On November 6th 2016 (6/11/16) the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) launched an operation to liberate the Syrian city of Raqqa from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This operation was codenamed; "Wrath of Euphrates."
The first stage of the operation saw the SDF advance on Raqqa in three directions; North, West and East. This first stage was completed on March 19th 2017 (19/3/17) with the SDF taking up positions at al-Karamah - roughly 30km (20 miles) south-east of Raqqa.
On March 21st (21/3/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate the town of Tabqa and the adjoining Tabqa Dam. The Tabqa Dam creates Lake Assad out of the Euphrates River and sits roughly 40km (25 miles) west of Raqqa.The SDF had reached Lake Assad on January 20th (20/1/17). On May 11th (11/3/17) both the town of Tabqa and Tabqa Dam were liberated by the SDF.
On June 6th (6/6/17) the operation to liberate Raqqa itself was begun. This saw the SDF enter the city on three axis'; North, West and East. At the same time the SDF launched a west-to-east sweep on the southern bank of the Euphrates in order to cut Raqqa off from the rest of Syria.
The eastern axis began by entering the Mashlab district at the most
south-easterly tip of Raqqa on June 6th (6/6/17). By June 17th (17/6/17)
they had succeeded in liberating the Mashlab, al-Sinaa and Bitani
districts. These all sit on the eastern outskirts of Raqqa.
The western axis began by entering the Jazra suburb on June 6th
(6/6/17). By July 3rd (3/7/17) the western axis had succeeded in
completely liberating the Sabahiya, Romaniyah, al-Qadisiyyah and
al-Hattin districts and parts of the an-Nadah and al-Baryd districts.
These all sit on the western outskirts of Raqqa.
On July 2nd (2/7/17) the eastern axis entered the Hisham Abdulmalik
district at the very south of Raqqa on the banks of the Euphrates. Having liberated the Yarmouk district on July 17th (17/7/17) the western axis entered the Shahada district. This also sits at the very south of Raqqa directly adjacent to the Hisham Abdulmalik district.
Last Wednesday (2/8/17) the western and eastern axis' linked up at the H6 Highway which forms the boundary between the Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik district. This created a continuous SDF line dividing both districts south towards the Euphrates and north to the rest of the city.
By Saturday (5/8/17) the SDF cleared the area between the dividing line and the Euphrates in both the Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik districts. As of today they have succeeded in clearing the areas north of the dividing line.
As a result both the Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik are both 99-100% liberated.
Alongside fighting in the Hisham Abdulmalik district the eastern axis also entered the Old City district of Raqqa on July 6th (6/7/17). This sits directly west of the al-Sinaa and Bitani district and directly north of the Hisham Abdulmalik district.
Within the Old City district the eastern axis have focused their advance on the southern most edge of the district north of the Raqqa to Deir-ez-Zour road. Along with the liberation of the Hashim Abdulmalik district this has brought the SDF to within 600 metres/yards of Raqqa's Harun al-Rashid Gardens.
Whenever you see a television news report about ISIL it is often illustrated with the same piece of footage. ISIL parading captured vehicles under their black flag around a city square. There's even one guy doing doughnuts in a tracked armoured vehicle. This footage is shot in Harun al-Rashid Gardens.
As such these gardens are of huge significance to ISIL. Intelligence suggests that they have established their main headquarters in Raqqa in the area just to the south of the gardens in the area of Faysal Street, the Governate Buildings and the Presidents Square. The SDF is now poised to enter exactly this area.
Away from the Shahada district the SDF's western axis has been continuing to make progress in the north of the city. Particularly in the an-Nadah district. This sits directly south of the al-Bayrd district and stretches deep towards the centre of the city.
As of July 27th (27/7/17) the SDF were in disputed control of around 20% of the an-Nadah district. That has now increased to disputed control of around 60% of the district with the SDF exerting complete control over around 20%.
The western axis also completely liberated the Karim district on Sunday (6/8/17). This small district sits directly south of an-Nahdah and directly north of the Darayeh district. The western axis remains in disputed control of around 80% of the Darayeh district and 50% disputed control of the al-Moroor district to its west.
Amid these gains there is growing concern over the number of casualties the SDF are sustaining. Not from frontline combat but from behind-the-lines attacks by ISIL. Usually deploying Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED's).
Last Wednesday (2/8/17) footage was circulated of an ISIL VBIED attack on a building housing journalists covering the battle in the Muktaltha neighbourhood of the Mashlab district. On the very eastern outskirts of Raqqa Mashlab district was liberated back on June 9th (9/6/17).
Last Thursday (3/8/17) as many as 40 SDF fighters were reported killed in a similar VBIED attack in the al-Hal market area. This is located between the al-Sinaa district and the Euphrates directly to the east of the Hisham al-Malik district. It was liberated on July 2nd (2/7/17).
Although a cause for concern this is very much part and parcel of the tactics the SDF are used to using.
The November 2016 to March 2017 advance on Raqqa was not really marked by traditional battles between the SDF and ISIL. Instead ISIL would move out of an area allowing the SDF in. Then once the SDF had set up camp ISIL would use suicide bombers to infiltrate the SDF's positions attacking them at night.
However in order to keep casualties to a minimum it is something that the SDF need to tighten up on. After all if they sustain to many casualties they'll run out of troops meaning that ISIL will win the battle.
There are a number of challenges in preventing these type of behind-the-lines attacks. Firstly within Raqqa as they have done elsewhere ISIL has established a complex tunnel and bunker network beneath the city.
Some have claimed that the VBIED used in the Muktaltha attack had actually emerged from this tunnel network. In places like Mosul ISIL have certainly built tunnels large enough to comfortably drive trucks through. However I find it unlikely that a tunnel entrance that large would have gone unnoticed for nearly two months
What I think is much more likely is that the Muktaltha attack was launched in somewhere like the Rameelah district which is still under full ISIL control. It was then driven across the open cemetery area before breaching Mashlab district on its northern flank.
Secondly the SDF have advanced rapidly within Raqqa. This leaves me concerned about the extent to which they've properly backcleared the areas behind the advancing frontline.
I say areas like the Shahada district and the Mashlab district are 100% under SDF control. However I am uncertain that they have taken the time to search every building in those areas to uncover weapons stores and ISIL sleeper cells.
Another big challenge are the guerrilla tactics the SDF are using. Rather than establishing a formal frontline they are instead using a loose network of forward fire bases.
This has actually given them an advantage against ISIL's favourite tactic of using VBIED's. In places like Mosul where more conventional tactics were being used if ISIL were able to detonate a VBIED at the frontline they could easily end up killing 20 to 30 troops at a time. If ISIL successfully use a VBIED against one of the SDF's forward fire bases they'll kill at most 10 troops.
The problem is though that it is much easier for ISIL to slip fighters and VBIED's through the SDF's loose network of forward fire bases. Having penetrated the forward line they can then attack rallying points where troops are gathered in larger numbers preparing to go into action. This increases the number of casualties.
To counter the threat the SDF need to do more to properly backclear areas including identifying and destroying tunnel entrances. They also need to do more to protect their flanks. This means establishing a network of fire bases along the sides of areas under their control rather than just at the forward most point.
The SDF also need to increase their control over the areas between the forward line and their rallying point.
This means establishing a network of observation posts, sentries and patrols between the two lines. If possible this can include camera technology to make sure that any attackers who slip through the forward line are stopped before they can reach their targets.
16:30 on 7/8/17 (UK date)
Monday, 7 August 2017
Wednesday, 2 August 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 37, Week 2, Day 7.
This should be read as a direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2017/08/operation-featherweight-month-37-week-2.html
In that post I said that the SDF's western axis in Shahada district and the eastern axis in Hisham Abdulmalik district were within 1.5km (0.9 miles) of uniting with each other.
Although it took a while for the information to reach me at the time of writing the distance had actually been closed to around 300 metres/yards. That is well within small arms range meaning that any ISIL fighters between the two axis were either dead or about to be killed.
Although it is yet to be confirmed it's reported today that the eastern axis and the western axis have now reached each other.
If and when that is confirmed it will created a dividing line across the entire south of the city of Raqqa. ISIL will be split into positions north of the line up to the Division 17 base and south of the line down to the Euphrates.
Beyond operations within Raqqa itself the SDF has also been conducting a west-to-east sweep on the southern bank of the Euphrates.
On June 29th (29/6/17) this southern sweep had liberated the entire area south of Raqqa cutting the city of from the rest of Syria.
On July 7th (7/7/17) it liberated the village Ukayrishah some 5km (9 miles) south-east of Raqqa. This had been an important part of ISIL's network for transporting stolen oil.
As of July 24th (24/7/17) this southern sweep had advanced a further 10km (6 miles) south-east taking up positions roughly 25km (15 miles) south-east of Raqqa. Here the SDF have hit a little bit of a snag.
Particularly under the US administration of Barack Obama one of the biggest lies told was that the Syrians and their Russian backers do not fight ISIL. This is simply not true.
In fact it was the Syrians without Russian support who'd taken ISIL to the brink of defeat in 2013 limiting them to an area within the Euphrates basin. It is this that prompted ISIL to invade Iraq instead in the winter of 2013.
In March 2017 Syria and Russian liberated the city of Palmyra from ISIL. This sits roughly 180km (110 miles) south-west of Raqqa almost directly in the centre of Syria.
Since then the Syrians have been advancing from Palmyra to the city of Deir-ez-Zour. This is around 180km (110 miles) north-west of Palmyra and around 130km (80 miles). Throughout the six years of the conflict the Syrians have been able to maintain partial control over Deir-ez-Zour despite their forces being besieged on all sides by ISIL.
In December 2016 the Syrians liberated all of the city of Aleppo from the Al Qaeda-led, ISIL allied Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF). Since then the Syrians have been advancing south-east from Aleppo City. Their objective is to cut ISIL off from their supply-lines into Turkey via the Garvaghy Road area.
On June 4th (4/6/17) the Syrians liberated the town of Maskanah. This sits around 80km (50 miles) south-east of Aleppo City and around 90km (55 miles) west of Raqqa on the southern side of Lake Assad. The liberation of Maskanah marked the complete liberation of Aleppo Province from ISIL.
On July 30th (30/7/17) the Syrians liberated the village of Dalhah as part of their efforts to advance on Deir-ez-Zour from the north-west.
The problem is that Dalhah sits directly next to the SDF positions 10km (6 miles) south-east of Ukayrishah on the southern bank of the Euphrates.
The SDF do control the northern bank of the Euphrates. However what happens next in the area is going to require close communication and coordination between the US and Russia and the Syrians and the SDF.
The SDF's success against ISIL has not gone unnoticed by Erdogan. It has prompted him into yet another aggressive outburst.
On June 22nd (22/6/17) - 16 days after the Raqqa battle began - Erdogan deployed more regular Turkish troops to Garvaghy Road. This is in preparation for an operation which has since been codenamed; "Euphrates Sword."
The purpose of Euphrates Sword is to attack and defeat the SDF in Afrin Canton. This will allow Garvaghy Road to be linked with the area south of Afrin Canton designated; "The Sudetenland." Centred around the city of Idlib this is currently under occupation by the Army of Conquest. Once Garvaghy Road and the Sudetenland have been united Erdogan hopes to have the area designated as deconfliction/safe zone under the Astana Process.
This has long been an aspiration of Erdogan's. However what has prevented him realising his dream thus far is the establishment of a Russian base within Afrin Canton in late-February/early-March 2017. In the week following the troop deployment in Garvaghy Road Russia began dismantling its base in Afrin Canton. This seems to be a Russian greenlight to Erdogan for the Euphrates Sword operation as part of the Astana Process.
On June 30th (30/6/17) Turkish forces both regular and irregular have been shelling Afrin Canton from both within Turkey and Garvaghy Road. This shelling has been near continuous for more then a month continuing today. It has primarily targeted civilian villages and refugee camps. It has also triggered numerous wildfires.
On July 1st (1/7/17) Erdogan's forces ordered civilians to leave the villages of Azaz, Exterin, Rai and Shehba all on the boundary between Garvaghy Road and Afrin Canton. Since the expulsion of civilians there have been periodic raids into Afrin Canton by the UTA which have been repelled by the SDF.
On July 30th (30/7/17) regular Turkish forces crossed into Syria to conduct overnight raids within Shangri-La. Specifically around the village of Boban which is around 13km (8 miles) west of Kobane City.
The SDF leadership have made it quite clear to CJTFOIR that if these Turkish attacks continue and escalate the SDF will have no option other than to abandon the Raqqa operation in order to defend Afrin Canton.
Aside from his violence against the SDF in Syria Erdogan has also been aggressively raising the diplomatic temperature.
On July 18th (18/7/17) Turkey's state-run Anadolu news agency published documents provided to it by the Turkish National Security Council. These detailed the size and location of all the CJTFOIR SOF bases within. Presumably in an invitation for ISIL and the Army of Conquest to attack those bases. Or at least to intimidate CJTFOIR into closing those bases.
On Friday (28/7/17) Joe Robinson a 24 year old British national was arrested whilst on holiday in Turkey on terrorism charges. The allegations stem for Robinson service against ISIL in the International Brigades of the SDF.
This seems intended to put the British government in a difficult position because they did not officially sanction Robinson's service with the SDF. Therefore they can only really provide him with normal Consular assistance rather than demand his release.
It must be said though that the decision to holiday in Turkey seems a particularly stupid one.
It does seem extremely odd that Erdogan feels he is in a position to behave in such a confrontational manner.
On June 5th (5/6/17) Arab states led by Saudi Arabia introduced trade sanctions against Qatar. This stems from a speech that Qatar's ruler Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani gave on May 20th (20/5/17). This was made public on May 23rd (23/5/17).
The main message of the speech was that Saudi Arabia had humiliated the Arab world by accepting US President Trump on a state visit. Sheikh Tamim felt there was no need to acknowledge Trump as US President because through the Muslim Brotherhood Qatar would soon use allegations of Russian hacking to overthrow him.
Alongside Qatar the Muslim Brotherhood's main sponsor is Erdogan's Turkey. So as soon as the Arab states sanctioned Qatar Erdogan stepped into to support them boosting trade between the two nations and establishing a military base in Qatar. Particularly the increase in trade has significantly mitigated the effects of the Arab sanctions.
Therefore the logical next step for the Arab states would be to expand the sanctions to include Turkey. Unlike Qatar which is the World's largest exporter of natural gas Turkey does not have deep cash reserves so would be unlikely to survive economic sanctions.
However the US has stepped in to calm the situation. This has discouraged the Arab states from expanding their sanctions to Turkey. The US' ultimate aim seems to be to end the blockade entirely.
Being so reliant on US protection you wouldn't think Erdogan would be in a position to make hostile demands of the US.
16:55 on 2/8/17 (UK date).
In that post I said that the SDF's western axis in Shahada district and the eastern axis in Hisham Abdulmalik district were within 1.5km (0.9 miles) of uniting with each other.
Although it took a while for the information to reach me at the time of writing the distance had actually been closed to around 300 metres/yards. That is well within small arms range meaning that any ISIL fighters between the two axis were either dead or about to be killed.
Although it is yet to be confirmed it's reported today that the eastern axis and the western axis have now reached each other.
If and when that is confirmed it will created a dividing line across the entire south of the city of Raqqa. ISIL will be split into positions north of the line up to the Division 17 base and south of the line down to the Euphrates.
Beyond operations within Raqqa itself the SDF has also been conducting a west-to-east sweep on the southern bank of the Euphrates.
On June 29th (29/6/17) this southern sweep had liberated the entire area south of Raqqa cutting the city of from the rest of Syria.
On July 7th (7/7/17) it liberated the village Ukayrishah some 5km (9 miles) south-east of Raqqa. This had been an important part of ISIL's network for transporting stolen oil.
As of July 24th (24/7/17) this southern sweep had advanced a further 10km (6 miles) south-east taking up positions roughly 25km (15 miles) south-east of Raqqa. Here the SDF have hit a little bit of a snag.
Particularly under the US administration of Barack Obama one of the biggest lies told was that the Syrians and their Russian backers do not fight ISIL. This is simply not true.
In fact it was the Syrians without Russian support who'd taken ISIL to the brink of defeat in 2013 limiting them to an area within the Euphrates basin. It is this that prompted ISIL to invade Iraq instead in the winter of 2013.
In March 2017 Syria and Russian liberated the city of Palmyra from ISIL. This sits roughly 180km (110 miles) south-west of Raqqa almost directly in the centre of Syria.
Since then the Syrians have been advancing from Palmyra to the city of Deir-ez-Zour. This is around 180km (110 miles) north-west of Palmyra and around 130km (80 miles). Throughout the six years of the conflict the Syrians have been able to maintain partial control over Deir-ez-Zour despite their forces being besieged on all sides by ISIL.
In December 2016 the Syrians liberated all of the city of Aleppo from the Al Qaeda-led, ISIL allied Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF). Since then the Syrians have been advancing south-east from Aleppo City. Their objective is to cut ISIL off from their supply-lines into Turkey via the Garvaghy Road area.
On June 4th (4/6/17) the Syrians liberated the town of Maskanah. This sits around 80km (50 miles) south-east of Aleppo City and around 90km (55 miles) west of Raqqa on the southern side of Lake Assad. The liberation of Maskanah marked the complete liberation of Aleppo Province from ISIL.
On July 30th (30/7/17) the Syrians liberated the village of Dalhah as part of their efforts to advance on Deir-ez-Zour from the north-west.
The problem is that Dalhah sits directly next to the SDF positions 10km (6 miles) south-east of Ukayrishah on the southern bank of the Euphrates.
The SDF do control the northern bank of the Euphrates. However what happens next in the area is going to require close communication and coordination between the US and Russia and the Syrians and the SDF.
The SDF's success against ISIL has not gone unnoticed by Erdogan. It has prompted him into yet another aggressive outburst.
On June 22nd (22/6/17) - 16 days after the Raqqa battle began - Erdogan deployed more regular Turkish troops to Garvaghy Road. This is in preparation for an operation which has since been codenamed; "Euphrates Sword."
The purpose of Euphrates Sword is to attack and defeat the SDF in Afrin Canton. This will allow Garvaghy Road to be linked with the area south of Afrin Canton designated; "The Sudetenland." Centred around the city of Idlib this is currently under occupation by the Army of Conquest. Once Garvaghy Road and the Sudetenland have been united Erdogan hopes to have the area designated as deconfliction/safe zone under the Astana Process.
This has long been an aspiration of Erdogan's. However what has prevented him realising his dream thus far is the establishment of a Russian base within Afrin Canton in late-February/early-March 2017. In the week following the troop deployment in Garvaghy Road Russia began dismantling its base in Afrin Canton. This seems to be a Russian greenlight to Erdogan for the Euphrates Sword operation as part of the Astana Process.
On June 30th (30/6/17) Turkish forces both regular and irregular have been shelling Afrin Canton from both within Turkey and Garvaghy Road. This shelling has been near continuous for more then a month continuing today. It has primarily targeted civilian villages and refugee camps. It has also triggered numerous wildfires.
On July 1st (1/7/17) Erdogan's forces ordered civilians to leave the villages of Azaz, Exterin, Rai and Shehba all on the boundary between Garvaghy Road and Afrin Canton. Since the expulsion of civilians there have been periodic raids into Afrin Canton by the UTA which have been repelled by the SDF.
On July 30th (30/7/17) regular Turkish forces crossed into Syria to conduct overnight raids within Shangri-La. Specifically around the village of Boban which is around 13km (8 miles) west of Kobane City.
The SDF leadership have made it quite clear to CJTFOIR that if these Turkish attacks continue and escalate the SDF will have no option other than to abandon the Raqqa operation in order to defend Afrin Canton.
Aside from his violence against the SDF in Syria Erdogan has also been aggressively raising the diplomatic temperature.
On July 18th (18/7/17) Turkey's state-run Anadolu news agency published documents provided to it by the Turkish National Security Council. These detailed the size and location of all the CJTFOIR SOF bases within. Presumably in an invitation for ISIL and the Army of Conquest to attack those bases. Or at least to intimidate CJTFOIR into closing those bases.
On Friday (28/7/17) Joe Robinson a 24 year old British national was arrested whilst on holiday in Turkey on terrorism charges. The allegations stem for Robinson service against ISIL in the International Brigades of the SDF.
This seems intended to put the British government in a difficult position because they did not officially sanction Robinson's service with the SDF. Therefore they can only really provide him with normal Consular assistance rather than demand his release.
It must be said though that the decision to holiday in Turkey seems a particularly stupid one.
It does seem extremely odd that Erdogan feels he is in a position to behave in such a confrontational manner.
On June 5th (5/6/17) Arab states led by Saudi Arabia introduced trade sanctions against Qatar. This stems from a speech that Qatar's ruler Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani gave on May 20th (20/5/17). This was made public on May 23rd (23/5/17).
The main message of the speech was that Saudi Arabia had humiliated the Arab world by accepting US President Trump on a state visit. Sheikh Tamim felt there was no need to acknowledge Trump as US President because through the Muslim Brotherhood Qatar would soon use allegations of Russian hacking to overthrow him.
Alongside Qatar the Muslim Brotherhood's main sponsor is Erdogan's Turkey. So as soon as the Arab states sanctioned Qatar Erdogan stepped into to support them boosting trade between the two nations and establishing a military base in Qatar. Particularly the increase in trade has significantly mitigated the effects of the Arab sanctions.
Therefore the logical next step for the Arab states would be to expand the sanctions to include Turkey. Unlike Qatar which is the World's largest exporter of natural gas Turkey does not have deep cash reserves so would be unlikely to survive economic sanctions.
However the US has stepped in to calm the situation. This has discouraged the Arab states from expanding their sanctions to Turkey. The US' ultimate aim seems to be to end the blockade entirely.
Being so reliant on US protection you wouldn't think Erdogan would be in a position to make hostile demands of the US.
16:55 on 2/8/17 (UK date).
Tuesday, 1 August 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 37, Week 2, Day 6.
On July 9th 2017 (9/7/17) the Iraqi city of Mosul was liberated from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
As part of that operation the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militias also liberated almost the entire area between Mosul and Iraq's border with Syria.
The liberation of Mosul does not mean the complete end of ISIL within Iraq. They still maintain control over small areas of the country. Most notably the town of Tal Afar to the west of Mosul and the Hawija Triangle area to the south-east of Mosul.
However Mosul was ISIL's de facto capital within Iraq. Its liberation marked ISIL losing control of the last major population centre in the country. As a result much of the focus for defeating the group has now shifted from Iraq to Syria.
Directly across the Iraq/Syria border to the west of Mosul you have the area designated; "Shangri-La." This stretches from the border with Iraq in the east to the Euphrates River to the west. The southern boundary of Shangri-La is still very much in dispute and subject to change. However it currently encompasses an area of around 17,000kmq (10,200milesq).
Shangri-La is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD).
The SDF is a coalition made up of the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG/YPJ). Arab and Turkmen fragments of what used to be referred to as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The Assyrian or Syriac Christian Military Council (MFS). Local Arab tribal forces who are indigenous to the area. International Brigades made up of foreign volunteers.
The SDF is backed by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). Alongside air support CJTFOIR has embedded within the SDF Special Operations Forces (SOF's) from the US, the UK and France. The US also deployed conventional Marine and Army units on the ground in Syria to support the SDF.
The SDF also control an area in the north-west of Syria along the border with Turkey. Centred around the city of Afrin this has been designated; "Afrin Canton." With it's eastern boundary roughly being the town of Azaz and its southern boundary roughly the town Ad Dana in the south Afrin Canton encompasses an area of roughly 3,000kmsq (1,800milesq).
In order to defeat ISIL then the obvious thing would be for the SDF to link Shangri-La to Afrin Canton giving them a continuous area of control along Syria's border with Iraq.
This would allow the SDF to cut the supply lines between ISIL and their main backer Turkey. It would also establish a vast area that could be designated as a Safe-Haven used to protect civilian Internally Displaced People (IDP's) before they are forced to become refugees.
This is exactly what the SDF set about doing.
On December 30th 2015 (30/12/15) the SDF liberated the Tishrin Dam. This gave them a crossing over the Euphrates. On August 27th 2016 (27/8/16) the SDF liberated the town of Manbij. This sits around 25km (15 miles) south-west of the Euphrates allowing the SDF to establish a foothold west of the River.
As ISIL's main backer Turkey was obviously not pleased at the prospect of the SDF cutting their main supply route with the group.
So on August 24th 2016 (24/8/16) Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent regular Turkish forces to illegally invade northern Syria. This operation was codenamed; "Euphrates Shield."
Acting in support of the United Turkmen Army (UTA) who are an irregular branch of the Turkish military who have long acted alongside ISIL inside Syria Erdogan's forces mission was to occupy the area between Shangri-La and Afrin Canton to prevent the SDF from linking the two areas. This roughly 100km (60 mile) wide area has been designated; "Garvaghy Road."
Erdogan's invasion in support of ISIL should never have been permitted by CJTFOIR who operate under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). However under former US President Barack Obama the operation was permitted. On the condition that all of Erdogan's forces - both regular and irregular - be withdraw from Garvaghy Road by September 7th 2016 (7/9/16).
September 7th came and went without Erdogan's forces making their withdrawal. However rather than forcing Erdogan to honour his agreement former President Obama instead caved in further to Erdogan's demands. This involved putting in motion a plan to destroy the SDF from within to allow Erdogan's forces to expand into Shangri-La and Afrin Canton.
The first element of Obama's plan to destroy the SDF was to order the establishment of a rival, Arab-only command structure within the SDF. This Syrian Arab Council (SAC) as it was known was then armed by the US. The hope being that it would move to overthrow the non-Arab elements of the SDF and then defect to join Erdogan's forces.
The second element of Obama's plan was to recruit and train a rival Syrian Kurdish force in Iraq. The hope being the Roj Peshmerga as they're known would enter Syria and work with the SAC to start a civil war within the SDF breaking the coalition apart.
The final element of Obama's plan was to send the SDF in battle to liberate the city of Raqqa within the Euphrates River basin which at the time served as ISIL's de facto capital within Syria and overall capital.
With Obama refusing to allow CJTFOIR to arm or support all but the SAC element of the SDF at the time the SDF as a small guerrilla force were in no way equipped to win such a battle. The hope being that once they'd been defeated Erdogan's forces would be able to seize Shangri-La from them.
The operation to liberate Mosul of course began on October 17th 2016 (17/10/16). The main element of Obama's plan for the operation was to leave the entire western side of Mosul undefended in order to allow ISIL fighters to withdraw to Raqqa.
Shortly after the Mosul operation had begun the US' NATO allies reminded Obama that with Erdogan's forces continuing to occupy Garvaghy Road allowing ISIL fighters to flee from Mosul to Raqqa also meant they could flee to Turkey and from Turkey to the rest of the World.
This pressure forced Obama to bring forward the SDF's assault on Raqqa. Codenamed; "Wrath of Euphrates" this began on November 6th 2016 (6/11/16).
At the time Obama launched this operation the SDF were actually located quite far away from Raqqa. Therefore the first stage of the operation was for the SDF to advance on Raqqa. This was conducted in three phases;
The first phase saw the SDF advance south to take up positions roughly 25km (15 miles) north of Raqqa. This phase was completed on November 25th 2016 (25/11/16).
The second phase saw the SDF sweep along the eastern banks of the Euphrates to take up positions at Tabqa - roughly 40km (25 miles) west of Raqqa. This phase was completed on January 20th 2017 (20/1/17).
The third phase saw the SDF advance to take up positions around al-Karamah which is roughly 30km (20 miles) south-east of Raqqa. This phase was completed on March 19th 2017 (19/3/17).
Immediately after the second phase had been completed Donald Trump replaced Barack Obama as US President on January 20th (20/1/17). This brought about a dramatic change in the US' attitude to the SDF.
The SAC was dismantled and calls for the Roj Peshmerga to enter Syria ceased. CJTFOIR began supplying and arming all elements of the SDF. This included establishing a network of operating bases with Shangri-La equipped with artillery units and gound-attack helicopters including the AH-64 Apache.
Faced with the prospect that a properly supported SDF would not be destroyed in the course of the Raqqa operation Erdogan became increasingly aggressive.
On February 28th (28/2/17) Erdogan declared that his forces would advance from the town of al-Bab within Garvaghy Road to capture Manbij from the SDF.
Perhaps buoyed by opposition to President Trump and despite US SOF's being present at Manbij Erdogan backed up this declaration by beginning Turkish airstrikes on March 1st (1/3/17). This fighting was only brought under control when Russia negotiated the deployment of Syrian troops to create a buffer-zone between Erdogan's forces at al-Bab and SDF forces at Manbij.
Erdogan's attacks on the SDF in Syria were accompanied by further aggression in Iraq. On Erdogan's orders Iraqi Kurdish Regional President Masoud Barzani sent the Roj Peshmerga to attack SDF affiliated members of the PMF in the Sinjar/Shingal mountains border region between Iraq and Syria. This prompted several days of fighting between groups who were supposed to be working together to liberate Mosul.
In mid-April Erdogan suffered another violent outburst. On April 11th (11/4/17) Turkish forces both regular and irregular and inside and out of Syria began artillery strikes against SDF positions in Afrin Canton. On April 20th (20/4/17) Erdogan expanded this aggression to include Turkish airstikes against Afrin Canton, Shangri-La and Iraq's Kurdish Region.
The most notable strikes in what was nearly three weeks of attacks were the bombing of an Iraqi Peshmerga base in Sinjar/Shingal and the bombing of the SDF command centre at al-Malikiyah/Derik in north-east Syria. Both of these occurred on April 25th (25/4/17) killing 10 and 28 members of anti-ISIL forces respectively.
Despite CJTFOIR singularly failing to get Erdogan's aggression under control the SDF were not deterred by these attacks.
On May 11th (11/5/17) the SDF succeeded in liberating the town of Tabqa from ISIL. This marked the successful completion of an operation that had begun on March 21st (21/3/17). It technically expanded the southern boundary of Shangri-La south of the Euphrates River.
On June 6th (6/6/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate Raqqa itself.
The nature of the fighting in Raqqa is very different to the nature of the fighting in Mosul.
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) who liberated Mosul are a conventional military force. They are well equipped with highly mobile armoured vehicles such as Humvees and MRAP's along with tanks. They have their own air and artillery support units and further support from CJTFOIR.
Therefore the ISF's main tactic was within Mosul was to overwhelm an area with troops in columns of as many as 35 armoured vehicles at at time. Having advanced into an area they would then soften-up the next area with air and artillery strikes before moving to overwhelm it.
As a lightly armed guerrilla force the SDF simply do not have the equipment to deploy such tactics in Raqqa. Instead they are relying on more guerrilla-style tactics.
This involves them establishing a loose frontline out network of forward fire bases which are often little more then a house. The snipers and riflemen in these forward fire bases then slowly pick off the ISIL fighters in front of them with the help of CJTFOIR artillery and airstrikes including the close air-support provided by the Apaches.
Once ISIL defences in the area ahead of them have been weakened the SDF use what vehicles they have to mount raids to capture and establish further forward fire bases. Thus gradually moving the frontline forward to liberate the city.
This is closer to the tactics that were used by the ISF during the battle for Mosul's Old City district. It is of course much slower and time consuming. However particularly in the early stages of the battle the SDF have been advancing rapidly.
The Raqqa operation is being conducted on three axis; The North, the East and the West. The SDF are also conducting a west-to-east sweep on the southern bank of the Euphrates to cut Raqqa off from the rest of Syria.
The northern axis is focused on the sprawling former Syrian military - Division 17 - base to the north of the city. At some 50kmsq (30 milesq) this Division 17 base is almost half the size of Raqqa itself. Having entered the base on June 6th (6/6/17) the northern axis have secured all of it and appear to now be in some sort of holding pattern.
The eastern axis began by entering the Mashlab district at the most south-easterly tip of Raqqa on June 6th (6/6/17). By June 17th (17/6/17) they had succeeded in liberating the Mashlab, al-Sinaa and Bitani districts. These all sit on the eastern outskirts of Raqqa.
The western axis began by entering the Jazra suburb on June 6th (6/6/17). By July 3rd (3/7/17) the western axis had succeeded in completely liberating the Sabahiya, Romaniyah, al-Qadisiyyah and al-Hattin districts and parts of the an-Nadah and al-Baryd districts. These all sit on the western outskirts of Raqqa.
On July 2nd (2/7/17) the eastern axis entered the Hisham Abdulmalik district at the very south of Raqqa on the banks of the Euphrates. On July 6th (6/7/17) the eastern axis was able to enter the Old City district which sits directly west of the al-Sinaa and Bitani district and directly north of the Hisham Abdulmalik district.
On July 3rd (3/7/17) the western axis entered the Yarmouk district which sits on the northern bank of the Euphrates. By July 17th (17/7/17) the western axis had fully liberated Yarmouk district. This allowed them to enter the Shahada district which sits directly between the Yarmouk district and the Hisham Abdulmalik district.
In breaching the Shahada, Hisham Abdulmalik and Old City districts the SDF appear to have moved from ISIL's outer-ring of defence into what could be one of multiple inner-rings of defence. This means that the fighting has become harder.
This change in the tempo in fighting has served to highlight the pro-ISIL bias that still exists in much of the western media.
In response to the western axis liberating Yarmouk district and entering Shadada district ISIL declared that the SDF had suffered heavy casualties and had been forced to halt the entire Raqqa operation. This was simply not true. However because many western journalists have spent years cultivating friends and sources within ISIL while ignoring the SDF this was widely reported as truth.
Although the SDF are very far from being stopped in their tracks ISIL have increased their resistance. This has resulted in the SDF have to absorb and repel more ISIL counter-attacks. Most notably in the al-Baryd district on July 19th (19/7/17) and in the Shadada district on July 21st (21/7/17). Both of these are on the western axis.
The largest ISIL counter-attack reported so far though occurred on the eastern axis in Hisham Abdulmalik district on July 24th (24/7/17). However this simply resulted in the attack been repelled by the SDF with 35 ISIL fighters being killed.
Despite the increase in ISIL's resistance the SDF have continued to make steady progress.
On July 24th (24/7/17) the western axis reached the Children's Hospital. This sits on the boundary between the Shahada district and the al-Moroor and the oddly named Security Box district which both sit directly north of Shahada district. It means that the western axis is now very deeply advanced into the Shahada district even if it is a narrow corridor.
As of July 27th (27/7/17) the western axis was in disputed control of around 80% the Darayeh district to the north of the Shahada district and disputed control of around 50% of the al-Moroor district directly east of the Darayeh district. They were also in disputed control of roughly 20% of both an-Nahdah and al-Baryd districts to the north of the city.
The eastern axis was in full control of around 20% and disputed control of roughly 80% of the Old City district.
The real progress though has been focused on the southern Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik districts. As of July 27th (27/7/17) the western axis were in full control of around 30% and disputed control over roughly 95% of Shahada district. The eastern axis were in full control of roughly 60-65% of Hisham Abdulmalik with 100% of the district being under disputed control.
Yesterday (31/7/17) the eastern axis reached the boundary between the Hisham Abdulmalik district and the Shahada district.
This puts the eastern and western axis within 1.5km (0.9 miles) from linking up with each other totally ousting ISIL from the banks of the Euphrates at the southern most point of the city.
At around 17:40 on 1/8/17 (UK date) I'll have to pick this up tomorrow.
As part of that operation the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militias also liberated almost the entire area between Mosul and Iraq's border with Syria.
The liberation of Mosul does not mean the complete end of ISIL within Iraq. They still maintain control over small areas of the country. Most notably the town of Tal Afar to the west of Mosul and the Hawija Triangle area to the south-east of Mosul.
However Mosul was ISIL's de facto capital within Iraq. Its liberation marked ISIL losing control of the last major population centre in the country. As a result much of the focus for defeating the group has now shifted from Iraq to Syria.
Directly across the Iraq/Syria border to the west of Mosul you have the area designated; "Shangri-La." This stretches from the border with Iraq in the east to the Euphrates River to the west. The southern boundary of Shangri-La is still very much in dispute and subject to change. However it currently encompasses an area of around 17,000kmq (10,200milesq).
Shangri-La is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD).
The SDF is a coalition made up of the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG/YPJ). Arab and Turkmen fragments of what used to be referred to as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The Assyrian or Syriac Christian Military Council (MFS). Local Arab tribal forces who are indigenous to the area. International Brigades made up of foreign volunteers.
The SDF is backed by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). Alongside air support CJTFOIR has embedded within the SDF Special Operations Forces (SOF's) from the US, the UK and France. The US also deployed conventional Marine and Army units on the ground in Syria to support the SDF.
The SDF also control an area in the north-west of Syria along the border with Turkey. Centred around the city of Afrin this has been designated; "Afrin Canton." With it's eastern boundary roughly being the town of Azaz and its southern boundary roughly the town Ad Dana in the south Afrin Canton encompasses an area of roughly 3,000kmsq (1,800milesq).
In order to defeat ISIL then the obvious thing would be for the SDF to link Shangri-La to Afrin Canton giving them a continuous area of control along Syria's border with Iraq.
This would allow the SDF to cut the supply lines between ISIL and their main backer Turkey. It would also establish a vast area that could be designated as a Safe-Haven used to protect civilian Internally Displaced People (IDP's) before they are forced to become refugees.
This is exactly what the SDF set about doing.
On December 30th 2015 (30/12/15) the SDF liberated the Tishrin Dam. This gave them a crossing over the Euphrates. On August 27th 2016 (27/8/16) the SDF liberated the town of Manbij. This sits around 25km (15 miles) south-west of the Euphrates allowing the SDF to establish a foothold west of the River.
As ISIL's main backer Turkey was obviously not pleased at the prospect of the SDF cutting their main supply route with the group.
So on August 24th 2016 (24/8/16) Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent regular Turkish forces to illegally invade northern Syria. This operation was codenamed; "Euphrates Shield."
Acting in support of the United Turkmen Army (UTA) who are an irregular branch of the Turkish military who have long acted alongside ISIL inside Syria Erdogan's forces mission was to occupy the area between Shangri-La and Afrin Canton to prevent the SDF from linking the two areas. This roughly 100km (60 mile) wide area has been designated; "Garvaghy Road."
Erdogan's invasion in support of ISIL should never have been permitted by CJTFOIR who operate under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). However under former US President Barack Obama the operation was permitted. On the condition that all of Erdogan's forces - both regular and irregular - be withdraw from Garvaghy Road by September 7th 2016 (7/9/16).
September 7th came and went without Erdogan's forces making their withdrawal. However rather than forcing Erdogan to honour his agreement former President Obama instead caved in further to Erdogan's demands. This involved putting in motion a plan to destroy the SDF from within to allow Erdogan's forces to expand into Shangri-La and Afrin Canton.
The first element of Obama's plan to destroy the SDF was to order the establishment of a rival, Arab-only command structure within the SDF. This Syrian Arab Council (SAC) as it was known was then armed by the US. The hope being that it would move to overthrow the non-Arab elements of the SDF and then defect to join Erdogan's forces.
The second element of Obama's plan was to recruit and train a rival Syrian Kurdish force in Iraq. The hope being the Roj Peshmerga as they're known would enter Syria and work with the SAC to start a civil war within the SDF breaking the coalition apart.
The final element of Obama's plan was to send the SDF in battle to liberate the city of Raqqa within the Euphrates River basin which at the time served as ISIL's de facto capital within Syria and overall capital.
With Obama refusing to allow CJTFOIR to arm or support all but the SAC element of the SDF at the time the SDF as a small guerrilla force were in no way equipped to win such a battle. The hope being that once they'd been defeated Erdogan's forces would be able to seize Shangri-La from them.
The operation to liberate Mosul of course began on October 17th 2016 (17/10/16). The main element of Obama's plan for the operation was to leave the entire western side of Mosul undefended in order to allow ISIL fighters to withdraw to Raqqa.
Shortly after the Mosul operation had begun the US' NATO allies reminded Obama that with Erdogan's forces continuing to occupy Garvaghy Road allowing ISIL fighters to flee from Mosul to Raqqa also meant they could flee to Turkey and from Turkey to the rest of the World.
This pressure forced Obama to bring forward the SDF's assault on Raqqa. Codenamed; "Wrath of Euphrates" this began on November 6th 2016 (6/11/16).
At the time Obama launched this operation the SDF were actually located quite far away from Raqqa. Therefore the first stage of the operation was for the SDF to advance on Raqqa. This was conducted in three phases;
The first phase saw the SDF advance south to take up positions roughly 25km (15 miles) north of Raqqa. This phase was completed on November 25th 2016 (25/11/16).
The second phase saw the SDF sweep along the eastern banks of the Euphrates to take up positions at Tabqa - roughly 40km (25 miles) west of Raqqa. This phase was completed on January 20th 2017 (20/1/17).
The third phase saw the SDF advance to take up positions around al-Karamah which is roughly 30km (20 miles) south-east of Raqqa. This phase was completed on March 19th 2017 (19/3/17).
Immediately after the second phase had been completed Donald Trump replaced Barack Obama as US President on January 20th (20/1/17). This brought about a dramatic change in the US' attitude to the SDF.
The SAC was dismantled and calls for the Roj Peshmerga to enter Syria ceased. CJTFOIR began supplying and arming all elements of the SDF. This included establishing a network of operating bases with Shangri-La equipped with artillery units and gound-attack helicopters including the AH-64 Apache.
Faced with the prospect that a properly supported SDF would not be destroyed in the course of the Raqqa operation Erdogan became increasingly aggressive.
On February 28th (28/2/17) Erdogan declared that his forces would advance from the town of al-Bab within Garvaghy Road to capture Manbij from the SDF.
Perhaps buoyed by opposition to President Trump and despite US SOF's being present at Manbij Erdogan backed up this declaration by beginning Turkish airstrikes on March 1st (1/3/17). This fighting was only brought under control when Russia negotiated the deployment of Syrian troops to create a buffer-zone between Erdogan's forces at al-Bab and SDF forces at Manbij.
Erdogan's attacks on the SDF in Syria were accompanied by further aggression in Iraq. On Erdogan's orders Iraqi Kurdish Regional President Masoud Barzani sent the Roj Peshmerga to attack SDF affiliated members of the PMF in the Sinjar/Shingal mountains border region between Iraq and Syria. This prompted several days of fighting between groups who were supposed to be working together to liberate Mosul.
In mid-April Erdogan suffered another violent outburst. On April 11th (11/4/17) Turkish forces both regular and irregular and inside and out of Syria began artillery strikes against SDF positions in Afrin Canton. On April 20th (20/4/17) Erdogan expanded this aggression to include Turkish airstikes against Afrin Canton, Shangri-La and Iraq's Kurdish Region.
The most notable strikes in what was nearly three weeks of attacks were the bombing of an Iraqi Peshmerga base in Sinjar/Shingal and the bombing of the SDF command centre at al-Malikiyah/Derik in north-east Syria. Both of these occurred on April 25th (25/4/17) killing 10 and 28 members of anti-ISIL forces respectively.
Despite CJTFOIR singularly failing to get Erdogan's aggression under control the SDF were not deterred by these attacks.
On May 11th (11/5/17) the SDF succeeded in liberating the town of Tabqa from ISIL. This marked the successful completion of an operation that had begun on March 21st (21/3/17). It technically expanded the southern boundary of Shangri-La south of the Euphrates River.
On June 6th (6/6/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate Raqqa itself.
The nature of the fighting in Raqqa is very different to the nature of the fighting in Mosul.
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) who liberated Mosul are a conventional military force. They are well equipped with highly mobile armoured vehicles such as Humvees and MRAP's along with tanks. They have their own air and artillery support units and further support from CJTFOIR.
Therefore the ISF's main tactic was within Mosul was to overwhelm an area with troops in columns of as many as 35 armoured vehicles at at time. Having advanced into an area they would then soften-up the next area with air and artillery strikes before moving to overwhelm it.
As a lightly armed guerrilla force the SDF simply do not have the equipment to deploy such tactics in Raqqa. Instead they are relying on more guerrilla-style tactics.
This involves them establishing a loose frontline out network of forward fire bases which are often little more then a house. The snipers and riflemen in these forward fire bases then slowly pick off the ISIL fighters in front of them with the help of CJTFOIR artillery and airstrikes including the close air-support provided by the Apaches.
Once ISIL defences in the area ahead of them have been weakened the SDF use what vehicles they have to mount raids to capture and establish further forward fire bases. Thus gradually moving the frontline forward to liberate the city.
This is closer to the tactics that were used by the ISF during the battle for Mosul's Old City district. It is of course much slower and time consuming. However particularly in the early stages of the battle the SDF have been advancing rapidly.
The Raqqa operation is being conducted on three axis; The North, the East and the West. The SDF are also conducting a west-to-east sweep on the southern bank of the Euphrates to cut Raqqa off from the rest of Syria.
The northern axis is focused on the sprawling former Syrian military - Division 17 - base to the north of the city. At some 50kmsq (30 milesq) this Division 17 base is almost half the size of Raqqa itself. Having entered the base on June 6th (6/6/17) the northern axis have secured all of it and appear to now be in some sort of holding pattern.
The eastern axis began by entering the Mashlab district at the most south-easterly tip of Raqqa on June 6th (6/6/17). By June 17th (17/6/17) they had succeeded in liberating the Mashlab, al-Sinaa and Bitani districts. These all sit on the eastern outskirts of Raqqa.
The western axis began by entering the Jazra suburb on June 6th (6/6/17). By July 3rd (3/7/17) the western axis had succeeded in completely liberating the Sabahiya, Romaniyah, al-Qadisiyyah and al-Hattin districts and parts of the an-Nadah and al-Baryd districts. These all sit on the western outskirts of Raqqa.
On July 2nd (2/7/17) the eastern axis entered the Hisham Abdulmalik district at the very south of Raqqa on the banks of the Euphrates. On July 6th (6/7/17) the eastern axis was able to enter the Old City district which sits directly west of the al-Sinaa and Bitani district and directly north of the Hisham Abdulmalik district.
On July 3rd (3/7/17) the western axis entered the Yarmouk district which sits on the northern bank of the Euphrates. By July 17th (17/7/17) the western axis had fully liberated Yarmouk district. This allowed them to enter the Shahada district which sits directly between the Yarmouk district and the Hisham Abdulmalik district.
In breaching the Shahada, Hisham Abdulmalik and Old City districts the SDF appear to have moved from ISIL's outer-ring of defence into what could be one of multiple inner-rings of defence. This means that the fighting has become harder.
This change in the tempo in fighting has served to highlight the pro-ISIL bias that still exists in much of the western media.
In response to the western axis liberating Yarmouk district and entering Shadada district ISIL declared that the SDF had suffered heavy casualties and had been forced to halt the entire Raqqa operation. This was simply not true. However because many western journalists have spent years cultivating friends and sources within ISIL while ignoring the SDF this was widely reported as truth.
Although the SDF are very far from being stopped in their tracks ISIL have increased their resistance. This has resulted in the SDF have to absorb and repel more ISIL counter-attacks. Most notably in the al-Baryd district on July 19th (19/7/17) and in the Shadada district on July 21st (21/7/17). Both of these are on the western axis.
The largest ISIL counter-attack reported so far though occurred on the eastern axis in Hisham Abdulmalik district on July 24th (24/7/17). However this simply resulted in the attack been repelled by the SDF with 35 ISIL fighters being killed.
Despite the increase in ISIL's resistance the SDF have continued to make steady progress.
On July 24th (24/7/17) the western axis reached the Children's Hospital. This sits on the boundary between the Shahada district and the al-Moroor and the oddly named Security Box district which both sit directly north of Shahada district. It means that the western axis is now very deeply advanced into the Shahada district even if it is a narrow corridor.
As of July 27th (27/7/17) the western axis was in disputed control of around 80% the Darayeh district to the north of the Shahada district and disputed control of around 50% of the al-Moroor district directly east of the Darayeh district. They were also in disputed control of roughly 20% of both an-Nahdah and al-Baryd districts to the north of the city.
The eastern axis was in full control of around 20% and disputed control of roughly 80% of the Old City district.
The real progress though has been focused on the southern Shahada and Hisham Abdulmalik districts. As of July 27th (27/7/17) the western axis were in full control of around 30% and disputed control over roughly 95% of Shahada district. The eastern axis were in full control of roughly 60-65% of Hisham Abdulmalik with 100% of the district being under disputed control.
Yesterday (31/7/17) the eastern axis reached the boundary between the Hisham Abdulmalik district and the Shahada district.
This puts the eastern and western axis within 1.5km (0.9 miles) from linking up with each other totally ousting ISIL from the banks of the Euphrates at the southern most point of the city.
At around 17:40 on 1/8/17 (UK date) I'll have to pick this up tomorrow.
Saturday, 29 July 2017
Notes From Khanistan Vol II
Over the course of the night of June 13th 2017 (13/6/17) into June 14th 2017 (14/6/17) a fire completely destroyed the Grenfell Tower. This was a 129 apartment block on the Lancaster West housing estate in the Kensington area of the UK city of
London. The fire left 80 either dead or missing presumed dead.
There have been persistent rumours that this fire was an arson attack orchestrated by the UK Labour Party. The objective being to damage the reputation of and ultimately overthrow the UK's elected government. A very serious allegation indeed.
Since then supporters of the Labour Party have been threatening and conducting acts of violent disorder - rioting.
This began on June 17th (17/6/17) when a mob attacked the headquarters of Kensington & Chelsea council damaging the building and threatening to kill council staff within the building.
June 21st (21/6/17) saw the State Opening of Parliament. The Labour Party declared this to be; "A Day of Rage" and called supporters to the streets to use; "Any Means Necessary" to disrupt the opening of Parliament. Due to it being the hottest day of the year this plan fell flat with one newspaper describing the fiasco with the headline; "Too Hot to Trot."
Labour's Day of Rage at the opening of Parliament was accompanied by two successive nights of rioting in the Stamford Hill district of London on June 20th (20/6/17) and June 21st (21/6/17). Predominately Jewish the Stamford Hill area is a adjacent to the Barnet area of London. Barnet's equally large Jewish population were famously denied the right to vote in the 2016 London Mayoral election.
There is really no explanation or obvious trigger for the two nights of violence in Stamford Hill. Criminal street gangs simply started launching attacks on police and local residents.
On June 15th (15/6/17) a young black man by the name of Edson da Costa who had been working as a drug dealer/courier died after being arrested by police in the Beckton area of London.
The da Costa family supported by the Labour Party immediately claimed that Edson had died as the result of torture by racist police officers. Their claims included that he had suffered injuries consistent with a severe beating such as a fractured skull and a ruptured bladder.
Curiously none of those injuries showed up in any of the autopsies carried out on Edson da Costa. They did though discover multiple packages of Crack Cocaine lodged in his throat and stomach. His death was the result of an overdose having ingested a large quantity of drugs.
The truth though meant little to the campaign so on June 25th (25/6/17) London was subjected to another night of rioting. This time in the Forest Gate area of London where Edson da Costa had lived.
Over the night of last Friday (21/7/17) into Saturday (22/7/17) there was a similar incident in the Dalston/Hackney area of London.
A young black man by the name of Rashan Charles who'd been working as a drug dealer/courier was stopped by police. During the course of his arrest Rashan Charles swallowed multiple packages of a drug believed to be either Crack Cocaine or Heroin in order to conceal them. Despite the police's best efforts to remove the packets Rashan Charles too died of a massive drug overdose.
Again though facts seem to count for nothing. Supported by the Labour Party the Charles family have been circulating similar, unsupportable claims that Rashan Charles was choked to death by racist police officers. Throughout the week they have been threatening to riot yesterday (28/7/17).
On Thursday (27/7/17) London's Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) appear to have moved to reduce the threat of rioting by appeasing the Labour Party.
They took the legally questionable step of declaring they have reasonable grounds to suspect both Kensington & Chelsea council who own Grenfell Tower and the Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) of corporate manslaughter over the fire.
I should point out that the legal bar for reasonable suspicion is so low as to be almost meaningless. The legal bar for actually filing charges is much higher and the bar for securing a conviction is much higher still.
Corporate Manslaughter is used when an organisational structure rather than an individual is reasonable for people's deaths. Although a criminal offence you obviously can't put an abstract organisational structure in prison so the maximum punishment is extremely large fines.
I hesitate to describe these organisational structures as a company or a corporation. One of the most high profile convictions for corporate manslaughter was actually secured against London's MPS over the shooting death of Jean Charles de Menezes.
On July 7th 2005 (7/7/05) Al Qaeda terrorists detonated bombs on three London Underground rail (the Tube) trains and a London bus killing 52 people. On July 21st (21/7/05) a second group of terrorists attempted a similar attack. However their explosives failed and they fled.
On July 22nd (22/7/05) an MPS surveillance team wrongly identified Jean Charles de Menezes as one of the terrorists. They then handed responsibility for him over to a second MPS surveillance team. That second team tracked de Menezes into the Stockwell Tube station.
Believing him to be a suicide bomber who was about to detonate his device aboard a crowded passenger train the MPS then dispatched a firearms team to shoot and kill him before he was able to do so.
Although Jean Charles de Menezes was not a terrorist the MPS firearms team did exactly as they were lawfully instructed to do so. The second surveillance team also acted as they were lawfully instructed to do so genuinely believing de Menezes to be a suicide bomber. The first surveillance team who initially wrongly identified de Menezes as a terrorists had made a simple human error.
As a result rather than any individual being at fault it was the MPS procedure's and training that were at fault. Therefore the MPS were convicted of corporate manslaughter.
The senior MPS officer in charge of the de Menezes operation - the Gold Commander - was one Cressida Dick. At the time there was talk of her being personally prosecuted for manslaughter. Although that did not come to pass you would have thought it would still have spelt the end of the aptly named Cressida Dick's career.
Strangely not though. On April 10th 2017 (10/4/17) Cressida Dick was appointed MPS Commissioner with responsibility for the entire force.
The offence of corporate manslaughter centres around the concept of; "Controlling Mind."
This requires the organisational structure to have such a high degree of control over their employees and the working environment they can be considered to have total responsibility for both. Normally this relates to the rules the organisation sets, the training it gives to its employees and the discipline it maintains to make sure the employees follow the rules and their training.
So if an organisation sets strict rules, conducts extensive employee training and ensures the rules are followed if an employee decides to break those rules then it is the individual rather than the organisation that is responsible.
Obviously to give a full opinion on the Grenfell Tower case I need all the facts.
However based on the information I do have available while highly unlikely it is possible that Kensington & Chelsea council could be guilty of corporate manslaughter. Likewise it is equally possible that KCTMO could be guilty of corporate manslaughter.
However what cannot be possible is what the MPS are claiming - that both are guilty. It's not possible for two entities to have a controlling mind over a single incident.
When it comes to fire safety who has a controlling mind is reasonably clear. In 2005 the then Labour government changed the legislation by introducing the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order. This required a so-called; "Responsible Person (RP)" to be designated within an organisation to have controlling mind over fire safety.
At the time the Labour Party's reforms were viewed as a significant weakening of fire safety. Prior to 2005 it was only the Fire Service that could hold responsibility for fire safety. The 2005 changes allowed any member of the public to be designated as responsible.
Both Kensington & Chelsea council and KCTMO have designated the London Fire Brigade (LFB) as the Responsible Person with controlling mind over fire safety at Grenfell Tower.
In doing so both organisations have not only met their legal obligations but have exceeded them. That makes it almost completely impossible for them to be prosecuted for the offence.
The MPS' attempts to play fast and loose with the rule of law to appease the Labour Party have failed. Last night there was hours or rioting in the Dalston/Hackney area of London.
Led by local Labour MP Dianne Abbott people are again beginning to gather in the area putting it at significant risk for a second night of rioting.
16:40 on 29/7/17 (UK date).
There have been persistent rumours that this fire was an arson attack orchestrated by the UK Labour Party. The objective being to damage the reputation of and ultimately overthrow the UK's elected government. A very serious allegation indeed.
Since then supporters of the Labour Party have been threatening and conducting acts of violent disorder - rioting.
This began on June 17th (17/6/17) when a mob attacked the headquarters of Kensington & Chelsea council damaging the building and threatening to kill council staff within the building.
June 21st (21/6/17) saw the State Opening of Parliament. The Labour Party declared this to be; "A Day of Rage" and called supporters to the streets to use; "Any Means Necessary" to disrupt the opening of Parliament. Due to it being the hottest day of the year this plan fell flat with one newspaper describing the fiasco with the headline; "Too Hot to Trot."
Labour's Day of Rage at the opening of Parliament was accompanied by two successive nights of rioting in the Stamford Hill district of London on June 20th (20/6/17) and June 21st (21/6/17). Predominately Jewish the Stamford Hill area is a adjacent to the Barnet area of London. Barnet's equally large Jewish population were famously denied the right to vote in the 2016 London Mayoral election.
There is really no explanation or obvious trigger for the two nights of violence in Stamford Hill. Criminal street gangs simply started launching attacks on police and local residents.
On June 15th (15/6/17) a young black man by the name of Edson da Costa who had been working as a drug dealer/courier died after being arrested by police in the Beckton area of London.
The da Costa family supported by the Labour Party immediately claimed that Edson had died as the result of torture by racist police officers. Their claims included that he had suffered injuries consistent with a severe beating such as a fractured skull and a ruptured bladder.
Curiously none of those injuries showed up in any of the autopsies carried out on Edson da Costa. They did though discover multiple packages of Crack Cocaine lodged in his throat and stomach. His death was the result of an overdose having ingested a large quantity of drugs.
The truth though meant little to the campaign so on June 25th (25/6/17) London was subjected to another night of rioting. This time in the Forest Gate area of London where Edson da Costa had lived.
Over the night of last Friday (21/7/17) into Saturday (22/7/17) there was a similar incident in the Dalston/Hackney area of London.
A young black man by the name of Rashan Charles who'd been working as a drug dealer/courier was stopped by police. During the course of his arrest Rashan Charles swallowed multiple packages of a drug believed to be either Crack Cocaine or Heroin in order to conceal them. Despite the police's best efforts to remove the packets Rashan Charles too died of a massive drug overdose.
Again though facts seem to count for nothing. Supported by the Labour Party the Charles family have been circulating similar, unsupportable claims that Rashan Charles was choked to death by racist police officers. Throughout the week they have been threatening to riot yesterday (28/7/17).
On Thursday (27/7/17) London's Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) appear to have moved to reduce the threat of rioting by appeasing the Labour Party.
They took the legally questionable step of declaring they have reasonable grounds to suspect both Kensington & Chelsea council who own Grenfell Tower and the Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) of corporate manslaughter over the fire.
I should point out that the legal bar for reasonable suspicion is so low as to be almost meaningless. The legal bar for actually filing charges is much higher and the bar for securing a conviction is much higher still.
Corporate Manslaughter is used when an organisational structure rather than an individual is reasonable for people's deaths. Although a criminal offence you obviously can't put an abstract organisational structure in prison so the maximum punishment is extremely large fines.
I hesitate to describe these organisational structures as a company or a corporation. One of the most high profile convictions for corporate manslaughter was actually secured against London's MPS over the shooting death of Jean Charles de Menezes.
On July 7th 2005 (7/7/05) Al Qaeda terrorists detonated bombs on three London Underground rail (the Tube) trains and a London bus killing 52 people. On July 21st (21/7/05) a second group of terrorists attempted a similar attack. However their explosives failed and they fled.
On July 22nd (22/7/05) an MPS surveillance team wrongly identified Jean Charles de Menezes as one of the terrorists. They then handed responsibility for him over to a second MPS surveillance team. That second team tracked de Menezes into the Stockwell Tube station.
Believing him to be a suicide bomber who was about to detonate his device aboard a crowded passenger train the MPS then dispatched a firearms team to shoot and kill him before he was able to do so.
Although Jean Charles de Menezes was not a terrorist the MPS firearms team did exactly as they were lawfully instructed to do so. The second surveillance team also acted as they were lawfully instructed to do so genuinely believing de Menezes to be a suicide bomber. The first surveillance team who initially wrongly identified de Menezes as a terrorists had made a simple human error.
As a result rather than any individual being at fault it was the MPS procedure's and training that were at fault. Therefore the MPS were convicted of corporate manslaughter.
The senior MPS officer in charge of the de Menezes operation - the Gold Commander - was one Cressida Dick. At the time there was talk of her being personally prosecuted for manslaughter. Although that did not come to pass you would have thought it would still have spelt the end of the aptly named Cressida Dick's career.
Strangely not though. On April 10th 2017 (10/4/17) Cressida Dick was appointed MPS Commissioner with responsibility for the entire force.
The offence of corporate manslaughter centres around the concept of; "Controlling Mind."
This requires the organisational structure to have such a high degree of control over their employees and the working environment they can be considered to have total responsibility for both. Normally this relates to the rules the organisation sets, the training it gives to its employees and the discipline it maintains to make sure the employees follow the rules and their training.
So if an organisation sets strict rules, conducts extensive employee training and ensures the rules are followed if an employee decides to break those rules then it is the individual rather than the organisation that is responsible.
Obviously to give a full opinion on the Grenfell Tower case I need all the facts.
However based on the information I do have available while highly unlikely it is possible that Kensington & Chelsea council could be guilty of corporate manslaughter. Likewise it is equally possible that KCTMO could be guilty of corporate manslaughter.
However what cannot be possible is what the MPS are claiming - that both are guilty. It's not possible for two entities to have a controlling mind over a single incident.
When it comes to fire safety who has a controlling mind is reasonably clear. In 2005 the then Labour government changed the legislation by introducing the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order. This required a so-called; "Responsible Person (RP)" to be designated within an organisation to have controlling mind over fire safety.
At the time the Labour Party's reforms were viewed as a significant weakening of fire safety. Prior to 2005 it was only the Fire Service that could hold responsibility for fire safety. The 2005 changes allowed any member of the public to be designated as responsible.
Both Kensington & Chelsea council and KCTMO have designated the London Fire Brigade (LFB) as the Responsible Person with controlling mind over fire safety at Grenfell Tower.
In doing so both organisations have not only met their legal obligations but have exceeded them. That makes it almost completely impossible for them to be prosecuted for the offence.
The MPS' attempts to play fast and loose with the rule of law to appease the Labour Party have failed. Last night there was hours or rioting in the Dalston/Hackney area of London.
Led by local Labour MP Dianne Abbott people are again beginning to gather in the area putting it at significant risk for a second night of rioting.
16:40 on 29/7/17 (UK date).
Thursday, 27 July 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 37, Week 2, Day 1
This should be read as a direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2017/07/operation-featherweight-month-37-week-1_24.html
No Plan For
Peace:
Mosul was first
settled in the 25th Century B.C as part of the nation of Assyria. At its peak
this stretched from the island on Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea to the west
to Persia in the east and from the Caucus nations of Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan in the north to the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt in the south.
Over the course
of some 3,000 years Assyria was conquered as part of numerous empires. These
included the Macedonian Empire, the Hellenic or Greek Empire and the Roman
Empire along with several Persian or Iranian Empires. Assyria and the Assyrian
people were some of the first to adopt Christianity in the last days of the
Roman Empire.
In the 7th
Century A.D Mosul was overrun by the Muslim Crusades. As part of the area's new
Muslim identity Assyria was dismantled.
In the 9th
Century Mosul briefly came under the control of the Turkish dynasty of Kundajiq
before being taken over by the Shia Muslim Abbasid Caliphate. In the 11th
Century Mosul was conquered by the Sunni Muslim Selijuq Empire which was
predominately based in Turkey.
In the 13th
Century Mosul was briefly conquered by the Mongol Empire of Hulagu Khan before
being returned to the Abbasid Caliphate which was by then part of the Mamluk
Empire in 1260.
In 1516 the
Ottoman Empire defeated the Mamluks in the Battle of Dabiq Meadow leading to
the entire Mamluk Empire including Mosul being absorbed into the Ottoman
Empire.
This 800 year
period of conquest and counter-conquest saw Mosul absorb a wide variety of
immigrants including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Armenians, Circassians, Kawliya or
Gypsies and of course Persians alongside the indigenous Assyrians.
The Ottoman
Empire fell with defeat to the allied forces at the end of the First World War
in 1918. Mosul and its surroundings were then ruled by the British as Mandatory
Iraq. In 1932 the Kingdom of Iraq was established with the nation becoming a
Ba'athist Republic in 1958.
In 1979 Saddam
Hussein established himself as the de facto ruler of Iraq. Hussein used this
position to consolidate the power of his own Sunni Arab minority.
This included
the suppression of Iraq's Shia majority and a policy of "Arabisation"
in the north of the country.
The purpose of Arabisation was to make
minorities out of the Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen Armenians and Circassians who
were a majority in the north.
This was done by forcing them out of their homes
and replacing them with Sunni Arabs. It was as part of this program that Mosul
was turned into Iraq's second largest city including the building of Mosul Dam which was opened in 1984.
In 2003 Saddam
Hussein was overthrown and Iraq was transformed from a dictatorship into what
is largely speaking a democracy. This restored power to the Shia majority and
brought to an end the special privileges that the Sunni minority enjoyed under
Saddam.
Mosul's Sunni
population has long chaffed against the loss of their special status. They have
repeatedly accused the Shia dominated Iraqi Central Government (ICG) of
ignoring them and persecuting them.
When ISIL
invaded northern Iraq in the summer of 2014 many of Mosul's Sunnis saw the
group as a credible alternative to the ICG and sided with them. This collusion
by local residents is really the main reason why ISIL were able to capture
Mosul so easily.
Three years on
the majority of Mosul's residents have realised that ISIL are far, far worse than
the ICG. However that does not mean they suddenly like the ICG and many of the
old grievances still exist. There are many ethnic groups like the Turkmen and
sadly the Kurds along with local tribes such as the Nujafi tribe who are more than
happy to exploit those grievances for their own ends.
Therefore there
is a high risk that even though ISIL have been defeated they will simply be
replaced by similar armed insurgencies against the ICG.
To prevent this
it is vital that the ICG has a strong post-conflict reconstruction plan to
reassert its authority over the city by making sure that Mosul's residents feel
that they were being listened to and cared for.
Any post-conflict
reconstruction plan has four key priorities;
1. Security:
Beneath Mosul's Old City there is a famous underground market that dates back
to the pre-Ottoman period. During their occupation of the city ISIL have added
a vast network of tunnels and bunkers stretching across much of the city.
Besides the
tunnel and bunker network there is clear evidence that as they've neared defeat
ISIL have established a network of sleeper agents within the city. These people
have mingled in with the civilian population in order to carry out terror
attacks in the future.
So although
Mosul was functionally liberated back on July 9th (9/7/17) there remains work
to be done clearing the tunnel and bunker network and capturing any remaining
sleeper agents. Just on Tuesday (25/7/17) ISIL were able to carry out a small
and largely ineffective attack on one of Mosul's markets.
Beyond any
remaining ISIL fighters there remains the problem of vast amounts of unexploded
ordinance littering the city.
This includes the Improvised Explosive Devices
(IED's) that ISIL have hidden in many homes along with weapons which have been
fired by the ISF but failed to explode and weapons that ISIL had stored for use
during the battle.
These weapons
remain as dangerous now as they did when the battle was raging. In fact as they
age and become unstable they may actually become more dangerous.
Unexploded ordnance
can of course kill. However particularly landmines and IED's pose a great risk
of injury such as the loss of limbs. Children are especially at risk of this
type of injury.
Talking to
people in Mosul there are already an estimated 900 children who've suffered
this type of explosive amputation and have lost limbs. Having covered several
Para-Olympic games this is an issue I'm actually quite familiar with so you'll
excuse me if I take a tangent to talk about it in more detail.
Treating
amputees including by fitting prosthetic limbs is actually quite a complicated
task. It requires multiple medical disciplines working together over a long
period of time.
Firstly you need
surgical specialists. If an amputation has not been performed properly or has
not healed properly then fitting a prosthetic can actually make life worse for
the person by causing them further health problems. Therefore you need ideally
an orthopaedic surgeon to confirm that a person would benefit from a prosthetic
limb.
This can take a
very long time. In the US there is currently much coverage of Gabe Davis a 9
year old double above the knee amputee. It has taken six years and 14 surgeries
to get him to the point where he is able to have prosthetics fitted. His is a
particularly complex case but its normally in the region of six months to a
year after amputation that prosthetics would be considered.
Even the best
prosthetics do not attach to the nervous system meaning that they don't have sensation.
They also do not connect to muscles meaning that you cannot move them the way
you would move a normal limb.
Therefore particularly
with legs people need to spend a lot of time with a Physical/Occupational
Therapist learning how to use their prosthetics. For above the knee amputees
this often includes a period using mini-prosthetics before graduating to full
sized ones.
Hopefully
illustrating my point this is a video of British double above the knee amputee Richard
Whitehead winning T42 200m at the 2016 Paralympics. Although effective I'm sure
you'll agree his running style seems strange and unnatural the first time you
see it; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FmnRjk9oRZ4
Finally each
prosthetic needs to be custom made for its user. This normally involves a cast
being made of the amputation site or stump. That cast is then used to make a
fastening cup out of carbon fibre or plastic which attaches the prosthetic to
the stump. This work requires a medical technician who specialises in
prosthetics.
Obviously
prosthetics do get broken and as people's bodies change over time their
prosthetics need to be replaced to grow with them. This is particularly true
for growing children.
So providing
care for children and adults who've lost limbs to explosives is not as simple
as a charity swooping in and just handing out prosthetic limbs.
Instead it falls
to the Iraqi Health Ministry to establish specialist hospitals or specialist
clinics in existing hospitals to provide care for these people over the course
of their lifetimes.
Charities will
certainly be prepared to assist in setting up those specialist centres. If Iraq
can ensure a steady supply of customers the prosthetics manufacturers will
probably train the technicians for free.
Obviously the
most effective treatment is to remove all the unexploded ordinance before it
has a chance to injure anyone. This is a substantial task with estimates
ranging from a few months to a full year.
It may even take
longer than that. Some 70 years after the event both Britain and Germany still
regularly uncover and have to make safe explosives dating back to the Second
World War. However I should point out that during that war both Britain and
Germany essentially spent five years absolutely carpet bombing each other.
It is hard to
prioritise where to focus the bomb disposal effort.
There is little point
making all the civilian homes safe if none of the support services like shops
and employers that civilians need to survive in those homes have not also been
made safe. Likewise there's no point making the shops and employers safe if the
city is a ghost town because none of the homes have been made safe.
The priority
really should be on inspecting all buildings and then triaging them. The ones that a free from explosives can be reopened immediately while
those with explosives can remain closed off until the explosives have been
cleared.
There also needs
to be some form of public information campaign so people know to avoid areas
that are awaiting demining and know not to touch or in the case of children
play with unexploded munitions.
Beyond the
security challenges associated with the war there of remain all the usual
crimes problems you get in a city of more than a million people. These include
things like theft and personal disputes. Looting is always a huge problem with
it being extremely easy to grab hold of valuables being left in the ruins of
abandoned buildings.
The remaining
ISIL fighters and particularly the removal of unexploded munitions are
obviously military problems that need to be handled by the military elements of
the ISF. However the everyday policing such as catching looters and generally
interacting with the public should be handled by civilian police force elements
of the ISF.
The current
security situation in Mosul remains something of a disorganised mess.
The western half
of the city was liberated by three elements of the ISF; the Counter-Terrorism
Force (CTF/Golden Division), the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Federal Police.
Security around the city is being provided by the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and
militias from the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF).
Within the
eastern half of the city which was liberated back in January security patrols
are being mounted by a variety of militias - some part of the PMF structure,
others not. Many of the militias in the east operate without oversight and
neither like nor trust each other. It must be said that many are distinctly
untrustworthy committing most of the looting rather than stopping it.
All of these
different security forces operating without a single unified command means that
the operation is confused and lacking in direction. The different groups all look
after the area they are in control of meaning that resources are not being
shared between the areas where they are needed most.
2. Restoring
Basic Services: Whether it is caused by war or natural disaster the most
effective way for an area to recover is to get it back to as close to what was
normal as soon as possible. The government's main role here is to restore the
basic services people use to get on with their lives.
The most
important basic service in Mosul as in any city is water and sanitation. To
live people need clean drinking water. In order to keep that water clean people's
sewage and waste need to be removed. Particularly within Mosul one of the main
sanitation problems are all the dead bodies that remain hidden in the rubble.
These need to be located, removed and safely disposed of as quickly as
possible.
If the
sanitation situation is not taken under control then particularly with
malnourished people Mosul is running a high risk of a second tragedy in the
form of widespread outbreaks of diseases like Cholera and Typhoid.
Along with clean
water to drink in order to live people also need food to eat. Therefore it is
important to restore the food distribution networks. Or to put it in less
technical terms; get the shops and markets reopened.
In order to do
this the authorities need to make sure that existing merchants have premises to
operate from, the ability to purchase stock from suppliers and transport links
to get that stock delivered.
As I mentioned
in my previous post the authorities can help merchants purchase stock from
suppliers by providing loan guarantees. This allows merchants to get stock on
credit with the supplier assured that the government will cover the cost should
they default.
The authorities
also need to make sure that customers can then buy that stock from the
merchants. When public sectors employees are back at work and getting paid this
problem should really take care of itself.
However the
authorities can introduce price controls to prevent profiteering and a ration
voucher system to cover any potential cash shortfall. That involves giving people vouchers which they can exchange
for goods. The merchant then exchanges the vouchers with the government for
cash.
In order for a
city to function people need to be able to move around it. Therefore the
authorities need to get the roads both within Mosul and in and out of Mosul
re-opened as quickly as possible. This involves clearing rubble, making repairs
and keeping delays at security checkpoints of a minimum.
To operate a
shop, run a business or make repairs people need electricity to provide light, refrigeration
and to power tools. Therefore the authorities need to restore the power supply
grid as quickly as possible.
3. Recovery:
Many buildings and even entire neighbourhoods in Mosul have been totally destroyed
by the fighting. However there are also many buildings that have only been
lightly damaged with a hole in the roof here and a knocked down wall there.
The best thing
for the owners of these properties to do is to repair the damage themselves.
After all it is extremely complicated for the government to arrange for
builders to visit and carry out repairs of some 700,000 properties. However it
is relatively easy for residents of each one of those properties to arrange for
builders to visit and repair just their building.
The ICG can
speed the process up by making compensation available to people who are
carrying out their own repairs. This can be done in two ways;
The first is
obviously to just hand out cash. However with no real system of checks and
balance this approach is open to widespread fraud and corruption. Also it tends
not to be that effective. If people are given cash no questions asked they tend
to spend it quickly rather than on repair work meaning that the repairs end up not
being done.
The second
option is a compensation scheme modelled on a insurance payout. The closest
example to what I mean I can think of is the UK's Riot Damages Act of 1886.
As the name
suggests this allows for government compensation to be paid to people who have
property lost or damaged during riots. Much to the annoyance of particularly
Housing Associations linked to the Labour Party it was used extensively
following the August 2011 riots. The law was then repealed.
It works by
people filling in a form detailing the damage, when and how it was caused and
the value of repairing or replacing it. This form is then sent to the relevant
authority - in this case the Police Authority.
They then assess the claim to
make sure that it is genuine and valid. Obviously you can't claim for riot
damage if you are one of the rioters. Finally the person making the claim receives
payment.
This approach
massively reduces the possibility for fraud because it is easier to detect
multiple claims being made by the same person or for the same address. Also having
to submit a plan of what repairs you are going to carry out forces you to
actually plan those repairs. This makes it more likely any compensation will
actually be used on repairs.
The main
disadvantage is that it can take an extremely long time for payments to be
made. I think the final case following the August 2011 riots was not settled
until April 2016.
However if
people can be reasonably assured that compensation will be forthcoming they are
more likely to spend their savings getting repairs done knowing those savings
will be replenished. If there is significant trust in the compensation scheme
they may even be able to get the work done on a buy now, pay later credit
basis.
4.
Reconstruction: Across Mosul there are areas that have been completed
destroyed. The people living in these areas will require a lot of support from
the ICG.
The question is
whether the authorities simply want to restore Mosul to the way it was before
the battle. Or do they want to use it as an opportunity to improve Mosul.
"Build Back Better" as it’s known in the jargon.
In any city
anywhere in the World there are always things that can be improved. A prime
example of this is the US city of Los Angeles in California.
Los Angeles was
first established as a city at birth of the era of the motor car. As such the
principle behind Los Angeles was to build vast freeways and allow development
to spring up around those freeways. The result of this is that to get anywhere
in this sprawling city you need to drive. That causes massive gridlock and
traffic chaos.
I get the
impression that many people in Los Angeles wouldn't be that bothered if the
city was destroyed in a massive earthquake. That would give them the
opportunity to start again from scratch eliminating many of the city's design
flaws.
If it is decided
to simply restore Mosul to the way it was you're talking in terms of a
multi-year project in which architects are employed and buildings rebuilt. If
you're talking about building back better that is an even longer - possibly
decades long - process in which new urban design plans are drawn up, new
building are designed and finally built.
Throughout
either process the people who have lost their homes will need somewhere to
live. In the event of a year or two restoration process it may be possible to
house them in IDP camps during that time.
However in the
event of a longer process the best approach is for the government to buy their
destroyed properties. This allows them to buy new properties elsewhere.
If
there are concerns about the reconstruction process changing the demographics
of the city the people who've sold their destroyed properties can be given
first refusal to buy the new homes once they've been completed.
For simplicity's
sake I have listed priorities separately. However in reality not one of them
can happen in isolation of each other.
For example if
you want to restore water and sanitation systems you are going to need to
restore the electricity supply to power construction tools and water pumps. To
do either of those tasks you need to have the worksites secured and free from
unexploded ordinance. You also need the roads open to move equipment to the
sites and have food and water supplies along with accommodation for workers.
To get the work
done quickly there needs to be a high degree of coordination between the
different agencies involved. To achieve this the ICG needs to establish a
single command centre or cell to handle the reconstruction.
This involves
bringing all the relative agencies such as single body for security, the water
and power providers, the road maintenance agency, the urban planning agency,
the finance ministry etc together under one roof.
As I've said
formulating a plan to evacuate the city would have provided a headstart in this
process by establishing an agency for IDP's/Residents. Such an agency still
needs to be created to give residents a clear voice within the command cell.
The command cell
is headed by a single individual who has the responsibility and authority to
coordinate the different agencies to work together.
19:25 on 27/7/17 (UK date).
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