7th 2019 (7/2/19) there have been 76 confirmed attacks. With a notable increase in frequency starting early to mid December 2018.

These attacks have all been in the nature of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) bombings, sniper attacks, targeted assassinations and ambushes against vehicle patrols.

Rather amusingly on December 12th 2018 (12/12/18) ISIL made an uncorroborated claim of a stabbing attack against the SDF in Shadaddi. You wouldn't think they would want to boast about being reduced to using the tactics their lone-wolf attackers use in western nations. In what used to be the group's heartland.

You will be glad to know that I am not going to list each of these 76 attacks.

The majority of them though have taken place in and around the areas directly on the banks of the Euphrates. Particularly around Raqqa City. They have also clustered around the towns of Darnaj and Diban. This sit around 40km (20 miles) and 50km (30 miles) north-west of Hajin respectively and are of limited strategic importance.

However the attacks have also managed to spread far and wide across Shangri-La. Including into areas where ISIL have never held territory.

On November 20th 2018 (20/11/18) one member of the SDF was killed in an IED attack in the town of Tal Byad/Gire Spi. This sits right on the border between Shangri-La and Turkey. Around 120km (70 miles) north of Raqqa City. It's been under complete SDF control since June 2015.

On November 21st 2018 (21/11/18) three members of the SDF and four members of the SDF civilian police (Asayish) were killed in bombings in Shadaddi and Dashisha. Dashisha sits around 30km (20 miles) south of Shadaddi. Both were liberated by the SDF back in February 2016.

November 28th 2018 (28/11/18) saw two members of the SDF killed in a roadside IED attack on their vehicle in Hasakah City. Although it was totally liberated by the SDF August 2015 Hasakah City has never been fully out of the SDF's control.

The SDF's security headquarters in Ras al-Ayn/Serekanyie was attacked with a large IED on December 1st 2018 (1/12/18). Resulting in 13 members of the SDF being killed.

Serekanyie is located right on Shangri-La's border with Turkey, around 180km (110 miles) north-east of Raqqa City. It has never been under the control of anyone except the SDF throughout the entire conflict.

On December 20th 2018 (20/12/18) a roadside IED attack targeted an SDF patrol in Qamishli/Qamishlo. Fortunately it did not succeed in causing any casualties.

Considered the capital of Syria's Kurdish region Qamishlo has never been under the control of anyone except the SDF. Located as it is right on Shangri-La's border with Turkey. Some 400km (240 miles) north of Hajin.

On December 26th 2018 (26/12/18) an SDF commander, Jawan Khalil was killed in a targeted assassination. Within Hasakah City.

There was another targeted assassination on December 30th 2018 (30/12/18). This time Marwan Fateeh, co-chair of the civilian Deir-ez-Zour legislative council was killed. On the road linking Hasakah City and Deir-ez-Zour City.

On January 28th 2019 (28/1/19) there was a sniper attack in Tal Abyad/Gire Spi. In which one member of the SDF was killed.

The attacks have also clustered around the town of Manbij. This marks the westerly border of Shangri-La. Sitting on the western bank of the Euphrates Manbij is the town which controls the Tishreen Dam across the river. It sits around 65km (40 miles) south-west of Kobane/Ayn al-Arab.

Of the 76 attacks targeting Shangri-La during this period 13 of them struck Manbij alone.

These include attacks such as the targeted assassination of Hamza Zaza, of the SDF's Manbij Military Council (M-MC). With an IED attached to his vehicle on November 24th 2018 (24/11/18). A drive-by shooting of the SDF's Manbij HQ on December 6th 2018 (6/12/18). Which resulted in no casualties.

The majority though have been IED attacks. Targeting both SDF patrols and civilians.


21:00 on 20/2/19 (UK date).

Operation Featherweight: Month 56, Week 3, Day 3.

Within the Syria there are still five main areas of operation. Reading from right-to-left;

Shangri-La, Garvaghy Road, Afrin Canton, the Sudetenland and Central Syria.

Shangri-La: This is located in the north-east of Syria. Essentially it is everything to the north-west of the Euphrates River.

Shangri-La is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) coalition.

The largest element of the SDF coalition is the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). They operate alongside Assyrian/Syriac Christian, Turkmen and Arab Muslim forces.

The Arab element makes up around 50% of the SDF. It is comprised of both elements of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) and local tribes indigenous to north-eastern Syria.

The SDF also contains a small International Brigade made up of foreign volunteers.

The SDF is currently supported by the US-led coalition, Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). With air power, Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and increasingly conventional ground forces.

The only area of Shangri-La which has so far not fallen under SDF control is an area known as the; "Hajin Pocket."

This is a roughly 35km (20 mile) long, 10km (6 mile) wide area stretching along the north bank of the Euphrates River. From the town of Hajin to Mount Baghouz, where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria.

This Hajin Pocket has remained under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).

Within this roughly 350kmsq (210 milesq) Hajin Pocket there are 12 main towns/villages. Reading from the north-west to the south-east;

Hajin, Abu Hassan, Al Kashmah, As Sha'fah, Al Bubadran, Al-Ulayat, As-Sousse/Susah, Al Marashidah, Al Shalja/Nazl al-Fira, as-Safafinah, Baghouz Fawqani and Baghouz Tahtani.

Amongst these 12 towns there sit a number of small villages and hamlets. In the space between them ISIL have built up layers of defences.

These defences are made up of dug in fighting positions, trenches and tunnel networks. They are interwoven with large numbers of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) and landmines.

On May 1st 2018 (1/5/18) the SDF launched a new anti-ISIL operation within Shangri-La codenamed; "Operation: Round Up."

This operation began with two concurrent phases.

The first phase focused on the Hajin Pocket itself. The objective was to isolate it from the Syria/Iraq border and to isolate the towns within it from each other.

The second phase of Round Up which was launched at the same time focused on clearing ISIL from desert areas to the north of the Euphrates River.

By August 7th 2018 (7/4/18) these first two phases of Operation: Round Up had been completed.

Over the night of September 10th 2018 (10/9/18) into September 11th 2018 (11/9/18) the SDF launched the third phase of Operation: Round Up. It's objective was to liberate the towns within the Hajin Pocket.

On October 25th 2018 (25/10/18) bad weather set in across the area. This allowed ISIL to launch a large, coordinated and highly effective counter-offensive. Across all of the Hajin Pocket.

October 28th 2018 (28/10/18) this ISIL counter-offensive forced the SDF to retreat from the Hajin Pocket and temporarily suspend their operations.

On November 14th 2018 (14/11/18) the SDF resumed their operation to liberate the towns within the Hajin Pocket. By November 30th 2018 (30/11/18) this now Phase Four of Operation Round Up had established three SDF battle axis';

A north-western axis focused on Hajin.

A south-eastern axis focused on Baghouz.

A northern axis. This time focused on Shafah.

The Baghouz and Shafah axis most certainly battle fronts. Members of the SDF were killing and being killed amid heavy fighting on both.

However the primary objective on those axis was not to liberate territory. Instead it was to put pressure upon ISIL and divide their forces. To allow advances to be made on the Hajin axis.

On December 18th 2018 (18/12/18) the SDF liberated Abu al-Khatir. This is technically a separate village which sits directly adjacent to Hajin's south-eastern tip.

The liberation of Abu al-Khatir marked the complete liberation of Hajin.

On December 24th 2018 (24/12/18) the SDF entered Abu Hassan. The town which sits around 8km (5 miles) south-east of Hajin.

By December 28th 2018 (28/12/18) the SDF had liberated Abu Hassan and moved on to Khasham. Which sits around 3km (2 miles) south-east of Abu Hassan.

After just a day of fighting the SDF liberated Khasham on December 29th (29/12/18). They then advanced the roughly 2km (1.2 miles) to the south-east. Joining the battle for Shafah from the north-west.

On January 15th 2019 (15/1/19) the SDF were able to declare Shafah liberated. Along with the town of Abu Bubadran. Which sits directly adjacent to Shafah's south-eastern tip.

Following the liberation of Abu Bubadran on January 15th 2019 (15/1/19) the SDF's north-western axis advanced on al-Ulayat. The town which sits between Abu Bubadran and Sousse.

Al-Ulayat presented no problem the SDF. They swiftly liberated it and joined the battle for Sousse the same day

By January 20th 2019 (20/1/19) Sousse had effectively been liberated. The SDF then moved onto Mouzan. A village sitting with Sousse directly to its north-west and Safafinah directly to its west.

On January 21st 2019 (21/1/19) the SDF liberated Mouzan. With fighting moving to Safafinah and Al Shalja/Nazl al-Fira. A town which sits with Mouzan to its north-west.

On January 23rd 2019 (23/1/19) both Safafinah and Shalja were liberated. Amid ISIL's defences collapsing and its fighters fleeing to Al Marashidah. Marashidah sits directly on the banks of the Euphrates. With Sousse to its north and Safafinah to its east.

The SDF chased ISIL into Marashidah with fighting there beginning the following day. January 24th 2019 (24/1/19).

On January 28th 2019 (28/1/19) the SDF fully liberated Marashidah.

This left ISIL in just Baghouz Fawqani. Along with the patches of open land between Marashidah to the west and Baghouz Tahtani to the east.

Throughout this Phase Four of Operation: Round Up the SDF have been battling ISIL within Baghouz Fawqani and its surroundings. Specifically on two sub-axis.

One at the very south-east of the town by the Baghouz Cliffs. A second to the north-west of the town. Roughly where it is separated from Sousse by Mouzan.

On both of these sub-axis' the SDF have been able to make significant progress within Baghouz Fawqani. The reason why the SDF have been unable to formally declare Baghouz Fawqani is that they have not taken full control of the town.

However, by the same token, ISIL themselves have not been in full control of Baghouz Fawqani.

This has provided the SDF with a fantastic opportunity to protect the local civilian population.

On January 29th 2019 (29/1/19) the SDF suspended their efforts to liberate Baghouz Fawqani.

Instead they shifted their focus to evacuating civilians from areas which where not under SDF control but where ISIL did not have enough of a presence to stop them. While CJTFOIR air and artillery strikes forced ISIL to hide in their bunkers.

On Saturday, February 9th 2019 (9/2/19) the SDF determined that there were no longer any uncontrolled areas they could rescue civilians from. So they resumed their operation to liberate Baghouz Fawqani.

The start of this final push saw ISIL hold scattered positions across the al-Murasmah, Shuraydah and al-Kanafirah neighbourhoods. It began with CJTFOIR conducting a day of airstrikes to destroy the roads between those neighbourhoods. In order to isolate ISIL's scattered positions from one another.

On Monday, February 11th 2019 (11/2/19) SDF ground units moved into clear the scattered ISIL positions.

By Tuesday, February 12th 2019 (12/2/19) the SDF had cleared ISIL from the southern portion of the Kanafirah neighbourhood. Including the are around the entrance to the destroyed Bukamal bridge. Linking Baghouz Fawqani with the Syrian controlled town of Abu Kamal.

By Thursday, February 14th 2019 (14/2/19) the SDF had cleared ISIL from the Murasmah neighbourhood and the northern section of the Shuraydah neighbourhood. This involved a particularly horrific incident.

In the Shuraydah neighbourhood the SDF had to assault and capture an ISIL weapons store. Many of the ISIL fighters the SDF were forced to kill in capturing this weapons store were aged around 9 or 10 years old.

Significantly younger than the 15 years of age, the minimum age at which people can fight under the laws of war. The same age at which Shamima Begum claims she was too young to know what she was doing when she chose to join ISIL. So we should all feel sympathetic towards her and forgive her.

On Friday, February 15th 2019 (15/2/19) ISIL were finally pushed out of their remaining positions in both the Shuraydah and Kanafirah neighbours. Leaving them in a tiny area of scrubland all of 1km (0.6 miles) north-west of the Bukamal bridge head.

On Saturday, February 16th 2019 (16/2/19) the US Vice President Mike Pence addressed the Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany. He described this remaining area under ISIL control as being a square mile.

That seems to be an overestimate. The SDF put the total area as being just 0.5kmsq. Or 250 yards by 250 yards.

To look at this ISIL controlled area is just a squatters camp. A few vehicles and ramshackle tents standing on a small patch of waste ground.

As such I have decided to designate it; "Camp Futility."

The concern though is that ISIL's Camp Futility is located above the entrance to an underground network of tunnels and bunkers.

Even so I must say that is reminds me of the eviction of the Dale Farm Traveller/Gypsy camp. In the British county of Essex in 2011. Although I seem to remember Dale Farm being larger and better defended.

ISIL's Camp Futility though is probably better armed than Dale Farm. But not by much.

ISIL have lost all of their heavy weapons. Leaving them with just small arms such as rifles, pistols, grenades, explosives and possibly the occasional TOW/MILAN type shoulder launched rocket.

So while Baghouz Fawqani has not technically been fully liberated I would say that at this point the battle is most certainly over.

If this were still a battle then Camp Futility is a military position of the size and type that you would simply wipe out with an airstrike. Or an artillery strike.

However before being forced from Baghouz Fawqani ISIL kidnapped between 600 and 1000 civilians. They are now holding these people in the camp as human shields. So while air and artillery strikes are still on the table they are certainly not desirable options at this point.

Figuring out how to dislodge ISIL from this tiny scrap of wasteland actually presents a pretty unique challenge for even the most experienced military planner. Normally when a military force find themselves cornered in a position this hopeless they just give up and surrender.

So I think the SDF are just going to surround the area and wait. Eventually the adrenaline of battle will wear off and ISIL will realise that they are totally trapped. With dwindling supplies of ammunition, food, water and fuel.

In the event of a prolonged siege everything we know about ISIL tells us that they will first deny dwindling resources to their civilian hostages. So they die before ISIL's fighters. It is also highly likely that ISIL will start killing the hostages.

Therefore it may become necessary for the SDF to raid Camp Futility.

The best model of how to go about this seems to come from Egypt. The August 2013 clearance of the Rabaa Mosque and Al-Nahda Square camps.

In July 2013 the people of Egypt held a second revolution. Overthrowing the corrupt President Mohammad Morsi. Of ISIL's parent organisation the Muslim Brotherhood.

In response the Muslim Brotherhood established two squatter camps in Cairo. At the Rabaa Mosque and al-Nahda Square.   

The occupants of these camps were armed. With weapons such as rifles, pistols, grenades, explosives.

The camps were being used as a base to stage attacks against the Egyptian security forces. They were also used as a place to kidnap, torture and kill civilian opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Following a month of negotiations with the Muslim Brotherhood to vacate the camp the Egyptian security forces were left with no choice other than to raid it. Swamping it with tear gas while sending bulldozers and armoured vehicles to physically take control of the area. All under the careful watch of snipers.

Strangely, under the laws of war the SDF would not be able to use tear gas. Even if they did have access to it.

Of course in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood responsed to the raid by opening fire on the Egyptian security services. Forcing them to return fire. The Muslim Brotherhood then started shooting all the women and children in the camp. Before finally setting fire to the camp. Burning it to the ground.

This saw around 600 people killed. Including 43 members of the Egyptian security service. The Muslim Brotherhood of course claimed that 2,600 civilians had been killed. With a further 3,994 wounded.

Sadly much of the western media were taken in by the Muslim Brotherhood's Atrocity Propaganda.

To the point that many of them seem to have been recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood. Becoming happy warriors in the Muslim Brotherhood's campaign to delegitimise the Egyptian government. By labelling the 2013 as a coup and declaring the clearance of, particularly the Rabaa camp to be a massacre.

All in support of ISIL's Sinai Province terror campaign against Egypt.

Sadly looking at the Khashoggi and Begum cases the western media have still not learnt their lesson about providing material or moral support to genocidal organisations.

18:30 on 19/2/19 (UK date).

Britain's Sh*t the Bed Again.

For the past five days the news in Britain has been dominated by Shamima Begum. Who is currently in the custody of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) in Syria.

The reason for this is that Britain has failed to understand the events over the past two months in Syria. As a result it is now incompetently flailing about.

In a way that is embarrassing to be associated with.

So my priority should be catching up on the events of the past two months.

However the Begum story has provoked such anger in Britain, Syria and Iraq that it is impossible for me to ignore. It is also so unspeakably offensive it is hard for any right thinking person to concentrate on anything else.

On Thursday (14/2/19) Britain's "The Times" newspaper published an audio interview it had conducted with Begum. This was published on the newspaper's website and re-published by almost all British TV and radio news broadcasters.

On Sunday (17/2/19) Britain's "Sky News" news channel conducted a video interview with Begum. Again this was re-published by almost all of Britain's TV and radio broadcaster.

In both the audio and video interviews Begum confirms that she is a member of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). She uses the interviews to call for sympathy towards her as a member of ISIL. By giving Begum this platform the broadcasters involved are supporting ISIL. In almost the most literal sense.

In UK law ISIL are a proscribed terror group. Under the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 12 of the Act creates the offence of supporting a proscribed terror group. An offence which carries a sentence of 10 years imprisonment.

So this is simply a criminal matter. The police should have already arrested any journalist, editor, etc who is responsible for the decision to give support to a proscribed terror group.

Those who have committed the offence will attempt to argue that they were justified in doing so. On the grounds that the debate over what to do with captured members of ISIL is in the public interest.

This debate has been a constant thoughout the four and a half year conflict against ISIL. Particularly following the liberation of the Iraqi city of Mosul in July 2017. Also particularly following the liberation of the Syrian city of Raqqa in October 2017.

There is barely a day that goes by without news of how the strategy to deal with the children of ISIL in both Syria and Iraq is progressing.

At all of these points the British media have decided that the debate over what to do with captured members of ISIL is not in the public interest. So have taken the editorial decision not to air content relating to it.

The debate over what to do with captured members of ISIL has been running for so long we are actually at the point where there is nothing new to add. It wasn't even a particularly complex debate to begin with.

Those captured have been captured on a battlefield in a UN designated theatre of war. Therefore civilian law does not apply to them. Instead they are covered by the laws of war. Essentially the Geneva Conventions.

The Geneva Conventions lay out the judicial process to be applied to these prisoners. The; "Due Process."

As soon as is practicable they are to be placed before a Military Tribunal. That tribunal's first task is to determine whether they are a civilian or a member of an armed group.

If it is determined the prisoner is a member of an armed group the tribunal's next task is to determine whether that armed group is a legal or an illegal one.

The Geneva Conventions also lay out the exact criteria for what a legal armed group is. However ISIL's activities such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, slavery, sexual slavery and other Crimes Against Humanity are all definite no-no's under the Geneva Convention.

If the tribunal determines the prisoner is a member of an illegal armed group then the prisoner is to be executed.

Within Syria there is a small, practical problem in applying this sentence.

In the Syria conflict ISIL and Al Qaeda loosely represent Sunni Muslims. The Syrian government and Hezbollah are Shia Muslims. The YPG element of the SDF are fricking Anarchists. One of their main ideological influences is American social theorist Murray Bookchin.

Due to a deep ideological objection the YPG have been clear from their inception. They will not use the death penalty in areas of Syria under their control. Regardless of the offender and the severity of the offence.

There is fortunately a very simple solution to this. Once it has been determined that prisoners are members of an illegal armed group they are transferred to the custody of the Syrian government. Which has no such ideological objection to the death penalty.

This solution puts certain nations of Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) in a difficult position. They have spent eights years supporting ISIL and associated groups by attempting to claim that there is something wrong with Syria's execution of prisoners.

That is despite those nations being fully aware that execution is the lawful and internationally agreed punishment for members of illegal armed groups. The punishment is necessarily harsh in order to provide a strong deterrent against people joining illegal armed groups.

If you're morally outraged by the notion of the death penalty I doubt your mind can even conceive of the things you would need to do to another human being to be classed as an unlawful combatant.

Particularly in the case of ISIL it's like paedophilia. If you do understand it then that really only proves there's something seriously wrong with you.

If CJTFOIR are not prepared to allow the SDF to transfer prisoners to the Syrians for execution the prisoners can simply be transferred to Iraq instead. Iraq most certainly does execute illegal combatants. In December 2017 they hung 38 of them in a single day.

Even if Iraq are not to accept these illegal combatants CJTFOIR can execute them itself in Syria. I mean that in the sense that if transport can be arranged I will do it personally. I will then stand before God and the International Criminal Court (ICC) and happily explain why I do not feel bad about my actions for even a moment.

CJTFOIR, particularly the US are hesitant to do this because they wish to keep gathering intelligence by reinterviewing the prisoners. You have to question of how much intelligence value someone like Begum actually represents. Plus once an illegal combatant is sentenced it doesn't mean they have to be executed in a timely fashion and there is nothing to stop them being interrogated during their period of detention.

As I've stated at all other times this point has been discussed I'm only referring to foreign ISIL members. Discretion should be used to give lighter punishments to local fighters who have been conscripted by ISIL. Such as the local fighters the SDF have already released to the supervision of their tribes.

British broadcaster's decision to give Begum a platform to elicit support for ISIL constitutes a serious criminal offence. Against Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

As such it seems almost pointless to also look at the elements of the OFCOM Broadcasting Code regulations these broadcasters have also violated.

However the story has been presented to the public in a materially misleading way. In a number of areas.

For example it is being claimed that civilian law applies to Begum's case. Things like they Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or the Human Rights Act of 1998. This is materially incorrect. Those captured on a battlefield in a UN designated theatre of war are subject only to the laws of war.

It is also being claimed that Begum is a child. She is currently aged 19 years. Clearly over the age of majority of 18 years under UK civilian law. Also the age of majority in the laws of war which apply in this case is 15 years. So Begum is considered an adult both now and when she originally left the UK in 2015.

It is being claimed that Begum is British. This too is false. All ISIL members are required to renounce their existing citzenships upon becoming members of the group. As such Begum has voluntarily renounced the right to be described as a British citizen. The fact this choice has made her voluntarily stateless is really something she should have considered at the time.

It is also being claimed that Britain cannot make Begum and other ISIL members stateless.

In terms of its legal relevance this point is about a useful as a debate over whether Britain has the power to turn Begum into an Elephant.

The decision to become stateless was one Begum took in 2015. It is not in Britain's power to reverse that decision.

Britain can only consider whether it wants to grant refugee status, and a possible path to citizenship to Begum. That too is a very short debate. The 1951 Convention on Refugees expressly forbids the granting of refugee status to members of illegal armed groups.

It is also wholly untrue to claim that nations cannot make its citizens stateless.

A rather famous example is this is Canada. In 1977 it changed the law regarding people with dual nationality. So that they had to formally reapply for the Canadian citizenship before reaching 28 years of age. However the Canadian government then completely forgot to tell anyone about this.

So, 28 years later, in 2005 the Canadian government discovered that it had made hundreds of its citizens stateless. Due to simple clerical error.

These people had never waged war against Canada. They never joined an illegal armed group. They certainly had not committed Crimes Against Humanity. However they had no legal recourse to regain their Canadian citizenship.

Across the Middle-East and Africa people being made stateless is widespread. So much so you can describe it as a common practice.

In response the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) launched its; "IBelong" campaign to combat statelessness. This though is primarily aimed at pressuring nations to grant refugees a path to citizenship.

Despite the UNHCR campaign there is absolutely no aspect of law that prevents nations from making its citizens stateless. In fact the opposite is true. The ability to make a citizen stateless is considered a nation's right.

British civil servants have simply been lying to British government ministers when they claim that Britain cannot make people stateless.

They're doing this because they are concerned that if Britain refuses accept ISIL members it will set a diplomatic precedent. One that nations will point to in order to prevent Britain deporting failed asylum seekers.

Here British civil servants fears reveal nothing but their own incompetence.

Much of the relations between nations is done on the basis of consensus and agreement. The repatriation of failed asylum seekers is no exception.

Therefore there is no law by which Britain can force nations to accept failed asylum seekers. So those who wish to refuse are going to refuse. They don't even have to give a reason why they're refusing.

Any diplomat worth their pay though will find it very easy to argue that these ISIL cases are not standard immigration cases.

For example the individuals have renounced all citizenships and are therefore already stateless. They are also members of an illegal armed group which has committed Crimes Against Humanity.

Mainly though they have been captured on a battlefield in a UN designated theatre of war. So civilian law, including immigration law, simply does not apply to them.

16:00 on 18/2/19 (UK date).

Operation Featherweight: Month 56, Week 2, Day 5.

A direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-2.html

The liberation of Shafah saw the SDF's north-western axis and northern axis unite. To form a single north-western axis.

Again the liberation of Shafah was carefully coordinated with the SDF's south-eastern axis.

On November 30th 2018 (30/11/18) the SDF's south-eastern axis advanced from its positions on the Syria/Iraq border to open a Humanitarian Corridor into Sousse. On December 16th 2018 (16/12/18) they developed this Humanitarian Corridor into a full battle front.

On December 19th 2018 (19/12/18) the SDF's south-eastern axis liberated Hawl al-Sousse. A village directly adjacent to Sousse's south-eastern side. This saw them break the main defensive ring around Sousse and start to advance into the town proper.

Following the liberation of Abu Bubadran on January 15th 2019 (15/1/19) the SDF's north-western axis advanced on al-Ulayat. The town which sits between Abu Bubadran and Sousse.

Al-Ulayat presented no problem the SDF. They swiftly liberated it and joined the battle for Sousse the same day. January 15th 2019 (15/1/19). Opening up a second front in the town.

By January 20th 2019 (20/1/19) Sousse had effectively been liberated. The SDF then moved onto Mouzan. A village sitting with Sousse directly to its north-west and Safafinah directly to its west.

On January 21st 2019 (21/1/19) the SDF liberated Mouzan. With fighting moving to Safafinah and Al Shalja/Nazl al-Fira. A town which sits with Mouzan to its north-west.

On January 23rd 2019 (23/1/19) both Safafinah and Shalja were liberated. Amid ISIL's defences collapsing and its fighters fleeing to Al Marashidah. Marashidah sits directly on the banks of the Euphrates. With Sousse to its north and Safafinah to its east.

The SDF chased ISIL into Marashidah with fighting there beginning the following day. January 24th 2019 (24/1/19).

On January 28th 2019 (28/1/19) the SDF fully liberated Marashidah.

This left ISIL in just Baghouz Fawqani. Along with the patches of open land between Marashidah to the west and Baghouz Tahtani to the east.

Throughout this Phase Four of Operation: Round Up the situation around Baghouz Fawqani has been complicated. To say the least.

On November 30th 2018 (30/11/18) the SDF reclaimed their positions along the Syria/Iraq border. From there they advanced down to Mount Baghouz on December 3rd 2018 (3/12/18).

The SDF then went around Mount Baghouz to liberate Baghouz Tahtani on December 8th 2018 (8/12/18). This allowed them to attack Mount Baghouz from three sides. Liberating it on December 11th 2018 (11/12/18).

The SDF then advanced north-west from Baghouz Tahtani towards Baghouz Fawqani. Along the Baghouz Cliffs. On January 2nd 2019 (2/1/19) the SDF liberated Harse. A small village directly adjacent to Baghouz Fawqani's south-eastern tip.

However at the same time the SDF also advanced on multiple sub-axis' from the Syria/Iraq border positions. In order to clear ISIL from the desert area between Baghouz Fawqani and the Syria/Iraq border.

The most north-westerly of these sub-axis' saw the SDF reach Sousse and open a Humanitarian Corridor. On November 30th 2018 (30/11/18).

On or around December 12th 2018 (12/12/18) the SDF opened a third sub-axis. This advanced on Baghouz Fawqani's north-westerly tip. Roughly where it is separated from Sousse by Mouzan.

At no point during this Phase Four have the SDF declared Baghouz Fawqani to be liberated.

However on January 23rd 2019 (23/1/19) there was a strong rumour that Baghouz Fawqani had been liberated.

This though proved to be untrue when the following day, January 24th 2019 (24/1/19) ISIL launched a sustained counter-offensive. This not only saw them in control of parts Baghouz Fawqani it also saw them in control of parts of Baghouz Tahtani.

Likewise on January 30th 2019 (30/1/19) there were even stronger rumours that the SDF had liberated Baghouz Fawqani.

Again these proved to be untrue when on February 2nd 2019 (2/2/19) ISIL launched another counter-offensive from Baghouz Fawqani. This saw them take control of parts of not only Baghouz Fawqani but also on Baghouz Tahtani and reach Mount Baghouz.

Ultimately though this counter-offensive proved to be nothing more than an attempt by a large number of ISIL fighters to break out from Baghouz Fawqani for the Syria/Iraq border. When they arrived at the Syria/Iraq border they were stopped in their tracks by Iraqi PMF units.

So it seems the reason why the SDF have not yet formally declared Baghouz Fawqani liberated is because they are not in full control of the town. However, by the same token, it is clear that ISIL are themselves not in full control of Baghouz Fawqani.

This has provided the SDF with a fantastic opportunity to protect the local civilian population.

On January 29th 2019 (29/1/19) the SDF suspended their efforts to liberate Baghouz Fawqani. Instead they shifted their focus to evacuating civilians for areas which where not under SDF control by where ISIL did not have enough of a presence to stop them. While CJTFOIR air and artillery strikes forced ISIL to hide in their bunkers.

During this period the SDF also opened negotiations with ISIL over the groups peaceful surrender. These though made little progress due to the ridiculous nature of ISIL's demands.

For example on January 29th 2019 (29/1/19) ISIL demanded that they be given free transfer to either the Turkish controlled Sudetenland or to Turkey itself. There is obviously no suggestion that that SDF could allow them to travel to Turkey, and by extension the wider World. So this demand was rejected.

On February 4th 2019 (4/2/19) ISIL demanded transfer to the Turkish controlled Sudetenland. In return for the surrender of Baghouz Fawqani and the release of 29 SDF prisoners they were holding. In rejecting this demand the SDF chose to protect the wider World over bringing their people home.

On February 5th 2019 (5/2/19) the UK Security Minister Ben Wallace made an absolute fool of himself. He told journalists that British civilian hostage John Cantlie is still alive and being held in Hajin. Despite his comments coming almost two months after the liberation of Hajin.

ISIL immediately leaped on Wallace's comments. On February 6th 2019 (6/2/19) they informed the SDF that they were holding Cantlie alive. They promised to release him if the SDF immediately allowed them to be transferred to either the Turkish controlled Sudetenland or to the Syrian Desert.

ISIL also claimed to be holding Italian Priest Father Paolo Dall'oglio alive and offered to release him. This significantly undermined ISIL's offer. It's been widely reported, by multiple sources, that Fr Dall'oglio was executed by ISIL in 2013 and his body dumped in a mass grave alongside other victims of ISIL's genocide in Raqqa City.

On Saturday, February 9th 2019 (9/2/19) the SDF determined that there were no longer any uncontrolled areas they could rescue civilians from. So they resumed their operation to liberate Baghouz Fawqani.

Since then I have been continuing to try to catch up. I am technically still more than a week behind.

So I do not feel that I am knowledgeable enough about the SDF's current, active battle to comment on it here. We are down to the detail of the specific locations of specific fighters. A point where I find I tend to do more harm than good.

I should point out though that both the SDF and CJTFOIR seem to have been treated the Hajin Pocket like one big battle. As if the liberated areas were simply districts of one very big city rather than a dozen separate towns.

Meaning that the SDF have liberated 11 of those 12 towns. However what they have not stopped to check every basement of every house before moving onto the next town. So while they are liberated I would not yet describe them as fully secure.

For example on January 7th 2019 (7/1/19) the SDF were engaged in heavy fighting in Sousse. However this did not stop ISIL taking advantage of another period of bad weather to launch a sustained attack on the SDF in the liberated town of Hajin.

Likewise on January 26th 2019 (26/1/19) the SDF were engaged in heavy fighting in Marashidah. That though did not stop ISIL launching a sustained attack on the SDF in the liberated town of Sousse. An attack that prompted a ten hour firefight in which 11 members of the SDF gave their lives to repel.

So if, or more likely, when Baghouz Fawqani is liberated the SDF will have to spend some time going back over all of the Hajin Pocket. Sweeping it to allow it to transition from liberated to fully secured.

20:50 on 14/2/19 (UK date).