Operation Featherweight: Month 30, Week 4, Day 5.

On December 12th 2016 (12/12/16) the northern Syrian city of Aleppo was liberated from the Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) coalition. In the wake of that liberation Russia convened talks on the Syria conflict between Syria, Turkey, the Army of Conquest and Iran in Astana, Kazakhstan for December 27th 2016 (27/12/16).

However under pressure those talks were moved forward to December 20th 2016 (20/12/16) and would now take place in Moscow, Russia. They were immediately proceeded by the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey in Ankara and the Berlin terror attack. Both of which took place on December 19th 2016 (19/12/16).

Although the Moscow talks were initially unsuccessful they did lay the ground work for a partial ceasefire for Syria which was declared on December 29th 2016 (29/12/16). In declaring this ceasefire it was made clear that it would not apply to; "Terrorist Groups." However it far made clear who was considered a terrorist group.

Previous ceasefires had defined both the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al Qaeda/the Base's Syrian affiliate the Jabhat al-Nusra/the Support Front (ANF) as  terrorist groups. However at the insistence of Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan this latest ceasefire also seemed to include the anti-ISIL Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) as a terrorist group. It made no mention of the groups that fight alongside Al Qaeda within the Army of Conquest.

This ceasefire agreement was supposed to form the basis for further negotiations scheduled for January 27th 2017 (27/1/17) in Astana, Kazakhstan. However under pressure from Erdogan those negotiations have now been brought forward to January 23rd 2017 (23/1/17) - just three days after the inauguration of Donald Trump as the next US President. Having succeeded in getting the negotiations moved forward Erdogan has now insisted that the US be invited and Russia have agreed.

Today a cargo plane - TK6491 - belonging to the 49% Chinese owned Turkish carrier MyCargo crashed into a village in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan destroying 15 houses and killing at least 37.

Being an air crash this obviously references the loss of Russian Military Tupolev Tu-154B RA-85572 over the Black Sea on December 25th 2016 (25/12/16).

At the time I said the death aboard that flight of Yelizaveta Glinka M.D (AKA; "Dr Liza") referenced specific military developments in Syria. Those were the fate of the Tishrin Dam and the Tabqa Dam which span the Euphrates River north of ISIL's de facto Syrian capital - Raqqa. The Tishrin Dam is where Erdogan wants to attack the SDF if he is able to clear them from Manbij while the Tabqa Dam is where ISIL's supply lines cross the the Euphrates River linking Raqqa with al-Bab and by extension Turkey via the H4 Highway.

With it being a cargo or supply plane lost today it is clear that Erdogan wants the Tabqa Dam supply route kept open. You could almost say that he thinks it would be a tragedy if it was lost.

The plane originated from Hong Kong en route to Istanbul, Turkey. Under the One China policy Hong Kong is of course considered part of China. 

Following the January 1st 2017 terror attack on the Reina nightclub in Istanbul Kyrgyzstan or more accurately the neighbouring Chinese province of Xinjiang is something that Erdogan has seemed very interested in. Particularly as Erdogan keeps mooting Turkish membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as an alternative to membership of the European Union (EU).

Bishkek is actually on the other side of Kyrgyzstan from Xinjiang,  right on the border with Kazakhstan. The aircraft was a Boeing 747 so the US will be included in the crash investigation if nothing else.

Today's drama aside the December 29th (29/12/16) ceasefire has been reasonably successful in keeping things relatively quiet in Syria. The only exception has been around the town of Wadi Barada and the village of Ayn al-Fijeh. These are both located around 10km (6 miles) north-west of Syria's capital Damascus.

As their names suggest both Wadi Barada and Ayn al-Fijeh are home to natural water springs. Together they make up the majority of Damascus' water supply. On December 22nd 2016 (22/12/16) the Army of Conquest which occupy the area poisoned those springs with diesel fuel and destroyed the pumping station. As a result Damascus' civilians have been without clean water for nearly a month.

The situation in Wadi Barada also highlights the fallacy of trying to claim that there is a distinction between Al Qaeda and what is often wrongly referred to as; "moderate rebels." There simply is no distinction. As within the rest of Syria these supposedly moderate groups fight alongside Al Qaeda and other extreme Islamist terror groups as part of the Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) coalition.

The largest group within the Army of Conquest is Al Qaeda. However two large, dominant groups within the coalition are the Islamic Movement of the Freemen of the Levant/Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (Ahrar al-Sham) and the United Turkmen Army (UTA).

The fragments of what used to be known as; "The Free Syrian Army (FSA)" that are particularly active around Wadi Barada are the Levant Liberation Army, the Zabandani Hawks Brigade and the al-Hamza Battalion. As with the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement/Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki who operated in eastern Aleppo City both the al-Hamza Battalion and the Zabandani Hawks Brigade have been supplied with weapons under the US Train & Equip program.

Due to Al Qaeda's leadership role within the Army of Conquest the Syrian government has not considered the December 29th ceasefire to be in effect in Wadi Barada and fighting there has continued. Particularly over the course of the past week Syrian  forces have made significant progress in liberating the area.

On Friday (13/1/17) a deal was reached that would see the Army of Conquest surrender control of Wadi Barada and Ayn al -Fijeh returning them to Syrian control. The local groups such as the Levant Liberation Army, the Zabandani Hawks Brigade and the al-Hamza Battalion have all being complying with this agreement laying down their weapons and leaving.

However the Al Qaeda and Ahrar al-Sham elements have been trying to fight on. Yesterday (15/1/17) Ahrar al-Sham elements shot and killed retired Syrian Brigadier General Ahmad Ghadban as he was leaving the area. 

A longtime resident of Ayn al-Fijeh Brigadier General Ghadban had been a key figure in negotiating the agreement between the Syrian and local forces. The hope was clearly that his death would bring an end to the agreement allowing the Army of Conquest to cling onto control of the area. Possibly by having the Syrian military operation declared a ceasefire violation. 

Modelled on the liberation of Aleppo City the agreement in Wadi Barada will see the Army of Conquest fighters give up their heavy weapons. However they will then be allowed travel some 360km (216 miles) north to the area around Idlib City. That is the area which has been designated; "The Sudetenland."

I will pick things up there tomorrow.

20:10 on 16/1/17 (UK date).

Operation Featherweight: Month 30, Week 4, Day 3.

On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

As I mentioned in my previous post a key part of the plan for this operation was to leave the west of Mosul undefended in order to allow ISIL to flee back into Syria. Particularly their de facto capital of Raqqa.

There are many, many things wrong with this plan. However possibly the most important one occurs some 620km (370 miles) west of Mosul where Syria borders Turkey. Specifically the roughly 100km (60 mile) area between Azaz/Kilis to the west and the Euphrates River in the east. This has become known as either; "Garvaghy Road" or "Erdogan's Pocket."

Garvaghy Road is ISIL's main supply route with Turkey. ISIL oil flows up Garvaghy Road into Turkey. In return weapons, fighters and other equipment flow from Turkey to Raqqa and beyond - possibly as far as the Iraqi border town of Qaim. Therefore if ISIL fighters can flee from Mosul to Raqqa they can also quite easily flee from Raqqa to Turkey and from there to the rest of the world.

To the east of Garvaghy Road you have a vast 12,000kmsq (7,200milesq) buffer/safe-zone controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/QSD) - the most effective anti-ISIL force within Syria. To the west of the Garvaghy Road you have another area under SDF control. Centred around the city of Afrin this has become known as; "The Afrin Canton."

Therefore the logical thing would be for the SDF to advance across Garvaghy Road linking the eastern buffer-zone with the Afrin Canton.

However under outgoing US President Barack Obama the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve - has repeatedly blocked the SDF from making this advance by starving them of ammunition and air support. 

On August 25th 2016 (25/8/16) Obama took things even further by giving Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan permission to militarily invade and occupy Garvaghy Road. This was done specifically to protect ISIL's supply lines from the SDF.

This plan to allow Erdogan to flood - particularly Europe - with ISIL fighters did not go down at all well with the US' other NATO partners. So following what I gather was a heated NATO meeting in late October 2016 the Obama attempted to bodge together a solution. The SDF would launch an operation to liberate Raqqa.

As with the operation to liberate Mosul the first stage would be to encircle Raqqa.

The first phase of this first stage was launched on November 6th 2016 (6/11/16). It focused on the SDF advancing south towards Raqqa from the town of Ayn Issa. At the time marking the southern boundary of the SDF's eastern buffer-zone Ayn Issa sits around 60km (35 miles) east of the Euphrates and around 50km (30 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey. Crucially it sits around 70km (40 miles) north of Raqqa.

On November 25th 2016 (25/11/16) this first phase was declared to be complete. The SDF had advanced roughly 45km (27 miles) south of Ayn Issa putting them within 25km (15 miles) north of Raqqa. As they advanced they'd liberated around 600kmsq (360 milesq) of predominately farmland from ISIL control. It was during this advance that Chief Petty Officer Scott Dayton was killed on November 24th 2016 (24/11/16) - the US first combat fatality within Syria.

On December 10th 2016 (10/12/16) the second phase of the operation was launched. This would see the SDF advance along the Euphrates River from essentially the town of Sarrin to liberate the area between Raqqa and the Euphrates River.

By January 5th 2017 (5/1/17) the SDF had reached within 8km (5 miles) of the Tabqa Dam which forms Lake Assad out of the Euphrates River and is around 55km (30 miles) west of Raqqa. On January 6th 2017 (6/1/17) the SDF succeeded in liberating Jabour Castle (Qalat Jabar) which sits in a peninsula on the northern side of Lake Assad approximately 45km (27 miles) west of Raqqa.

It was during this phase of the operation that two members of the SDF's Quinta Brigada international brigade gave their lives. They were Ryan Lock aged 20 from Chichester, UK and Nazzareno Tassone aged 24 from Edmonton, Canada.

Although the advance towards Raqqa has ended this phase of the operation is technically still underway. The focus is now on linking the western advance up with the northern advance. When complete it will have succeeded in liberating approximately 600km (360 milesq) from area.

This will bring the total area liberated to 1,200kmsq (720 milesq) expanding the SDF's eastern buffer-zone to 13,200kmsq (7, 920 milesq).

Even before this second phase is complete there has been talk of soon launching a third phase. This is said to be planned for the east of Raqqa and seems to be focused on cutting Raqqa off from Deir-ez-Zour. An oil rich area Deir-ez-Zour sits around 160km (95 miles) south-east of Raqqa along the Euphrates Basin.

Perhaps telegraphing a possible focus for this third phase last Sunday (8/1/17) US SOF's conducted a raid in Madan. This is approximately 55km (33 miles) south-east of Raqqa and 70km (40 miles) north of Deir-ez-Zour. Although the details are being kept quiet it seems the objective of the mission was the capture of ISIL finance minister Abu Anas and at least 25 ISIL fighters were killed in the process. 

The first two phases of the SDF's Raqqa operation have succeeded in liberating 113 villages along with countless farms and civilians from ISIL's rule. Therefore it is impossible to describe it as meaningless. However it has certainly not succeeded in the main objective of cutting Raqqa off from Garvaghy Road.

In December 2015 Tishrin Dam - close of Sarrin - was liberated. Since then ISIL's main way to cross the Euphrates River and therefore access Garvaghy Road has been the Tabqa Dam. 

Although the SDF have advanced within 8km (5 miles) of the Tabqa Dam the US has so far declined the SDF permission to liberate the dam itself. Therefore ISIL's ability to access Garvaghy Road via the H4 Highway and the town of al-Bab remains unchanged.

My main concern though is that once the encirclement stage is complete the SDF will then come under immense US pressure to launch an assault on Raqqa itself. The SDF are simply not equipped to mount such an operation.

In launching an operation of similar scale to liberate Mosul the combined forces of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) initially committed a force of 40,000. They are equipped with thousands of armoured HUMVEE's, tanks and the latest Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) armoured vehicles. They are supported by US and French Special Operations Force (SOF) heavy artillery and advanced aircraft such at the AH-64 Apache gunship.

In contrast the SDF have committed just 3,500 troops to the Raqqa operation. That force has no tanks, no armoured vehicles and no close air support. They are limited to old unarmoured civilian vehicles, rusty Soviet era weapons and continue to be starved of ammunition by CJTFOIR.

As the Mosul operation has progressed the combined ISF, Peshmerga force has seen some 10% of its force killed. That represents some 4,000 fatalities - 500 more than the total the SDF has available for the entire Raqqa operation. With the Mosul operation having reached the point of no return the ISF and the Peshmerga have been forced to commit ever more forces and equipment to the operation until they finally succeed.

ISIL are likely to fight even harder for Raqqa than they have been for Mosul.

Therefore I am extremely concerned that if an assault on Raqqa is launched the SDF will quickly see their initial force of 3,500 wiped out forcing them to commit more and more of their total force of around 70,000 to the operation. Quite quickly that drain on the SDF's resources will cause the eastern buffer-zone to collapse meaning that all the progress of the last, nearly three years will be wiped out.

The prospect of an SDF collapse already seems to have Turkish President/Prime Minister/Emperor Recep Tayyip Erdogan rubbing his hands with glee.

Since early November 2016 Erdogan has been focused on cycling control of the town of al-Bab from ISIL to both his regular and irregular forces. Sitting 40km (25 miles) south of Syria's border with Turkey and 70km (40 miles) west of the Euphrates al-Bab links Raqqa with Turkey via the H4 Highway and the Tabqa Dam. Therefore Erdogan's hope is that anything travelling between Turkey and al-Bab will be dismissed as supplies to Turkish forces rather than supplies to ISIL in Raqqa.

It is certainly no secret that once Erdogan's forces have taken control of al-Bab he wants them to attack SDF positions at the town of Manbij which sits around 50km (30 miles) north-east of al-Bab along the M4 Motorway. Having captured Manbij from the SDF it seems likely that Erdogan intends to capture the Tishrin Dam and press on into the SDF's eastern buffer-zone. To this end Erdogan has been extensively building up his forces in and around al-Bab.

Although they have not yet been condemned Erdogan's aspirations have struggled to find support from CJTFOIR. Up until December 28th 2016 (28/12/16) CJTFOIR had declined to provide air support to Erdogan's forces around al-Bab. Then on December 29th 2016 (29/12/17) Erdogan used this proposed Russian-led peace process to force Russia to provide his forces with air support around al-Bab.

This represented the first time that Russia had provided military support to a NATO member in combat. With NATO being formed to fight Russia it is hard to overstate how dramatic this development is. It would seem to indicate that Erdogan intends to pull Turkey out of NATO in order to form a military alliance with Russia.

This fear prompted CJTFOIR to provide Erdogan's forces around al-Bab with air support for the first time on December 30th 2016 (30/12/16). Since then Erdogan has continued to play CJTFOIR and Russia off against each other with both air forces seeming to provide Erdogan's forces with air support on alternate days. In a development that should worry all on Thursday (12/1/17) Erdogan appear to have reached a formal military co-operation agreement.

Obviously faced with this opposition to his plans Erdogan has embarked on a frantic effort to build up pressure to overcome that opposition.

On January 1st 2017 (1/1/17) there was the gun attack on the Reina nightclub in Istanbul. I covered this in detail here; http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2017/01/operation-featherweight-month-30-week-2.html

Although he has so far eluded capture attacker was identified last Sunday (8/1/17) as Abdulkadir Masharipov from Uzbekistan. That followed a week of speculation that he was from Kyrgyzstan which borders China. Specifically China's semi-autonomous Xinjiang region.

Thanks to the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest entry "1944" by Jamala there has been lots of talk recently about Josef Stalin's decision to exile ethnic Turks from what used to be Ukraine in 1944. Stalin exiled those ethnic Turks to what at the time was the southern USSR - now Turkmenistan - and to China's Xinjiang region where they are known as; "Uighurs."

These ethnic Turks have been a source of tension between China and Erdogan for some time now. Back in June 2015 Erdogan falsely accused China of forbidding these ethnic Turks from participating in the holy Muslim month of Ramadan. This sparked such fury amongst Erdogan's Islamist supporters that on July 4th 2015 (4/7/15) they attacked a group of South Korean tourists in Istanbul in a misguided act of revenge.

Due to this perceived persecution by China it is reasonably common for these Uighurs to sneak across the border from Xinjiang to Kyrgyzstan. Recently there has been a growing problem of these Chinese ethnic Turks travelling to Turkey and then onto Syria and Iraq to join ISIL using Kyrgz passports.

China is of course one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Particularly in the wake of the UNSC meetings following the liberation of Aleppo City on December 12th 2016 (12/12/16) there has been some discussion amongst the permanent members of the UNSC about whether China has been engaged in fight against ISIL in a way that is in keeping with the responsibility of being a permanent member. Turkey is of course not a permanent member of the UNSC.

So while Erdogan has been threatening everyone else this Kyrgz element of the Reina attack has been an enquiry to China over this discussion. An enquiry that carries with it an air of menace.

While Erdogan was trying to convince everyone the Reina attacker was Kyrgz/Chinese the manhunt focused of Istanbul's Izmir district. During that manhunt on January 5th 2017 (5/1/17) there was a foiled suicide attack on Izmir's Courthouse. With a number of Kyrgz/Chinese suspects in the Reina attack scheduled to appear in that Courthouse later in the day that certainly added an extra element of drama to discussions.

Responsibility for the Izmir attack has since been claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK). If the western media is unable to realise the distinction between TAK and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) there is absolutely no chance of Turkey's Erdogan controlled media picking up on it. Therefore domestically the attack contributes to demands for Erdogan to deploy more forces to Garvaghy Road to defend ISIL against the SDF.

Last Saturday (7/1/17) there was a large bombing in the Syrian city of Azaz which killed at least 43 people. Azaz of course makes up the western border of Garvaghy Road. 

The crucial element of this attack is that the bomb was delivered in an oil tanker. Prior to their recent rapprochement Russia collected extensive evidence of not only Turkey but the Erdogan family's role in the ISIL oil trade. As the Russian-led negotiations continue Erdogan is obviously interested to know if this oil trade will be allowed to continue. However it seems clear that Erdogan is an ideological ally of ISIL rather than merely an economic one so his support for the group will likely continue even if he is not being paid in return.

The attack on what is currently a Turkish occupied town obviously triggered demands that more is done to increase security to protect civilians. That provides Erdogan with opportunity to build up forces in Azaz ahead of an attack westward on the SDF controlled Afrin Canton.

In a further effort to convince the Turkish people that the World is just one giant conspiracy against Erdogan yesterday (13/1/17) Turkey arrested 4 serving soldiers over the December 17th 2016 (17/12/16) bombing of a military bus in Kayseri. Following the July 15th 2016 (15/7/16) Turkish rising the Turkish military have largely been dismissed as part of what Erdogan calls the Gulen Terrorist Organisation (FETO). The Kayseri bombing has previously been blamed on the PKK. 

Therefore this seems to be an attempt to further link FETO and the PKK in the minds of the Turkish people. Particularly as Erdogan's constitutional reform bill begins its journey through Parliament amid - by Turkish standards - moderate opposition.

Although Erdogan was finally forced to admit that the Reina attacker was from Uzbekistan rather than Kyrgz/Chinese yesterday (13/1/17) two Chinese suspects were arrested accused of assisting him. So it seems that Erdogan is really interested in this China discussion.

Switching back to the Mosul operation for a moment there has been some dramatic progress in just the last three days.

In my previous post on the topic I mentioned that in the area north of the M2 Hawler Road the ISF had liberated the al-Muhafazan,  al-Sukkar and al-Baladiyat neighbourhoods. This established a forward line along the Hawler Road as it runs north to south alongside the Nineveh Ruins and the Mosul University complex.

I also mentioned that in the area to the south of the Hawler Road the ISF had secured control of Mosul's so-called "Fourth Bridge" and reached Jonah's tomb. The ISF had also liberated the Mosul communication and post centre which sits between the M80 Road and the al-Horia roundabout which leads onto the al-Jamhuriya bridge.

Yesterday (13/1/17) the ISF crossed the Hawler Road and entered the Mosul University complex. Today they have confirmed that they have liberated if not fully secured this sprawling complex.

Also yesterday the ISF succeeded in liberating the Mosul Governate buildings. Today they have confirmed they have secured the al-Faisaliah neighbourhood where it is located. This gives them partial control of not only the Fourth Bridge and the al-Jumhuriya Bridge but also the so-called "Old Bridge."

In my post on Wednesday (11/1/17) I said that ISIL were in control of just nine of eastern Mosul's neighbourhoods. That has now fallen to just five one of which is just forest and another two are essentially marsh land.

The clearest sign that ISIL's defences in eastern Mosul are now in collapse came yesterday when ISIL themselves attempted to demolish all five of Mosul's bridges following a retreat. That suggests that the ISIL fighters remaining in the east of the city have been abandoned to fight to the death or until their ammunition runs out.

Due to the complex nature of urban warfare I can't really give a prediction of when Mosul's left bank will be liberated. However I will be extremely surprised if I'm still talking about fighting on that side of the Tigris at this time next week. 

17:30 on 14/1/17 (UK date).

Edited at around 20:15 on 16/1/17 (UK date);

I initially wrote that Masharipov had alluded capture. It will haunt me forever.

Operation Featherweight: Month 30, Week 3, Day 7.

Since the summer of 2014 the northern Iraqi city of Mosul has been under the occupation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

On October 17th 2016 (17/10/16) an operation was launched to liberate the city. This is a combined operation by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR). Its first objective was to encircle Mosul from the north, east and south.

The primary motivation behind launching the operation at that time was to ensure lots of positive news coverage ahead of the November 8th 2016 (8/11/16) US election. This was done in an effort to help Hillary Clinton succeed Barack Obama as President. The main part of the plan was to hope that ISIL would simply run away and escape via the west to Syria.

Neither of those things are considered particularly valid when planning a major military operation.

Realising this on November 16th 2016 (16/11/16) the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) militia element of the ISF succeeded in liberating Tal Afar airport to the west of Mosul cutting off the western escape route. Despite a major element of the plan being changed no-one saw any need to change the rest of the plan.

On November 1st 2016 (1/11/16) the ISF launched an east to west frontal assault on Mosul starting from the suburb of Gogjali. By November 24th 2016 (24/11/16) the ISF had succeeded in securing 16 neighbourhoods. Their most forward positions arced from the al-Zuhar neighbourhood to the al-Karamah neighbourhood to the north-east and arced from the al-Karamah neighbourhood to the al-Salam neighbourhood to the south-east.

On December 4th 2016 (4/12/16) the ISF launched another push westwards from the al-Salam neighbourhood into the Palestine/Falastin, Qarayat Yarimjah and Judaydah Mufti neighbourhoods. They also launched a simultaneous push on the north side of the M2/Hawler Road from the al-Karamah neighbourhood to the al-Bareed and al-Tameen neighbourhoods.

By December 9th 2016 (9/12/16) the ISF had advanced so they were in at least partial control of 27 of Mosul's western neighbourhoods. To the north of the Hawler Road the ISF controlled neighbourhoods in almost a vertical line from al-Zuhar to al-Tameen. To the south of the Hawler Road the ISF controlled neighbourhoods in an arc from al-Karamah to the Judaydah neighbourhood.

However these gains came at significant cost.

The ISF do not publish their own casualty figures. However the persistent rumour is that those 39 days of fighting 4,000 ISF service personnel gave their lives. That represents 10% of the entire force of 40,000 committed to the operation. The ISF's elite Counter Terrorism Service (CTS/Golden Division) who have been leading the fight were particularly hard hit. They have seen some 20% of their entire force killed in the Mosul operation.

With the Golden Division in particular having sustained so many casualties they could no longer be considered an effective fighting force a tactical pause was declared on December 9th 2016 (9/12/16). This was to allow for replacements of equipment and men - some said to be poorly trained - to be brought in to reinforce the operation.

Due to the slow progress of the operation the US has also been forced to change the mission its Special Operations Forces (SOF) around Mosul from an advisory to a frontline combat one. In turn this has forced them to increase the number of SOF's by 450. In another clear sign of mission creep other members of CJTFOIR  - mainly Britain and France - have also deployed a further 50 SOF's - primarily snipers - in forward positions in Mosul.

I have always maintained that this Mosul operation has been poorly planned and - at primarily the insistence of the Americans - conducted at completely the wrong time. However the December pause has provided a clear demonstration of why now it has begun there is no choice other than to see it through even if it is sucking in an spitting out more personnel than had been expected.

The December pause of course not only allowed the ISF time to re-group it also allowed ISIL to re-group. 

As a result ISIL were able to launch a counter-offensive turning six neighbourhoods - Intisar, Somer, al-Saha, al-Salam, Falastin and al-Quds - from being under complete ISF control back into areas of conflict. The Intisar and al-Quds neighbourhoods were of particular concern because they are far behind what is loosely considered the frontline. Al-Quds in particular is one of Mosul's most eastern neighbourhoods.

On December 22nd 2016 (22/12/16) ISIL were able to shell and launch Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED/Suicide truck bomb) attacks against Gogjali. That is so far to the east it is not technically considered part of Mosul. On December 28th 2016 (28/12/16) ISIL were able to launch fullscale attacks in the areas of Abu Aweza and Tal Afar which are some distance outside of Mosul. Fortunately both of these attacks were quickly repelled.

On December 29th 2016 (29/12/16) the ISF launched a fresh push of their own in the south-east and north-east of the city.

In the south-east the ISF's first priority to was re-establish control over the neighbourhoods they'd lost before pushing on from Intisar and Falastin neighbourhoods into al-Wadha and al-Maliyah. In the north-east the first priority was liberating the villages of al-Sada and al-Tawila on the first day before entering the al-Muhafazan and al-Sukkar neighbourhoods.

On January 6th 2017 (6/1/17) the ISF conducted their first night mission of the operation. This took them across the Khosr River - key tributary to the Tigris River running through the centre of Mosul - and into the Rifaq and al-Muthana neighbourhoods. These border the Nineveh ruins which are considered by many to mark the centre of Mosul.

On Sunday January 8th 2017 (8/1/17) the ISF announced that they had completed their push into the al-Muhafazan and al-Sukkar neighbourhoods and entered the al-Baladiyat neighbourhood. Once all three neighbourhoods have been secured that will establish a forward line along the Hawler Road as it runs north to south alongside the Nineveh Ruins.

To the south-east on January 3rd 2017 (3/1/17) the ISF entered the al-Wadha neighbourhood and began to attack the Baath neighbourhood. On Monday January 9th 2017 (9/1/17) reached the so-called "Fourth Bridge" across the Tigris from the Baath and al-Maliyah neighbourhoods.

Yesterday (10/1/17) it was confirmed that the ISF had reached the Mosul communication and post centre which sits between the M80 Road and the al-Horia roundabout which leads onto the al-Jamhuriya bridge. Today it was announced that the ISF had entered Jonah's Tomb which sits between the al-Maliyah and al-Jazar neighbourhoods.

These latest gains mean that ISIL now only control 9 neighbourhoods or roughly 20% of the territory on Mosul's east or left bank. These include the sparsely populated al-Arabi and Rashidiyah neighbourhoods to the north. As a result we seem to be approaching the point where Mosul's eastern side can be declared liberated.

That of course will still leave Mosul's west or right bank to be liberated. Although geographically smaller than the east of the city the west of Mosul is much older made up of a tightly packed warren of old buildings and narrow streets unsuited to modern warfare. As such the fighting there is likely to be much tougher and take even longer. 

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has estimated that the operation will now last until Easter which is in mid-April 2017. That increased delay raises further concerns about the fate of Mosul's civilian population.

The plan was that Mosul's civilians would remain within their homes as the fighting quickly passed them by. With the fighting not progressing as quickly as hoped this plan doesn't seem to be working. In the first five days following the December 29th 2016 (29/12/16) push some 13,000 civilians fled Mosul. That brings the total number of people having fled Mosul to over 130,000 all of whom are currently being housed in poorly equipped Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camps amid freezing weather.

I am also growing increasingly concerned about the fate of people living in towns such as Qaryart al-Ashiq between the west of Mosul and Tal Afar. As far back as November 2016 there were growing concerns that civilians in this area were beginning to run out of essential supplies. Based on current estimates and strategy they will likely be the last civilians liberated from ISIL after Mosul itself is liberated. Five months or more is a very long time to expect them to wait for relief.

Obviously ISIL have not taken their recent losses in Mosul in good grace. Since the start of the December 29th 2016 (29/12/16) push they have responded with an intense bombing campaign centred around the Iraqi capital Baghdad - some 400km (240 miles) to the south. January 2nd 2017 (2/1/17) was a particularly brutal day.

On Saturday December 31st 2016 (31/12/16) French President Francois Hollande announced that he would be visiting Iraq on Monday January 2nd 2017 (2/1/17) to congratulate the nation on the progress it had made improving security. The public nature of this announcement gave ISIL two days to plan attacks to prove Hollande wrong.

On the morning of January 2nd 2017 (2/1/17) ISIL detonated a total of six car bombs at markets in and around Baghdad predominately focused on the overwhelmingly Shia Sadr City. Then in the evening ISIL launched bomb and gun attacks against two police stations in the city of Samarra - some 115km (70 miles) north of Baghdad.

The nature of these attacks seemed inspired by the opening episode ("The Six Thatchers") of the fourth season of the BBC TV Show "Sherlock" which was first broadcast on Sunday January 1st 2017 (1/1/17). The began with the telling of the old folk story "The Appointment in Samarra." As with all folk stories there are various version of this tale but the all serve as an allegory about fate.

A merchant is busy in a market in Baghdad when he sees the figure of death. Although death looks surprised to see him the merchant immediately flees Baghdad for Samarra. That evening in Samarra the merchant is again faced with death. This time he accepts his fate but asks death why he seemed surprised to see him in Baghdad that morning.

Death replies; "Because I had an appointment with you this evening in Samarra."

Sherlock is one of the BBC's big exports. So not only was this episode broadcast in the UK on January 1st it was also broadcast across Europe - including Russia - at the same time. As a result it was trending globally on Twitter that evening - only in Russian. That would certainly hint at a thaw in relations between the UK and Russia.

Just this Sunday (8/1/17) there was another bombing in the Sadr City district of Baghdad. This time it targeted the Jamila market. I think that counts as close enough to "Jamala" singer of the controversial 2016 Eurovision Song Contest entry "1944."

So it seems that ISIL is growing increasingly concerned about the division between Russia and the west on which the group depends. It must be extremely frustrating for them to have all these complex conversations going on above their heads.

As with the wave of attacks that was triggered by the start of the Mosul operation back in October 2016 the main objective of this latest ferocious wave of attacks is to undermine faith in the Iraqi government. Ideally ISIL are looking to bring down that government so it can no longer fight them. Failing that it is trying to force the Iraqi government to withdraw forces from the Mosul operation to protect Baghdad to reduce the pressure on ISIL in Mosul.

Unfortunately this tactic seems to be having some effect. 

Following the latest bomb attacks on Monday (9/1/17) mass protests were held in Baghdad calling for better security in the capital. The Iraqi police broke up these protests using tear gas. There now seems to be protests growing elsewhere in Iraq over the way the police broke up the Baghdad protests.

Sadly the latest waves of attacks in Baghdad serve to highlight that the war against ISIL in Iraq will not be won with the liberation of ISIL. The group still need to be defeated in areas such as the Hawija Triangle between Tikrit and Kirkuk and their sleeper cells still need to be dismantled.

Fortunately the Iraqi government seem to be fully aware of this problem. 

On Friday January 6th 2017 (6/1/17) they launched an operation in and around Anbar province's border with Syria. Centred around the town Qaim this is intended to stop ISIL from smuggling fighters and predominately VBEID's such as those seen in Baghdad into Iraq from Syria.

So far this operation seems to be making good progress with the ISF backed by Sunni tribal forces liberating parts of Sagra and Zawiya and advancing on Fhemi valley which is seen as a key cross-border smuggling route. 

17:45 on 11/1/17 (UK date).