A direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.com/2019/02/operation-featherweight-month-56-week-4.html
In that post I looked at US President Donald Trump's announcement on December 19th 2018 (19/12/18). That he intended to immediately withdraw US troops from Syria.
I particularly looked at the fact that the Shangri-La area is not the only area of Syria in which US troops are operating. Aside from the supporting the SDF the US also has troops stationed at the Dollywood base. Located close to the town of al-Tanf within the Central Syria area.
The only function US troops are currently performing at the Dollywood base is to protect ISIL. The exclusion zone around the base provides ISIL with a de facto safe haven in which they can operate. That obviously runs counter to the US mission to defeat ISIL.
So removing US troops from the Dollywood base is not a cause for concern. It is a decision that it is almost two years overdue.
Of the roughly 2,300 US troops deployed in the Shangri-La area a full 2,000 of them belong to two artillery battalions. They were sent into Syria ahead of the Battle of Raqqa City, in the spring of 2017, to perform a specific task. To rain artillery shells down on ISIL defensive positions, destroying them.
With the liberation of the Hajin Pocket area there are now no longer any ISIL defensive positions within Shangri-La. Meaning that those two artillery battalion's task is now complete. So they should be withdrawn and allowed to return to their normal duties.
This changing of the type of resources used as the mission changes is common throughout all wars. It's certainly been common throughout the war against ISIL and associated groups.
In December 2016 Denmark withdrew its seven F-16 fighters jets and support personnel from the CJTFOIR coalition. This wasn't because Denmark suddenly no longer believed in the mission or no longer wished to aid it. CJTFOIR had just found itself in a position where it had far more planes than targets to bomb.
Therefore CJTFOIR was able to allow some of those planes to return to their normal duties. It was easier to stand down all Danish aircraft then stand down, say four Danish and three American planes. Then try to coordinate the remaining aircraft under a unified CJTFOIR command.
Likewise in December 2017 Australia withdrew it's seven F-18 fighter jets and support personnel from the CJTFOIR. Again this was simply because as ISIL's territory shrank CJTFOIR found itself in a position where it had far more planes than targets to bomb.
As recently as January 21st 2019 (21/1/19) the UK announced it was withdrawing its eight GR-4 fighters from the CJTFOIR coalition.
Again this had nothing to do with President Trump's announcement. With there now being so few targets to bomb there was no point keeping the 40 year old aircraft in service beyond its planned retirement in March 2019.
The UK will continue to deploy six of the newer Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as part of CJTFOIR. If the need arises it will deploy more of the newer type of aircraft to CJTFOIR.
However there is a certain level of debate over the costs of deploying the GR4's replacement the F-35 against the Russian S-400 Air Defence System. There's even significant interest in the upgraded S-200 system's capability against aircraft such as the F-35.
The liberation of the Hajin Pocket means that ISIL are now defeated as a conventional military force. They're now forced to operate as an armed insurgency conducting guerrilla attacks.
I do not intend to ignore these ISIL guerrilla attacks. Nor do I mean to detract from their severity.
However I think it is important to take a moment to appreciate just what a massive improvement this is.
Last Thursday, February 21st (21/2/19) ISIL conducted a particularly successful guerrilla attack. An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) hidden in a car was used to ambush a bus carrying workers from the Omar Oil & Gas Field. 24 of those civilian workers were killed and many more were wounded.
That though is still a massive improvement on the Battle of Kobani in the winter of 2014/15. It is also a massive improvement on the Battle of Raqqa City in the summer and autumn of 2017.
It is even a massive improvement on ISIL's November 24th 2018 (24/11/18) two day attack on the town of Bahrah, just outside the Hajin Pocket. In which 92 members of the SDF were killed in the conventional battle.
I should also point out that even if we were to do absolutely nothing about ISIL's insurgency it would likely fade on its own.
Throughout this conflict I've often found myself talking about the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). I particularly talk about their Grey Wolves paramilitary wing as being part of the NATO "Gladio" operation. A secret army to counter Soviet influence and use guerrilla tactics to fight behind the lines in the event of a Soviet invasion.
Operation Gladio has its roots in the GHQ Auxilary Units Britain operated during World War Two. These were the forerunner of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) which was copied by the US to create the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Which became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The GHQ Auxiliary Units were made up of 3,500 volunteers. Often veterans of the International Brigades from the Spanish Civil War. They were divided into eight man autonomous cells, given a stockpile of weapons and a 20kmsq (15 milesq) area of operations.
In the event of Britain being invaded the GHQ Auxiliary Units were tasked with carrying out intense guerrilla attacks against the Nazi forces. Until they were killed. They were instructed to use the last of their weapon stockpiles to conduct one final suicide attack.
Obviously the GHQ Auxiliary Units were never used. However in their planning they had a predicted life expectancy of just 12 days after being activated.
So even without any action being taken against them it is likely that ISIL's own Auxiliary Units or Sleeper Cells will become less effective. Burning themselves out as they run out of ammunition.
Obviously though I have absolutely no intention of leaving ISIL's sleeper cells to simply fade away.
In terms of combating ISIL as a guerrilla force there remains a substantial, conventional military role for the SDF to play. Conducting patrols, sweeping operations and re-sweeping operations of the desert areas to uncover ISIL camps and weapons stores.
As the Syrian military has been doing in the Syrian Desert/Badiya al-Sham. Or at least the areas of the Syrian Desert they're not blocked from entering by the US troops deployed at the Dollywood base.
These type of operations are hugely assisted by surveillance assets. Such as satellites and drones. If you've identified an ISIL camp that may soon move on the best way to destroy it is with an airstrike.
However I don't think there was any suggestion of President Trump's withdrawal announcement apply to this type of US asset. They don't even operate out of either Syria or Iraq.
Primarily though the fight is now going to shift into counter-terrorism operations and raids. Often in otherwise peaceful civilian urban areas. These are Special Operations. So require Special Operations Forces (SOF's).
The SDF have already made significant progress in developing this type of capabilities.
In March 2017 the SDF's own Special Operations Force the Anti-Terror Units (YAT) introduced itself to the World. Participating in an airborne assault on the ISIL occupied town of Tabqa.
An airborne assault is a particularly complex and sophisticated military operation. In the US Army soldiers have to do a special course and receive a special qualification badge before they're allowed to participate in them. So the SDF's ability to conduct such an operation impressed and caught the attention of a lot of people.
The YAT are said to be loosely based on Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service (ICTS/Golden Division). The Golden Division itself is said to be based on the US Army's Green Berets SOF.
From what I've seen of their operations though the YAT seem to operate more along the lines of the US Navy SEAL Teams or the US Army Delta Force. When those SOF's are operating in their counter-terrorism role.
That is to say that the YAT operate almost like a police Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) team. A well equipped and extremely lethal SWAT team.
From the Ayaish neighbourhood police officer up to the YAT itself everyone gathers intelligence on ISIL sleeper cells, how they operate and where they are located. Rather like how a police force would track a drugs gang or a gang of armed robbers.
Once the intelligence has been gathered and collated the YAT move in to raid the targets. Capturing or killing members of the ISIL cells, seizing their weapons and equipment and generally disrupting their ability to operate and conduct attacks.
Alongside the YAT the SDF announced, on January 16th 2019 (16/1/19), the creation of its Commando Forces (Hezen Komandoz). The only thing I really know about them at this point is their name and the first graduating class was made up of 120 members.
I would assume though, from the name, that they are intended to function as what is traditionally recognised as a commando force. That is to say an elite force which is more capable and more specialised than a conventional force. Yet falls just short of the standards of a Special Operations Force.
In an anti-terrorism role they would act in support of the YAT. As the basis of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).
A prime example of this comes from the Philippines. In May 2017 two ISIL affiliated groups, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group, overran the Philippine city of Marawi.
If something like this occurred in Shangri-La it would be too large for the YAT to handle alone. So they would lead the operation backed by the Hezen Komandoz. If need be the operation would be further supported by conventional units of the SDF. Likely securing the areas the YAT and Hezen Homandoz had cleared.
It must be said though that to be effective any commando force needs to be of at least battalion sized, 800-1000 strong. The equivalent force in the UK military is the Navy Marine Commandos. That is currently made up of five battalions. Plans to cut it to just three battalions have proved highly controversial.
Also simply calling yourself a SOF or a Commando does not make it true. You need the rigorous selection and training to back it up.
So despite the work the SDF have done to build their own capabilities CJTFOIR does still need to deploy its own SOF's to Shangri-La. In order to provide training help the SDF build up its own capacity and fill in any existing capability gaps.
After all the YAT maybe capable of mounting an airborne assault. However they still require CJTFOIR to provide them with the aircraft.
In deciding what level of support it can provide the US, and other members of CJTFOIR, will have to consider what impact that support will have on their own forces. Along with what missions their forces will not then be able to carry out because they're deployed in Syria.
The last conventional war the NATO elements of CJTFOIR fought was in 1999. The small, illegal one against Serbia.
Following the September 11th 2001 (11/9/01) attacks the US declared the Global War on Terror. This war is still ongoing and is one which is being fought primarily by Special Operations Forces (SOF).
As a result these past 18 years have seen a massive increase in the public's interest in SOF's. So you have TV shows such as; "The Unit," "SEAL Team" and the far inferior; "Six."
The UK even has a reality TV show called; "SAS: Are You Tough Enough." Currently in its fifth season this puts members of the public through a toned down, softened version of SAS selection. To find out if they're tough enough. The answer is often a resounding; "No."
Under former US President Obama the Global War on Terror became much worse. With Islamist terrorism spreading to previously safe areas such as Libya, Nigeria and across Africa's Sahel Belt.
In October 2017 a number of US Green Beret SOF's were killed in Niger. Including Sgt La David Johnson. Many Americans, particularly Democrats, were shocked to learn that first a country called Niger existed and that US troops were deployed there.
In fact US SOF's have their main, big mission in Afghanistan. Along with a number of smaller deployments in a host of places such as Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Burkina Faso all across Africa. They also conduct response operations such as to rescue hostages or to target senior terrorist leaders.
The problem with this is that the entire US SOF community is only about 70,000 strong. Including support staff such as in logistics and intelligence. The sheer number of missions they're being asked to do is putting a huge stress on them.
Conventional US troops will do a 6 to 9 month deployment in a combat zone. They then won't be asked to do another combat deployment for at least another 12 months. SOF's will return from a three month combat deployment only to be immediately sent out on another one.
Back in January 2019 it emerged that there had been a massive spike in suicides within the US SOF community. They saw 32 suicides per 100,000 people. More than double the national average of 13 per 100,000 people.
Obviously I've not looked at the circumstances of each individual suicide. Dealing with personal medical records I wouldn't be able to. However most seem to be linked to relationship breakdowns and financial worries rather than things like PTSD.
Both of these factors seem to be caused by the high rate of deployment. That obviously puts stress on personal relationships and people often spend money they don't have trying to mitigate those relationship stresses. For example if your spouse is not home to cook dinner your kids would be forced to spend money on take-out.
So there is some pressure on the US to reduce the number of SOF deployments it is undertaking. In order to reduce the risk of them being pushed to breaking point. There is certainly significant pressure on the US to pay them more.
Fortunately the type of training and support mission required in Shangri-La can be extremely small.
On January 15th 2019 (15/1/19) there was an Islamist terror attack on a hotel in the Westlands district of the Kenyan capital Nairobi.
In the middle of the effort to bring this attack to an end there was a single British SAS solider. He'd been deployed, on his own, to train and support Kenyan forces. When the attack happened he decided to get stuck in.
It also means that at some point Britain looked at Kenya and wondered how many SAS soldiers would be required to have a significant impact of the Islamist terror threat there. The answer they came up with was; One.
Alongside ISIL's guerrilla attacks the other major challenge facing the SDF is what to do with the large number of ISIL prisoners they have captured. Something that Britain has pushed into the spotlight with the case of Shamima Begum.
Within Britain the tone of the coverage of Shamima Begum has been that she is some sort of almost heroic figure. An innocent victim of the brutality of the cruel SDF.
There have genuinely been calls for her to be allowed to return home and not face any punishment at all. Some people seem to think that if she is to be punished it should only be the mildest telling off by the police and Courts.
As if she'd simply been caught underage drinking or engaging in some light shoplifting.
To those arguments the answer is very simple. Begum, and all of ISIL prisoners have been captured on the battlefield. In a UN designated warzone.
As such civilian law does not apply to them. The only way to deal with them is under the laws of war, essentially the Geneva Conventions. Through a system of military tribunal.
However I should make clear that the Geneva Conventions do not allow for collective punishment. Nor do they allow for summary justice or extrajudicial punishment. In fact they expressly forbid them.
It's worth pointing out though that fighters of the GHQ Auxiliary Units were instructed to commit suicide rather than allow themselves to be captured. That's because they knew that they were acting as illegal combatants so absolutely everything was on the table in terms of what could be done to them if they were captured.
The crimes committed by ISIL are so shocking and so severe there have only been five, possibly six occasions where the international community has been called upon to prosecute crimes of such magnitude.
The Nuremberg Military Tribunal. This addressed the crimes of Nazi Germany committed before and during the Second World War. Including the holocaust.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Associated with the Nuremberg Military Tribunal this addressed the crimes committed by Imperial Japan during the Second World War.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. These addressed the crimes committed by Cambodia's Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979. Much like Shamima Begum the Khmer Rouge was famously made up of many members who were just teenagers.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. This addressed the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This addressed crimes committed during the break up of Yugoslavia and the associated Balkan Wars. Including the 1995 Srebrenica massacre.
If you look at these tribunals in detail you will quickly notice that they are all different in structure from each other. They have been specifically tailored to fit the people who committed the crimes, the crimes themselves and the communities that became the victims of those crimes.
Even the second round of Nuremberg Tribunals was different from the first. The third round was different from them both.
So even this simple answer of how to prosecute the ISIL prisoners is not that simple.
As such I will have to circle back to this complex issue. Dealing with it more fully in an appropriate section.
The immediate priority is ensuring that there is the space and time in which to have these discussions and make appropriate decisions.
Fortunately under the laws of war there is no concept of Habeus Corpus, restrictions of detention without trial.
Lawful combatants, Prisoners Of War (POW's) are never expected to be put on trial. By definition their actions are considered entirely lawful. Instead they are held until the war ends. Or until their captors benevolently decided to release them and send them home.
In the interim though the SDF do need to house and control these ISIL prisoners.
The immediate thing they need to do is screen them.
Amongst the thousands of people emerging for previously ISIL controlled areas there are some who are clearly ISIL members. Such as Shamima Begum. However there are also some who are clearly wholly innocent civilians.
The SDF need to identify those who are clearly innocent civilians and transport them to Internally Displaced People's (IDP) camps. Such as the one at al-Hawl. These people are considered victims, whom nobody has any interest in taking further action against. The SDF therefore has a responsibility to ensure that they receive appropriate care.
The people who have been identified as ISIL members need to be separated from the civilians. They need to be transported and housed in entirely separate camps. In terms of design, for speed, these can be almost exactly the same as the IDP camps. Only with external fencing, guard and watch towers.
I would locate these prisoner camps close to Raqqa City. Where a camp for ISIL family members emerged during the Battle of Raqqa City. It is in this area where ISIL dug the majority of their mass graves. Mass graves which are now slowly being unearthed.
I think it is important that the journalists rushing to give the likes of Shamima Begum a sympathetic ear take a look at those mass graves.
Once they've built prisoner camps and separated ISIL members into them the SDF need to look at what, of limited, resources can be made available to them. Here there is a clear protocol known as the priority of life.
At the top there are the SDF themselves. If they don't get what they need function then everything falls to bits and nobody gets anything.
Coming a very close second behind the SDF you have the civilians.
Last, and very much least you have the ISIL prisoners themselves. They only get what is left after everybody else has gotten what they need.
I should make clear though that the priority of life protocol only comes into effect when there is not enough to go around. It does not advocate starving ISIL prisoners to death.
However neither I, nor the law will stand for innocent civilians being starved to death in order save the lives of ISIL prisoners.
If the prospect of ISIL prisoners starving to death horrifies people, well.
Surely they should take action to make sure that the SDF have everything they need.
21:20 on 27/2/19 (UK date).
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