Operation Featherweight: Month 37, Week 1, Day 1.

This should be read as a direct continuation of; https://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2017/07/operation-featherweight-month-36-week-5.html

No Plan For Prisoners:

Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimate that more than 2,600 prisoners were taken in the Mosul operation up until March 2017. The Associated Press (AP) estimate that a further 1,150 prisoners were taken between March and June. Local sources estimate that a further 300 prisoners were taken in the final week of the battle alone.

The fact that I can only give you rough estimates really illustrates the problem. No real mechanism exists to count let alone process the prisoners taken.

In this type of operation it is inevitable that people who share their name with known ISIL fighters or look like known ISIL fighters will be wrongly arrested.

The type of confusion that exists on the battlefield is really illustrated by an event that took place over the course of last week. A young woman in her late teens was taken prisoner in the tunnel network ISIL have established underneath Mosul.

Initially this woman was identified as a well known Russian ISIL sniper. Then it was claimed that she was a Chechen who'd simply been married to an ISIL fighter. Next a Yezidi family came forward convinced the woman was their daughter who'd been kidnapped by ISIL several years ago. On Tuesday (18/7/17) it was finally confirmed she's Linda Wenzel a teenager who left Germany to join ISIL back in 2016 aged 16.

Therefore the first thing that the prisoner mechanism must do is quickly establish the difference between those who can reasonably be suspected of crimes and those who have simply been wrongly arrested out of mistaken identity. After all if you'd been wrongly arrested you certainly wouldn't want to spend months rotting in prison while the mistake is uncovered.

The prisoner mechanism’s next task is to distinguish between those who can be reasonably suspected but are in fact not guilty and those who are guilty. It must then decide how to punish the guilty.

At the top end of the scale you have those who have taken a leadership role within ISIL. These individuals are deeply ideologically committed to the group and have directed others to commit crimes on behalf of the group.

These leaders are joined by the foreign fighters. These are people so ideologically committed to the group that they have gone to great lengths to travel large distances to commit the worst crimes imaginable on ISIL's behalf.

Both of these groups are simply to be executed. The scale of the crimes they have committed require the most severe punishment and there is little to no chance of them ever being rehabilitated.

At the other end of the spectrum you have local people who simply have the misfortune of being in Mosul when ISIL overran the city. These people have no ideological commitment to the group and did not commit the worst crimes instead only acting in a supporting role under threat that either they or their families would be killed.

These prisoners can probably be dealt with by what in the UK is known as a Conditional Discharge. This means the person is convicted of the offences but receive no punishment beyond being given a verbal warning. Essentially they're told not to do it again.

However the fact that the person has been convicted is noted down in a file that can be accessed by the police and security services. That means that if the person is caught reoffending, say by being in possession of illegal weapons their previous conviction is taken into account meaning they receive the most serious punishment for any subsequent offences.

For prisoners whose crimes are not that severe but are still too severe for a Conditional Discharge type of punishment there should be the option of a Probation type punishment. This means that the person is convicted but then set free only with restrictions on their behaviour for a certain period of time.

So for example they may be prevented from leaving their homes during certain times, prevented from travelling to certain areas entirely and prevented from associating with certain people such as others convicted of ISIL crimes.

During this time they are closely monitored by a probation officer or the police who they have to meet with regularly such as weekly or even daily. As part of the monitoring process the police are allowed to search their homes and communications etc without cause to make sure they're not at risk of reoffending.

This type of punishment is probably most appropriate for the families of ISIL fighters. Although these people may not have directly participated in violent acts they are most certainly members of an illegal armed group and have provided support services to those who have committed serious crimes. I don't think anyone seriously believes that significant moral and ideological differences exist between say husband and wife.

The majority of the prisoners though will likely fit in between these the extremes. Their crimes are not severe enough to warrant execution but still so serious that they have to be punished. These people will be sent to prison for a length of time determined by the exact nature of their offences.

With a very large number of people being sent to prison it is then important to consider the type of prisons they will be held in.

What the Iraqis want to absolutely avoid is prisons like Camp Bucca. This was an internment camp established by US forces close to southern city of Basra in 2003. 

Camp Bucca is seen as crucial in the formation of ISIL. It was there that senior ISIL figures like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi etc first met while mixing with former members of Iraq's Ba'athist military.

The problem with Camp Bucca is that it was so badly designed it barely qualified as a prison.

Rather than being held in cells prisoners were held in large fenced off pens with cinder block buildings and sometimes tents providing shelters. The guards rarely entered these large pens where hundreds of prisoners were held instead opting to only patrol the communal areas outside of the pens. 

As a result the prisoners were free to do more or less as they pleased within the pens. This turned it into a sort of terrorist training camp.

The other vitally important thing is that prisoners are held in humane conditions. 

Under the system I would operate if a person’s crimes are serious enough to warrant life imprisonment they will simply be executed. As a result every person put into prison will at some point leave prison.

The conditions that currently exist in Iraq's prisons are simply not acceptable.

At one detention facility close to Mosul 114 male prisoners were being held in a single cell measuring 4 by 6 metres/yards. That cell has no windows nor ventilation meaning that even in spring temperatures were above 40C (100F). The cell does not have a toilet or washing facilities. As a result many of the prisoners are ill with conditions like Scabies.

Neither the cell nor anywhere else in the prison has electricity. If the prisoners want to be fed then they have to arrange for someone outside of the prison to visit them bringing with them enough food for everyone in the cell.

If you keep people in these conditions for any length of time they are going to get angrier and angrier. Particularly at the government and the country that has forced them into those conditions. When they're released that anger is going to make it much more likely that they will return to terrorism or turn to terrorism for the first time.

The best way I can think of to avoid these twin problems is to operate a prison in the style of the one illustrated in the Australian TV show; "Wentworth Prison." Obviously the prison shown in that fictional TV does not actually exist. However it is modelled on the Australian prison system and the TV show is certainly a lot easier to access than the design plans of actual Australian prisons.

The prison compound is divided into blocks. So A-Block, B-Block, C-Block etc. The blocks are divided further into units.

Each of these units contains either six or eight small cells - one for each prisoner. In the centre of the unit there is a communal kitchen/lounge area. This contains a sink/wetbar, a fridge and basic cooking facilities such as a hotplate and a kettle. This allows the prisoners to prepare drinks and snacks they've purchased in the prison shop. There are also chairs and a TV where prisoners can gather.

Overnight or during a security lockdown the doors to each unit are locked. However the individual cells are not locked unless the prisoner chooses to lock them. This allows the prisoners within the unit to freely associate with each other. This small amount of autonomy is important for the prisoners sense of self-respect and rehabilitation.

During the day the units are unlocked and prisoners in all of the block can associated with each other during mealtimes in a communal dining, a communal exercise yard or on work/education placements.

The important thing though is that the prison guards are free to enter both the units and the cells whenever they like. That makes it quite clear who is running the prison.

Obviously building and staffing new prisons from scratch requires time, planning and money. All things the Iraqis don't have the luxury of at the moment. However it should be possible to improve on an easy to build camp such as Camp Bucca by incorporating those principles.

So for example rather than having units built out of steel and concrete you have cinder block or wooden huts which function as the unit. They're locked from the outside and fenced off from each other. Then separately from the units you have communal areas such as a dining room and exercise yard. The blocks are fenced off from each other and the entire site is surrounded by levels of fencing.

It is important though that the number of prisoners in each unit is kept to manageable size of no more than ten. It is equally important that prison guards regularly and freely enter the units. This prevents the prisoners forming large groups or gangs in which they can radicalise and train each other while making clear that it is the guards who run the prison.

If there are particularly difficult prisoners they can be put into solitary confinement. Alternatively there is a tactic known in the UK as; "Ghosting."

This involves moving a prisoner between blocks within a prison and between prisons on a regular, weekly or monthly basis. This prevents the prisoner from forming relationships with other prisoners who may be at risk of radicalisation. It also serves as a form of punishment by making it much harder for the ghosted prisoner to receive visitors and letters from home.

Although the absence of a plan to deal with prisoners is a significant failure in the planning for the Mosul operation the Iraqis are currently trying to make the best of a bad situation.

Currently prisoners from Mosul are taken to one of three detention centres around the city. From there they are brought in front of a civilian Magistrate for what is essentially a Habeas Corpus hearing.

If the Magistrate is shown probable cause to prosecute the individual - normally the testimony of two independent witnesses - the person is transferred into the civilian justice system where they'll await trial. If that probable cause cannot be shown then the Magistrate orders the individual released.

The problem however is that the detention centres are operated by the military over which the civilian Magistrate as severely limited authority. As a result numerous reports have emerged of the detention facilities simply refusing to release individuals who the Magistrate has ordered set free.

Reports have also emerged of bribery leading to people who can reasonably be suspected of ISIL crimes simply buying their way out of detention. However I should point out that just because an individual who Mosul residents have identified as an ISIL member is released from detention is does not mean they have bribed their way to freedom. The Magistrate may have ordered their release for entirely legitimate reasons.

The problem with this current approach is that although ISIL is an illegal military organisation it is still a military organisation. Therefore its members should expect to be tried by a military tribunal rather than a civilian Court.

What constitutes a military tribunal is really up to the Iraqis to decide. However typically cases tend to be tried in front of a panel of three Judges rather than a Jury.

The burden of proof that a military tribunal requires to convict is also something the Iraqis are free to decide. However it is extremely unusual for a military tribunal to require the beyond all reasonable doubt standard typically used in civilian criminal trials. Instead they tend to rely on the balance of probabilities standard used in cases of civil and property law.

Within a military tribunal the accused should still be granted an advocate to present arguments and question evidence on their behalf. However they will be given much less option to suppress evidence on technical grounds such as whether a search warrant was issued.

The exception to this is evidence obtained under torture. Torture is in itself a crime under international law. Therefore evidence obtained under torture should be automatically excluded. Knowing that torture can cause a prosecution to fail should serve as a strong deterrent against the Iraqi security forces using torture. Something that is to the benefit of all Iraqis.

However military prisoners can and should expect to be subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques that stop just short of torture. These include things like stress positions, sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation (hooding, solitary confinement etc) and physical violence of the nature of slapping rather than punching. Evidence obtained by these methods should not be excluded.

The advantage of military tribunals is that they can operate much more quickly than civilian trials. There's no weeks of Jury selection for example.

Based on my incomplete figures Iraq has in excess of 4,000 prisoners to process from Mosul alone. The Iraqi legal system also has many other challenges to face such as lost or destroyed documents and disputes over property ownership. As a result many of those taken prisoner face lengthy delays of years in poor prison conditions while awaiting their cases to be resolved.

This is particularly bad news for the innocent.

Therefore it is better for all Iraqis for cases relating to ISIL and its military activities to be handled by appropriate military tribunals leaving the civilian legal system to deal with the usual civilian crimes.

The two further areas I wish to look at are the lack of planning for civilians and the lack of planning for reconstruction. However as you can see these topics are getting more complicated.

17:00 on 20/7/17 (UK date) 

Edited at around 15:20 on 21/7/17 (UK date) to add;

Throughout the Mosul operation I've been saying that a plan for prisoners needs to be drawn up. However I repeatedly failed to do that because the issue is so complicated. In writing this I still don't think I made myself clear.

By saying that ISIL prisoners are military prisoners who need to be tried by military tribunals I'm not saying that they should be granted Prisoner Of War (POW) status or Political/Special Prisoner status. This would be the worst thing to do.

Firstly granting special status gives ISIL's claimed cause undeserved legitimacy and provides a focal point for their supporters to rally around. 

ISIL are not a group fighting against an oppressive regime or to free a nation from foreign occupation. In fact many of them are foreign invaders who have travelled to Iraq to pursue genocide, slavery and sexual slavery. Those are not legitimate political aspirations. 

Secondly special status plays havoc with the way that a prison is run by exempting special status prisoners from normal prison rules. So for example they don't have to wear prison uniforms or do prison work. Also they have to be housed alongside special status prisoners from their own group. This creates a prison within a prison that the guards don't control.

So while ISIL prisoners should be tried by military tribunal they should be housed in normal prisons mixed in with regular prisoners. 

This obviously creates the risk that they will radicalise other prisoners. However the idea of keeping them in small managable groups and using tactics such as ghosting is specifically to stop this happening. 

Operation Featherweight: Month 36, Week 5, Day 1.

In the summer of 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) invaded the north-west of Iraq. This included seizing the city of Mosul which has functioned as the group's de facto capital in the country ever since.

On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate Mosul from ISIL. This was intended as a combined operation.

The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga along with the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militias would take responsibility for securing the areas around Mosul. The ISF would take responsibility for liberating the city itself. 

All aspects of this operation have been supported by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). 

On July 9th 2017 (9/7/17) Mosul was finally liberated.

Throughout the battle it has been apparent that there were many things wrong with the way the operation was planned. Now that the battle and the week of celebrations are over I will now look at the things that were wrong in the planning.

I'm not doing this to detract from the massive achievement of liberating Mosul. I'm doing it in the spirit of learning from the mistakes in order to improve in the future.

Wrong Place: Roughly 130km (80 miles) south-west of Mosul you have an area designated the Hawija Triangle.

This has the town of Hawija at its centre. It's southern tip is the city of Tikrit. Its northern tip is the town of Baiji. Its eastern tip is the city of Kirkuk.

The Hawija Triangle was created in the spring of 2015 when the ISF and the PMF liberated Tikrit and then Baiji. What then stopped them liberating the Hawija Triangle was tension with the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and their Peshmerga force.

Kirkuk is an ethnically mixed city with a large Kurdish population. However it sits outside of the Kurdish Region. When the ISIL invaded northern Iraq in the summer of 2014 the Peshmerga moved into Kirkuk to stop it falling under ISIL control.

The KRG have made it clear that they want use the Peshmerga's continued presence in Kirkuk to seize it and its oild fields as part of the Kurdish Region.

As a result the Iraqi Central Government (ICG) do not want the Peshmerga involved in an operation in the Hawija Triangle in case they use it as an opportunity to try and steal more territory. 

Likewise the KRG don't want the ISF involved in an operation in the Hawija Triangle in case it forces them to hand back control of Kirkuk to the ICG.

The operation to liberate Mosul was of course a joint operation involving the ISF, the PMF and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga. It has been hampered by the same tensions that have blocked an operation in the Hawija Triangle.

I have to say that the main problem has come from the KRG and its President Masoud Barzani. 

Barzani still clings to this notion that if the KRG can export oil from Kirkuk through Turkey then the KRG will be able to declare independence from Iraq and become a nation state. The dependence on Turkey in this rush to statehood has caused the KRG to repeatedly take actions that have threatened to undermine the liberation of Mosul.

One of the main issues has been the presence of Turkish troops at the Bashiqa camp which at the start of the Mosul operation was on the ISIL side of the frontline.

These are the troops that Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan deployed to Iraq in December 2015 in preparation for an invasion of the Garvaghy Road area of Syria which was originally scheduled for December 16th 2015 (16/12/15).

On October 4th 2016 (4/10/16) the ICG passed a resolution calling for those troops to withdraw from Iraq and the matter was about to be elevated to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However the KRG then demanded that the troops stay. Something that wildly exceeded its authority because Bashiqa is not part of the Kurdish Region.

It was the Turkish troops at Bashiqa who fired the first shots of the Mosul operation opening fire on the city over the night of October 15th (15/10/16). This forced the ICG's hand causing the operation to be launched on October 17th (17/10/16) long before it was ready to start.

Alongside the Turkish troops presence the KRG has also allowed Turkey to repeatedly carry out air and artillery strikes against the PMF within Iraq despite the ICG's objections. This has created a very real threat that Erdogan would conduct largescale attacks against anti-ISIL forces.

This threat has been most keenly felt in the town of Tal Afar which is roughly 65km (40 miles) west of Mosul.

In November 2016 the PMF established a front to the west of Mosul by advancing on Tal Afar airport from the southern Qarrayah Front. They have since liberated everything between that western front and Mosul and everything between the western front and Iraq's border with Syria.

Everything that is except for Tal Afar itself.  

Erdogan has repeatedly threatened that if Tal Afar is liberated then he will send Turkish troops to attack the PMF. Due to the KRG's tolerance of Erdogan's aggression this threat has had to be taken seriously. As a result Tal Afar remains as a pocket of ISIL occupation even though Mosul itself has now been liberated.

Then of course there is the issue of the now infamous town of Sinjar/Shingal. Mostly populated by Kurds who follow the Yezidi religion this sits outside of the Kurdish Region some 115km (70 miles) west of Mosul.

When Sinjar was overrun by ISIL in the summer of 2014 it fell to the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) to cross the border to rescue Shingal's civilians. They then organised the local population into the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS). This went on to be incorporated into the PMF militia structure.

Erdogan's hatred of the YPG is well established. KRG President Barzani's dream is to rely on Erdogan's support to build an Iraqi Kurdish nation including the Sinjar/Shingal region.

So in March 2017 at Erdogan's urging Barzani sent the Peshmerga to attack the YBS element of the PMF at Sinjar. This created the bizarre situation where two forces who were supposed to be working together to liberate Mosul from ISIL were instead fighting each other.

Barzani's mandate as KRG President actually expired all the way back on August 20th 2015 (20/8/15).

I have repeatedly defended Barzani's right to continue as KRG President without a fresh election being held due to the ongoing war. You only need to look at how the UK's June 2017 election was influenced by two comparatively small terror attacks to see why holding an election just kilometres from a city entirely under ISIL control would be very bad idea.

It seems though Barzani's aversion to elections only applies to his mandate as President. 

In April Barzani declared that he would be holding a referendum on independence for the Iraqi Kurdish region. Done without consultation with the ICG or even the Kurdish Regions other political parties this massively increased tensions between the Peshmerga and the ISF.

It is the absolute last thing that anybody needs in the middle of a battle. 

With the date of the referendum now set for September 25th (25/9/17) it looks likely that it will take place while raging in the Hawija Triangle.

With the Hawija Triangle being much smaller and significantly less complicated than Mosul I would have thought it would have provided an ideal proving ground for the ISF, PMF and Peshmerga to work out their differences so those differences didn't interfere with the Mosul operation in the way that they did.

Wrong Time: The Mosul operation was launched on October 17th 2016 (17/10/17). This meant that it was conducted in autumn into winter.

Modern military aircraft can operate day and night in all sorts of weather conditions. However for this sort of urban battle against an enemy without air defences they much prefer lots of clear daylight.

That is something that even in Iraq is in short supply over the winter months. So throughout the course of the battle many days were lost because not even the vast resources of CJTFOIR were able to provide air support.

Although it was not really predictable in the autumn of 2016 the winter particularly in January through to March turned out to be a harsh one. Therefore not only were days lost because aircraft could not effectively fly days and even weeks were lost because ground troops could not move about.

Unavoidably the battle for Mosul meant that civilians within the city were subjected to siege conditions. This meant shortages of essential supplies such as water, food and medicine. However conducting the operation over the winter months also created another shortage. Fuel for heating.

Sadly is impossible to conduct this type of operation without subjecting civilians to some level of suffering. However you would try and plan the operation for a time when demand for supplies is at its lowest in order to minimise that suffering.

Therefore for these reasons I would've thought that it was only natural that the Mosul operation was conducted in spring into summer rather than autumn into winter.

The Falls Road Failure: The original plan for the Mosul operation was to only surround the city on three sides; North, East and South. 

This left a vast 28,000kmsq (16,800milesq) area west of the city designated; "The Falls Road" totally undefended

The objective of doing this appeared to be to allow ISIL fighters to flee from Mosul back across the border to Syria. This was to allow a quick and symbolic victory to be declared.

However this is not how you fight a war.

By granting ISIL an escape route from Mosul you are simply allowing them to regroup and fight on in Syria. As the Garvaghy Road area of Syria's border with Turkey has still not been sealed allowing ISIL to escape to Syria is to allow them to flee to Turkey and from there to anywhere else in the World.

That is not a plan to defeat ISIL. Instead it is a plan to move them from one location to another.

By leaving the Falls Road open ISIL were not only being given the ability to escape from Mosul. They were also being given the opportunity to bring in reinforcements and supplies from Syria in order to better defend Mosul.

Finally leaving the western side of Mosul undefended greatly reduced the tactical options available to the operation.

In planning an operation of this type you would want the option to attack from all directions at once. If only to confuse the enemy into not knowing where the attack was coming from. Failing to establish a western front made it quite clear to ISIL that the attack would not be coming from the west.

The PMF did of course break with the plan and establish a western front by advancing on Tal Afar airport from the southern Qarrayah Front. However this was not completed until November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) fifteen days after the assault on the city itself had begun. Crucially it was also never officially recognised as part of the battle plan.

Back To Front: Within the western half of Mosul - the "Right Bank" - there is the Old City district. With parts dating all the way back to the 9th Century the Old City district is a maze of tightly packed buildings and narrow alleyways that is totally unsuited to modern war fighting.

At the centre of the Old City there is the Grand Mosque of al-Nuri. This is where ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi publicly declared the group to be a Caliphate and he its Caliph. As such it is of huge importance to the group.

This meant that ISIL viewed the Old City and the al-Nuri Mosque to be their Castle Keep. They built their entire defences of the city around protecting the al-Nuri Mosque and making sure that the Old City was the last area they were ousted from.

Therefore the operation to liberate Mosul should have been built around making sure the Old City was the amongst the first places ISIL were ousted from.

The ideal scenario is that having been ousted from the Old City ISIL's defences would completely collapse and they would surrender the city.

However failing that an early liberation of the Old City would mean that ISIL could be pushed back against their own defences undermining their ability to fight. This would involve them being forced into the more modern areas of the east of the city - the "Left Bank" - where the ISF's advantage in terms of equipment and manpower would be clearer.

If there was any advantage to leaving the Hawija Triangle under ISIL occupation it’s that ISIL could have been encouraged to abandon Mosul to make a last stand there.

Therefore my plan for the Mosul operation would have been to surround the city on all sides. I would then use the western front to attack the Right Bank of the city first. This would be done in much the same way that it has been done although I would have launched the third, northern axis at the same time as the initial southern and south-westerly axis.

A Lack of Mobility: This might seem a strange thing to say but the ISF were too focused on liberating each of Mosul's neighbourhoods.

What the ISF would do is arrive at a neighbourhood and then try to fight their way through it. This actually makes it easier for ISIL to defend that neighbourhood. This type of frontal assault allowed ISIL to see where they were being attacked and their focus all of their resources on repelling that assault.

The better tactic would be to concentrate on controlling the roads that divide the neighbourhoods. This cuts the ISIL fighters off from each other denying them access to reinforcements, resupply and crucially command and control. 

That changes the dynamic from fighting one large organised army into fighting small disorganised groups of demoralised fighters with limited resources. As the small groups of fighters collapse you then back clear the neighbourhoods.

Although it is a tactic best suited to the Left Bank then the Right Bank the ISF did begin to deploy this tactic towards the end of the battle.

On May 4th (4/5/17) the northern axis in the Right Bank was opened. However rather than clearing down through the neighbourhoods the ISF instead moved to throw a cordon around the 17 Tammuz, Hay al-Uraybi, Hay ar-Rafai, Zanjili and Old City districts. 

With the ISF enjoying air superiority over the area this was done to deny ISIL movement between the districts. Once that movement had been denied all the districts excluding the Old City were liberated in rapid succession.

Not only didn't make use of their advantage of mobility they or more accurately CJTFOIR actually seemed to set out to minimise their mobility.

In the early stages of the battle CJTFOIR bombed all of the bridges crossing the Tigris River in the centre of Mosul. This was done to prevent ISIL bringing in reinforcements from western Mosul into eastern Mosul.

As I've said I would have designed the battle to force ISIL from the Right Bank into the Left Bank. I certainly would not have destroyed the bridges to prevent them doing that of their own accord.

The destruction of the bridges also made it harder for the ISF when they came to fight on the Right Bank.

Although it looks good in movies sending troops across bridges is often an extremely bad idea. It leaves them incredibly exposed so all the enemy needs to do is put a couple of machine guns at the other end of the bridge and the advancing troops are wiped out.

However when it was introduced the northern axis was rapidly able to capture the western bridgeheads of the Third Bridge and Fifth Bridge. If the bridges had not been destroyed the ISF would have been able to bring in reinforcements across the bridges.

 
Likewise if the tactics of the northern axis had been used by the southern axis reinforcements could have been brought in across the remaining bridges once their western bridgeheads had been secured. 

Element of Surprise Lost: The entire Mosul operation was designed around the November 8th 2016 (8/11/16) US Presidential Election. The purpose was to propel Hillary Clinton to victory on the back of a swift victory against ISIL.

The date of the 2016 US Presidential Election was laid out in the US Constitution published in 1776. Due to the mass of media coverage you certainly didn't need to be living in the US to know that the election was coming up. As such it was very easy for ISIL to predict that an operation to liberate Mosul would be launched to coincide with the election.

Despite already being hampered by predictability the Mosul operation then set out to remove whatever element of surprise it had left.

In the roughly month before the Mosul operation was launched the fact that it was imminent was being openly and widely discussed. This included very public clashes between the KRG and the ICG over exactly when it would begin.

When the start of the operation was formally announced on October 17th (17/10/16) forces were some 25km (15 miles) away from Mosul at their closest point on the Tel Skuf Front and some 45km (30 miles) away at their furthest point on the Qarayyah Front. To advance from those positions they had to fight their way through numerous sizable towns and villages such as Bartella and Haman al-Alil.

This meant there was a more then three week period between the operation being formally announced and the ISF actually entering Mosul on November 1st (1/11/16). This not only allowed ISIL to know that Mosul would be attacked but gave them a very clear idea of how and where that attack would be coming from. This gave ISIL the advantage of being able to best prepare their defences.

Rather than making a big announcement that Mosul was to be liberated and then advancing troops on the city I would have instead quietly made a series of advances that were barely mentioned. So you would just do a small operation to liberate the villages around Tel Skuf followed by a small operation to liberate the villages around Haman al-Alil etc.

Obviously it is impossible to surround a city with 40,000 troops and their equipment without anybody noticing. 

However by doing it discreetly in stages with no stated intent you put the pressure on ISIL to decide whether this meant an operation to liberate Mosul was underway. This subtle pressure grinds away at their commanders and if they're seen to get their decisions wrong it undermines confidence in the entire command structure causing troop morale to collapse. 

With the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) operation to liberate the Syrian city of Raqqa this mistake has been repeated on a much larger scale. The start of the Raqqa operation was announced on November 6th 2016 (6/11/16). The SDF did not enter Raqqa until June 6th 2017 (6/6/17) giving ISIL a full seven months to prepare their defences.

The Resistance That Never Was: Amid all the hyperbole in the run-up to Mosul operation we were frequently promised that there was a network of resistance fighters within the city poised to spring into action.

In this type of operation having a resistance movement embedded in the city can be extremely useful. At the most basic level it can be used to provide real time intelligence about the enemies positions allowing them to be destroyed from the air.

Through actors like MosulEye we did see some of this emerge in the later stages of the battle as they tried to gather information from local residents and pass it on to CJTFOIR. However a properly coordinated resistance movement would have been so much more effective in this task. 

Rather then CJTFOIR having to scour social media for information from sources they don't know and therefore cannot trust it would be so much easier if trained resistance fighters could simply radio their control room.

If CJTFOIR were able to smuggle equipment in to the resistance fighters it could be even more effective still. There is a piece of equipment called a laser designator. This allows a person on the ground to shine a laser onto a target building. An aircraft can then come along and fire a missile directly onto that laser beam.

Local resistance fighters are also extremely useful when it comes to helping to protect civilians. 

A prime example of this which has been in the news a lot recently was the role Polish resistance movement known as the Polish Home Army in the ghettos - particularly the Warsaw Ghetto - during the Second World War.

Prior to establishing the Concentration Camps and then Death Camps the Nazis gathered undesirables - mainly Jews and Gypsies - in into sections of a city which where then cut off from the outside world. In 1943 the Polish Home Army staged an uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto ending Nazi control for almost a month. However they and other European resistance movements spent most of their time quietly smuggling civilians out of the ghettos to safety.

If there was a properly organised resistance movement within Mosul it too could have helped smuggle civilians out of the city. It could also have coordinated with the ISF to help establish humanitarian corridors to help civilians escape areas of the city with were about to come under attack.

If there was a particularly strong resistance movement in Mosul the ISF and CJTFOIR could not only have smuggled weapons into them but also Special Operation Forces (SOF's) in to operate alongside them. 

This would have allowed them to carry out attacks on key ISIL buildings such as ammunition depots and prisons and assassinations of key ISIL commanders. This type of behind-the-lines attacks help spread confusion and fear destroying morale and undermining defences.

The first rule of any successful resistance movement though is; YOU DO NOT TALK ABOUT THE RESISTANCE. It must be carried out in absolute secrecy.

By very publicly touting the presence of a resistance movement within Mosul CJTFOIR and the Iraqis prompted ISIL to go on a paranoid rampage to wipe out the resistance fighters. At best this lead to a large number of innocent Moslawi civilians being murdered needlessly.

At worst - from a military perspective - it led to the resistance movement being wiped out before the battle had even begun. However I've always had my doubts as to whether this resistance movement ever existed to begin with. 

Part two to follow.

16:30 on 18/7/17 (UK date).


  

Notes From Khanistan.

Over the course of the night of June 13th 2017 (13/6/17) into June 14th 2017 (14/6/17) a fire completely destroyed the 129 apartment Grenfell Tower on the Lancaster West housing estate in the Kensington area of the UK city of London. The fire left 80 either dead or missing presumed dead.

The UK Labour Party have treated this almost exactly the same as the US Democrat Party treated the June 12th 2016 (12/6/16) terror attack against the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, US. A perfectly normal part of their campaign to be exploited to score points off their political rivals.

However as the investigation has progressed a number of worrying details have begun to emerge of how London Fire Brigade (LFB) responded to the fire.

The main one of these is that it was London Fire Brigade who certified Grenfell Tower as safe. So no matter what the arguments are about cladding, sprinkler systems etc ultimately it was the LFB who told all the other authorities that the building was safe.

The initial fire crew that attended the scene put out the fire in the apartment where it originated. They then packed up their equipment and went to leave the scene.

I don't think this is as dramatic as it first sounds. They were called to put out a fire in a single apartment. When they realised that it was the entire building that was on fire they remained at the scene and called for extra resources. Obviously though the Public Inquiry will have to look in detail at that chain of events and whether the correct decisions were made in a timely fashion.

More worryingly is that after a major incident had been declared the LFB waited a full 30 minutes before requesting what is known as an aerial platform. This would have allowed them to reach above the area of the building that was burning and douse it with water to prevent the fire spreading further.

What worries me about LFB's integrity is that they have claimed this delay was caused by government cuts to their budget. That is simply not true. The required resources were available just minutes from the scene. However the decision to request those resources was not taken for a full half hour.

Then there is the decision not to evacuate the building for up to four hours after the LFB first responded to the fire.

This has been put down to a firefighting tactic known as; "Defend in Place." The principle behind this tactic is that buildings such as Grenfell Tower are designed so any fire is contained in each apartment. Failing that it is contained between floors. Therefore evacuating the entire building would actually further endanger residents by putting them at risk of panic and crushing during the evacuation.

However within 40 minutes footage of the fire spreading up the exterior of the building was all over the TV news. Therefore I find it hard to understand why the Fire Officer in command of the incident was unable to identify that the Defend in Place tactic had failed and order an evacuation.

These failures by the LFB and whether they are justifiable or not they are certainly failures seem very similar to the 1989 Hillsborough Stadium disaster. Unless you believe the wilder conspiracy theories no-one set out to kill 96 football fans that day.

The Hillsborough disaster actually began with a crush amongst fans on the Leppings Lane road outside of the stadium. The Police Officer in command that day David Duckenfield then decided to open an exit gate to allow the fans to enter the stadium more quickly. Ironically this was done in an effort to protect the fans from being crushed.

At the same time as opening the exit gate the Police Officer in command failed to block the entrance to the central terrace pen. This meant that fans were crammed into that central pen rather than being evenly distributed across the three pens.

The Police Officer in command then failed to identify that the central pen had become overcrowded and order it to be evacuated.

Finally the Police Officer in command of what at that time was a major incident failed to request that ambulances that were lined up outside be allowed to enter the stadium to treat the injured.

Although public perception has changed a lot since then at the time of the Hillsborough disaster the police were hailed as heroes just as the LFB are being hailed as heroes in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. There was lots of talk of officers bravely putting their lives in danger to rescue the injured from violent football hooligans.

These tales of heroism grew into a sort of reverence around the police that meant their actions were never properly questioned during the subsequent Taylor Public Inquiry.

During that Inquiry Duckenfield claimed that the dynamic nature of the disaster caused him to freeze up so he couldn't be blamed for his actions and inactions. Now 28 years later Duckenfield is finally to be charged with Manslaughter by Way of Gross Negligence meaning that claim will finally be tested in Court.

So in light of the Grenfell Tower fire there are very serious questions to be asked of London Fire Brigade. Any criminal investigation would be remiss if it failed to ask those tough questions.

The LFB is under the authority of London's Labour Mayor Sadiq Khan. He also has responsibility for London's Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). However the rules are quite clear that he cannot and should not attempt to influence policing policy.

Over the course of last night (13/7/17) we've been given a stark reminder of how Sadiq Khan is coping with his responsibility for crime and policing.

Over a 90 minute period two young men on a Motor Scooter/Moped sprayed acid in the faces of five people apparently in the course of committing a series of robberies. This represents the convergence of two growing crime problems within London.

The first of these is the use of Motor Scooters in robberies.This involves often two people riding a Motor Scooter riding up onto the pavement to steal valuables such as cellphones from people going about their daily lives. Often the Motor Scooters themselves are stolen.

This type of crime is being driven by the policies of the MPS. They will not give chase to suspects on Motor Scooters in case through their own reckless and criminal behaviour the suspects end up injuring themselves. As a result criminals know that if they use a Motor Scooter to commit a crime the police won't event attempt to try and catch them.

As with all other motor vehicles the police also have the power to stop any Motor Scooter without cause and seize any vehicles that are found to be stolen, not insured or not taxed. However for some reason the police decline to do this.

The second growing crime problem is the use of acid as a weapon.

This was something that was actually very fashionable amongst football hooligans in the 1970's and 1980's. You used to be able to by a brand of Jiff lemon juice that was sold in a squeezable plastic bottle in the size and shape of a lemon. You would then drain out the lemon juice and replace it with something more corrosive such as Ammonia or Nitric or Sulphuric acid before squirting it in someone's face.

The use of acid as a weapon along with football hooliganism very much fell out of fashion following the Hillsborough disaster.

What seems to have brought the use of acid back into fashion in London is the capital's close cultural links with nations on the Asian sub-continent. Particularly Pakistan.

Particularly within Pakistan's Muslim communities the honour system still very much exists. This holds that if a woman is thought to bring dishonour on her family she is to be violently punished by the men in her family. If the supposed dishonour is vanity the woman is often punished by having acid thrown on her.

The number of these attacks in Pakistan greatly increased in the late 2000's and early 2010's largely being imported from Taliban controlled Afghanistan. To stop the practice being imported from Pakistan to its own Muslim communities India actually banned the retail sale of acids in 2013.

Through the capital's cultural links to Pakistan the honour system and the use of acid as a weapon has been imported. There is has mixed with criminals old enough to remember the 1970's and 1980's.

In 2016 there were 458 acid attacks in London. However until today they've not made it onto the news. With one notable exception.

On June 21st (21/6/17) Resham Khan and Jameel Muhktar were attacked with acid in the Beckton area of east London. This was given widespread media coverage because Jameel Muhktar wanted to use the incident to promote the conspiracy theory that Islamaphobia amongst British authorities meant the crime wasn't being investigated. There are several things wrong with that.

Firstly there were 458 acid attacks in London alone in 2016. So the MPS failing to investigate an acid attack is far from an uncommon event.

Secondly the majority of those 458 acid attacks were carried out by Muslims as honour punishments. Normally against a daughter, sister or cousin who'd brought shame on the family by dressing in western clothes, seeking an education or drinking alcohol. Exactly the sort of things that Resham Khan had been doing.

The police are generally discouraged from investigating these crimes out of the misplaced sense of cultural sensitivity which Sadiq Khan relies on for votes.

Finally following the attack Jameel Muhktar was placed in a medically induced coma for several days. That made it rather hard for the police to interview him hampering the investigation.

Then of course there is London's ever growing problem of knife violence. I think this was best summed up during the June 3rd (3/6/17) marauding run-over and stabbing terror attack in the London Bridge area of London.

During the course of that incident there was another stabbing attack in the Vauxhall area of London which is around 30 minutes walk from London Bridge. This led to great concern that London was suffering a widespread marauding attack.

It turned out though the Vauxhall stabbing attack was just another one of London's everyday stabbing attacks.

Last night's acid attacks have led the national news throughout the day. Now the media have started to realise that it reflects very badly on Sadiq Khan and the Labour Party it will be interesting to see how the story gets downgraded.

I've already noticed that now Friday prayers have begun at the local Mosque both BBC and Sky News are declining to broadcast live from the scene.

15:50 on 14/7/17 (UK date).

Edited at around 19:10 on 14/7/17 (UK date) to add;

BBC London News who you thought would be all over this story instead decided to bump it to item two. Sandwiched between two stories about how awesome Labour London Mayor Sadiq Khan is.

As for Labour London Mayor Sadiq Khan he has reacted rather predictably. Along with local Labour MP Diane Abbott he has tried to shift the blame onto the national government by demanding they introduce legislation designating acid as a type of offensive weapon.

As such I should point out that all corrosive substances including acids and the far more potent alkaloids have been designated as offensive weapons since the introduction of the 1953 Prevention of Crime Act. The transfer of said substance to a secondary container demonstrates intent.

Therefore the question is really why under Labour London Mayor Sadiq Khan the MPS feel they are unable to enforce this particular law?

It is likely to be the same reason they feel they are unable to enforce the laws that state that you can only drive a Motor Scooter with the owner's permission while you are insured to do so and said vehicle is properly taxed;

The Labour Party need their thugs on the streets to scare up votes.

Operation Featherweight: Month 36, Week 4, Day 2.

On November 6th 2016 (6/11/16) the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) launched an operation designated; "Wrath of Euphrates" to liberate the Syrian city of Raqqa from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The SDF are a coalition of forces made up of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), the Christian Syriac Military Council (MSF) and fragments of what used to be known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) alongside Arab tribal forces local to north-east Syria.

They are supported by the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) who have embedded Special Operations Forces (SOF's) and conventional US military artillery units within the SDF.

The city of Raqqa lies within the Euphrates River basin. It sits around 120km (70 miles) south of the town of Ackackale on Syria's border with Turkey and around 250km (150 miles) west of Syria's border with Iraq. It has functioned as ISIL's de facto capital in Syria since 2013.

The first stage of the Wrath of Euphrates operation was to advance SDF forces close to Raqqa. This was carried out in three phases;

The first phase of the operation launched on November 6th 2016 (6/11/16) was to advance south from the town of Ayn Issa towards Raqqa. This was completed on November 25th 2016 (25/11/16) with the SDF taking up positions roughly 25km (15 miles) north of Raqqa.

The second phase of the operation launched on December 10th 2016 (10/12/16) was for the SDF to sweep down from the town of Sarrin along the banks of the Euphrates to the Tabqa Dam complex. This was completed on January 20th 2017 (20/1/17) with the SDF taking up positions at Jabour Castle at Lake Assad some 10km (6 miles) west of the Tabqa Dam and 40km (25 miles) west of Raqqa.

The third phase of the operation launched on February 4th (4/2/17) was to secure the territory east of Raqqa cutting it off from the city of Deir-ez-Zour around 120km (70 miles) south-east of Raqqa along the Euphrates. This third phase was completed on March 19th (19/3/17) with the SDF taking up positions around al-Karamah which is roughly 30km (20 miles) south-east of Raqqa.

During the course of these three phases the SDF liberated in excess of 4,200kmsq (2,500 milesq) of territory from ISIL.

On March 22nd (22/3/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate both the town of Tabqa and the Tabqa Dam. This was completed on May 11th (11/5/17).

On June 6th (6/6/17) the SDF launched an operation to liberate the city of Raqqa itself. This was launched on three axis. North, West and East.

The northern axis advanced on the sprawling former Syrian military - Division 17 - base to the north of the city. At some 50kmsq (30 milesq) this Division 17 is almost half the size of Raqqa itself. As of July 11th (11/7/17) the SDF now control some 60-70% of the Division 17 base.

The western axis began by advancing into the Jazra suburb on the western side of Raqqa. They then proceeded to liberate the Sabahiya, Romaniyah, al-Qadisiyyah and al-Hattin districts all sitting on the western side of Raqqa.

On July 3rd (3/7/17) the western axis entered the Yarmouk district at the most south-westerly tip of Raqqa. They currently control around 10-15% of the Yarmouk district while fighting continues in the an-Nadah and al-Baryd districts which sit east of the Romaniyah district and north-east of the al-Qadisiyyah and al-Hattin districts.

The eastern axis began by advancing into the Mashlab district at the most south-easterly tip of Raqqa on June 6th (6/6/17). Having liberated the Mashlab district on June 9th (9/6/17) the eastern axis proceeded to the liberate the al-Sinaa district directly to the west on June 15th (15/6/17).

The eastern axis then liberated the Bitani district which sits directly to the north of al-Sinaa district on June 17th (17/6/17). This allowed them to enter the Rawdah district which sits north-west of the Bitani district on June 28th (28/6/17).

On July 2nd (2/7/17) the eastern axis entered the Hisham Abdulmalik district at the very south of Raqqa on the banks of the Euphrates. On July 6th (6/7/17) the eastern axis was able to enter the al-Mahdi, ar-Rashid and ar-Rafiqah neighbourhoods of Raqqa's Old City district. This sit directly to the west of the al-Sinaa and Bitani districts.

The SDF are currently in control of roughly 95% of al-Mahdi neighbourhood, 5% of ar-Rashid neighbourhood and 30% of ar-Rafiqah neighbourhood. They also control around 30% of the Hisham Abdulmalik district and 50% of Rawdah district.

While the advances have been taking place within Raqqa the SDF have also been conducting a west-to-east sweep along the southern banks of the Euphrates.

On June 29th (29/6/17) this succeeded in completely cutting Raqqa off from the outside world. This sweep has continued with the SDF yesterday (11/7/17) reaching positions roughly 15km (9 miles) south-east of Raqqa. This puts them in control of the village of Ukayrishah which had served as an important oil transit site for ISIL.

Within the YPG element of the SDF there is an International Brigade of foreign volunteer fighters. They in part are deployed in the east-to-west sweep south of Raqqa.

On July 5th (5/7/17) an International Brigade patrol was ambushed by ISIL. This resulted in the deaths of three volunteers;

• Luke Rutter. Aged 22 years old from Birkenhead, UK.

• Nicholas Warden. Aged 29 years old from New York State, USA.

• Robert Grodt. Aged 28 from California, USA.

17:00 on 12/7/17 (UK date).