Last Sunday (19/2/17) the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) began an operation to liberate the western side of the city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
This is the latest phase in an operation that began on October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) that succeeded in liberating the eastern side of the city on January 25th 2017 (15/1/17). It is supported by the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militia, the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR).
On Friday (24/2/17) the ISF completed a complex manoeuvre to simultaneously liberate both the Ghazlani military base and Mosul international airport which sit side-by-side at the southern tip of western Mosul. The ISF then immediately proceeded to move to liberate the Hay al-Tayaran neighbourhood which sits directly north of the airport. This marked the start of the grinding process of liberating the city room-by-room, floor-by-floor, house-by-house, street-by-street, neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood.
Although things are progressing more quickly than I'd expected the start of this slow process means that there are unlikely to be enough developments for me to provide daily updates. Instead I'm expecting to give an update every two to three days. However things will be dictated entirely by events on the ground.
I do though have to take a moment to write about the death on Saturday (25/2/17) of Shifa Gardi. A journalist for the Iraqi Kurdish broadcaster Rudaw Ms Gardi was killed by an ISIL Improvised Explosive Device (IED) while investigating reports of a mass grave close to the village of Al Athba. 20km (12 miles) south of Mosul.
On Friday (24/2/17) 63 people - mostly civilians - were killed in an ISIL suicide bombing close to the Syrian town of al-Bab. Later that day 16 Jordanian border guards were killed in an ISIL attack on their post. Earlier on Saturday (25/2/17) 42 people were killed in multiple Al Qaeda suicide bombings in the Syrian city of Homs.
Amid all this slaughter it seems almost strange for me to talk at length about the death of just one person. However it is hard to overstate just how crucial Rudaw have been to this war.
Wherever you are in the World or whatever news channel you're watching the chances are you've seen footage of the war that has a little; "R" superimposed in the top left corner of the screen. That is the logo of Rudaw and it is often they who are the only ones brave enough to go and shoot the footage. Although I like to think I add at least some value the majority of what I do here is really just reading out loud what Rudaw have written.
Amongst people who work in the news business the 1991 Gulf War is widely regarded as the first television war. Advances in technology meant that for the first time journalists embedded with soldiers on the frontlines could edit together their reports and beam them back to the studio by satellite to be included on the evening news. They could even set up a satellite link to be interviewed live from the studio whilst standing on the frontlines.
In this war Rudaw have taken things a step further. They have been livestreaming the operation to liberate Mosul both on the Internet and on their satellite channel. Amid the chaos I don't really know how to process this. However amongst journalists and broadcasters it is clearly something that is going to be talked about for years to come.
On one level it is a remarkable resource for me. I can simply log on to the livestream and see with my own eyes how the battle is going. However I find it worrying that ISIL can also log on to the livestream and see exactly what the ISF are up to.
Plus it represents an absolutely huge ethical quandary for broadcasters and those who regulate them. Watching live uncensored footage of battle makes it quite clear how extremely violent and frankly shit war really is. Part of Rudaw's coverage of Ms Gardi's death was a very poignant photograph of her producer leaning over a bodybag containing her corpse that had been hastily slung across the back seats of a 4x4.
Throughout the battle for Mosul Shifa Gardi had been reporting from the field during the day before returning to the studio in Erbil to anchor a nightly show - Focus Mosul - updating the country on the days developments. Within Arab and Kurdish society a woman anchoring a primetime news program is still a major thing. Let alone one that saw her broadcasting live from battle alongside male soldiers.
Shifa Gardi is so well known amongst Iraqis and others for her Mosul coverage hearing that she'd been killed is like hearing that Anderson Cooper, Wolf Blitzer, Huw Edwards, Kay Burley or any other nationally known news anchor had suddenly been killed.
Just on Monday (20/2/17) Shifa Gardi provided us all with one of those marvellously surreal moments that only happen in war.
Embedded with the Iraqi Federal Police as they liberated Albu Saif Shifa Gardi noticed someones pet bunny rabbit that had become separated from its owners amid the fighting. Taking pity on this starving and injured animal she scooped it up and took it back to her office to give it to an animal shelter.
War correspondents are considered a strange and unique breed. However even amongst them strolling back into your office with a bunny rabbit tucked into your flak jacket is considered hilariously bizarre.
12:50 on 26/2/17 (UK date).
Sunday, 26 February 2017
Saturday, 25 February 2017
CNN's War on Democracy.
On Friday (24/2/17) the Geneva Process talks on Syria resumed in, well, Geneva, Switzerland. Frustratingly I can't really talk about these talks whilst they're taking place.
However very early on Friday morning (European time) - there was an extremely alarming contribution to those talks from the US broadcaster CNN.
CNN ran an exclusive story about the White House asking the FBI to publicly dismiss an earlier story about links between US President Trump and Russia. The implication being that President Trump was trying to use the FBI as some sort of party political secret police.
I don't think I need to tell anyone that the relationship between the US and Russia is at its lowest point since the Cold War. This is despite former President Obama beginning his term with a promise to improve relations with Russia - the 2009 "Re-Set."
The reason for the current division between the US and Russia is quite simple. It's the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Under Obama the US supported ISIL while Russia opposed them. So the two nations have parted ways.
When broadcasters like CNN - who incidentally testified on ISIL's behalf at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - talk about Trump's links to Russia they're not upset about Russia. What they're upset about is Trump's opposition to ISIL - the Russian position. If CNN just came out and openly said that they supported ISIL and urged others to support the group they would simply be arrested.
So in the timing of Friday's story CNN were trying to send a message to pro-ISIL delegates at the Geneva talks. That message was simply that they could ignore whatever the US delegation was saying because they, CNN would make sure that despite the election the US continued Obama's policy of supporting ISIL.
If you actually look at the facts of Friday's story they are very different from the "alternative facts" that CNN are trying to spin.
On February 14th (14/2/17) CNN and the New York Times ran another exclusive story. This one claimed that they had anonymous sources within the FBI claiming the bureau could prove that Trump's Presidential campaign had close links to Russia's intelligence services.
Obviously once the story broke the White House asked the FBI if this were true. The FBI immediately informed the White House that the story was completely false. CNN and the New York Times' anonymous source had either lied to them or they had simply made up this source. After all with it being anonymous there's no way for anyone to check that the source actually exists.
The White House then asked the FBI if they would mind saying publicly that CNN and the New York Times' story was completely false and made up. The FBI responded that it is against their policy to comment publicly on counter-intelligence matters. After all talking about those matters risks exposing methods reducing the US' ability to conduct future counter-intelligence operations.
However on February 17th (17/2/17) the FBI did brief Congress on the matter. You will notice that all the members of Congress who were vocally decrying Trump's claimed links with Russia on February 16th (16/2/17) have suddenly gone very quiet.
The February 14th (14/2/17) CNN and New York Times story led to the ousting of Michael Flynn - the President's National Security Adviser.
Micheal Flynn has long been a target for the likes of CNN and the New York Times because he has previously described radical Islamism like that practiced by ISIL as a cancer on Islam. You will notice that he did not say that Islam is a cancer.
Instead Flynn said that the groups like ISIL who use violence and Islam as weapons to further their political aims are a cancer on Islam. This is a pretty common opinion within Islam - particularly amongst the millions fighting ISIL. However radical Islamism is apparently the only form of Islam that US Democrats will permit.
So Friday's (24/2/17) scandal is actually that CNN and the New York Times falsified a story to oust a member of the elected President's national security team because they did not like his opposition to ISIL. They doubled down on the story to promote their political agenda at the Geneva talks at the expense of the agenda of America''s democratically elected government.
That a small, unelected cabal of journalists and government employees think they can subvert the policy of an elected government is extremely serious stuff that borders on treason.
If I was talking about this in somewhere like Egypt or Turkey I would have to refer to them as a; "Parallel State." However in those nations parallel states have long existed to prevent radical Islamists from staging coups against democracy. The US' parallel state seems dedicated to staging a coup against democracy on behalf of radical Islamists.
In response on Friday (24/2/17) the White House declined to invite CNN and the New York Times to a press briefing. Not only was this a completely reasonable response I actually thought is was too moderate.
Press access to the White House is not an automatic right. There are plenty of news organisations that want White House access but don't make the cut.
If CNN and the New York Times are going to continue to wage war against not just the current President but the US' entire system of government surely they can't expect to be granted the special privilege of access to the White House.
12:10 on 25/2/17 (UK date).
However very early on Friday morning (European time) - there was an extremely alarming contribution to those talks from the US broadcaster CNN.
CNN ran an exclusive story about the White House asking the FBI to publicly dismiss an earlier story about links between US President Trump and Russia. The implication being that President Trump was trying to use the FBI as some sort of party political secret police.
I don't think I need to tell anyone that the relationship between the US and Russia is at its lowest point since the Cold War. This is despite former President Obama beginning his term with a promise to improve relations with Russia - the 2009 "Re-Set."
The reason for the current division between the US and Russia is quite simple. It's the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Under Obama the US supported ISIL while Russia opposed them. So the two nations have parted ways.
When broadcasters like CNN - who incidentally testified on ISIL's behalf at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - talk about Trump's links to Russia they're not upset about Russia. What they're upset about is Trump's opposition to ISIL - the Russian position. If CNN just came out and openly said that they supported ISIL and urged others to support the group they would simply be arrested.
So in the timing of Friday's story CNN were trying to send a message to pro-ISIL delegates at the Geneva talks. That message was simply that they could ignore whatever the US delegation was saying because they, CNN would make sure that despite the election the US continued Obama's policy of supporting ISIL.
If you actually look at the facts of Friday's story they are very different from the "alternative facts" that CNN are trying to spin.
On February 14th (14/2/17) CNN and the New York Times ran another exclusive story. This one claimed that they had anonymous sources within the FBI claiming the bureau could prove that Trump's Presidential campaign had close links to Russia's intelligence services.
Obviously once the story broke the White House asked the FBI if this were true. The FBI immediately informed the White House that the story was completely false. CNN and the New York Times' anonymous source had either lied to them or they had simply made up this source. After all with it being anonymous there's no way for anyone to check that the source actually exists.
The White House then asked the FBI if they would mind saying publicly that CNN and the New York Times' story was completely false and made up. The FBI responded that it is against their policy to comment publicly on counter-intelligence matters. After all talking about those matters risks exposing methods reducing the US' ability to conduct future counter-intelligence operations.
However on February 17th (17/2/17) the FBI did brief Congress on the matter. You will notice that all the members of Congress who were vocally decrying Trump's claimed links with Russia on February 16th (16/2/17) have suddenly gone very quiet.
The February 14th (14/2/17) CNN and New York Times story led to the ousting of Michael Flynn - the President's National Security Adviser.
Micheal Flynn has long been a target for the likes of CNN and the New York Times because he has previously described radical Islamism like that practiced by ISIL as a cancer on Islam. You will notice that he did not say that Islam is a cancer.
Instead Flynn said that the groups like ISIL who use violence and Islam as weapons to further their political aims are a cancer on Islam. This is a pretty common opinion within Islam - particularly amongst the millions fighting ISIL. However radical Islamism is apparently the only form of Islam that US Democrats will permit.
So Friday's (24/2/17) scandal is actually that CNN and the New York Times falsified a story to oust a member of the elected President's national security team because they did not like his opposition to ISIL. They doubled down on the story to promote their political agenda at the Geneva talks at the expense of the agenda of America''s democratically elected government.
That a small, unelected cabal of journalists and government employees think they can subvert the policy of an elected government is extremely serious stuff that borders on treason.
If I was talking about this in somewhere like Egypt or Turkey I would have to refer to them as a; "Parallel State." However in those nations parallel states have long existed to prevent radical Islamists from staging coups against democracy. The US' parallel state seems dedicated to staging a coup against democracy on behalf of radical Islamists.
In response on Friday (24/2/17) the White House declined to invite CNN and the New York Times to a press briefing. Not only was this a completely reasonable response I actually thought is was too moderate.
Press access to the White House is not an automatic right. There are plenty of news organisations that want White House access but don't make the cut.
If CNN and the New York Times are going to continue to wage war against not just the current President but the US' entire system of government surely they can't expect to be granted the special privilege of access to the White House.
12:10 on 25/2/17 (UK date).
Friday, 24 February 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 32, Week 1, Day 5.
Last Sunday (19/2/17) the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) militias launched an operation to liberate the western half of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
This operation is being supported by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga who continue to provide perimeter security to the eastern half of the city which was liberated on January 25th (25/2/17).
Yesterday (23/2/17) the ISF launched the most complex manoeuvre of possibly the entire operation. This involved them simultaneously liberating Mosul airport and the Ghazlani military base which sit side-by-side at the southern most tip of Mosul.
By the day's end the ISF had succeeded in liberating 85% of the Ghazlani base and 50% of the airport. This led to some concern that ISF forces would sustain a high number of casualties both from ISIL fighters remaining in the base and the airport and from a possible ISIL counter-offensive on both locations.
Today I am happy to report that no such counter-offensive occurred. In fact at around 09:00 (GMT) this morning the ISF were able to declare Mosul airport to be completely, 100% liberated from ISIL. At around 10:00 (GMT) the ISF were able to declare that the Ghazlani base is also now completely, 100% liberated from ISIL.
Since then the ISF have begun to advance into the Hay al-Tayaran neighbourhood. This sits directly directly to the north of Mosul airport. They also continue to hold the Tal al-Rayyan neighbourhood to the north-west of Ghazlani base which was liberated yesterday and have advanced into the Hay al-Mamun neighbourhood which sits north-east of Tal al-Rayyan and directly north of the Ghazlani base.
To the west of the city the PMF have continued their advance around the town of Tal Afar. Today they have announced the liberation of the villages of Tal Zalat, Um Musaid and al-Zaytun. Assuming the liberation of al-Zaytun has come from the north-west this almost completely cuts ISIL positions in western Mosul off from ISIL positions in Tal Afar. It also places the PMF around 25km (15 miles) west of Mosul itself.
Also today Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that he has given the Iraqi Air Force permission to conduct airstrikes against ISIL positions within Syria. This announcement was immediately followed by Iraqi airstrikes against ISIL positions in and around Deir-ez-Zour in Syria. These strikes were carried out in response to the three ISIL bomb attacks conducted against the Bayaa and Sadr City districts of Baghdad last week.
This expansion of Iraqi operations into Syria serves to underline that the ISIL threat to Iraq will not end with the liberation of Mosul. Nor will it end with the liberation of Hawija. Instead it will only end when ISIL have been completely defeated in both Iraq and Syria.
Although former US President Barack Obama seemed to do everything in his power to block it the original plan was that the ISF would defeat ISIL in Iraq sweeping them back into Syria. The ISF would then chase ISIL into Syria and defeat them there too. The expansion of Iraqi strikes into Syria shows that Iraq is still committed to that plan.
Deir-ez-Zour is where the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) are currently focusing their efforts to expand their de facto safe-haven and prepare for the liberation of Raqqa. I think it is fair to assume then that they enjoy Iraqi support even if Iraq's Kurdistan Region is still trying to undermine them.
Also today there has been an ISIL suicide attack on the Turkish occupied Syrian town of al-Bab. This has killed in excess of 50 people - predominately Sunni-Arab civilians. ISIL have also mounted an attack on a Jordanian border post which has killed 15 Jordanian border guards.
Both of these attacks appear to be ISIL's contribution to the Geneva process talks which formally resumed today.
However with those talks taking place I can't go into much detail beyond saying that now the pressure is mounting ISIL seem desperate for the United Turkmen Army (UTA) and the Southern Front to swoop in to their rescue.
18:10 on 24/2/17 (UK date).
This operation is being supported by the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga who continue to provide perimeter security to the eastern half of the city which was liberated on January 25th (25/2/17).
Yesterday (23/2/17) the ISF launched the most complex manoeuvre of possibly the entire operation. This involved them simultaneously liberating Mosul airport and the Ghazlani military base which sit side-by-side at the southern most tip of Mosul.
By the day's end the ISF had succeeded in liberating 85% of the Ghazlani base and 50% of the airport. This led to some concern that ISF forces would sustain a high number of casualties both from ISIL fighters remaining in the base and the airport and from a possible ISIL counter-offensive on both locations.
Today I am happy to report that no such counter-offensive occurred. In fact at around 09:00 (GMT) this morning the ISF were able to declare Mosul airport to be completely, 100% liberated from ISIL. At around 10:00 (GMT) the ISF were able to declare that the Ghazlani base is also now completely, 100% liberated from ISIL.
Since then the ISF have begun to advance into the Hay al-Tayaran neighbourhood. This sits directly directly to the north of Mosul airport. They also continue to hold the Tal al-Rayyan neighbourhood to the north-west of Ghazlani base which was liberated yesterday and have advanced into the Hay al-Mamun neighbourhood which sits north-east of Tal al-Rayyan and directly north of the Ghazlani base.
To the west of the city the PMF have continued their advance around the town of Tal Afar. Today they have announced the liberation of the villages of Tal Zalat, Um Musaid and al-Zaytun. Assuming the liberation of al-Zaytun has come from the north-west this almost completely cuts ISIL positions in western Mosul off from ISIL positions in Tal Afar. It also places the PMF around 25km (15 miles) west of Mosul itself.
Also today Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that he has given the Iraqi Air Force permission to conduct airstrikes against ISIL positions within Syria. This announcement was immediately followed by Iraqi airstrikes against ISIL positions in and around Deir-ez-Zour in Syria. These strikes were carried out in response to the three ISIL bomb attacks conducted against the Bayaa and Sadr City districts of Baghdad last week.
This expansion of Iraqi operations into Syria serves to underline that the ISIL threat to Iraq will not end with the liberation of Mosul. Nor will it end with the liberation of Hawija. Instead it will only end when ISIL have been completely defeated in both Iraq and Syria.
Although former US President Barack Obama seemed to do everything in his power to block it the original plan was that the ISF would defeat ISIL in Iraq sweeping them back into Syria. The ISF would then chase ISIL into Syria and defeat them there too. The expansion of Iraqi strikes into Syria shows that Iraq is still committed to that plan.
Deir-ez-Zour is where the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) are currently focusing their efforts to expand their de facto safe-haven and prepare for the liberation of Raqqa. I think it is fair to assume then that they enjoy Iraqi support even if Iraq's Kurdistan Region is still trying to undermine them.
Also today there has been an ISIL suicide attack on the Turkish occupied Syrian town of al-Bab. This has killed in excess of 50 people - predominately Sunni-Arab civilians. ISIL have also mounted an attack on a Jordanian border post which has killed 15 Jordanian border guards.
Both of these attacks appear to be ISIL's contribution to the Geneva process talks which formally resumed today.
However with those talks taking place I can't go into much detail beyond saying that now the pressure is mounting ISIL seem desperate for the United Turkmen Army (UTA) and the Southern Front to swoop in to their rescue.
18:10 on 24/2/17 (UK date).
Thursday, 23 February 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 32, Week 1, Day 4.
On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate
the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL). Mosul has functioned as ISIL's de facto capital in Iraq
since the summer of 2014.
This operation is a combined one between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) who are a loose coalition of militias that serve as part of the ISF. The operation is being backed by the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR).
By January 25th 2017 (25/1/17) the eastern half of Mosul - often known as; "The Left Bank" - was fully liberated from ISIL.
On Sunday - February 19th (19/2/17) - an operation was launched to liberate the western half of Mosul - often known as; "The Right Bank" - from ISIL. The first stage of this operation saw the ISF advance in two columns from positions just south of Mosul known as the Qarrayah line.
In this first stage of the advance the main challenge has been to detect and defuse the vast number of landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) that ISIL have laid between the Qarrayah line and southern Mosul.
To aid with this the US and other CJTFOIR nations have deployed a number of highly trained bomb disposal specialists to assist the ISF. Yesterday (22/2/17) the US confirmed that a number of its deployed specialists had come under fire and being wounded. However no further details have been given.
By the end of the first day of operations the ISF had liberated 10 villages and the Lazakah power plant which provides power to all of Mosul.
By Monday (20/2/17) evening the ISF had succeeded in liberating the Albu Saif village/neighbourhood which sits at the southern most tip of Mosul's western side. By Tuesday (21/2/17) they had succeeded in liberating Yarmouk village/neighbourhood which sits between Albu Saif and Mosul.
As with Gogjali to the east of Mosul neither Albu Saif nor Yarmouk are technically part of Mosul. However they are so close that on the ground you would need that administrative distinction pointed out to you.
As you move north from either Albu Saif or Yarmouk to your east you have Mosul airport while to the west you have the Ghazlani military base. Together Mosul airport and the Ghazlani military base occupy roughly 20% of the territory on Mosul's western side.
The problem is that the airport and the military base function almost as a city within in a city. So if the ISF were to move to liberate the airport without also liberating the military base ISIL fighters in Ghazlani would cut the ISF troops at the airport to pieces. Likewise if the ISF moved against the military base without also liberating the airport ISIL fighters in the airport would cut the ISF troops in Ghazlani to pieces.
So what the ISF needed to do was take both the airport and the military base at the same time. This requires a lot of careful coordination. As a result on Wednesday (22/2/17) the operation went into a short tactical pause.
The operation resumed at dawn today with dramatic effect. Within four hours the ISF had succeeded in liberating Mosul airport. They also entered the Ghazlani military base and were reported to be in control of at least half of it. However at the time of writing that report was at least six hours old so the ISF may have liberated more of Ghazlani base by now.
Obviously I'll be a lot happier when Ghazlani base is fully liberated. However even 50% control should be enough to suppress the ISIL fighters there and help protect the airport. The test will come tomorrow it seems almost inevitable that ISIL will launch a counter-offensive.
The liberation of the airport and the military base is a huge gain for the ISF. Obviously it means that around 20% of the total territory they need to liberate has been liberated. In a day.
However it also provides the ISF with a base of operations within western Mosul. Once the area has been fully secured they can now bring reinforcements, ammunition, fuel and other supplies into Ghazlani and then quickly supply them to ISF units fighting elsewhere in western Mosul as the operation progresses.
Throughout the Mosul operation the big problem has been the failure to establish a western front to encircle the city on all sides.
This was partially solved on November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) when the PMF completed an advance from the Qarrayah line liberating Tal Afar airport from ISIL. This established a western front cutting ISIL off from Syria. However it still left the problem of what to do about Tal Afar itself.
This entire Nineveh Plains area surrounding Mosul to the town of Sinjar/Shingal around 140km (85 miles) to the west is almost exclusively Sunni-Muslim. However Tal Afar itself stands almost as a little island of ethnic Turks. These Turkmen are a mixture of both Sunni and Shia Muslims.
Although there are around 60 PMF units in total the PMF units active around the Nineveh Plains are almost exclusively Shia-Muslim. As such Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long been afraid that if the PMF liberate Tal Afar the particularly Shia Turkmen will ally themselves with the PMF rather than Erdogan. Therefore Erdogan has long threatened to militarily invade and occupy northern Iraq if the PMF enter Tal Afar.
In response the PMF have decided to simply go around Tal Afar.
When the ISF began their advance north to Mosul on Sunday (19/2/17) the PMF also began an advance north-east from the Qarrayah line. Yesterday (22/2/17) the PMF began an advance in three columns north-east around Tal Afar. The objective seems to be that having rounded Tal Afar they will advance south-east to meet those advancing from the Qarrayah line. This will cut Mosul off from Tal Afar and tighten the noose around the west of the city.
Erdogan's threat to invade and occupy northern Iraq is clearly not an empty one. He has already done just that in northern Syria.
Since mid-to-late November 2016 Erdogan's efforts have been focused on the town of al-Bab. This represents a key supply node within northern Syria. It sits around 40km (24 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey, 30km (18 miles) north-east of Aleppo City and 50km (30 miles) south-west of Manbij which is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD).
For a town that is only roughly 20kmsq (12 milesq) is area Erdogan's efforts to capture al-Bab have been long and tortured.
Last Thursday (16/2/17) Erdogan declared that the town had been fully captured. This was soon downgraded to Erdogan's forces only being in control of 40% of al-Bab. On Tuesday (21/2/17) Erdogan declared that his forces controlled 60% of the town. Today it's been announced that Erdogan's forces have taken control of the centre of al-Bab and victory has once again been declared.
As with all other aspects of Erdogan's actions in northern Syria today's announcement seems to be a carefully scripted piece of theatre. It was designed to coincide with the resumption of the United Nations (UN) led Geneva Process on Syria.
In the first instance it projects an image of Erdogan's power. It sends the message that Erdogan controls this piece of Syria and will continue to hold it throughout the Geneva Process. That Geneva Process is of course still suffering from its founding flaw that foreign powers can attack and invade Syria in order to get a say in how Syria is run.
The question of what Erdogan will do next once he has captured al-Bab has long been a cause for concern.
Erdogan has long stated that his next objective is to attack the SDF - and the US Special Operations Forces (SOF's) embedded with them - at Manbij. However more recently Erdogan has said that he intends to send his forces a further 500km (300 miles) deeper into Syria to capture the cities of Raqqa and Palmyra. To deter that latter option Russia has established a security line just south of al-Bab. However Erdogan has recently indicated that he would be prepared to violate that security line even if it means direct conflict with Russia.
Obviously the declaration that al-Bab has been liberated pushes all those questions to the fore right at the moment that everybody is meeting in Geneva.
18:25 on 23/2/17 (UK date).
Edited at around 19:55 on 23/2/17 (UK date) to add;
Key to today's complex manoeuvre has been speed. As a result the days events have been extremely fast moving and at times have seemed utterly baffling to outsiders.
Whilst I was writing the above the ISF came out and gave a formal assessment of their progress. They now assess 85% of the Ghazlani military base to be under their control and 50% of Mosul airport to be under their control.
Obviously the report I would have liked to have heard is that Ghazlani and the Mosul airport are both 100% under ISF control. That rapid gain has triggered a collapse in ISIL's ranks, they've all committed suicide and the battle is over.
However I think this situation is actually slightly better. My main concern was that the ISF would get stranded on the open areas of the airports and come under continuous fire from ISIL positions in the airport buildings and at Ghazlani base.
The fact that the majority of Ghazlani base has been liberated makes that less likely. Obviously though I would like to know exactly which bits of the base and the airport have been liberated and which bits remain under ISIL control.
Also today's operations haven't just focused on the Ghazlani base and the airport.
The ISF have also managed enter and liberate the Tall arRayyan neighbourhood of Mosul. This sit directly north-west of the Ghazlani base.
It is also being reported that the ISF have managed to cross the M1 Motorway as it runs beside the Tall ar Rayyan neighbourhood. This has allowed them to establish a foothold within the Hay al-Mamun neighbourhood which sits direct north of the Ghazlani base.
This operation is a combined one between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) who are a loose coalition of militias that serve as part of the ISF. The operation is being backed by the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR).
By January 25th 2017 (25/1/17) the eastern half of Mosul - often known as; "The Left Bank" - was fully liberated from ISIL.
On Sunday - February 19th (19/2/17) - an operation was launched to liberate the western half of Mosul - often known as; "The Right Bank" - from ISIL. The first stage of this operation saw the ISF advance in two columns from positions just south of Mosul known as the Qarrayah line.
In this first stage of the advance the main challenge has been to detect and defuse the vast number of landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) that ISIL have laid between the Qarrayah line and southern Mosul.
To aid with this the US and other CJTFOIR nations have deployed a number of highly trained bomb disposal specialists to assist the ISF. Yesterday (22/2/17) the US confirmed that a number of its deployed specialists had come under fire and being wounded. However no further details have been given.
By the end of the first day of operations the ISF had liberated 10 villages and the Lazakah power plant which provides power to all of Mosul.
By Monday (20/2/17) evening the ISF had succeeded in liberating the Albu Saif village/neighbourhood which sits at the southern most tip of Mosul's western side. By Tuesday (21/2/17) they had succeeded in liberating Yarmouk village/neighbourhood which sits between Albu Saif and Mosul.
As with Gogjali to the east of Mosul neither Albu Saif nor Yarmouk are technically part of Mosul. However they are so close that on the ground you would need that administrative distinction pointed out to you.
As you move north from either Albu Saif or Yarmouk to your east you have Mosul airport while to the west you have the Ghazlani military base. Together Mosul airport and the Ghazlani military base occupy roughly 20% of the territory on Mosul's western side.
The problem is that the airport and the military base function almost as a city within in a city. So if the ISF were to move to liberate the airport without also liberating the military base ISIL fighters in Ghazlani would cut the ISF troops at the airport to pieces. Likewise if the ISF moved against the military base without also liberating the airport ISIL fighters in the airport would cut the ISF troops in Ghazlani to pieces.
So what the ISF needed to do was take both the airport and the military base at the same time. This requires a lot of careful coordination. As a result on Wednesday (22/2/17) the operation went into a short tactical pause.
The operation resumed at dawn today with dramatic effect. Within four hours the ISF had succeeded in liberating Mosul airport. They also entered the Ghazlani military base and were reported to be in control of at least half of it. However at the time of writing that report was at least six hours old so the ISF may have liberated more of Ghazlani base by now.
Obviously I'll be a lot happier when Ghazlani base is fully liberated. However even 50% control should be enough to suppress the ISIL fighters there and help protect the airport. The test will come tomorrow it seems almost inevitable that ISIL will launch a counter-offensive.
The liberation of the airport and the military base is a huge gain for the ISF. Obviously it means that around 20% of the total territory they need to liberate has been liberated. In a day.
However it also provides the ISF with a base of operations within western Mosul. Once the area has been fully secured they can now bring reinforcements, ammunition, fuel and other supplies into Ghazlani and then quickly supply them to ISF units fighting elsewhere in western Mosul as the operation progresses.
Throughout the Mosul operation the big problem has been the failure to establish a western front to encircle the city on all sides.
This was partially solved on November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) when the PMF completed an advance from the Qarrayah line liberating Tal Afar airport from ISIL. This established a western front cutting ISIL off from Syria. However it still left the problem of what to do about Tal Afar itself.
This entire Nineveh Plains area surrounding Mosul to the town of Sinjar/Shingal around 140km (85 miles) to the west is almost exclusively Sunni-Muslim. However Tal Afar itself stands almost as a little island of ethnic Turks. These Turkmen are a mixture of both Sunni and Shia Muslims.
Although there are around 60 PMF units in total the PMF units active around the Nineveh Plains are almost exclusively Shia-Muslim. As such Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long been afraid that if the PMF liberate Tal Afar the particularly Shia Turkmen will ally themselves with the PMF rather than Erdogan. Therefore Erdogan has long threatened to militarily invade and occupy northern Iraq if the PMF enter Tal Afar.
In response the PMF have decided to simply go around Tal Afar.
When the ISF began their advance north to Mosul on Sunday (19/2/17) the PMF also began an advance north-east from the Qarrayah line. Yesterday (22/2/17) the PMF began an advance in three columns north-east around Tal Afar. The objective seems to be that having rounded Tal Afar they will advance south-east to meet those advancing from the Qarrayah line. This will cut Mosul off from Tal Afar and tighten the noose around the west of the city.
Erdogan's threat to invade and occupy northern Iraq is clearly not an empty one. He has already done just that in northern Syria.
Since mid-to-late November 2016 Erdogan's efforts have been focused on the town of al-Bab. This represents a key supply node within northern Syria. It sits around 40km (24 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey, 30km (18 miles) north-east of Aleppo City and 50km (30 miles) south-west of Manbij which is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD).
For a town that is only roughly 20kmsq (12 milesq) is area Erdogan's efforts to capture al-Bab have been long and tortured.
Last Thursday (16/2/17) Erdogan declared that the town had been fully captured. This was soon downgraded to Erdogan's forces only being in control of 40% of al-Bab. On Tuesday (21/2/17) Erdogan declared that his forces controlled 60% of the town. Today it's been announced that Erdogan's forces have taken control of the centre of al-Bab and victory has once again been declared.
As with all other aspects of Erdogan's actions in northern Syria today's announcement seems to be a carefully scripted piece of theatre. It was designed to coincide with the resumption of the United Nations (UN) led Geneva Process on Syria.
In the first instance it projects an image of Erdogan's power. It sends the message that Erdogan controls this piece of Syria and will continue to hold it throughout the Geneva Process. That Geneva Process is of course still suffering from its founding flaw that foreign powers can attack and invade Syria in order to get a say in how Syria is run.
The question of what Erdogan will do next once he has captured al-Bab has long been a cause for concern.
Erdogan has long stated that his next objective is to attack the SDF - and the US Special Operations Forces (SOF's) embedded with them - at Manbij. However more recently Erdogan has said that he intends to send his forces a further 500km (300 miles) deeper into Syria to capture the cities of Raqqa and Palmyra. To deter that latter option Russia has established a security line just south of al-Bab. However Erdogan has recently indicated that he would be prepared to violate that security line even if it means direct conflict with Russia.
Obviously the declaration that al-Bab has been liberated pushes all those questions to the fore right at the moment that everybody is meeting in Geneva.
18:25 on 23/2/17 (UK date).
Edited at around 19:55 on 23/2/17 (UK date) to add;
Key to today's complex manoeuvre has been speed. As a result the days events have been extremely fast moving and at times have seemed utterly baffling to outsiders.
Whilst I was writing the above the ISF came out and gave a formal assessment of their progress. They now assess 85% of the Ghazlani military base to be under their control and 50% of Mosul airport to be under their control.
Obviously the report I would have liked to have heard is that Ghazlani and the Mosul airport are both 100% under ISF control. That rapid gain has triggered a collapse in ISIL's ranks, they've all committed suicide and the battle is over.
However I think this situation is actually slightly better. My main concern was that the ISF would get stranded on the open areas of the airports and come under continuous fire from ISIL positions in the airport buildings and at Ghazlani base.
The fact that the majority of Ghazlani base has been liberated makes that less likely. Obviously though I would like to know exactly which bits of the base and the airport have been liberated and which bits remain under ISIL control.
Also today's operations haven't just focused on the Ghazlani base and the airport.
The ISF have also managed enter and liberate the Tall arRayyan neighbourhood of Mosul. This sit directly north-west of the Ghazlani base.
It is also being reported that the ISF have managed to cross the M1 Motorway as it runs beside the Tall ar Rayyan neighbourhood. This has allowed them to establish a foothold within the Hay al-Mamun neighbourhood which sits direct north of the Ghazlani base.
Monday, 20 February 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 32, Week 1, Day 1.
On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Mosul has functioned as ISIL's de facto capital in Iraq since the summer of 2014.
This operation is a combined one between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) who are a loose coalition of militias that serve as part of the ISF. The operation is being backed by the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR).
The initial plan was to surround Mosul on the three sides; the North, the East and the South.
The eastern front was always the most advanced. By October 31st 2016 (31/10/16) the ISF had succeeded in reaching the Gogjali area which sits right on the outskirts of Mosul itself. On the northern front the Peshmerga succeeded in liberating the towns of Bashiqa & Barzani by November 16th 2016 (16/11/16). This marked the end of their advance with responsibility for advancing further into Mosul being handed to the ISF.
On the southern or Qarrayah front the ISF succeeded in liberating the town of Haman al-Alil on November 7th 2016 (7/11/16). The ISF then proceeded to liberate all the villages and areas between Haman al-Alil and the village of Bhakira some 23km (14 miles) to the west. As of November 24th 2016 (24/11/16) this meant that the ISF had established a line of control just 7km (4 miles) to the south of Mosul.
On October 29th 2016 (29/10/16) the PMF acting almost independently of the ISF opened up a western front. They did this by pushing up from the town of Ayn Nasr on the Qarrayah front all the way to the town of Tel Afar which sits around 100km (80 miles) west of Mosul along the H47 Highway.
On November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) the PMF liberated Tel Afar airport. Although this stopped short of giving them control of the town itself it put the PMF in control of the H47 Highway cutting off ISIL's route to and from Syria.
On November 1st 2016 (1/11/16) the ISF launched their assault on Mosul proper from the east. On January 25th 2017 (25/1/17) the ISF succeeded in fully liberating the entire eastern side of Mosul up to the Tigris River which runs through the centre of the city. Since then the operation has been in pause to allow the ISF to prepare for an assault on the western side of Mosul.
That operation to liberate the west of Mosul began yesterday (19/2/17). Obviously the first phase of the operation is to advance from the forward positions on Mosul itself.
At dawn the Federal Police branch of the ISF began an advance from the Qarrayah line. At the same time the PMF began an advance from Ash Sahaji to the west long the Mosul to Ash Sahaji road.The Iraqi Army branch of the ISF also began an advance between the PMF and Federal Police advances.
So combined PMF and ISF forces now appear to be advancing on the entire south-west quarter of Mosul from the Mosul to Ash Sahaji road to the Tigris River.
Amid light resistance from ISIL by yesterday evening (19/2/17) the Federal Police branch of the ISF had succeeded in liberating 10 villages and the Lazakah Power Plant. This sits around 8km (5 miles) south of the Abu Saif village/neighbourhood and supplies power to all of Mosul.
Today the Federal Police branch are said to be within 2km (1.2 miles) of Mosul Airport and on the verge of liberating Abu Saif. The Army branch are said to be on the outskirts of the Ghazlani military base.
Obviously at the very early stages of this new phase of the operation there is not much for me to say. I suspect though that will change in the days and weeks to come.
In the meantime on January 28th (28/1/17) US President Donald Trump issued a memorandum to 12 US Government departments. This gave them 30 days to report back to help draw up a new strategy to defeat ISIL and associated groups.
Last Wednesday (15/2/17) one of those departments - the Department of Defence - made public that it was contemplating deploying conventional US ground troops to Syria. This is certainly something that has to be considered in drawing up a new strategy. However it strikes me as an extremely bad idea and one that should never be put into motion.
Unlike defeated 2016 US Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton I do not invite the fathers of ISIL terrorists to my campaign rallies. Nor do I pass sensitive information to ISIL cells in Bangladesh.
Unlike former US President Barack Obama I do not rely on Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan for all my information and opinions about Iraq, Syria and the rest of the Muslim world.
As a result I know that the violence and butchery of ISIL and their associates is very far from a mainstream Muslim point of view. In fact there are many who would say that ISIL and their associates are not Muslims at all.
I know this because I have spent nearly two and a half years working with Muslim to defeat ISIL and their associates.
When I talk about the ISF I am talking about a group of people who are almost all Muslims. When I talk about the PMF I am talking about people almost all of whom are Muslims. When I talk about the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) or the wider Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) I am again talking about people who are almost all Muslims.
In fact when I talk about the fight against ISIL and their associates the only times I am not talking about Muslims I will tell you by referring to people as Assyrian Christians or Yezidis.
Therefore I know that there is absolutely no lack of will within the Islamic world to defeat ISIL and their associates. The problem - particularly in Syria and Iraq - is simply a lack of resources.
Prior to the US invasion in 2003 the Iraqi military had suffered for years following lost wars in 1988 and 1991 and the deserved sanctions that followed. In 2003 the US disbanded the Iraqi military entirely. Since then the Iraqi military has been to rebuild itself from scratch. This is something the US has hardly helped with delaying the delivery of F-16 fighter aircraft to the Iraqi airforce even while the battle against ISIL has been raging on.
When it comes to militias like the YPG nobody is getting paid. In Iraq some of the Assyrian Christian militias and the Yezidi Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) are not only not getting paid they actually have to pay for the privilege of fighting ISIL by buying their own weapons, ammunition and equipment. Added to that many of these militias have had to teach themselves how to be soldiers despite having no experience. After all how prepared would you be if one day you suddenly had to fight a war?
Deploying conventional US ground troops to Syria is also an extremely bad idea because although the overwhelming majority of their violence is directed against other Muslims ISIL and their associates like to claim that they are protecting Muslims from Christian Crusaders.
Almost all of ISIL's propaganda and murder videos refer to either; "The Nations of the Cross" or; "The Soldiers of the Cross." They are also obsessed with the Sykes-Picot Agreement which drew the border between Syria and Iraq following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Therefore deploying large numbers of US troops - the Soldiers of the Cross - to Syria would delegitimise the conflict as the Muslim war against ISIL that it is. Instead it would legitimise ISIL's claim that they are the true Muslims battling the crusaders while running a very high risk of the US getting bogged down in Syria just as it did in Iraq and continues to be in Afghanistan.
Instead the solution is to support the local Muslim and non-Muslim forces that want to defeat ISIL in doing just that. That does not mean supporting groups that are prepared to ally themselves with ISIL in order to fight the secular Syrian government or any of the minority religious and ethnic groups it protects.
The problem is that ISIL and its associates do have some supporters and those supporters are very opposed to the US increasing its support for those who wish to fight and defeat ISIL. Chief amongst these supporters is of course Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Back in August 2016 Erdogan sent Turkish forces to illegally invade northern Syria specifically to prevent the SDF from liberating more territory from ISIL. Erdogan is currently lobbying the US for his forces to participate in any operation against ISIL's de facto Syrian capital Raqqa. The proposal that Erdogan is most keen on would see Turkish troops invade Syria via the border town of Tel Abyad. This would immediately split the SDF's de facto safe-zone in half significantly weakening the fight against ISIL.
Within Iraq militias like the YBS have recently been absorbed into the PMF structure. This means they've been getting paid and have access to equipment and training. However under pressure from Erdogan who has been bombing Iraq since the summer of 2015 the Iraqi government on February 13th (13/2/17) were forced to exclude the YBS from the PMF structure.
So if the US were to increase its support for local forces fighting to defeat ISIL it would likely put it on a collision course with Erdogan. Experience tells us that Erdogan will respond to not getting his own way by dispatching terrorists disguised as refugees/migrants to carry out terror attacks against, in this case, the US.
In preparation for this looming confrontation with Erdogan while he was issuing his memo on strategy President Trump also issued a series of Executive Orders temporarily restricting travel from seven nations to the US. Particularly Syrian refugees from camps in Turkey where ISIL are known to operate and Al Qaeda appear to be in charge of security vetting. After all as the June 12th 2016 (12/6/16) Orlando terror attack showed it only takes one person to slip through the net.
Unfortunately Washington State Attorney General Robert Ferguson on behalf of both his state and Minnesota State sought an obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from Judge James Robart blocking this sensible precaution.
As such this statement by the Department of Defence does seem more aimed at AG Ferguson than anybody else. It seems to be asking him that now he's siding with Erdogan and by extension ISIL against the US how many US troops he would like to see killed as an alternative?
At around 17:40 on 20/2/17 (UK date) I'll have to pick this up after dinner.
Edited around 19:35 on 20/2/17 (UK date) to add;
In bringing this legal challenge AG Ferguson et al is forcing the US government to make public some extremely sensitive intelligence on the situation in and around Iraq and Syria. In writing about this last Tuesday (14/2/17) I said that this was so sensitive I wasn't happy even acknowledging that intelligence may exist.
On Wednesday (15/2/17) ISIL proved my point. They took 13 civilians in Mosul who they accused of being spies, locked them in metal cages and then drowned them in the Tigris River. This not only highlights the brutality of ISIL but also their paranoia. If they even suspect a group of people of being spies they will often kill them all. Even talking about spies that the US may have within ISIL will likely trigger even more of these mass killings.
As I also mentioned last Tuesday (14/2/17) on Monday (13/2/17) AG Ferguson's challenge - rather than the TRO - reached the Courts for the first time. There Judge Robart denied the US government's request to have the proceedings delayed indefinitely. However he upheld Ferguson's request to have the proceedings delayed indefinitely.
The issue here is the possibility of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals holding an "En Banc" hearing on the matter. En Banc is merely French for; "In Bench." Essentially I think there are 25 Judges currently sitting on the 9th Circuit. However only three of them have supported the TRO. This seems to have prompted the other 22 Judges to call for an opportunity to take a very close look at the behaviour of the three.
Obviously getting 25 Judges who live all across the US together in the same place for an en banc hearing is an extremely time consuming process that could take weeks if not months. The problem is that we simply don't have weeks let alone months for this matter to be resolved.
Last Thursday (16/2/17) Erdogan declared that the Syrian town of al-Bab had been fully captured. Erdogan went on to declare that his forces would now attack the SDF - including embedded US Special Operations Forces (SOF) - at Manbij.
Erdogan's claim that al-Bab had been liberated has since been contradicted. However his forces continue to operate inside al-Bab controlling at least 40% of the town meaning that it could be fully captured any day now opening the way for an assault on US troops at Manbij.
With the US being bound by AG Ferguson it has fallen to Russia to control the situation. On Tuesday (14/2/17) it was announced that Russia had brokered a so-called "Security Line" between Erdogan's forces and Syria forces at al-Bab. With Syrian forces being in control of all positions south of al-Bab this should prevent Erdogan's forces from advancing further south.
However Erdogan has likened this security line to the "Green Line" that separates Turkish occupation forces and Cypriot forces in Cyprus. The European Union (EU) is currently heavily invested in reuniting Cyprus removing the Green Line. The fact Erdogan seems more interested in Cyprus suggests he's not taking the al-Bab line too seriously.
Also while I've been writing this it has been reported that a Turkish F-16 struck a Russian military convoy close to the city of Homs killing four Russian soldiers. If confirmed that would suggest Erdogan is already testing out what sort of opposition he may receive from Russia if he were to violate the al-Bab line.
So with AG Ferguson refusing to stand on the merits of his argument and time running out it has fallen to President Trump to be the bigger man.
On Thursday (16/2/17) the US government informed the 9th Circuit of its intention to issue new Executive Orders on the matter. This doesn't automatically end the case but the existing TRO will not be applicable to the new orders rendering the case rather moot.
Obviously I do not have advance copies of these new Executive Orders. However in the US all laws and Executive Orders are issued under the Constitution. Therefore you don't normally have to actually write on them that they must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution. It's implied.
Therefore I suspect that these new Executive Orders will be almost exactly the same as the original ones. However they will explicitly state things like that they can't be used to deny US citizens entry to the US.
It will then fall back to AG Ferguson to decide whether to challenge the new Executive Orders on the grounds they're covered by the existing TRO, mount a fresh challenge against them or simply learn not to put his own ego ahead of complex matters of foreign policy.
20:20 on 20/2/17 (UK date).
This operation is a combined one between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) who are a loose coalition of militias that serve as part of the ISF. The operation is being backed by the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR).
The initial plan was to surround Mosul on the three sides; the North, the East and the South.
The eastern front was always the most advanced. By October 31st 2016 (31/10/16) the ISF had succeeded in reaching the Gogjali area which sits right on the outskirts of Mosul itself. On the northern front the Peshmerga succeeded in liberating the towns of Bashiqa & Barzani by November 16th 2016 (16/11/16). This marked the end of their advance with responsibility for advancing further into Mosul being handed to the ISF.
On the southern or Qarrayah front the ISF succeeded in liberating the town of Haman al-Alil on November 7th 2016 (7/11/16). The ISF then proceeded to liberate all the villages and areas between Haman al-Alil and the village of Bhakira some 23km (14 miles) to the west. As of November 24th 2016 (24/11/16) this meant that the ISF had established a line of control just 7km (4 miles) to the south of Mosul.
On October 29th 2016 (29/10/16) the PMF acting almost independently of the ISF opened up a western front. They did this by pushing up from the town of Ayn Nasr on the Qarrayah front all the way to the town of Tel Afar which sits around 100km (80 miles) west of Mosul along the H47 Highway.
On November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) the PMF liberated Tel Afar airport. Although this stopped short of giving them control of the town itself it put the PMF in control of the H47 Highway cutting off ISIL's route to and from Syria.
On November 1st 2016 (1/11/16) the ISF launched their assault on Mosul proper from the east. On January 25th 2017 (25/1/17) the ISF succeeded in fully liberating the entire eastern side of Mosul up to the Tigris River which runs through the centre of the city. Since then the operation has been in pause to allow the ISF to prepare for an assault on the western side of Mosul.
That operation to liberate the west of Mosul began yesterday (19/2/17). Obviously the first phase of the operation is to advance from the forward positions on Mosul itself.
At dawn the Federal Police branch of the ISF began an advance from the Qarrayah line. At the same time the PMF began an advance from Ash Sahaji to the west long the Mosul to Ash Sahaji road.The Iraqi Army branch of the ISF also began an advance between the PMF and Federal Police advances.
So combined PMF and ISF forces now appear to be advancing on the entire south-west quarter of Mosul from the Mosul to Ash Sahaji road to the Tigris River.
Amid light resistance from ISIL by yesterday evening (19/2/17) the Federal Police branch of the ISF had succeeded in liberating 10 villages and the Lazakah Power Plant. This sits around 8km (5 miles) south of the Abu Saif village/neighbourhood and supplies power to all of Mosul.
Today the Federal Police branch are said to be within 2km (1.2 miles) of Mosul Airport and on the verge of liberating Abu Saif. The Army branch are said to be on the outskirts of the Ghazlani military base.
Obviously at the very early stages of this new phase of the operation there is not much for me to say. I suspect though that will change in the days and weeks to come.
In the meantime on January 28th (28/1/17) US President Donald Trump issued a memorandum to 12 US Government departments. This gave them 30 days to report back to help draw up a new strategy to defeat ISIL and associated groups.
Last Wednesday (15/2/17) one of those departments - the Department of Defence - made public that it was contemplating deploying conventional US ground troops to Syria. This is certainly something that has to be considered in drawing up a new strategy. However it strikes me as an extremely bad idea and one that should never be put into motion.
Unlike defeated 2016 US Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton I do not invite the fathers of ISIL terrorists to my campaign rallies. Nor do I pass sensitive information to ISIL cells in Bangladesh.
Unlike former US President Barack Obama I do not rely on Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan for all my information and opinions about Iraq, Syria and the rest of the Muslim world.
As a result I know that the violence and butchery of ISIL and their associates is very far from a mainstream Muslim point of view. In fact there are many who would say that ISIL and their associates are not Muslims at all.
I know this because I have spent nearly two and a half years working with Muslim to defeat ISIL and their associates.
When I talk about the ISF I am talking about a group of people who are almost all Muslims. When I talk about the PMF I am talking about people almost all of whom are Muslims. When I talk about the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) or the wider Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) I am again talking about people who are almost all Muslims.
In fact when I talk about the fight against ISIL and their associates the only times I am not talking about Muslims I will tell you by referring to people as Assyrian Christians or Yezidis.
Therefore I know that there is absolutely no lack of will within the Islamic world to defeat ISIL and their associates. The problem - particularly in Syria and Iraq - is simply a lack of resources.
Prior to the US invasion in 2003 the Iraqi military had suffered for years following lost wars in 1988 and 1991 and the deserved sanctions that followed. In 2003 the US disbanded the Iraqi military entirely. Since then the Iraqi military has been to rebuild itself from scratch. This is something the US has hardly helped with delaying the delivery of F-16 fighter aircraft to the Iraqi airforce even while the battle against ISIL has been raging on.
When it comes to militias like the YPG nobody is getting paid. In Iraq some of the Assyrian Christian militias and the Yezidi Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) are not only not getting paid they actually have to pay for the privilege of fighting ISIL by buying their own weapons, ammunition and equipment. Added to that many of these militias have had to teach themselves how to be soldiers despite having no experience. After all how prepared would you be if one day you suddenly had to fight a war?
Deploying conventional US ground troops to Syria is also an extremely bad idea because although the overwhelming majority of their violence is directed against other Muslims ISIL and their associates like to claim that they are protecting Muslims from Christian Crusaders.
Almost all of ISIL's propaganda and murder videos refer to either; "The Nations of the Cross" or; "The Soldiers of the Cross." They are also obsessed with the Sykes-Picot Agreement which drew the border between Syria and Iraq following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Therefore deploying large numbers of US troops - the Soldiers of the Cross - to Syria would delegitimise the conflict as the Muslim war against ISIL that it is. Instead it would legitimise ISIL's claim that they are the true Muslims battling the crusaders while running a very high risk of the US getting bogged down in Syria just as it did in Iraq and continues to be in Afghanistan.
Instead the solution is to support the local Muslim and non-Muslim forces that want to defeat ISIL in doing just that. That does not mean supporting groups that are prepared to ally themselves with ISIL in order to fight the secular Syrian government or any of the minority religious and ethnic groups it protects.
The problem is that ISIL and its associates do have some supporters and those supporters are very opposed to the US increasing its support for those who wish to fight and defeat ISIL. Chief amongst these supporters is of course Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Back in August 2016 Erdogan sent Turkish forces to illegally invade northern Syria specifically to prevent the SDF from liberating more territory from ISIL. Erdogan is currently lobbying the US for his forces to participate in any operation against ISIL's de facto Syrian capital Raqqa. The proposal that Erdogan is most keen on would see Turkish troops invade Syria via the border town of Tel Abyad. This would immediately split the SDF's de facto safe-zone in half significantly weakening the fight against ISIL.
Within Iraq militias like the YBS have recently been absorbed into the PMF structure. This means they've been getting paid and have access to equipment and training. However under pressure from Erdogan who has been bombing Iraq since the summer of 2015 the Iraqi government on February 13th (13/2/17) were forced to exclude the YBS from the PMF structure.
So if the US were to increase its support for local forces fighting to defeat ISIL it would likely put it on a collision course with Erdogan. Experience tells us that Erdogan will respond to not getting his own way by dispatching terrorists disguised as refugees/migrants to carry out terror attacks against, in this case, the US.
In preparation for this looming confrontation with Erdogan while he was issuing his memo on strategy President Trump also issued a series of Executive Orders temporarily restricting travel from seven nations to the US. Particularly Syrian refugees from camps in Turkey where ISIL are known to operate and Al Qaeda appear to be in charge of security vetting. After all as the June 12th 2016 (12/6/16) Orlando terror attack showed it only takes one person to slip through the net.
Unfortunately Washington State Attorney General Robert Ferguson on behalf of both his state and Minnesota State sought an obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from Judge James Robart blocking this sensible precaution.
As such this statement by the Department of Defence does seem more aimed at AG Ferguson than anybody else. It seems to be asking him that now he's siding with Erdogan and by extension ISIL against the US how many US troops he would like to see killed as an alternative?
At around 17:40 on 20/2/17 (UK date) I'll have to pick this up after dinner.
Edited around 19:35 on 20/2/17 (UK date) to add;
In bringing this legal challenge AG Ferguson et al is forcing the US government to make public some extremely sensitive intelligence on the situation in and around Iraq and Syria. In writing about this last Tuesday (14/2/17) I said that this was so sensitive I wasn't happy even acknowledging that intelligence may exist.
On Wednesday (15/2/17) ISIL proved my point. They took 13 civilians in Mosul who they accused of being spies, locked them in metal cages and then drowned them in the Tigris River. This not only highlights the brutality of ISIL but also their paranoia. If they even suspect a group of people of being spies they will often kill them all. Even talking about spies that the US may have within ISIL will likely trigger even more of these mass killings.
As I also mentioned last Tuesday (14/2/17) on Monday (13/2/17) AG Ferguson's challenge - rather than the TRO - reached the Courts for the first time. There Judge Robart denied the US government's request to have the proceedings delayed indefinitely. However he upheld Ferguson's request to have the proceedings delayed indefinitely.
The issue here is the possibility of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals holding an "En Banc" hearing on the matter. En Banc is merely French for; "In Bench." Essentially I think there are 25 Judges currently sitting on the 9th Circuit. However only three of them have supported the TRO. This seems to have prompted the other 22 Judges to call for an opportunity to take a very close look at the behaviour of the three.
Obviously getting 25 Judges who live all across the US together in the same place for an en banc hearing is an extremely time consuming process that could take weeks if not months. The problem is that we simply don't have weeks let alone months for this matter to be resolved.
Last Thursday (16/2/17) Erdogan declared that the Syrian town of al-Bab had been fully captured. Erdogan went on to declare that his forces would now attack the SDF - including embedded US Special Operations Forces (SOF) - at Manbij.
Erdogan's claim that al-Bab had been liberated has since been contradicted. However his forces continue to operate inside al-Bab controlling at least 40% of the town meaning that it could be fully captured any day now opening the way for an assault on US troops at Manbij.
With the US being bound by AG Ferguson it has fallen to Russia to control the situation. On Tuesday (14/2/17) it was announced that Russia had brokered a so-called "Security Line" between Erdogan's forces and Syria forces at al-Bab. With Syrian forces being in control of all positions south of al-Bab this should prevent Erdogan's forces from advancing further south.
However Erdogan has likened this security line to the "Green Line" that separates Turkish occupation forces and Cypriot forces in Cyprus. The European Union (EU) is currently heavily invested in reuniting Cyprus removing the Green Line. The fact Erdogan seems more interested in Cyprus suggests he's not taking the al-Bab line too seriously.
Also while I've been writing this it has been reported that a Turkish F-16 struck a Russian military convoy close to the city of Homs killing four Russian soldiers. If confirmed that would suggest Erdogan is already testing out what sort of opposition he may receive from Russia if he were to violate the al-Bab line.
So with AG Ferguson refusing to stand on the merits of his argument and time running out it has fallen to President Trump to be the bigger man.
On Thursday (16/2/17) the US government informed the 9th Circuit of its intention to issue new Executive Orders on the matter. This doesn't automatically end the case but the existing TRO will not be applicable to the new orders rendering the case rather moot.
Obviously I do not have advance copies of these new Executive Orders. However in the US all laws and Executive Orders are issued under the Constitution. Therefore you don't normally have to actually write on them that they must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution. It's implied.
Therefore I suspect that these new Executive Orders will be almost exactly the same as the original ones. However they will explicitly state things like that they can't be used to deny US citizens entry to the US.
It will then fall back to AG Ferguson to decide whether to challenge the new Executive Orders on the grounds they're covered by the existing TRO, mount a fresh challenge against them or simply learn not to put his own ego ahead of complex matters of foreign policy.
20:20 on 20/2/17 (UK date).
Friday, 17 February 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 31, Week 4, Day 7.
On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
This was a joint operation between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) who are a coalition of around 40 militias who operate as part of the ISF. However it was the ISF alone who were tasked with entering Mosul itself
On January 25th 2017 (25/1/17) the ISF had succeeded in liberating the entire eastern half of Mosul from ISIL. Since then the operation has been in pause to allow the ISF to consolidate their position and plan how best to go about liberating the western half of Mosul.
A similar operational pause was declared on December 9th 2016 (9/12/16) for twenty days until December 29th (29/12/16). This allowed ISIL to re-group and mount a counter-offensive which saw them seize back at least partial control of six neighbours that the ISF had liberated just days earlier.
As a result there is obvious concern that this current pause cannot be allowed to go on for too long in case it again provides ISIL with an opportunity to re-group.
Obviously on this occasion you have the advantage of a clear physical barrier between the ISIL occupied west and the liberated east in the form of the Tigris River. However the Tigris River is only around 250metre/yards wide as it flows through Mosul. ISIL artillery has a range of around 24km (15 miles).
In the 23 days of this latest pause there have been a few incidents of ISIL launching attacks in eastern Mosul;
On January 27th (27/1/17) twin Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED's/Truck bombs) struck the northern Rashidiya neighbourhood and the central Forest neighbourhood. However coming just two days after the east of the city had been liberated these seem to have been the result of ISIL's fighters left behind after the battle rather than a fresh offensive.
On February 1st (1/2/17) ISIL launched into three days of shelling of northern and central neighbourhoods along the banks of the Tigris. That forced around 1,300 civilians to flee from their homes.
On February 5th (5/2/17) a commercial drone which ISIL had adapted was used to drop hand grenades on the Rashidiya neighbourhood. On the same day ISIL were able to fire rockets on the Somar district. In total these twin attacks killed four people - three civilians and one soldier.
On February 10th (10/2/17) an ISIL suicide bomber attacked a restaurant in the Zahar district killing 10 and wounding 33. On the same day another ISIL suicide bomber attacked an ISF checkpoint in the Nouri neighbourhood killing one soldier.
On Wednesday (15/2/17) a 14 year old ISIL suicide bomber was intercepted in the Nouri neighbourhood before he was able to carry out his attack.
Although not ideal these incidents seem be isolated rather than evidence of wider co-ordinated fight-back by ISIL. As such at the risk of tempting fate it seems that the planners have the luxury of time before having to put the next phase of the Mosul operation into motion.
As with any operation of this type what the ISF want to do is surround western Mosul on all sides. This will allow them to completely control the situation and attack in a way that will do ISIL the most damage. The problem is that the initial plan for the operation was only to surround Mosul from three sides leaving the west of the city open to allow ISIL escape into Syria.
On October 29th 2016 (29/10/16) the PMF broke with this plan and opened a western front to the operation. By November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) the PMF had succeeded in liberating the airport at the town of Tal Afar some 80km (50 miles) west of Mosul. Thus all but cutting off ISIL's escape route and effectively surrounding Mosul on all sides.
As a result the operation to liberate the western half of Mosul really rests on a decision about what the PMF's role will be. Will they participate in the operation itself or will they hang back securing the perimeter as the Peshmerga have done to the east and north of Mosul.
Turkish President/Prime Minister/Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long opposed any PMF involvement in the Mosul operation.
In part that is because Erdogan opposes any action to defeat ISIL. However he particularly fears any action that will reduce his influence over ethnic Turkmen in an area of northern Iraq that he one day hopes to annex as part of his new Ottoman Empire. As part of this effort to block PMF involvement Erdogan has engaged in a huge smear campaign claiming that if they enter Mosul the PMF engage in ethnic cleansing, genocide and other heinous crimes.
I personally have no time for Erdogan's conspiracy theories and horror stories. However I am aware that in this type of operation you need careful coordination between the forces on the ground. Ideally what you want is a single force made up of highly disciplined troops with a clear chain of command all answerable to a single overall commander.
On January 26th (26/1/17) the PMF themselves provided a prime example of the type of problems a lack of coordination can cause. They opened fire on a Peshmerga unit who were stationed close to them in the area between Sinjar and Tal Afar.
The PMF claim that they had simply mistaken the Peshmerga unit for an ISIL unit. However past tension between the PMF and the Peshmerga has led some to speculate that it may have been a warning for the Peshmerga not to get too comfortable in the area around Sinjar.
Whatever the reason it is exactly this sort of lack of discipline that would rule the PMF out of operating inside of Mosul itself. After all we can't have a situation where they panic and start attacking the ISF units while they're both supposed to be fighting ISIL.
Therefore as I've said before I would prefer it if the PMF ceded their positions west of Mosul to the ISF and allow the ISF to take sole control of operations within Mosul. To this end ISF forces have been withdrawing from positions within liberated east Mosul and taking up positions to the south and west of Mosul.
However they seem to be suffering from something of a manpower problem. Where the ISF have withdrawn from eastern Mosul PMF units have been brought in to provide security. As you would expect from any loosely organised militia rather than professional military this has led to a few reported incidents of the PMF engaging in looting both of civilian and public property inside eastern Mosul.
Given that they are enthusiastic rather than well trained and disciplined if there is a manpower issue I would much prefer to see the PMF given a combat role in west Mosul than a security role in east Mosul. They would though have to be prepared to fully accept the ISF's command structure including ISF officers embedded within frontline units.
While awaiting a decision on their role in the Mosul operation the PMF have pressed ahead clearing ISIL from the areas around Tal Afar. On February 1st (1/2/17) this saw them launch a week long operation to clear the area between Tal Afar and Sinjar. This included taking full control of the Tal Afar to Sinjar road and the village of Ayn Talawi to the north of the road.
Having seen their last sliver of an escape route closed on February 12th (12/2/17) ISIL launched a big offensive against PMF positions at Tal Afar in an attempt to reopen the route. This saw a female Algerian journalist severely wounded by ISIL sniper fire on February 13th (13/2/17) and the first confirmed use by ISIL of a tank in battle in Iraq. However the ISIL offensive was broken by the PMF on February 14th (14/2/17).
Being unable to reopen their escape route to Syria ISIL have instead been reduced to lashing out in anger against the Iraqi capital Baghdad.
On Tuesday (14/2/17) ISIL killed four in a bombing in the predominately Shia Baiyaa neighbourhood in the south of the city. This was followed up by another bombing on the famously Shia Sadr City district which killed 18 on Wednesday (15/2/17). Yesterday (16/2/17) ISIL struck the Baiyaa neighbourhood again.
16:55 on 17/2/17 (UK date).
This was a joint operation between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, the US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) who are a coalition of around 40 militias who operate as part of the ISF. However it was the ISF alone who were tasked with entering Mosul itself
On January 25th 2017 (25/1/17) the ISF had succeeded in liberating the entire eastern half of Mosul from ISIL. Since then the operation has been in pause to allow the ISF to consolidate their position and plan how best to go about liberating the western half of Mosul.
A similar operational pause was declared on December 9th 2016 (9/12/16) for twenty days until December 29th (29/12/16). This allowed ISIL to re-group and mount a counter-offensive which saw them seize back at least partial control of six neighbours that the ISF had liberated just days earlier.
As a result there is obvious concern that this current pause cannot be allowed to go on for too long in case it again provides ISIL with an opportunity to re-group.
Obviously on this occasion you have the advantage of a clear physical barrier between the ISIL occupied west and the liberated east in the form of the Tigris River. However the Tigris River is only around 250metre/yards wide as it flows through Mosul. ISIL artillery has a range of around 24km (15 miles).
In the 23 days of this latest pause there have been a few incidents of ISIL launching attacks in eastern Mosul;
On January 27th (27/1/17) twin Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED's/Truck bombs) struck the northern Rashidiya neighbourhood and the central Forest neighbourhood. However coming just two days after the east of the city had been liberated these seem to have been the result of ISIL's fighters left behind after the battle rather than a fresh offensive.
On February 1st (1/2/17) ISIL launched into three days of shelling of northern and central neighbourhoods along the banks of the Tigris. That forced around 1,300 civilians to flee from their homes.
On February 5th (5/2/17) a commercial drone which ISIL had adapted was used to drop hand grenades on the Rashidiya neighbourhood. On the same day ISIL were able to fire rockets on the Somar district. In total these twin attacks killed four people - three civilians and one soldier.
On February 10th (10/2/17) an ISIL suicide bomber attacked a restaurant in the Zahar district killing 10 and wounding 33. On the same day another ISIL suicide bomber attacked an ISF checkpoint in the Nouri neighbourhood killing one soldier.
On Wednesday (15/2/17) a 14 year old ISIL suicide bomber was intercepted in the Nouri neighbourhood before he was able to carry out his attack.
Although not ideal these incidents seem be isolated rather than evidence of wider co-ordinated fight-back by ISIL. As such at the risk of tempting fate it seems that the planners have the luxury of time before having to put the next phase of the Mosul operation into motion.
As with any operation of this type what the ISF want to do is surround western Mosul on all sides. This will allow them to completely control the situation and attack in a way that will do ISIL the most damage. The problem is that the initial plan for the operation was only to surround Mosul from three sides leaving the west of the city open to allow ISIL escape into Syria.
On October 29th 2016 (29/10/16) the PMF broke with this plan and opened a western front to the operation. By November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) the PMF had succeeded in liberating the airport at the town of Tal Afar some 80km (50 miles) west of Mosul. Thus all but cutting off ISIL's escape route and effectively surrounding Mosul on all sides.
As a result the operation to liberate the western half of Mosul really rests on a decision about what the PMF's role will be. Will they participate in the operation itself or will they hang back securing the perimeter as the Peshmerga have done to the east and north of Mosul.
Turkish President/Prime Minister/Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long opposed any PMF involvement in the Mosul operation.
In part that is because Erdogan opposes any action to defeat ISIL. However he particularly fears any action that will reduce his influence over ethnic Turkmen in an area of northern Iraq that he one day hopes to annex as part of his new Ottoman Empire. As part of this effort to block PMF involvement Erdogan has engaged in a huge smear campaign claiming that if they enter Mosul the PMF engage in ethnic cleansing, genocide and other heinous crimes.
I personally have no time for Erdogan's conspiracy theories and horror stories. However I am aware that in this type of operation you need careful coordination between the forces on the ground. Ideally what you want is a single force made up of highly disciplined troops with a clear chain of command all answerable to a single overall commander.
On January 26th (26/1/17) the PMF themselves provided a prime example of the type of problems a lack of coordination can cause. They opened fire on a Peshmerga unit who were stationed close to them in the area between Sinjar and Tal Afar.
The PMF claim that they had simply mistaken the Peshmerga unit for an ISIL unit. However past tension between the PMF and the Peshmerga has led some to speculate that it may have been a warning for the Peshmerga not to get too comfortable in the area around Sinjar.
Whatever the reason it is exactly this sort of lack of discipline that would rule the PMF out of operating inside of Mosul itself. After all we can't have a situation where they panic and start attacking the ISF units while they're both supposed to be fighting ISIL.
Therefore as I've said before I would prefer it if the PMF ceded their positions west of Mosul to the ISF and allow the ISF to take sole control of operations within Mosul. To this end ISF forces have been withdrawing from positions within liberated east Mosul and taking up positions to the south and west of Mosul.
However they seem to be suffering from something of a manpower problem. Where the ISF have withdrawn from eastern Mosul PMF units have been brought in to provide security. As you would expect from any loosely organised militia rather than professional military this has led to a few reported incidents of the PMF engaging in looting both of civilian and public property inside eastern Mosul.
Given that they are enthusiastic rather than well trained and disciplined if there is a manpower issue I would much prefer to see the PMF given a combat role in west Mosul than a security role in east Mosul. They would though have to be prepared to fully accept the ISF's command structure including ISF officers embedded within frontline units.
While awaiting a decision on their role in the Mosul operation the PMF have pressed ahead clearing ISIL from the areas around Tal Afar. On February 1st (1/2/17) this saw them launch a week long operation to clear the area between Tal Afar and Sinjar. This included taking full control of the Tal Afar to Sinjar road and the village of Ayn Talawi to the north of the road.
Having seen their last sliver of an escape route closed on February 12th (12/2/17) ISIL launched a big offensive against PMF positions at Tal Afar in an attempt to reopen the route. This saw a female Algerian journalist severely wounded by ISIL sniper fire on February 13th (13/2/17) and the first confirmed use by ISIL of a tank in battle in Iraq. However the ISIL offensive was broken by the PMF on February 14th (14/2/17).
Being unable to reopen their escape route to Syria ISIL have instead been reduced to lashing out in anger against the Iraqi capital Baghdad.
On Tuesday (14/2/17) ISIL killed four in a bombing in the predominately Shia Baiyaa neighbourhood in the south of the city. This was followed up by another bombing on the famously Shia Sadr City district which killed 18 on Wednesday (15/2/17). Yesterday (16/2/17) ISIL struck the Baiyaa neighbourhood again.
16:55 on 17/2/17 (UK date).
Tuesday, 14 February 2017
Operation Featherweight: Month 31, Week 4, Day 4.
As I seem to do every day yesterday I talked about this 100km (60 mile) stretch of Syria's border with Turkey known as; "Garvaghy Road."
To the east of Garvaghy Road you have an area known as; "Shangri-La." This is the 15,200kmsq (9,120 milesq) - and growing - area controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Although a de facto safe-haven for civilians this still needs to be designated as such under law.
To the west of Garvaghy Road you have an area known as; "The Afrin Canton." This roughly 440kmsq (265 milesq) area is also under SDF control and functions as a de facto safe-haven for civilians if not yet a safe-haven de jure.
To the south of the Afrin Canton you have an area known as; "The Sudetenland." This roughly 750kmsq (450 milesq) area is under the control of the Al Qaeda led Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF). Centred around the city of Idlib this is where civilians were forcibly transferred by the Army of Conquest following the liberation of eastern Aleppo City on December 12th 2016 (12/12/16).
On January 23rd (23/1/17) and January 24th (24/2/17) talks were held in Astana, Kazakhstan on Syria between Russia, Turkey, Iran, Syria and the Army of Conquest. The main conclusion of that meeting was to establish a mechanism between Russia, Turkey and Iran to implement a ceasefire that had been agreed on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16).
On February 6th (6/2/17) Russia, Turkey and Iran held their first what is termed a technical meeting again in Astana. As the name suggests the purpose was to discuss the technical aspects of the ceasefire mechanism. Due to the time difference this meeting began pretty much as the US Super Bowl was coming to an end.
The period between the January 24th (24/1/17) meeting and the February 6th (6/2/17) meeting saw the bounds of what can and can't be considered a ceasefire violation tested.
So for example on January 25th (25/1/17) Turkish forces based in Turkey opened fire on civilians in the town of Ghzail killing 8. Ghzail sits within the SDF controlled Shangri-La area. Turkey - or perhaps more accurately their President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan - considers the Army of Conquest to be covered by the ceasefire but not the SDF.
On February 3rd (3/2/17) Syria conducted airstrikes against Army of Conquest positions around Idlib City which is at the centred of the Sudetenland. As they are an Al Qaeda led group Syria does not consider the Army of Conquest to be covered by the ceasefire. However Erdogan does.
On February 7th (7/2/17) Syrian aircraft again struck Army of Conquest positions in the Sudetenland. This would suggest that the February 6th (6/2/17) technical meeting did not reach the conclusion that Erdogan had been pressing for. That message seems to have been reaffirmed on February 9th (9/2/17) when Syria conducted airstrikes against Army of Conquest positions. This time in the city of Homs which sits around 200km (120 miles) south of the Sudetenland.
The results of the February 6th (6/2/17) technical meeting seems to have provoked something of a tantrum from Erdogan. That evening Erdogan's forces in Azaz within the Garvaghy Road area launched a ferocious and sustained artillery barrage against civilians in the SDF controlled Afrin Canton.
On February 9th (9/2/17) the Army of Conquest opened fire on a Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) aid distribution centre in Aleppo City. This attack killed one member of SARC's staff and wounded seven others along with killing two civilians.
The attack seem to have been a response to the killing by the US of senior Al Qaeda envoy Abu Hani al-Masri along with 10 other Al Qaeda fighters at SARC Idlib City Headquarters on February 2nd (2/2/17) and February 4th (4/2/17). The message seemed to be that if SARC is not prepared to shelter the Army of Conquest then the Army of Conquest is not prepared to allow SARC to distribute aid to Syrian civilians.
Over the weekend you may have heard numerous western news outlets - particularly CNN - reporting that US President Trump's executive orders on immigration had been defeated in the US Courts. This was simply not true.
Highlighting just how untrue this was yesterday (13/2/17) the case rather than merely the application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) came before a US Court for the first time.
At this hearing in front of James Robart in Seattle the US government made an application for the case to be delayed indefinitely.
This is quite a clever move because just after an Appeals Court has upheld the TRO you can't really make an application for the TRO to be scrapped. However you can make an application which gets the Judge to agree that the case is going nowhere fast. In doing this the Judge would also agree that it is inappropriate to impose a TRO indefinitely and withdraw it.
However if the Judge can't pick up on the subtly of that and insists the TRO must stay in place he is also insisting that the case must be treated as an urgent emergency. As such he should clear his case load and work through the night if necessary until the matter is resolved.
Having acknowledged that the case is indeed an emergency that needs to be resolved before the capture of al-Bab in the next week it falls on the Judge to hurry up and actually hear the case. His first decision is whether he wants to do this in open court or in private. "In Camera" for those of us who aren't bedazzled by a little bit of Latin.
The applicants case rests on the US government's ability to demonstrate that the threat profile has changed since the last review of immigration vetting was carried out in late 2015.
In order to demonstrate that the threat profile has changed the US government will have to present Top Secret evidence. Some of this is so sensitive that I am not even happy discussing it here.
However I think it is general enough to say that the US government has sources within the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) feeding them information about how ISIL is working within refugee camps in an effort to carry out attacks against the US. If these sources were revealed in open Court ISIL would simply kill those and the US government's ability to protect American citizens would be reduced.
It is not simply enough to try and protect the sources by giving them a pseudonym or codename.
If you are familiar with this type of things you would know that you can read between the lines to identify a source from the information itself. For example if only three people were at a meeting two of them are going to know that they're not the spy. Also ISIL have a longstanding practice of taking a large group of people they suspect of being spies and just murdering them all on the assumption they're bound to get the one spy in the group.
Although I obviously can't know for certain I suspect that the intelligence that led to the death of al-Masri in SARC's Idlib City HQ will play a large part in the US government's evidence. After all SARC are key to the US' vetting of refugees.
Quite beyond the usual issues of protecting intelligence sources this issue of Al Qaeda infiltration of SARC is a contentious one to say the least.
Since 2012 the United Nations (UN) have overseen what is known as the Geneva Process on Syria. Since the Russian-led Astana process on Syria began the Geneva Process has been on its knees. There was supposed to be a Geneva Process meeting on February 2nd (2/2/17) but it was cancelled due to the Astana process.
Within the Geneva Process and along with various UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions SARC are given a great deal of prominence. For example they are considered one of the few bodies able to deliver aid within Syria. The US proving beyond all doubt that SARC have been heavily infiltrated by Al Qaeda would probably kill the Geneva Process stone dead.
Therefore if Judge Robart declines an in camera hearing he will give the US government a stark choice. They can either scrap five years of diplomacy and abandon the middle east region to Russia or they can decline to submit evidence that would prove their case.
To deny in this case a respondent the opportunity to submit evidence to prove their case is to deny them due process under law.
Also today US National Security Adviser Michael Flynn has resigned. This is a peculiar one.
The resignation comes in response to newspaper reports that Flynn had spoke with the Russian Ambassador to the US on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16). They discussed the sanctions that former US President Obama had imposed on Russia that day. At the time Flynn was on the Presidential Transition team and therefore fully authorised to discuss matters of policy with foreign officials.
As such the only scandal I can see in the story is that Obama imposed sanctions on Russia on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16). Coming just 22 days before he left office this was simply Obama trying to bind President Trump to the policies that his designated successor Hillary Clinton fought and lost an election on.
This childish move also couldn't have come at a worst time. It was on December 29th (29/12/16) that Russia and Turkey agreed to the Syria ceasefire and move forward with the January Astana meetings. It was also the day that Russia conducted airstrikes in aid of Erdogan's forces in al-Bab. The first time ever that Russia had assisted a NATO nation in combat.
So if Russian President Putin had wanted to retaliate against Obama's temper tantrum he could quite easily have increased military co-operation with Erdogan making Turkey the first nation to leave the NATO alliance. He could also have simply given Erdogan support to attack US Special Operations Forces (SOF's) embedded with the SDF. That killing of US forces would normally leave the US at war with Turkey and NATO at war with itself.
So at that point the US really, really needed someone to reach out to the Russians to assure them that amateur hour was over.
In fact I actually though that the story broke on the same day that the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals screwed up the TRO hearing to reassure the world that despite local tantrums the grown ups were still in charge.
So quite why Micheal Flynn resigned is an utter mystery to me. I assume his replacement will be Michael Flynn.
18:45 on 14/2/17 (UK date).
To the east of Garvaghy Road you have an area known as; "Shangri-La." This is the 15,200kmsq (9,120 milesq) - and growing - area controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Although a de facto safe-haven for civilians this still needs to be designated as such under law.
To the west of Garvaghy Road you have an area known as; "The Afrin Canton." This roughly 440kmsq (265 milesq) area is also under SDF control and functions as a de facto safe-haven for civilians if not yet a safe-haven de jure.
To the south of the Afrin Canton you have an area known as; "The Sudetenland." This roughly 750kmsq (450 milesq) area is under the control of the Al Qaeda led Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF). Centred around the city of Idlib this is where civilians were forcibly transferred by the Army of Conquest following the liberation of eastern Aleppo City on December 12th 2016 (12/12/16).
On January 23rd (23/1/17) and January 24th (24/2/17) talks were held in Astana, Kazakhstan on Syria between Russia, Turkey, Iran, Syria and the Army of Conquest. The main conclusion of that meeting was to establish a mechanism between Russia, Turkey and Iran to implement a ceasefire that had been agreed on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16).
On February 6th (6/2/17) Russia, Turkey and Iran held their first what is termed a technical meeting again in Astana. As the name suggests the purpose was to discuss the technical aspects of the ceasefire mechanism. Due to the time difference this meeting began pretty much as the US Super Bowl was coming to an end.
The period between the January 24th (24/1/17) meeting and the February 6th (6/2/17) meeting saw the bounds of what can and can't be considered a ceasefire violation tested.
So for example on January 25th (25/1/17) Turkish forces based in Turkey opened fire on civilians in the town of Ghzail killing 8. Ghzail sits within the SDF controlled Shangri-La area. Turkey - or perhaps more accurately their President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan - considers the Army of Conquest to be covered by the ceasefire but not the SDF.
On February 3rd (3/2/17) Syria conducted airstrikes against Army of Conquest positions around Idlib City which is at the centred of the Sudetenland. As they are an Al Qaeda led group Syria does not consider the Army of Conquest to be covered by the ceasefire. However Erdogan does.
On February 7th (7/2/17) Syrian aircraft again struck Army of Conquest positions in the Sudetenland. This would suggest that the February 6th (6/2/17) technical meeting did not reach the conclusion that Erdogan had been pressing for. That message seems to have been reaffirmed on February 9th (9/2/17) when Syria conducted airstrikes against Army of Conquest positions. This time in the city of Homs which sits around 200km (120 miles) south of the Sudetenland.
The results of the February 6th (6/2/17) technical meeting seems to have provoked something of a tantrum from Erdogan. That evening Erdogan's forces in Azaz within the Garvaghy Road area launched a ferocious and sustained artillery barrage against civilians in the SDF controlled Afrin Canton.
On February 9th (9/2/17) the Army of Conquest opened fire on a Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) aid distribution centre in Aleppo City. This attack killed one member of SARC's staff and wounded seven others along with killing two civilians.
The attack seem to have been a response to the killing by the US of senior Al Qaeda envoy Abu Hani al-Masri along with 10 other Al Qaeda fighters at SARC Idlib City Headquarters on February 2nd (2/2/17) and February 4th (4/2/17). The message seemed to be that if SARC is not prepared to shelter the Army of Conquest then the Army of Conquest is not prepared to allow SARC to distribute aid to Syrian civilians.
Over the weekend you may have heard numerous western news outlets - particularly CNN - reporting that US President Trump's executive orders on immigration had been defeated in the US Courts. This was simply not true.
Highlighting just how untrue this was yesterday (13/2/17) the case rather than merely the application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) came before a US Court for the first time.
At this hearing in front of James Robart in Seattle the US government made an application for the case to be delayed indefinitely.
This is quite a clever move because just after an Appeals Court has upheld the TRO you can't really make an application for the TRO to be scrapped. However you can make an application which gets the Judge to agree that the case is going nowhere fast. In doing this the Judge would also agree that it is inappropriate to impose a TRO indefinitely and withdraw it.
However if the Judge can't pick up on the subtly of that and insists the TRO must stay in place he is also insisting that the case must be treated as an urgent emergency. As such he should clear his case load and work through the night if necessary until the matter is resolved.
Having acknowledged that the case is indeed an emergency that needs to be resolved before the capture of al-Bab in the next week it falls on the Judge to hurry up and actually hear the case. His first decision is whether he wants to do this in open court or in private. "In Camera" for those of us who aren't bedazzled by a little bit of Latin.
The applicants case rests on the US government's ability to demonstrate that the threat profile has changed since the last review of immigration vetting was carried out in late 2015.
In order to demonstrate that the threat profile has changed the US government will have to present Top Secret evidence. Some of this is so sensitive that I am not even happy discussing it here.
However I think it is general enough to say that the US government has sources within the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) feeding them information about how ISIL is working within refugee camps in an effort to carry out attacks against the US. If these sources were revealed in open Court ISIL would simply kill those and the US government's ability to protect American citizens would be reduced.
It is not simply enough to try and protect the sources by giving them a pseudonym or codename.
If you are familiar with this type of things you would know that you can read between the lines to identify a source from the information itself. For example if only three people were at a meeting two of them are going to know that they're not the spy. Also ISIL have a longstanding practice of taking a large group of people they suspect of being spies and just murdering them all on the assumption they're bound to get the one spy in the group.
Although I obviously can't know for certain I suspect that the intelligence that led to the death of al-Masri in SARC's Idlib City HQ will play a large part in the US government's evidence. After all SARC are key to the US' vetting of refugees.
Quite beyond the usual issues of protecting intelligence sources this issue of Al Qaeda infiltration of SARC is a contentious one to say the least.
Since 2012 the United Nations (UN) have overseen what is known as the Geneva Process on Syria. Since the Russian-led Astana process on Syria began the Geneva Process has been on its knees. There was supposed to be a Geneva Process meeting on February 2nd (2/2/17) but it was cancelled due to the Astana process.
Within the Geneva Process and along with various UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions SARC are given a great deal of prominence. For example they are considered one of the few bodies able to deliver aid within Syria. The US proving beyond all doubt that SARC have been heavily infiltrated by Al Qaeda would probably kill the Geneva Process stone dead.
Therefore if Judge Robart declines an in camera hearing he will give the US government a stark choice. They can either scrap five years of diplomacy and abandon the middle east region to Russia or they can decline to submit evidence that would prove their case.
To deny in this case a respondent the opportunity to submit evidence to prove their case is to deny them due process under law.
Also today US National Security Adviser Michael Flynn has resigned. This is a peculiar one.
The resignation comes in response to newspaper reports that Flynn had spoke with the Russian Ambassador to the US on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16). They discussed the sanctions that former US President Obama had imposed on Russia that day. At the time Flynn was on the Presidential Transition team and therefore fully authorised to discuss matters of policy with foreign officials.
As such the only scandal I can see in the story is that Obama imposed sanctions on Russia on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16). Coming just 22 days before he left office this was simply Obama trying to bind President Trump to the policies that his designated successor Hillary Clinton fought and lost an election on.
This childish move also couldn't have come at a worst time. It was on December 29th (29/12/16) that Russia and Turkey agreed to the Syria ceasefire and move forward with the January Astana meetings. It was also the day that Russia conducted airstrikes in aid of Erdogan's forces in al-Bab. The first time ever that Russia had assisted a NATO nation in combat.
So if Russian President Putin had wanted to retaliate against Obama's temper tantrum he could quite easily have increased military co-operation with Erdogan making Turkey the first nation to leave the NATO alliance. He could also have simply given Erdogan support to attack US Special Operations Forces (SOF's) embedded with the SDF. That killing of US forces would normally leave the US at war with Turkey and NATO at war with itself.
So at that point the US really, really needed someone to reach out to the Russians to assure them that amateur hour was over.
In fact I actually though that the story broke on the same day that the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals screwed up the TRO hearing to reassure the world that despite local tantrums the grown ups were still in charge.
So quite why Micheal Flynn resigned is an utter mystery to me. I assume his replacement will be Michael Flynn.
18:45 on 14/2/17 (UK date).
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