Operation Featherweight: Month 54, Week 4, Day 1.

Within the conflict in Syria there are currently five main areas;

Shangri-La, Garvaghy Road, Afrin Canton, the Sudetenland and Central Syria.

Keeping track of events across these areas is a time consuming process. The Sudetenland is particularly difficult. As a result this two week gap between my posts has not been spent with me going on holiday. I've been using it to clear the backlog that built up over things like the Khashoggi affair and the US midterm elections.

Also I have to raise a complaint about the numerous US sanctions on Russia. While most people only notice these when they're announced on the news they are now causing me practical problems on a daily basis.

In order to map the conflict I often use Wikimapia. Rather like Wikipedia this allows Internet users to annote Google Maps and satellite images. The problem is that Wikimapia was founded by private citizens in Russia in 2006. US sanctions on Russia mean that Google have been forced to cut off access by Wikimapia to Google Maps.

This is hardly a terminal problem. However things which would have taken me a couple of seconds now take me 10-15 seconds. When you're doing something a few dozen times a day those extra few seconds quickly add up.

Due to the long gap I have to pick up where I left off.

Shangri-La: This is located in north-east Syria. It is essentially everything to the north-east of the Euphrates River. If you look at a map of Syria the Euphrates River is the big blue line.

Shangri-La has long been the main battleground between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) coalition.

The largest element of the SDF coalition is the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). They operate alongside Assyrian/Syriac Christian, Turkmen and Arab Muslim forces.

The Arab element which makes up around 50% of the SDF is comprised of both elements of the long defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) and local tribes indigenous to north-eastern Syria.

The SDF also contains a small International Brigade made up of foreign volunteers.

The SDF is supposedly supported by the US-led coalition, Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). With air power, Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and increasingly conventional ground forces.

The boundaries of Shangri-La were properly established by an SDF operation codenamed; "Operation: Cizre Storm." This was launched in September 2017.

Cizre Storm saw the SDF advance from positions already under their control. Essentially an imaginary line in the desert between the town of Madan on the banks of the Euphrates and the town of Shadaddi.

From this Madan-Shadaddi Line the SDF advanced first to the Khobar River and then to the Syria/Iraq border. Fighting and liberating territory from ISIL as they went.

This was done on two main axis;

One which advanced along the northern bank of the Euphrates liberating the towns and population centres which sit on the river bank.

A second that advanced across the desert area to the north of the Euphrates.

On November 25th 2017 (25/11/17) the SDF reached the Syria/Iraq border. In the area of the Buwarah Salt Pan.

On February 22nd 2018 (22/2/18) the SDF liberated the town of al-Bahrah. This sits around 40km (25 miles) north-west of where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria.

This left ISIL in control of a group of 10 towns stretching across roughly 35km (20 mile) along the north bank of the Euphrates. Centred around the town of Hajin this is known as the; "Hajin Pocket." 

On March 6th 2018 (6/5/18) SDF operations against ISIL in Shangri-La had to be suspended. Due to Turkey's invasion of Afrin Canton. An area under SDF control in the north-west of Syria.

On May 1st (1/5/18) the SDF launched a new anti-ISIL operation within Shangri-La codenamed; "Operation: Round Up." This was intended to target and liberate the Hajin Pocket.

This operation began with two concurrent phases.

The first phase focused on the roughly 35km (20 mile) area on the north bank of the Euphrates still under ISIL control. This stretches from the town of Hajin in the north down to Baghuz Tahtani in the south, where the Euphrates enters Iraq from Syria.

Its objective was to isolate these remaining towns. Both from each other and from the Syria/Iraq border.

This was achieved by the SDF reaching the banks of the Euphrates to the south-east of Hajin and just to the north-east of Abu Hassan on May 4th (4/5/18). Hajin sits around 35km (20 miles) north-west of the Syria/Iraq border while Abu Hassan sits around 8km (5 miles) south-east of Hajin.

At the same time the SDF advanced on the towns of Baghuz Tahtani and Baghuz Fawqani. These sit adjacent to each other stretching around 6km (3 miles) north-west of the Iraq/Syria border. By May 14th (14/5/18) the SDF had liberated Baghuz Tahtani and surrounded Baghuz Fawqani.

The second phase of Round Up which was launched at the same time focused on clearing ISIL from desert areas to the north of the Euphrates River.

Essentially a collection of towns, villages and farms known as the Wadi ash-Shawkh Agricultural Area. Located on the Syria/Iraq border around 240km (145 miles) north of Baghuz Tahtani on the Euphrates River.

On August 7th (7/8/18) the SDF forces who had conducted phase two of Round Up arrived at the al-Omar Oil & Gas Field linking up with the SDF forces who had conducted phase one of Round Up. As a result both of the opening phases of Round Up were declared to be at an end.

On September 11th (11/9/18) phase three of Operation: Round Up was launched. It's objective was to completely defeat ISIL in the Hajin Pocket.

Initially this operation made good progress.

On September 20th (20/9/18) the SDF completely liberated Baghuz Fawqani.

On September 25th (25/9/18) the SDF completely liberated al-Shalja. This sits directly to the north of Baghuz Fawqani.

Directly to the west of al-Shalja you have the town of as-Safafinah. To the west of as-Safafinah you have the town of al-Marashidah.

On October 2nd (2/10/18) the SDF entered Safafinah itself. On October 7th (7/10/18) the SDF entered Marashidah. On October 10th (10/10/18) there were reports that the SDF had managed to liberate all of Marashidah.

Unfortunately the weather then turned against the SDF. This poor weather and loss of visibility for CJTFOIR aircraft allowed ISIL to launch a five day counter-offensive. 

This forced the SDF to withdraw entirely from Safafinah and Marashidah. ISIL were then able to cut the SDF supply lines between al-Shalja and Baghuz Fawqani. Leading to heavy fighting in both al-Shalja and Baghuz Fawqani.

ISIL were also able to break through the SDF lines at Sousse. Which sits directly to the north of al-Shalja. From there ISIL made a break for the Syria/Iraq border where they clashed with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Perhaps most alarmingly ISIL were able to break through the SDF's lines between Hajin and Bahrah. This allowed them to reach the Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camp just outside Bahrah. There ISIL were able to kidnap roughly 100 families which works out at around 700 civilian hostages.

On October 15th (15/10/18) the bad weather lifted. This allowed the SDF to quickly recover all lost positions meaning it was as if the ISIL counter-attack had never happened.

On October 25th (25/10/18) bad weather set in again. This allowed ISIL to launch another large, coordinated and highly effective counter-offensive. Across all of the Hajin pocket.

By October 28th (28/10/18) the SDF had been forced out of all of its positions in the Hajin pocket. Wiping out all gains of the previous 47 days of fighting. 

Turkey saw this as an opportunity to start shelling SDF positions in the north of Shangri-La amid threats of invasion. As happened with the Cizre Storm operation and the Turkish invasion of Afrin Canton in March 2018 this forced the SDF to suspend the Round Up operation.

Unfortunately the SDF weren't just forced from the positions they'd gained in the Hajin pocket during phase three of Operation: Round Up. 

The SDF were also forced from positions along the Syria/Iraq border which they had gained during phase two of Operation: Round Up. Essentially a network of thirty positions stretching from Mount Baghuz in the south to the Mallah Salt Pan to the north.

Here the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and particularly the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) element came to the SDF's aid. Initially they were able to use artillery stationed in Iraq to create a no-go zone along this border area. To put it bluntly this is an area they can saturate with artillery shells meaning nothing and no-one can enter it and survive.

Then on November 6th (6/11/18) Iraqi PMF units entered Syria to take control of the positions abandoned by the SDF. This could create a whole new set of problems for the SDF.

The Popular Mobilisation Force is an umbrella term for more than 60 different Iraqi militias. The ideology, competence and allegiances of these different militias can vary widely.

One militia that used to make up the PMF was the Sinjar Protection Units (YBS). This is an Iraqi Kurdish Yezidi militia formed by the Syrian YPG. After they crossed the border into Iraq to climb Mount Shingal/Sinjar to rescue victims of the Yezidi genocide in the summer of 2014.

As a result the YBS obviously has quite good connections and relationships with the YPG and the SDF. This is why Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded the YBS be removed from the PMF umbrella under threat of a Turkish invasion of Iraq.

However many of the PMF militias are much closer in ideology to the Badr Army. This is a Shia Arab militia that was formed in 1982. By Iraqis who wanted to fight for Iran against Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.

I don't know the specific PMF militia that crossed into Syria on November 6th (6/11/18). However I do know that the Kata'ib Hezbollah militia that been particularly active in the area. Notably crossing into Syria to help Syrian forces liberate al-Bukamal/Abu Kamal across the Euphrates from Baghuz Fawqani in the winter of 2017.

Kata'ib Hezbollah are a Shia Arab militia that is very closely linked to both the Badr Army and Iran. In fact one of their senior leaders Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is a former member of the Badr Army and an adviser to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Quds Force. It is the Quds Force that arm and train Kata'ib Hezbollah.

Iran are also a longstanding ally of Syria. At Syria's invitation Iranian forces including the Quds Force have fought against ISIL and other terrorist groups in the country. As such I think it is fair to assume that PMF militias like the Badr Army and Kata'ib Hezbollah enjoy better connections and relations with the Syrians than they do the SDF.

Up until now Syria and its allies have been extremely reasonable about the activities of the SDF. Although no-one is saying it out loud Syria has pretty much given the SDF its tacit approval to establish Shangri-La to the north-east of the Euphrates. An area that includes a number of valuable Syrian oil fields.

That though could be about to change. 

The indications are that the US and CJTFOIR will not be willing to protect the SDF from a Turkish invasion and occupation of Shangri-La. Just as the US and CJTFOIR were unwilling to protect the SDF from a Turkish invasion and occupation of Afrin Canton or the Turkish invasion and occupation of Garvaghy Road.

If Turkey is permitted to invade Shangri-La then Syria really has no option other than to also attack Shangri-La. In order to secure as much territory as possible in order to stop it being seized by Turkey.

The presence of PMF militia's along the Syrian side of the Syria/Iraq border to the north of the Euphrates opens up a possible route for the Syrians into Shangri-La. However I think it's likely that Syria's reasonableness will continue. Provided the US and CJTFOIR can remove the Turkish threat.

How the defeat of October 28th (28/10/18) has affected the SDF's control over the area to the north of the Hajin Pocket is harder to assess.

This area is completely unpopulated desert. The only landmarks and navigation aids are things like salt pans. The area is dominated by the vast Omar Oil & Gas Field. Roughly 2,100kmsq (1,200 milesq) in area the Omar Oil & Gas Field is actually made up of around 14 sub-fields.

The SDF control this area with a network of essentially small bases known as Control Points and positions. Some of these can be extremely small made up of a platoon of between 16 and 44 troops dug in with a handful of vehicles. 

Particularly in periods of poor visibility. Such as at night or during the bad weather the area is currently experiencing it is easy for ISIL to sneak between these Control Points unnoticed. 

In the grand scheme of things ISIL's recent military victory over the SDF is small and insignificant. However it is the first military victory ISIL have achieved since February 2017. I think it's the first ever military victory ISIL have achieved against the SDF.

As a result the group have been hugely energised and have been mounting widespread attacks against the SDF along the borders of the Hajin pocket and beyond.

On November 4th (4/11/18) ISIL launched a sustained attack against SDF lines between Bahrah and Hajin. This resulted in 12 members of the SDF being killed. 

At the same time ISIL launched attacks against SDF positions in the town of Diban and Jarnof Oil Field. Diban sits around 40km (25 miles) north-west of Bahrah. One of the sub-fields in the Omar Oil & Gas Field the Jarnof field sits around 15km (10 miles) outside of Diban.

On November 8th (8/11/18) ISIL attacked SDF positions in the Tanak Oil Field. Again one of the sub-fields in the Omar Oil & Gas Field this sits around 20km (10 miles) north of Bahrah. In repelling this attack the SDF killed some 20 ISIL fighters.

Alarmingly there have also been a number of clashes reported between ISIL and the SDF in the area between the Hajin pocket and the ar-Rawdah Salt Pan. This sits around 90km (50 miles) north of the Hajin pocket. Crucially it also sits around 20km (10 miles) north-west of the Buwarah Salt Pan. Which the SDF liberated back on November 25th 2017 (25/11/17).

However rather than being evidence of ISIL recapturing the area these clashes seem to be the result of ISIL infiltrating through the gaps in the SDF's Control Points.

Therefore I think the SDF's battlefield priority should be reestablishing the containment of ISIL within the Hajin pocket. Both by reinforcing the network of Control Points to the north and taking back control of the border positions from the Iraqi PMF.

As I've said before once that containment of ISIL is back in place the SDF should then wait. Either until the spring when the weather improves or until CJTFOIR equip them with anti-tank weapons to combat ISIL's Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (S-VBIED) attacks from the ground.

18:20 on 26/11/18 (UK date)