Operation Featherweight: Month 37, Week 3, Day 5.

On November 6th 2016 (6/11/16) the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) launched an operation to liberate the Syrian city of Raqqa from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This operation was codenamed; "Wrath of Euphrates."

The first stage of the operation saw the SDF advance on Raqqa in three directions; North, West and East. This first stage was completed on March 19th 2017 (19/3/17) with the SDF taking up positions at al-Karamah - roughly 30km (20 miles) south-east of Raqqa.

On March 21st (21/3/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate the town of Tabqa and the adjoining Tabqa Dam. The Tabqa Dam creates Lake Assad out of the Euphrates River and sits roughly 40km (25 miles) west of Raqqa.The SDF had reached Lake Assad on January 20th (20/1/17). On May 11th (11/3/17) both the town of Tabqa and Tabqa Dam were liberated by the SDF.

On June 6th (6/6/17) the operation to liberate Raqqa itself was begun. This saw the SDF enter the city on three axis'; North, West and East. At the same time the SDF launched a west-to-east sweep on the southern bank of the Euphrates in order to cut Raqqa off from the rest of Syria.

The eastern axis began by entering the Mashlab district at the most south-easterly tip of Raqqa on June 6th (6/6/17). By June 17th (17/6/17) they had succeeded in liberating the Mashlab, al-Sinaa and Bitani districts. These all sit on the eastern outskirts of Raqqa.

The western axis began by entering the Jazra suburb on June 6th (6/6/17). By July 3rd (3/7/17) the western axis had succeeded in completely liberating the Sabahiya, Romaniyah, al-Qadisiyyah and al-Hattin districts and parts of the an-Nadah and al-Baryd districts. These all sit on the western outskirts of Raqqa.
 
On July 2nd (2/7/17) the eastern axis entered the Hisham Abdulmalik district at the very south of Raqqa on the banks of the Euphrates. Having liberated the Yarmouk district on July 17th (17/7/17) the western axis entered the Shahada district. This also sits at the very south of Raqqa directly adjacent to the Hisham Abdulmalik district.

Last Wednesday (2/8/17) the western and eastern axis' linked up at the H6 Highway which forms the boundary between the Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik district. This created a continuous SDF line dividing both districts south towards the Euphrates and north to the rest of the city.

By Saturday (5/8/17) the SDF cleared the area between the dividing line and the Euphrates in both the Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik districts. As of today they have succeeded in clearing the areas north of the dividing line.

As a result both the Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik are both 99-100% liberated.

Alongside fighting in the Hisham Abdulmalik district the eastern axis also entered the Old City district of Raqqa on July 6th (6/7/17). This sits directly west of the al-Sinaa and Bitani district and directly north of the Hisham Abdulmalik district.

Within the Old City district the eastern axis have focused their advance on the southern most edge of the district north of the Raqqa to Deir-ez-Zour road. Along with the liberation of the Hashim Abdulmalik district this has brought the SDF to within 600 metres/yards of Raqqa's Harun al-Rashid Gardens.

Whenever you see a television news report about ISIL it is often illustrated with the same piece of footage. ISIL parading captured vehicles under their black flag around a city square. There's even one guy doing doughnuts in a tracked armoured vehicle. This footage is shot in Harun al-Rashid Gardens.

As such these gardens are of huge significance to ISIL. Intelligence suggests that they have established their main headquarters in Raqqa in the area just to the south of the gardens in the area of Faysal Street, the Governate Buildings and the Presidents Square. The SDF is now poised to enter exactly this area.

Away from the Shahada district the SDF's western axis has been continuing to make progress in the north of the city. Particularly in the an-Nadah district. This sits directly south of the al-Bayrd district and stretches deep towards the centre of the city.

As of July 27th (27/7/17) the SDF were in disputed control of around 20% of the an-Nadah district. That has now increased to disputed control of around 60% of the district with the SDF exerting complete control over around 20%.

The western axis also completely liberated the Karim district on Sunday (6/8/17). This small district sits directly south of an-Nahdah and directly north of the Darayeh district. The western axis remains in disputed control of around 80% of the Darayeh district and 50% disputed control of the al-Moroor district to its west.

Amid these gains there is growing concern over the number of casualties the SDF are sustaining. Not from frontline combat but from behind-the-lines attacks by ISIL. Usually deploying Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED's).

Last Wednesday (2/8/17) footage was circulated of an ISIL VBIED attack on a building housing journalists covering the battle in the Muktaltha neighbourhood of the Mashlab district. On the very eastern outskirts of Raqqa Mashlab district was liberated back on June 9th (9/6/17).

Last Thursday (3/8/17) as many as 40 SDF fighters were reported killed in a similar VBIED attack in the al-Hal market area. This is located between the al-Sinaa district and the Euphrates directly to the east of the Hisham al-Malik district. It was liberated on July 2nd (2/7/17).

Although a cause for concern this is very much part and parcel of the tactics the SDF are used to using.

The November 2016 to March 2017 advance on Raqqa was not really marked by traditional battles between the SDF and ISIL. Instead ISIL would move out of an area allowing the SDF in. Then once the SDF had set up camp ISIL would use suicide bombers to infiltrate the SDF's positions attacking them at night.

However in order to keep casualties to a minimum it is something that the SDF need to tighten up on. After all if they sustain to many casualties they'll run out of troops meaning that ISIL will win the battle.

There are a number of challenges in preventing these type of behind-the-lines attacks. Firstly within Raqqa as they have done elsewhere ISIL has established a complex tunnel and bunker network beneath the city.

Some have claimed that the VBIED used in the Muktaltha attack had actually emerged from this tunnel network. In places like Mosul ISIL have certainly built tunnels large enough to comfortably drive trucks through. However I find it unlikely that a tunnel entrance that large would have gone unnoticed for nearly two months

What I think is much more likely is that the Muktaltha attack was launched in somewhere like the Rameelah district which is still under full ISIL control. It was then driven across the open cemetery area before breaching Mashlab district on its northern flank.

Secondly the SDF have advanced rapidly within Raqqa. This leaves me concerned about the extent to which they've properly backcleared the areas behind the advancing frontline.

I say areas like the Shahada district and the Mashlab district are 100% under SDF control. However I am uncertain that they have taken the time to search every building in those areas to uncover weapons stores and ISIL sleeper cells.

Another big challenge are the guerrilla tactics the SDF are using. Rather than establishing a formal frontline they are instead using a loose network of forward fire bases.

This has actually given them an advantage against ISIL's favourite tactic of using VBIED's. In places like Mosul where more conventional tactics were being used if ISIL were able to detonate a VBIED at the frontline they could easily end up killing 20 to 30 troops at a time. If ISIL successfully use a VBIED against one of the SDF's forward fire bases they'll kill at most 10 troops.

The problem is though that it is much easier for ISIL to slip fighters and VBIED's through the SDF's loose network of forward fire bases. Having penetrated the forward line they can then attack rallying points where troops are gathered in larger numbers preparing to go into action. This increases the number of casualties.

To counter the threat the SDF need to do more to properly backclear areas including identifying and destroying tunnel entrances. They also need to do more to protect their flanks. This means establishing a network of fire bases along the sides of areas under their control rather than just at the forward most point.

The SDF also need to increase their control over the areas between the forward line and their rallying point.

This means establishing a network of observation posts, sentries and patrols between the two lines. If possible this can include camera technology to make sure that any attackers who slip through the forward line are stopped before they can reach their targets.

16:30 on 7/8/17 (UK date)