Today I've been continuing to work through the text of this planned climate change agreement. I am currently dealing with Section K that deals with compliance.
Unfortunately this is one of the areas that is significantly under-developed. As a result rather then simply choosing from a list of options I'm going to have to try and develop the text. This is likely to take me until the end of the week.
Obviously though in light of Friday's (13/11/15) violence in the host city of Paris, France I do have to take a few moments to talk about the security arrangements for the COP21 Summit where this agreement is scheduled to be signed.
I should start by saying that I'm not particularly alarmed.
Of the six targets that were attacked only one - the Stade de France - had what I would consider a dedicated security perimeter.
It's been more then a decade since I worked in football security but even then we were well aware of suicide bombers desire to blow themselves up in a crowded area like a football stadium and the consequences of such a thing happening. As a result we had procedures in place to stop it from happening.
It seems that at Stade de France those procedures worked perfectly. The - now confirmed - two suicide bombers were unable breach the stadium perimeter and blew themselves up outside killing only themselves and an Egyptian tourist who was initially thought to be a third bomber.
The football match continued unaffected and actually at the end of the game spectators were held inside the stadium because it was considered one of the safest places in the city at that point.
The COP21 Summit itself will be held at a specially constructed site in Paris-Le Bourget which is on the very outskirts of Paris close to Le Bourget Airport.
Although it's not the sort of detail you would include in an online registry the site has been specifically designed with security in mind. As such it has an even stronger security perimeter then the one at Stade de France which worked just fine.
The perimeter around the COP21 can be strengthened even further by simply bringing more security staff/soldiers. There is obviously a degree of concern about crowding at entry points so what they might do is establish an outer perimeter at which only people's accreditation is checked allowing them to pass quickly through. The more time consuming security searches will then be carried out at an inner perimeter.
The general thinking on this sort of thing is that if a threat gets as far as the perimeter then the security plan has already failed. As a result there will also be a large intelligence operation to eliminate threats before they emerge. This will be largely unseen and will take place far away from the venue itself.
Almost two weeks prior to Friday's attacks France announced that it would be suspending the Schengen border free agreement and re-introducing border controls for the duration of COP21.
Although you can't completely eliminate illegal entry through sea ports etc this should significantly reduce the chances of any threats from outside of France entering the country during the summit. It's a pretty standard procedure that was actually used by Germany in 2007 to keep anti-G8 protesters out.
There is of course the issue of threats that are already in France. This is an area that does cause some concern because France has long complained that it lacks the resources to properly monitor all the homegrown threats. However that's really only a problem when you've got to monitor them indefinitely. It is much easier to keep people locked down for just two to three weeks.
Also as part of the State of Emergency legislation that France is bringing in in response to Friday's attacks house arrest has been introduced. This eliminates the needs for large surveillance teams because instead you just park a police car outside the person's house. If they try and leave they'll be immediately arrested and sent to prison.
It has also been confirmed that US President Barack Obama will be attending COP21. Although they might not be in a desperate rush to do so at the moment the US intelligence services have all sworn an oath to protect their President and they are prepared to go to extreme lengths to do so. So alongside the French intelligence operation there will also be a vast US operation looking over their shoulder and plugging any gaps.
All of the other Heads of Government/State (HOGS) who've confirmed that they'll be attending - Russian President Vladimir Putin for example - will also be bringing their own intelligence operations. So it's likely that not only will every potential terrorist in France be spied upon they'll also be several other intelligence agencies spying on the people spying on the terrorists.
Therefore my main concern is actually how all this will effect the mood or atmosphere of the summit.
It's well established that terrorists carry out their attacks because they know they can't defeat their enemy. So instead they try and created an atmosphere of terror that distracts their enemy causing them to defeat themselves.
Added to that the increased security measures could contribute to a threatening and suffocating atmosphere in which it's quite difficult to get work done.
For example soldiers in combat fatigues carrying assault rifles which can be quite intimidating to people who aren't used to be around them. Also simply avoid the hassle I suspect that delegates will enter the perimeter once in the morning and remain inside the perimeter until they leave at the end of the day.
That said most of these summits are hugely secure these days - COP20 was actually held in a military barracks. Therefore I don't think seasoned Summiteers will be in anyway intimidated by the security measured.
Plus in my experience of previous COP's people tend to end up sleeping at their desks rather then in their hotel beds.
I am though a little concerned about some of the youth delegates and those form the less experienced observer groups. They could get frustrated by the increased security and as a result paranoid enough to think the measures are an attempt to keep them out rather then a necessity to allow them to attend by keeping them safe.
20:50 on 16/11/15 (UK date).
Monday, 16 November 2015
Sunday, 15 November 2015
Paris Massacres: The Refugee Angle.
Following Friday's (13/11/15) triple suicide bombings at the Stade de France, Paris French authorities discovered a severed thumb.
As none but the attackers were killed in these incidents I found this quite amusing. After all the big joke from Thursday's (12/11/15) in Beirut, Lebanon was that there were actually 3 suicide bombers. The second killed the third by blowing off his *ahem* 'lower abdomen.' This prevented him detonating his bomb denying him his rights in paradise.
Anyway the French authorities ran this thumb through their police database and discovered that it belonged to a French criminal - Ismael Omar Mostefai. Although they were aware that Mostefari had travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) my current understanding is that they were not aware that he had returned to France.
This creates a strong suspicion that he re-entered the country as an irregular migrant. However as a French citizen and a member of ISIL he would not be legally eligible for either "Asylum Seeker" or "Refugee" status.
Suspicions that Mostefai had re-entered France by irregular means were strengthened by the discovery of an Egyptian and a Syrian passport at the scenes of the various attacks.
My current understanding is that the Egyptian passport has been proved to belong to a wholly innocent Egyptian tourist who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. He now joins the ranks of all a the faceless, nameless Muslims who have be killed by ISIL.
The Syrian passport is more troubling because it appears that it was used to seek asylum along the Balkan route. In accordance with the Dublin agreement Greece scanned the passport and finger-printed the individual who presented it. Despite not being a European Union (EU) member Serbia also scanned the passport although they suspect it of being a fake.
This presents a huge problem because currently the biggest issuer of Syrian passports is not Syria - it's Turkey.
Obviously it would be a very big statement to accuse Turkey of forging Syrian passports in order to assist ISIL's recruits journey into Syria.
However Turkey has certainly made clear that the presence of these forged passports make it extremely difficult for them to stop Syrian 'nationals' re-entering ISIL held territory. They though seem to have absolutely no problem denying Syrian passports bearing Kurdish names re-entry to Syria.
Unfortunately I've long since learnt that if I don't take at least one day a week off things start falling off of me. Therefore I am unable to discuss this issue in more detail.
However before our leader's failures get drowned out in the usual round of racist chuntering I suggest you re-read these;
Instead it is a problem we thought that if we ignored it then it would magically disappear in the next news cycle or election campaign.
18:00 on 15/11/15 (UK date).
As none but the attackers were killed in these incidents I found this quite amusing. After all the big joke from Thursday's (12/11/15) in Beirut, Lebanon was that there were actually 3 suicide bombers. The second killed the third by blowing off his *ahem* 'lower abdomen.' This prevented him detonating his bomb denying him his rights in paradise.
Anyway the French authorities ran this thumb through their police database and discovered that it belonged to a French criminal - Ismael Omar Mostefai. Although they were aware that Mostefari had travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) my current understanding is that they were not aware that he had returned to France.
This creates a strong suspicion that he re-entered the country as an irregular migrant. However as a French citizen and a member of ISIL he would not be legally eligible for either "Asylum Seeker" or "Refugee" status.
Suspicions that Mostefai had re-entered France by irregular means were strengthened by the discovery of an Egyptian and a Syrian passport at the scenes of the various attacks.
My current understanding is that the Egyptian passport has been proved to belong to a wholly innocent Egyptian tourist who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. He now joins the ranks of all a the faceless, nameless Muslims who have be killed by ISIL.
The Syrian passport is more troubling because it appears that it was used to seek asylum along the Balkan route. In accordance with the Dublin agreement Greece scanned the passport and finger-printed the individual who presented it. Despite not being a European Union (EU) member Serbia also scanned the passport although they suspect it of being a fake.
This presents a huge problem because currently the biggest issuer of Syrian passports is not Syria - it's Turkey.
Obviously it would be a very big statement to accuse Turkey of forging Syrian passports in order to assist ISIL's recruits journey into Syria.
However Turkey has certainly made clear that the presence of these forged passports make it extremely difficult for them to stop Syrian 'nationals' re-entering ISIL held territory. They though seem to have absolutely no problem denying Syrian passports bearing Kurdish names re-entry to Syria.
Unfortunately I've long since learnt that if I don't take at least one day a week off things start falling off of me. Therefore I am unable to discuss this issue in more detail.
However before our leader's failures get drowned out in the usual round of racist chuntering I suggest you re-read these;
- http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/operation-featherweight-month-13-week-4_22.html
- http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/operation-featherweight-month-14-week-2.html
- http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/operation-featherweight-month-14-week-2_7.html
- http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/operation-featherweight-month-14-week-4_21.html
- http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/hungarys-illegal-migration-moves.html
- http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/operation-featherweight-month-16-week-1_30.html
Instead it is a problem we thought that if we ignored it then it would magically disappear in the next news cycle or election campaign.
18:00 on 15/11/15 (UK date).
Saturday, 14 November 2015
Operation Featherweight: Month 16, Week 3, Day 4.
Monday November 30th (30/11/15) will see the opening of the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, France.
By the Summit's end on December 11th (11/12/15) it is expected to produce a new global agreement to tackle climate change replacing the Kyoto Protocol (KP).
Back when this process started in Cancun, Mexico in 2010 Ben Ali was still the President of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak was still the President of Egypt and Syria was a safe and stable secular nation.
I'll be damned if I going to let five years of hard work fall apart in the last few weeks for the sake of a war that is clearly still going to be with us on December 12th (12/12/15).
So until then my updates on the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria are likely to be limited to periodic overviews of the main events rather then detailed analysis' of every minor issue.
Since my last update on November 3rd (3/11/15) there have been some significant developments.
I suppose I should start with the liberation of Sinjar/Shingal which was completed just today. This is of course the city that sits at the foot of Sinjar/Shingal mountain around 50km (30 miles) east of Iraq's border with Iraq and Syria and around 55km (33 miles) west of Mosul - ISIL de facto capital in Iraq.
You may remember that in August 2014 ISIL advanced into Sinjar and proceeded to massacre 5,000 men belong to the Yezidi religion who are part of the Kurdish ethnic group. ISIL kidnapped and raped almost the same number of Yezidi women and girls many of who are still being kept in sexual slavery.
The rest of the population of Sinjar city - some 50,000 people - were forced to flee up Mount Sinjar where they became trapped and faced death by dehydration and starvation.
This generated so much fury amongst the White House press corp that US President Obama knew that with the mid-term elections just 3 months away he was no longer able to freely admit that ISIL were his allies and ISIL's values are his values.
So Obama dispatched a handful of US Navy jets to fly in skies over Iraq and bomb the occasional patch or desert while Obama built up the Islamic Movement of the Freemen of the Levant/Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (FML) as the acceptable face of Sunni extremism in Iraq and Syria.
Eventually Kurdish forces were able to rescue the Yezidi from Mount Sinjar and by the spring of 2015 they had been able to force ISIL back from the foot of the mountain and out of most of Sinjar city.
It was at this point Kurdish forces hit a problem in the form of thousands of landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) that ISIL had littered across Sinjar city and the surrounding area.
Lacking the expertise to clear these booby-traps the Kurdish forces were unable to secure the city and the surrounding area. This allowed ISIL to return a small presence of some 600 fighters to around 75% of Sinjar city.
Almost immediately the UK and Germany stepped up sending bomb disposal experts to train the Peshmerga - the armed force of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) - in how to defuse and remove all these explosives. This training was completed in the late summer at which point the operation to liberate Sinjar hit another problem.
The main Kurdish force that rescued the Yezidi from Mount Sinjar and initially liberated Sinjar city was the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). In the process the PKK formed, armed and trained the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) - a militia made up exclusively of Yezidi Kurds.
In a General Election in June 2015 Turkey's Justice & Development Party (AKP) failed to win the Parliamentary majority it needed to make party founder Recep Tayyip Erdogan President for life in defiance of Turkey's constitution.
With the permission of US President Obama Erdogan then declared war on the PKK in an effort to wrap himself in the flag and win that majority at a fresh round of elections. Erdogan's self-styled "War on Terror" saw him launch air-strikes against the training camps of the PKK and the YBS in northern Iraq. Those air-strikes against anti-ISIL forces continue.
With US President Obama and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refusing to demand that Erdogan ceased those strikes and respected Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity in line with the UN Charter the KRG felt that it was in no position to demand the strikes end.
So instead they turned on the PKK demanding that they comply with Erdogan's demand that they stop fighting ISIL and leave Iraq. This obviously led to a high degree of tension between the KRG, the PKK and the YBS that further delayed the liberation of Sinjar.
After an agreement that the KRG would be given full credit for the liberation of Sinjar despite the PKK and the YBS already holding around 25% of the city the operation was finally ready to start in the week beginning November 2nd (2/11/15). However it was delayed by bad weather.
On Thursday (12/11/15) the combined forces of the Peshmerga, the PKK, the YBS and the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) backed by close air-support from the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) - finally began their operation.
On the first day the Kurdish forces encircled Sinjar city from three directions cutting off access to the city. On the second day they swept into the city completely liberating it.
In the process Kurdish forces have cleared around 175km^2 (105 miles^2) from ISIL control liberating several villages that Yezidi refugees are now desperate to return to.
They also succeeded in taking control of the strategically important Highway 47 where it runs through Sinjar city. This cuts ISIL's main supply route between Mosul and Raqqa - it's de facto capital in Syria.
Although there are other, smaller roads and Kurdish forces were already in control of Highway 47 where is runs through Tal Afar between Sinjar and Mosul this tightens the noose around Mosul in preparation for an operation to finally liberate the city.
Apart from their support for the liberation of Sinjar the YPG who also been busy with an operation of their own as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which were formed on October 16th (16/10/15).
This is of course the operation that began on October 30th (30/10/15) that aims to drive ISIL back from the city of Hasakah and the town of Tel Hamees by liberating the areas around al-Hol and al-Ghazayleh.
Rather annoyingly my Internet connection is mysteriously preventing me from reading the latest updates on this operation which unfortunately I have failed to memorise. However the first objective is to sweep through all the small villages and farms in the area before encircling al-Hol and al-Ghazayleh.
The SDF seem to be making steady progress in the objective killing significant numbers of ISIL fighters in the process.
The success of the SDF has clearly not gone unnoticed by Turkey who continue artillery barrages against SDF positions along the Turkish border. The majority of this fire in recent days has been directed against Kobane including on November 10th (10/11/15) where four civilians were killed in Turkish attacks.
There has also been significant progress in the west of Syria.
This is the area where after joining up with Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate Al Nusra Front (ANF) to form the Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) coalition the FML have been advancing against Syrian government forces.
With the support of Russian air-power which is averaging around 150 air-strikes daily it seems that the JAF advance has been completely stopped and steady progress is being made rolling it back.
On November 4th (4/11/15) Syrian government had succeeded in liberating so much of the surrounding territory from JAF they were able to re-open the M5 Motorway that runs all the way from the capital Damascus to the city of Aleppo.
This re-establishes a vital supply line for Syrian government forces and cuts JAF's supply lines from Turkey into Hama, Homs, Idlib and Latakia provinces.
Capitalising on these improved supply lines on November 10th (10/11/15) Syrian government forces were finally able to break through ISIL lines lifting the siege on Kweires Airbase which is just south of Aleppo city.
Along with emerging reports that Syrian government forces have also been able to liberate some of the suburbs of Aleppo city from ISIL this creates a very real possibility that they will very soon re-establish control over both Aleppo city and province trapping ISIL in a very small area between Aleppo city and the SDF controlled buffer-zone on the eastern banks of the Euphrates River.
Essentially it means that the situation will have returned to the one that existed when CJTFOIR began operations.
In response to these ISIL defeats Turkey seems to be furious. On Wednesday (11/11/15) sources close to Erdogan's AKP announced that plans are being finalised to send 10,500 Turkish troops into Aleppo province in mid-December in order to prevent ISIL from being defeated.
Obviously this could be post-election bluster but it is a situation that needs to be very carefully monitored. The most obvious deterrent is that if Turkish troops were to mount this wholly illegal invasion they would be cut to pieces by Russian air-power.
However US President Obama seems to be working very hard to remove that deterrent by deploying US F-15E fighter jets to Incirlik in Turkey. The only conceivable role for these air-superiority fighters would be to attack Russian aircraft in order to protect a Turkish invasion force.
On Thursday (12/11/15) Lebanon risked being dragged further into the ISIL quagmire when ISIL carried out twin suicide bombings against a Palestinian refugee camp in a Hezbollah controlled area killing 41.
Although particularly brutal this attack didn't really tell us anything new about the conflict.
It has never been about the government of Syria nor the government of Iraq. It has always been a Saudi attempt to exterminate all Shia Muslims. That is because Shia's are far less likely then Sunnis to be taken in by the Whabbist perversion of Islam that the al-Saud's use to keep their population in poverty and penury.
As such this is far from the first time that the conflict has spilled over into Lebanon. It is also why Russia was forced to intervene to prevent ISIL and associated forces reaching the Lebanese border.
Then of course there was yesterday's (13/11/15) killing of Mohammed Emwazi (AKA: Jihadi John) in US drone strike in Raqqa.
I am obviously far from upset by this news and might even go so far as to describe it as damn funny.
However Emwazi has not murdered a hostage since his true identity was revealed back in February 2015 - it seems that simply letting him know that we knew his identity was enough to scare him away. Since then though ISIL has not stopped murdering hostages.
Therefore if you ask me to assess the military value to Emwazi's death there simply isn't one.
Instead it seems to be Obama back in his favourite "Drone Queen" role.
The thinking being that if he can wrap himself up in the flag of one headline grabbing death it will prevent people asking all the difficult questions about the progress of the operation raised by the above.
Of course last night's massacres in Paris meant that everyone quickly forgot about Jihadi John and all those difficult questions are front and centre of every new bulletin.
So today the US tried repeating the same stunt with a drone strike that is believed to have killed the leader of ISIL's Libya branch.
Again I am far from upset that this man is dead. However although ISIL's growth in Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan underlines the complete failure of Obama's non-strategy ISIL are far from the biggest problem in Libya.
That remains the Libya Dawn Islamist militia in the west. These are the people who pushed Libya's elected government out of Tripoli and continue to wage a low-level civil war that has given ISIL space to flourish.
US President Obama's position on Libya Dawn - communicated through the UNSC - remains the same.
The results of Libya's election must be overturned and it's democratically elected government must be removed so the Islamists can rule the nation in accordance with a strict interpretation of Sharia law.
21:30 on 14/11/15 (UK date).
By the Summit's end on December 11th (11/12/15) it is expected to produce a new global agreement to tackle climate change replacing the Kyoto Protocol (KP).
Back when this process started in Cancun, Mexico in 2010 Ben Ali was still the President of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak was still the President of Egypt and Syria was a safe and stable secular nation.
I'll be damned if I going to let five years of hard work fall apart in the last few weeks for the sake of a war that is clearly still going to be with us on December 12th (12/12/15).
So until then my updates on the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria are likely to be limited to periodic overviews of the main events rather then detailed analysis' of every minor issue.
Since my last update on November 3rd (3/11/15) there have been some significant developments.
I suppose I should start with the liberation of Sinjar/Shingal which was completed just today. This is of course the city that sits at the foot of Sinjar/Shingal mountain around 50km (30 miles) east of Iraq's border with Iraq and Syria and around 55km (33 miles) west of Mosul - ISIL de facto capital in Iraq.
You may remember that in August 2014 ISIL advanced into Sinjar and proceeded to massacre 5,000 men belong to the Yezidi religion who are part of the Kurdish ethnic group. ISIL kidnapped and raped almost the same number of Yezidi women and girls many of who are still being kept in sexual slavery.
The rest of the population of Sinjar city - some 50,000 people - were forced to flee up Mount Sinjar where they became trapped and faced death by dehydration and starvation.
This generated so much fury amongst the White House press corp that US President Obama knew that with the mid-term elections just 3 months away he was no longer able to freely admit that ISIL were his allies and ISIL's values are his values.
So Obama dispatched a handful of US Navy jets to fly in skies over Iraq and bomb the occasional patch or desert while Obama built up the Islamic Movement of the Freemen of the Levant/Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (FML) as the acceptable face of Sunni extremism in Iraq and Syria.
Eventually Kurdish forces were able to rescue the Yezidi from Mount Sinjar and by the spring of 2015 they had been able to force ISIL back from the foot of the mountain and out of most of Sinjar city.
It was at this point Kurdish forces hit a problem in the form of thousands of landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) that ISIL had littered across Sinjar city and the surrounding area.
Lacking the expertise to clear these booby-traps the Kurdish forces were unable to secure the city and the surrounding area. This allowed ISIL to return a small presence of some 600 fighters to around 75% of Sinjar city.
Almost immediately the UK and Germany stepped up sending bomb disposal experts to train the Peshmerga - the armed force of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) - in how to defuse and remove all these explosives. This training was completed in the late summer at which point the operation to liberate Sinjar hit another problem.
The main Kurdish force that rescued the Yezidi from Mount Sinjar and initially liberated Sinjar city was the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). In the process the PKK formed, armed and trained the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) - a militia made up exclusively of Yezidi Kurds.
In a General Election in June 2015 Turkey's Justice & Development Party (AKP) failed to win the Parliamentary majority it needed to make party founder Recep Tayyip Erdogan President for life in defiance of Turkey's constitution.
With the permission of US President Obama Erdogan then declared war on the PKK in an effort to wrap himself in the flag and win that majority at a fresh round of elections. Erdogan's self-styled "War on Terror" saw him launch air-strikes against the training camps of the PKK and the YBS in northern Iraq. Those air-strikes against anti-ISIL forces continue.
With US President Obama and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refusing to demand that Erdogan ceased those strikes and respected Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity in line with the UN Charter the KRG felt that it was in no position to demand the strikes end.
So instead they turned on the PKK demanding that they comply with Erdogan's demand that they stop fighting ISIL and leave Iraq. This obviously led to a high degree of tension between the KRG, the PKK and the YBS that further delayed the liberation of Sinjar.
After an agreement that the KRG would be given full credit for the liberation of Sinjar despite the PKK and the YBS already holding around 25% of the city the operation was finally ready to start in the week beginning November 2nd (2/11/15). However it was delayed by bad weather.
On Thursday (12/11/15) the combined forces of the Peshmerga, the PKK, the YBS and the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) backed by close air-support from the US-led coalition - Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) - finally began their operation.
On the first day the Kurdish forces encircled Sinjar city from three directions cutting off access to the city. On the second day they swept into the city completely liberating it.
In the process Kurdish forces have cleared around 175km^2 (105 miles^2) from ISIL control liberating several villages that Yezidi refugees are now desperate to return to.
They also succeeded in taking control of the strategically important Highway 47 where it runs through Sinjar city. This cuts ISIL's main supply route between Mosul and Raqqa - it's de facto capital in Syria.
Although there are other, smaller roads and Kurdish forces were already in control of Highway 47 where is runs through Tal Afar between Sinjar and Mosul this tightens the noose around Mosul in preparation for an operation to finally liberate the city.
Apart from their support for the liberation of Sinjar the YPG who also been busy with an operation of their own as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which were formed on October 16th (16/10/15).
This is of course the operation that began on October 30th (30/10/15) that aims to drive ISIL back from the city of Hasakah and the town of Tel Hamees by liberating the areas around al-Hol and al-Ghazayleh.
Rather annoyingly my Internet connection is mysteriously preventing me from reading the latest updates on this operation which unfortunately I have failed to memorise. However the first objective is to sweep through all the small villages and farms in the area before encircling al-Hol and al-Ghazayleh.
The SDF seem to be making steady progress in the objective killing significant numbers of ISIL fighters in the process.
The success of the SDF has clearly not gone unnoticed by Turkey who continue artillery barrages against SDF positions along the Turkish border. The majority of this fire in recent days has been directed against Kobane including on November 10th (10/11/15) where four civilians were killed in Turkish attacks.
There has also been significant progress in the west of Syria.
This is the area where after joining up with Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate Al Nusra Front (ANF) to form the Army of Conquest/Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) coalition the FML have been advancing against Syrian government forces.
With the support of Russian air-power which is averaging around 150 air-strikes daily it seems that the JAF advance has been completely stopped and steady progress is being made rolling it back.
On November 4th (4/11/15) Syrian government had succeeded in liberating so much of the surrounding territory from JAF they were able to re-open the M5 Motorway that runs all the way from the capital Damascus to the city of Aleppo.
This re-establishes a vital supply line for Syrian government forces and cuts JAF's supply lines from Turkey into Hama, Homs, Idlib and Latakia provinces.
Capitalising on these improved supply lines on November 10th (10/11/15) Syrian government forces were finally able to break through ISIL lines lifting the siege on Kweires Airbase which is just south of Aleppo city.
Along with emerging reports that Syrian government forces have also been able to liberate some of the suburbs of Aleppo city from ISIL this creates a very real possibility that they will very soon re-establish control over both Aleppo city and province trapping ISIL in a very small area between Aleppo city and the SDF controlled buffer-zone on the eastern banks of the Euphrates River.
Essentially it means that the situation will have returned to the one that existed when CJTFOIR began operations.
In response to these ISIL defeats Turkey seems to be furious. On Wednesday (11/11/15) sources close to Erdogan's AKP announced that plans are being finalised to send 10,500 Turkish troops into Aleppo province in mid-December in order to prevent ISIL from being defeated.
Obviously this could be post-election bluster but it is a situation that needs to be very carefully monitored. The most obvious deterrent is that if Turkish troops were to mount this wholly illegal invasion they would be cut to pieces by Russian air-power.
However US President Obama seems to be working very hard to remove that deterrent by deploying US F-15E fighter jets to Incirlik in Turkey. The only conceivable role for these air-superiority fighters would be to attack Russian aircraft in order to protect a Turkish invasion force.
On Thursday (12/11/15) Lebanon risked being dragged further into the ISIL quagmire when ISIL carried out twin suicide bombings against a Palestinian refugee camp in a Hezbollah controlled area killing 41.
Although particularly brutal this attack didn't really tell us anything new about the conflict.
It has never been about the government of Syria nor the government of Iraq. It has always been a Saudi attempt to exterminate all Shia Muslims. That is because Shia's are far less likely then Sunnis to be taken in by the Whabbist perversion of Islam that the al-Saud's use to keep their population in poverty and penury.
As such this is far from the first time that the conflict has spilled over into Lebanon. It is also why Russia was forced to intervene to prevent ISIL and associated forces reaching the Lebanese border.
Then of course there was yesterday's (13/11/15) killing of Mohammed Emwazi (AKA: Jihadi John) in US drone strike in Raqqa.
I am obviously far from upset by this news and might even go so far as to describe it as damn funny.
However Emwazi has not murdered a hostage since his true identity was revealed back in February 2015 - it seems that simply letting him know that we knew his identity was enough to scare him away. Since then though ISIL has not stopped murdering hostages.
Therefore if you ask me to assess the military value to Emwazi's death there simply isn't one.
Instead it seems to be Obama back in his favourite "Drone Queen" role.
The thinking being that if he can wrap himself up in the flag of one headline grabbing death it will prevent people asking all the difficult questions about the progress of the operation raised by the above.
Of course last night's massacres in Paris meant that everyone quickly forgot about Jihadi John and all those difficult questions are front and centre of every new bulletin.
So today the US tried repeating the same stunt with a drone strike that is believed to have killed the leader of ISIL's Libya branch.
Again I am far from upset that this man is dead. However although ISIL's growth in Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan underlines the complete failure of Obama's non-strategy ISIL are far from the biggest problem in Libya.
That remains the Libya Dawn Islamist militia in the west. These are the people who pushed Libya's elected government out of Tripoli and continue to wage a low-level civil war that has given ISIL space to flourish.
US President Obama's position on Libya Dawn - communicated through the UNSC - remains the same.
The results of Libya's election must be overturned and it's democratically elected government must be removed so the Islamists can rule the nation in accordance with a strict interpretation of Sharia law.
21:30 on 14/11/15 (UK date).
The Paris Massacres.
Last night 8 terrorists attacked multiple locations against the French capital Paris.
Three of the terrorists attacked the Stade de France stadium which was full to it's capacity of 80,000 with fans watching a football friendly between France and Germany. Fortunately it appears that the suicide bombers succeed in killing no-one but themselves.
The second group of five terrorists did a lot more damage with gun and grenade attacks against four packed restaurants/bars all within 8km (5 miles) of the Stade de France and 6km (3.5 miles) of the iconic Eiffel Tower.
They ended their rampage by storming the Bataclan concert venue which held a capacity crowd of around 1,500. Initially it was reported that people were being held hostage at the Bataclan but it quickly emerged that it was nothing more then a massacre with the terrorist killing the concert goers one-by-one.
By the time police had raided the Bataclan bring the attacks to an end after little more three hours 127 civilians had been killed and at least 180 wounded - 99 of whom remain in a critical condition in hospital.
This makes it the worst terror attack in Europe since the 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 and it may yet exceed that making it the worst terror attack in Europe's history.
The attack has already been claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as an act of retribution for France's military operations against ISIL in Syria and Iraq.
ISIL's claim of responsibility has been strengthened by the discovery of a Syrian passport in the possession of one of the attackers. This is likely to be one of the hundreds of thousands of forged passports that Turkey has produced to facilitate the transit of ISIL recruits between Europe and Syria.
Beyond mawkishly revelling in the gore of it all I'm not sure what more I am supposed to add. T
his is something that we all knew was going to happen. It is something that has been happening for the last five years now.
At the start of December Paris is supposed to be the scene of a new global deal to end the World of the scourge of global warming.
The existence of the fiefdom of the al-Saud family - Saudi Arabia - is almost entirely dependent on nations being forced to continue to buy and use fossil fuels at hugely inflated prices further contributing to global warming. As such the al-Saud's long ago decided that they will not allow this deal to be signed.
Initially they hoped it would die out in the dust of Doha, Qatar in 2012. However this did not happen and as momentum has grown ahead of next month's climax Saudi Arabia has increasingly used violence and intimidation to terrorise nations into not signing up.
A large part of Saudi Arabia's efforts have focused on supporting the Islamist extremists of al-Shabaab in Somalia. From there Saudi Arabia has been able to attack nations across east Africa and into the resource rich nations of central Africa such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR).
So between 2012 and 2014 there were around 60 terror attacks in Kenya killing at least 253 people. The majority of these attacks were exactly the same style of attacks as seen in Paris yesterday with people being attacked by guns and grenades wherever the gather in bars and restaurants. One such attack occurred at the Jericho Beer Garden in Mombasa where people had gathered to watch the Euro 2012 football game between England and Italy.
One of the worst attacks came on September 21st 2013 (21/9/13) when terrorists armed with guns and grenades stormed the Westgate Mall in Nairobi massacring 69 and wounding more then 175.
Following this attack US President Barack Obama - himself the son of a Kenyan father - along with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) offered some weasel words of condolence but took no action to stop the attacks.
On April 2nd 2015 (2/4/15) terrorists armed with guns and grenades stormed the Garissa University in Garissa massacring 147 people and wounding 70 more.
Again US President Obama and the UNSC offered some weasel words of condolence but took no action to stop the attacks.
Saudi Arabia has also exploited the chaos that has engulfed Libya since 2011 to terrorise nations in west Africa.
In 2012 Islamists with a very similar ideology to ISIL swept down from Libya and established as self-styled Islamic State across a section of Northern Mali roughly the size of France.
Here US President Obama did not even offer words of condolence. Instead he saw it as an opportunity to increase US domination of the region by tricking west African nations in conducting an operation of liberate Mali.
None of those African nations fell into the trap and in January 2013 France stepped up and removed Mali's 'Islamic State" in just over four and a half weeks.
Saudi Arabia simply transferred the Islamists from Mali to oil-rich Nigeria where they became known as Boko Haram. This was intended as punishment for Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan's principled refusal to fall into the Mali trap.
Since then Boko Haram have killed, raped and terrorised so many people in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad it has become almost impossible to keep count. The death toll has been so great that western liberals continued obsession with the just 276 schoolgirls who were kidnapped from a boarding school in Chibok in April 2014 seems like an insult to all the other victims.
Again here US President Obama didn't even bother offer words of condolence. Instead he led an electoral coup in April 2015 to oust President Jonathan and replace him with Boko Haram sympathiser and former military dictator Muhammadu Buhari.
Seven months later Buhari has still not appointed a government instead choosing to horde all power for himself while the attacks from Boko Haram continue.
With their brutality going unchecked for so long on January 7th 2015 (7/1/15) Saudi Arabia felt confident enough to show that it could strike both at the heart of Europe and the heart of the climate change negotiations by attacking Paris, France.
This began with the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine - which is very close to the scene of yesterday's attacks - that killed 11. It continued for two days with the Charlie Hebdo attackers finally being cornered and killed at an industrial estate just outside Paris while an accomplice killed four in an attack on a Jewish supermarket both on January 9th (9/1/15).
To this day US President Obama refuses to acknowledge that these attacks took place.
The people of Yemen from where the attacks had been launched noticed though and on January 22nd 2015 (22/1/15) overthrew the Saudi backed government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi which had sponsored the attacks.
The overthrow of Hadi cut Saudi Arabia's supply route across the Gulf of Aden to al-Shabaab in Somalia and therefore east and central Africa. So Saudi Arabia immediately launched an invasion of Yemen to re-install Hadi as their puppet and re-open the supply route.
Seven months into this war that has seen Saudi troops fight directly alongside members of ISIL and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) some 5,600 people have been killed - more then half of them civilians. Saudi Arabia's blockade of Yemen which has seen it bomb aircraft belonging to the International Red Cross/Crescent alongside numerous hospitals has driven more then 5 million civilians into famine.
US President Obama responded to this by immediately leaping to Saudi Arabia's aid. Not only is he providing weapons, air-to-air refuelling tankers and targeting intelligence to assist the Saudi war against Yemen Obama is also providing it with diplomatic cover by supporting UNSC resolutions demanding that Saudi Arabia has the right to dictate Yemen's government in clear violation of the UN's own Charter and all relevant aspects of international law.
Once again being told that no-one dares stop them Saudi Arabia again attacked France on August 21st (21/8/15) when an Islamist terrorist attacked passengers on a Thlys train travelling between Brussels, Belgium and Paris, France. It was only through miraculous bravery that this was stopped from being a massacre of some 300 civilians.
So yesterday's attacks in Paris were just the latest in a long string of attacks over the past several years.
What should happen now is that the leaders of the 28 nations who make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) should immediately hold an emergency summit to discuss this act of war against one of it's members.
Just as the did after the September 11th 2001 (11/9/01) attacks on the US they should invoke Article 5 - the mutual defence clause that declares an attack on one to be an attack on all. This would obligate all NATO members to do everything in their power to defeat ISIL wherever they may be in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2170 (2014).
However if US President Obama's supposed campaign promise to tackle climate change along with all the horrors we have seen over the past five years are not enough to shock him up off his knees it is unlikely that these latest Paris attacks will make any difference to him.
Therefore it is extremely likely that Obama will respond by travelling to Turkey for the G20 Summit where he will once again kiss the feet of Islamist terror.
This puts me in an extremely difficult position because I can help write the best, fairest and most equitable climate change agreement the World has ever seen.
However I know I cannot get nations to sign up to it if the supposed Commander-in-Chief of the World's largest military is telling them that Saudi Arabia will be allowed to attack them if they do.
16:30 on 14/11/15 (UK date).
Three of the terrorists attacked the Stade de France stadium which was full to it's capacity of 80,000 with fans watching a football friendly between France and Germany. Fortunately it appears that the suicide bombers succeed in killing no-one but themselves.
The second group of five terrorists did a lot more damage with gun and grenade attacks against four packed restaurants/bars all within 8km (5 miles) of the Stade de France and 6km (3.5 miles) of the iconic Eiffel Tower.
They ended their rampage by storming the Bataclan concert venue which held a capacity crowd of around 1,500. Initially it was reported that people were being held hostage at the Bataclan but it quickly emerged that it was nothing more then a massacre with the terrorist killing the concert goers one-by-one.
By the time police had raided the Bataclan bring the attacks to an end after little more three hours 127 civilians had been killed and at least 180 wounded - 99 of whom remain in a critical condition in hospital.
This makes it the worst terror attack in Europe since the 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 and it may yet exceed that making it the worst terror attack in Europe's history.
The attack has already been claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as an act of retribution for France's military operations against ISIL in Syria and Iraq.
ISIL's claim of responsibility has been strengthened by the discovery of a Syrian passport in the possession of one of the attackers. This is likely to be one of the hundreds of thousands of forged passports that Turkey has produced to facilitate the transit of ISIL recruits between Europe and Syria.
Beyond mawkishly revelling in the gore of it all I'm not sure what more I am supposed to add. T
his is something that we all knew was going to happen. It is something that has been happening for the last five years now.
At the start of December Paris is supposed to be the scene of a new global deal to end the World of the scourge of global warming.
The existence of the fiefdom of the al-Saud family - Saudi Arabia - is almost entirely dependent on nations being forced to continue to buy and use fossil fuels at hugely inflated prices further contributing to global warming. As such the al-Saud's long ago decided that they will not allow this deal to be signed.
Initially they hoped it would die out in the dust of Doha, Qatar in 2012. However this did not happen and as momentum has grown ahead of next month's climax Saudi Arabia has increasingly used violence and intimidation to terrorise nations into not signing up.
A large part of Saudi Arabia's efforts have focused on supporting the Islamist extremists of al-Shabaab in Somalia. From there Saudi Arabia has been able to attack nations across east Africa and into the resource rich nations of central Africa such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR).
So between 2012 and 2014 there were around 60 terror attacks in Kenya killing at least 253 people. The majority of these attacks were exactly the same style of attacks as seen in Paris yesterday with people being attacked by guns and grenades wherever the gather in bars and restaurants. One such attack occurred at the Jericho Beer Garden in Mombasa where people had gathered to watch the Euro 2012 football game between England and Italy.
One of the worst attacks came on September 21st 2013 (21/9/13) when terrorists armed with guns and grenades stormed the Westgate Mall in Nairobi massacring 69 and wounding more then 175.
Following this attack US President Barack Obama - himself the son of a Kenyan father - along with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) offered some weasel words of condolence but took no action to stop the attacks.
On April 2nd 2015 (2/4/15) terrorists armed with guns and grenades stormed the Garissa University in Garissa massacring 147 people and wounding 70 more.
Again US President Obama and the UNSC offered some weasel words of condolence but took no action to stop the attacks.
Saudi Arabia has also exploited the chaos that has engulfed Libya since 2011 to terrorise nations in west Africa.
In 2012 Islamists with a very similar ideology to ISIL swept down from Libya and established as self-styled Islamic State across a section of Northern Mali roughly the size of France.
Here US President Obama did not even offer words of condolence. Instead he saw it as an opportunity to increase US domination of the region by tricking west African nations in conducting an operation of liberate Mali.
None of those African nations fell into the trap and in January 2013 France stepped up and removed Mali's 'Islamic State" in just over four and a half weeks.
Saudi Arabia simply transferred the Islamists from Mali to oil-rich Nigeria where they became known as Boko Haram. This was intended as punishment for Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan's principled refusal to fall into the Mali trap.
Since then Boko Haram have killed, raped and terrorised so many people in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad it has become almost impossible to keep count. The death toll has been so great that western liberals continued obsession with the just 276 schoolgirls who were kidnapped from a boarding school in Chibok in April 2014 seems like an insult to all the other victims.
Again here US President Obama didn't even bother offer words of condolence. Instead he led an electoral coup in April 2015 to oust President Jonathan and replace him with Boko Haram sympathiser and former military dictator Muhammadu Buhari.
Seven months later Buhari has still not appointed a government instead choosing to horde all power for himself while the attacks from Boko Haram continue.
With their brutality going unchecked for so long on January 7th 2015 (7/1/15) Saudi Arabia felt confident enough to show that it could strike both at the heart of Europe and the heart of the climate change negotiations by attacking Paris, France.
This began with the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine - which is very close to the scene of yesterday's attacks - that killed 11. It continued for two days with the Charlie Hebdo attackers finally being cornered and killed at an industrial estate just outside Paris while an accomplice killed four in an attack on a Jewish supermarket both on January 9th (9/1/15).
To this day US President Obama refuses to acknowledge that these attacks took place.
The people of Yemen from where the attacks had been launched noticed though and on January 22nd 2015 (22/1/15) overthrew the Saudi backed government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi which had sponsored the attacks.
The overthrow of Hadi cut Saudi Arabia's supply route across the Gulf of Aden to al-Shabaab in Somalia and therefore east and central Africa. So Saudi Arabia immediately launched an invasion of Yemen to re-install Hadi as their puppet and re-open the supply route.
Seven months into this war that has seen Saudi troops fight directly alongside members of ISIL and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) some 5,600 people have been killed - more then half of them civilians. Saudi Arabia's blockade of Yemen which has seen it bomb aircraft belonging to the International Red Cross/Crescent alongside numerous hospitals has driven more then 5 million civilians into famine.
US President Obama responded to this by immediately leaping to Saudi Arabia's aid. Not only is he providing weapons, air-to-air refuelling tankers and targeting intelligence to assist the Saudi war against Yemen Obama is also providing it with diplomatic cover by supporting UNSC resolutions demanding that Saudi Arabia has the right to dictate Yemen's government in clear violation of the UN's own Charter and all relevant aspects of international law.
Once again being told that no-one dares stop them Saudi Arabia again attacked France on August 21st (21/8/15) when an Islamist terrorist attacked passengers on a Thlys train travelling between Brussels, Belgium and Paris, France. It was only through miraculous bravery that this was stopped from being a massacre of some 300 civilians.
So yesterday's attacks in Paris were just the latest in a long string of attacks over the past several years.
What should happen now is that the leaders of the 28 nations who make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) should immediately hold an emergency summit to discuss this act of war against one of it's members.
Just as the did after the September 11th 2001 (11/9/01) attacks on the US they should invoke Article 5 - the mutual defence clause that declares an attack on one to be an attack on all. This would obligate all NATO members to do everything in their power to defeat ISIL wherever they may be in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2170 (2014).
However if US President Obama's supposed campaign promise to tackle climate change along with all the horrors we have seen over the past five years are not enough to shock him up off his knees it is unlikely that these latest Paris attacks will make any difference to him.
Therefore it is extremely likely that Obama will respond by travelling to Turkey for the G20 Summit where he will once again kiss the feet of Islamist terror.
This puts me in an extremely difficult position because I can help write the best, fairest and most equitable climate change agreement the World has ever seen.
However I know I cannot get nations to sign up to it if the supposed Commander-in-Chief of the World's largest military is telling them that Saudi Arabia will be allowed to attack them if they do.
16:30 on 14/11/15 (UK date).
Friday, 13 November 2015
ADP Text 11/6/15 Revision: Section M: Peer Review Process.
Throughout I feel as
though I've been saying that all problems will be solved by the peer review
process. As such it is essential that the agreement includes a section
dedicated to establishing that peer review process. This is my attempt at how
that section should be worded.
The reasoning behind my decisions can be found here; http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/adp-ex-ante-review-general-concepts.html
And here; http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/adp-ex-ante-review-my-thoughts.html
I have temporarily
labelled it as Section M because that was the next available. However in the
final draft I may move it up in the document so it is closer to the Mitigation
and Adaptation sections.
Paragraph 1 - "Prior to being
inscribed all parties INDC's will be subjected to an ex ante peer review."
Paragraph 2 - "The result of that
review is to be non-binding and without prejudice."
Paragraph 3 - "At the quarterly
meeting 15 months prior to the date of inscription the Secretariat shall divide
participating nations into working groups of no fewer then five and no more
then eight members.
Each working group
shall contain;
(a). At least one
nation listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol,
(b). At least one
nation from the G77 group of nations,
(c). At least one
nation from the Least Developed Countries (LDC's) group,
(d). At least one
nation from the Small Island Developing States (SIDS),
Once those criteria
have been met the remaining members of the working groups shall be assigned on
a random basis."
Paragraph 4 - "At the quarterly
meeting 15 months prior to the date of inscription the Secretariat will assign
each working group INDC's to review equal to their number of members.
Each working group
shall be assigned;
(a). At least one
INDC containing an Absolute Reduction in emissions where available,
(b) At least one INDC
containing an Intensity Reduction where available,.
Once those criteria
have been met the remaining INDC's will be assigned on a random basis."
Paragraph 5 - "No working group may
review the INDC of one of it's members. In the event of conflict the INDC will
be reassigned to another working group in accordance with the criteria laid out
in Paragraph 4."
Paragraph 6 - "At the quarterly
meeting/COP 12 months prior to the date of inscription each party will present
their INDC to the working group to which it has been assigned."
Paragraph 7 - "Following the presentations
each member will prepare a report on the INDC's assigned to the group.
That report is to be;
(a). Based on the
criteria laid out in Technical Annex (X),
(b). Based on
science,
(c). An assessment of
the overall deliverability of the INDC,
(d). An assessment of
the adequacy and fairness of the INDC in line with the principle of Common But
Differentiated Responsibilities,
(e). An opportunity
to identify any weaknesses or missed opportunities within the INDC,
(f). An opportunity
to assist the nation in the delivery of it's INDC and the drawing up of future
INDC's."
Paragraph 8 - "At the quarterly
meeting 9 months prior to inscription group members are to present their
reports to the working group. The working group will then begin work on a
single synthesis report for each INDC before the group. These are to be based
on the commonalities between the individual reports."
Paragraph 9 - "At the quarterly
meeting 6 months prior to inscription the working groups will then present
their synthesis reports along with the individual reports to the nation(s)
whose INDC has been reviewed by the group. If a synthesis report cannot be
produced only the individual reports will be presented."
Paragraph 10 - "Nations will then
have 6 months to consider the results of the ex ante review and the option
amend their INDC's prior to inscription."
Paragraph 11 - "At any point during
the review process the Secretariat may exercise the right to conduct it's own
review of any INDC as it sees fit."
Paragraph 12 - "Following the
publication of the synthesis reports and prior to inscription any party may
request that the Secretariat conducts a review of it's amended INDC. This
further review may be carried out at the discretion of the Secretariat."
Paragraph 13 - "If a party feels that
it cannot work as part of its assigned group it can request the Secretariat
transfers it to another group upon presentation of a valid reason. Any
transfers must adhere to the criteria laid out in Paragraph 3 and are wholly at
the discretion of the Secretariat."
Paragraph 14 - "At the mid-way
point/ 5 years into the commitment period all parties will be subject to an ex
post peer review process."
Paragraph 15 - "The result of that
review is to be non-binding and without prejudice."
Paragraph 16 - "The ex post review
will be carried out by the same working groups assigned during the ex ante
review."
Paragraph 17 - "During the ex post
review the working groups will be assigned the same INDC's they were assigned
during the ex ante review."
Paragraph 18 - "At the quarterly
meeting six months prior to the mid-point COP each party will make a
presentation on the progress of their INDC to the working group to which it has
been assigned."
Paragraph 19 - "Following the
presentations each member of the working group will prepare a report on each of
the INDC's assigned to their group.
That report is to be;
(a). Based on the
criteria laid out in Technical Annex (X),
(b). Based on
science,
(c). An assessment of
the progress made towards the delivery of the INDC,
(d). A re-assessment
of the adequacy and fairness of the INDC in respect to it's progress towards
delivery in line with the principle of Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities
(e). An opportunity
to identify any weaknesses or missed opportunities within the INDC,
(f). An opportunity
to assist the nation in the delivery of it's INDC and the drawing up of future
INDC's"
Paragraph 20 - "At the quarterly
meeting 3 months prior to the mid-point COP group members are to present their
reports to the working group. The working group will then begin work on a
single synthesis report for each INDC before the group. These are to be based
on the commonalities between the individual reports."
Paragraph 21 - "At the mid-point COP
the working groups will present their synthesis reports along with the
individual reports to the nation(s) whose INDC has been reviewed by the group.
If a synthesis report cannot be produced only the individual reports will be
presented."
Paragraph 22 - "The individual and
synthesis reports of the ex post review are to be used to guide the
Secretariat's strategic review identified in Section J of this agreement."
Paragraph 23 - "At any point during
the review process the Secretariat may exercise the right to conduct it's own
review of any INDC as it sees fit."
Paragraph 24 - "New institutional arrangements or strengthened
institutional arrangements may be needed to serve this agreement."
15:15 on 13/11/15 (UK date).
Wednesday, 11 November 2015
ADP Text 11/6/15 Revision: Section J: Time-Frames & Other Matters
The big decision that has to be made in this section is whether the commitment period will be for 5 years or 10 years.
In the US they limit their President to 8 years in office and it is rare they get rid of them before then. In Russia the President is also limited to 8 consecutive years in office. China which does not elect its leaders still limits it's President and Prime Ministers to 10 years in office. The UK's longest serving Prime Minister was Margaret Thatcher who held office for a little over 10 years.
By contrast although Australia does not have term limits it only has 3 year terms. This is frequently blamed for the political instability that has seen Australia have 5 Prime Ministers in just 8 years.
Therefore I think that politically it is right for the commitment periods last for 10 years because this seems to reflect the natural rate of political change.
On a practical level many of the actions that nations will take under the agreement will involve large construction projects which take a long time to complete.
For example the Mosul hydroelectric dam in Iraq took 5 years to become operational. The Stella series of coal fired power stations in the UK also took 5 years to complete and cleaner, gas fired power stations take a similar length of time. Even the UK's tiny Gnats Mill hydroelectric plant took 3 years to complete.
Therefore under 5 year commitment periods there won't really be enough time for nations to bring a policy online let alone assess it's progress before they're being forced to develop the next set of policies.
Therefore on a practical level it is also right for the commitment periods to last 10 years because this will provide time for projects to be completed and assessed.
The big argument for 5 year commitment periods is that it will boost ambition by constantly asking people to think of what more they can do. However with ambition only really changing with governments - which tends to happen every 10 years or so - I think it's really going to have the opposite effect.
With people being constantly pestered to do more before they've been able to assess what they've done I think they're more likely to do the bare minimum or withdraw from the agreement entirely.
As such in this section I have exclude anything that is built around the idea of a 5 year commitment cycle.
To ensure that everybody knows that I am referring to I have also kept the chaotic layout that sees us jump backwards and forwards through the paragraph list.
Paragraph 172 - Here I've gone with Option 1(b) because this allows the specific provisions to be negotiated separately as part of the technical annex I laid out in the mitigation section.
Paragraph 162 - Throughout the process has been intended to begin on January 1st 2020 (1/1/20) to ensure that there is no gap in action. Therefore if the agreement is signed at COP21 that will be start date. I view the agreement to be durable for ever although I don't want to completely remove the possibility of renegotiation. So here I would adopt;
"The starting date for the implementation of this agreement to be 1 January 2020 and this agreement is intended to be durable forever."
Paragraph 166 - This contradicts the notion of durable agreement made up of successive commitment cycles. As such it will need to be removed.
Paragraph 167 - Here Options (a) through (g) and (i) through (k) all refer to an agreement that has 5 year commitment cycles. As such I've excluded them to adopt (h) where it reads;
"Every 10 years, with a midterm review."
Paragraph 163 - The intention is that nations will submit new contributions every 10 years almost for eternity after this agreement has been ratified. This paragraph completely contradicts that so must be removed.
Paragraph 169 - Here Option (b) is binary and this is not a binary agreement therefore it cannot be adopted. Option (a) is fine but due to the ex ante review submissions need to be made at least 15 months in advance rather then 12. Also I don't think there should be a limit on how early a submission can be made. So here I would adopt;
"Parties to communicate their proposed commitments / contributions / actions at least 15 months prior to their formalization to allow them to be peer reviewed."
Paragraph 173 - Here Option 2 is binary and therefore excluded. Option 3 runs a substantial risk of contradicting the provisions of the technical annex so here I would adopt Option 2 (b) where it makes reference to the technical annex;
"Facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of those commitments / contributions / actions as detailed in technical annex (X)/decision x/CP.x, including a description of why it considers its commitment is an ambitious and fair contribution to reaching the below 2 °C objective in accordance with provisions agreed by the COP."
Paragraph 174 - I consider this to be fine as is.
Paragraph 164 - I consider this fine as is. It merely makes clear that each commitment period is to be viewed as a continuation of the one that proceeded it.
Paragraph 168 - This applies to a 5 year commitment period when the agreement will use a 10 year period. As such it needs to be removed.
Paragraph 170 - Again this refers to a 5 year commitment period so must be removed.
Paragraph 165 - I consider this fine as is. It prevents backsliding.
Paragraph 178 - Under the agreement there are to be successive commitment cycles. Therefore there is no need to them to be amended so this needs to be removed.
Paragraph 171 - This is already covered by Paragraph 167 so needs to be removed as a duplication.
Paragraph 181 - This is fine with the bracketed section included as a standard clause to prevent decisions from being applied retroactively.
Paragraph 179 - Although I said above that there is no need for an amendment procedure due to there being successive commitment cycles if a nation discovers they are suddenly able to do more they should be able to increase their submission mid-cycle in order to boost ambition. That aim is best served by;
"Parties may, at any time, make upward adjustments to their commitments / contributions / actions by means of a simplified procedure. The governing body shall adopt modalities of the simplified procedure"
Paragraph 180 - With parties being allowed to set their own contributions allowing them to then scrap those contribution makes a mockery of the entire process. Therefore this paragraph should be removed entirely and defences for failing to deliver on a contribution can be handled in the compliance section.
Paragraph 182 - While I think it should be dealt with in the compliance section I understand that there may be legitimate reasons for a nation failing to meet it's obligations. Acknowledging Force Majeure here gives an added level of protection. Therefore I consider this fine as is.
Paragraph 177 - Throughout the Mitigation and Adaptation sections it's been established that there will be an online registry. Therefore here it is only possible to adopt Option 10.
Paragraph 161 - This is fine as is because it prevents there being gaps between commitment cycles.
Paragraph 183 - By allowing nations to set their own commitment levels the bar for participation in the process has been set extremely low. Therefore it is reasonable to limit decision making only to those who are participating in the process. As such I consider this fine as is.
Paragraph 175 - The issues raised here all relate to the ex ante peer review process. I think that needs to be given it's own dedicated section. As such this should be removed.
Paragraph 176 - Again this deals with the peer review process so should be removed and addressed in a dedicated section.
Paragraph 183 - The purpose of this paragraph is to establish the role of the governing body to conduct a strategic assessment of the aggregate effect of all the INDCs. Option 2 does not serve that purpose. Although it lists a lot of detail Option 3 also misses the point of establishing an assessment of the aggregate effect.
Therefore Option 1 is the only option that can be adopted here. However I would strengthen the protections to less capable nations by including the CBDR provisions from Option 3. So;
"The governing body shall regularly conduct a strategic review of implementation / aggregate ambition assessment in accordance with the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The purposes, modalities, procedures and guidelines of the review will be further elaborated and adopted by the COP / governing body guided by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), Article 7, paragraph 2(e), and Article 10, paragraph 2(a), of the Convention and drawing upon the lessons learned from previous review processes and ambition mechanisms under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the review."
Paragraph 185 - Here Options 2 & 3 are binary going against the collective principle of the agreement and therefore cannot be included. Option 5 is too vague not really providing enough guidance to the review. Option 1 is sufficient but Option 4 is better provided (d) can be removed.
Elsewhere in the agreement it has been accepted that richer nations need to do more then poorer nations. However defining this in terms of historical responsibility creates a loophole for very rich but young nations such as Saudi Arabia to avoid doing their part. Also the purpose of this review is to be forward looking to identify want can be achieved in the future. Therefore it is inappropriate to demand here that the review considers events that occurred not only before this agreement was signed but also before the proceeding KP was signed.
Paragraph 186 - Here Option 2 is binary and therefore cannot be included. Option 3 ties the review to the IPCC process rather then a UNFCCC process such as the ex post review so is likely to cause disruption. Therefore here I would adopt Option 1 with the strategic assessment being carried out alongside the ex post review every 5 years starting in 2025 assuming a 2020 start date for the agreement.
However I think that Paragraph 186 could also be merged with Paragraph 187;
Paragraph 187 - Here both Option 1 & 3 are both binary so have to be excluded under the collective principle leaving Option 2 as the only one that can be adopted. Merged with Paragraph 186 it should read;
"The review / assessment / mechanism which shall be applicable to all parties and guided by science shall take place in conjunction with the ex post review every five years starting in 2025."
Paragraph 191 - By setting a deadline of 2018 Option 1 prevents further refinements being made to a process that should be in effect for at least 80-100 years. That is irresponsible and short sighted. Option 2 is fine where (d) is removed because it is binary.
I am confused by (f) because (c) establishes the IAR and the ICA while (e) establishes the 2013-15 review. Therefore selecting either (a) or (b) under (f) would contradict one of the two. As such it only seems possible to include (f) without either option so it reads;
"The multilateral consultative process for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention, as set out in its Article 13."
Paragraph 188 - This is better covered as part of the ex post review. Therefore it should be removed from here and addressed in the dedicated section.
Paragraph 189 - As with above this is better covered as part of a dedicated section on the peer review process. Therefore it should be removed from here.
Paragraph 190 - Here Option 4 almost mandates that nations must adjust their contributions according the results of the review. That goes against the consensual nature of the agreement. It also goes against the principle that nations can't make adjustments to their contributions. Therefore it cannot be included. Option 2 is so vague as to have no meaning.
Therefore what I would do here is merge Options 1 & 3 to allow the review to make recommendations and oblige nations to take those recommendations into consideration when making their next contribution but stop short of mandating changes. So;
"The governing body shall recommend adjustments to Parties’ commitments in response to the findings of the review / action, in order to harness unrealized opportunities to mitigate and adapt to climate change and to mobilize the necessary financial support. Those recommendations are to be taken into account by parties in preparing their successive commitments / contributions / actions."
Paragraph 192 - This is fine as is. It just gives the freedom to create or strengthen institutional arrangements as the need arises.
Paragraph 161 - Putting aside the fact this is the second Paragraph 161 in the section and therefore at the very least needs to be re-labelled it deals with issues relating to the ex post review. As such it needs to be removed from here and dealt with in the dedicated section.
20:40 on 11/11/15 (UK date).
In the US they limit their President to 8 years in office and it is rare they get rid of them before then. In Russia the President is also limited to 8 consecutive years in office. China which does not elect its leaders still limits it's President and Prime Ministers to 10 years in office. The UK's longest serving Prime Minister was Margaret Thatcher who held office for a little over 10 years.
By contrast although Australia does not have term limits it only has 3 year terms. This is frequently blamed for the political instability that has seen Australia have 5 Prime Ministers in just 8 years.
Therefore I think that politically it is right for the commitment periods last for 10 years because this seems to reflect the natural rate of political change.
On a practical level many of the actions that nations will take under the agreement will involve large construction projects which take a long time to complete.
For example the Mosul hydroelectric dam in Iraq took 5 years to become operational. The Stella series of coal fired power stations in the UK also took 5 years to complete and cleaner, gas fired power stations take a similar length of time. Even the UK's tiny Gnats Mill hydroelectric plant took 3 years to complete.
Therefore under 5 year commitment periods there won't really be enough time for nations to bring a policy online let alone assess it's progress before they're being forced to develop the next set of policies.
Therefore on a practical level it is also right for the commitment periods to last 10 years because this will provide time for projects to be completed and assessed.
The big argument for 5 year commitment periods is that it will boost ambition by constantly asking people to think of what more they can do. However with ambition only really changing with governments - which tends to happen every 10 years or so - I think it's really going to have the opposite effect.
With people being constantly pestered to do more before they've been able to assess what they've done I think they're more likely to do the bare minimum or withdraw from the agreement entirely.
As such in this section I have exclude anything that is built around the idea of a 5 year commitment cycle.
To ensure that everybody knows that I am referring to I have also kept the chaotic layout that sees us jump backwards and forwards through the paragraph list.
Paragraph 172 - Here I've gone with Option 1(b) because this allows the specific provisions to be negotiated separately as part of the technical annex I laid out in the mitigation section.
Paragraph 162 - Throughout the process has been intended to begin on January 1st 2020 (1/1/20) to ensure that there is no gap in action. Therefore if the agreement is signed at COP21 that will be start date. I view the agreement to be durable for ever although I don't want to completely remove the possibility of renegotiation. So here I would adopt;
"The starting date for the implementation of this agreement to be 1 January 2020 and this agreement is intended to be durable forever."
Paragraph 166 - This contradicts the notion of durable agreement made up of successive commitment cycles. As such it will need to be removed.
Paragraph 167 - Here Options (a) through (g) and (i) through (k) all refer to an agreement that has 5 year commitment cycles. As such I've excluded them to adopt (h) where it reads;
"Every 10 years, with a midterm review."
Paragraph 163 - The intention is that nations will submit new contributions every 10 years almost for eternity after this agreement has been ratified. This paragraph completely contradicts that so must be removed.
Paragraph 169 - Here Option (b) is binary and this is not a binary agreement therefore it cannot be adopted. Option (a) is fine but due to the ex ante review submissions need to be made at least 15 months in advance rather then 12. Also I don't think there should be a limit on how early a submission can be made. So here I would adopt;
"Parties to communicate their proposed commitments / contributions / actions at least 15 months prior to their formalization to allow them to be peer reviewed."
Paragraph 173 - Here Option 2 is binary and therefore excluded. Option 3 runs a substantial risk of contradicting the provisions of the technical annex so here I would adopt Option 2 (b) where it makes reference to the technical annex;
"Facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of those commitments / contributions / actions as detailed in technical annex (X)/decision x/CP.x, including a description of why it considers its commitment is an ambitious and fair contribution to reaching the below 2 °C objective in accordance with provisions agreed by the COP."
Paragraph 174 - I consider this to be fine as is.
Paragraph 164 - I consider this fine as is. It merely makes clear that each commitment period is to be viewed as a continuation of the one that proceeded it.
Paragraph 168 - This applies to a 5 year commitment period when the agreement will use a 10 year period. As such it needs to be removed.
Paragraph 170 - Again this refers to a 5 year commitment period so must be removed.
Paragraph 165 - I consider this fine as is. It prevents backsliding.
Paragraph 178 - Under the agreement there are to be successive commitment cycles. Therefore there is no need to them to be amended so this needs to be removed.
Paragraph 171 - This is already covered by Paragraph 167 so needs to be removed as a duplication.
Paragraph 181 - This is fine with the bracketed section included as a standard clause to prevent decisions from being applied retroactively.
Paragraph 179 - Although I said above that there is no need for an amendment procedure due to there being successive commitment cycles if a nation discovers they are suddenly able to do more they should be able to increase their submission mid-cycle in order to boost ambition. That aim is best served by;
"Parties may, at any time, make upward adjustments to their commitments / contributions / actions by means of a simplified procedure. The governing body shall adopt modalities of the simplified procedure"
Paragraph 180 - With parties being allowed to set their own contributions allowing them to then scrap those contribution makes a mockery of the entire process. Therefore this paragraph should be removed entirely and defences for failing to deliver on a contribution can be handled in the compliance section.
Paragraph 182 - While I think it should be dealt with in the compliance section I understand that there may be legitimate reasons for a nation failing to meet it's obligations. Acknowledging Force Majeure here gives an added level of protection. Therefore I consider this fine as is.
Paragraph 177 - Throughout the Mitigation and Adaptation sections it's been established that there will be an online registry. Therefore here it is only possible to adopt Option 10.
Paragraph 161 - This is fine as is because it prevents there being gaps between commitment cycles.
Paragraph 183 - By allowing nations to set their own commitment levels the bar for participation in the process has been set extremely low. Therefore it is reasonable to limit decision making only to those who are participating in the process. As such I consider this fine as is.
Paragraph 175 - The issues raised here all relate to the ex ante peer review process. I think that needs to be given it's own dedicated section. As such this should be removed.
Paragraph 176 - Again this deals with the peer review process so should be removed and addressed in a dedicated section.
Paragraph 183 - The purpose of this paragraph is to establish the role of the governing body to conduct a strategic assessment of the aggregate effect of all the INDCs. Option 2 does not serve that purpose. Although it lists a lot of detail Option 3 also misses the point of establishing an assessment of the aggregate effect.
Therefore Option 1 is the only option that can be adopted here. However I would strengthen the protections to less capable nations by including the CBDR provisions from Option 3. So;
"The governing body shall regularly conduct a strategic review of implementation / aggregate ambition assessment in accordance with the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The purposes, modalities, procedures and guidelines of the review will be further elaborated and adopted by the COP / governing body guided by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), Article 7, paragraph 2(e), and Article 10, paragraph 2(a), of the Convention and drawing upon the lessons learned from previous review processes and ambition mechanisms under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the review."
Paragraph 185 - Here Options 2 & 3 are binary going against the collective principle of the agreement and therefore cannot be included. Option 5 is too vague not really providing enough guidance to the review. Option 1 is sufficient but Option 4 is better provided (d) can be removed.
Elsewhere in the agreement it has been accepted that richer nations need to do more then poorer nations. However defining this in terms of historical responsibility creates a loophole for very rich but young nations such as Saudi Arabia to avoid doing their part. Also the purpose of this review is to be forward looking to identify want can be achieved in the future. Therefore it is inappropriate to demand here that the review considers events that occurred not only before this agreement was signed but also before the proceeding KP was signed.
Paragraph 186 - Here Option 2 is binary and therefore cannot be included. Option 3 ties the review to the IPCC process rather then a UNFCCC process such as the ex post review so is likely to cause disruption. Therefore here I would adopt Option 1 with the strategic assessment being carried out alongside the ex post review every 5 years starting in 2025 assuming a 2020 start date for the agreement.
However I think that Paragraph 186 could also be merged with Paragraph 187;
Paragraph 187 - Here both Option 1 & 3 are both binary so have to be excluded under the collective principle leaving Option 2 as the only one that can be adopted. Merged with Paragraph 186 it should read;
"The review / assessment / mechanism which shall be applicable to all parties and guided by science shall take place in conjunction with the ex post review every five years starting in 2025."
Paragraph 191 - By setting a deadline of 2018 Option 1 prevents further refinements being made to a process that should be in effect for at least 80-100 years. That is irresponsible and short sighted. Option 2 is fine where (d) is removed because it is binary.
I am confused by (f) because (c) establishes the IAR and the ICA while (e) establishes the 2013-15 review. Therefore selecting either (a) or (b) under (f) would contradict one of the two. As such it only seems possible to include (f) without either option so it reads;
"The multilateral consultative process for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention, as set out in its Article 13."
Paragraph 188 - This is better covered as part of the ex post review. Therefore it should be removed from here and addressed in the dedicated section.
Paragraph 189 - As with above this is better covered as part of a dedicated section on the peer review process. Therefore it should be removed from here.
Paragraph 190 - Here Option 4 almost mandates that nations must adjust their contributions according the results of the review. That goes against the consensual nature of the agreement. It also goes against the principle that nations can't make adjustments to their contributions. Therefore it cannot be included. Option 2 is so vague as to have no meaning.
Therefore what I would do here is merge Options 1 & 3 to allow the review to make recommendations and oblige nations to take those recommendations into consideration when making their next contribution but stop short of mandating changes. So;
"The governing body shall recommend adjustments to Parties’ commitments in response to the findings of the review / action, in order to harness unrealized opportunities to mitigate and adapt to climate change and to mobilize the necessary financial support. Those recommendations are to be taken into account by parties in preparing their successive commitments / contributions / actions."
Paragraph 192 - This is fine as is. It just gives the freedom to create or strengthen institutional arrangements as the need arises.
Paragraph 161 - Putting aside the fact this is the second Paragraph 161 in the section and therefore at the very least needs to be re-labelled it deals with issues relating to the ex post review. As such it needs to be removed from here and dealt with in the dedicated section.
20:40 on 11/11/15 (UK date).
Tuesday, 10 November 2015
ADP Text 11/6/15 Revision: Section I: Transparency of Action & Support (Pt2)
The only reason I am including this as a separate post is because I ran out of space. Therefore it should be read as a direct continuation of;
http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/11/adp-text-11615-revision-section-i.html
Paragraph 152 - This is fine provided it reads;
"The governing body shall elaborate modalities, standards and guidelines to ensure mitigation outcomes traded internationally and used against commitments are Real, Permanent and Verifiable."
If the terms "Real," "Permanent" and "Verifiable" need to be defined further that can be done in the definitions section.
Paragraph 153 - This is fine provided it doesn't mandate the 1st session - instead simply stating that the governing body will establish those rules.
Paragraph 154 - This is a very difficult area because obviously there needs to be common accounting and tracking rules. However it is not an area that is particularly well developed.
For example there are really three types internationally transferable mitigation outcomes - carbon credits, Additional/Conditional joint projects and cross-border projects such as forestry management. I think that these all need to be treated differently and the Additional/Conditional projects have yet to be formally adopted let alone put into practice
Therefore rather then trying to define all the rules here it is better to state that rules are to be established and allow them to be developed separately from the agreement itself. So;
"Decides that a common accounting and tracking rules system is to be established for the purpose of safeguarding environmental integrity and avoiding double counting of internationally transferable mitigation outcomes of cooperative arrangements. That is to include the comprehensive recording of activities covered by cooperative arrangements resulting in internationally transferable mitigation outcomes, either at the UNFCCC level or at the national level, with transparent, comprehensive and publicly available information in English, ensuring synergies with existing UNFCCC tools and processes;
As you can see I've merged (b) into the paragraph because it just establishes that the rules to be created are to include comprehensive recording that will be publicly available and the system will work with other UNFCCC processes. I've excluded (c) and (d) they are too specific at this point.
The problem of the subject area not currently being advanced enough is rather highlighted by (a). Double-entry bookkeeping is something that I actually am qualified to talk about. As such while I understand that it is a good starting point for a discussion it is not sophisticated enough for the task. In fact it seems like a bit of a joke at my expense.
Paragraph 155 - Again this issue of sharing is a complicated by the type of transferable outcome you're talking about.
It is of course impossible for the outcome of carbon credits to be shared - the principle being that an emission in one place is off-set by a carbon sink elsewhere. Likewise although it's a new idea I don't think that Additional/Conditional joint project should be shared. Instead the reduction should only be counted in the nation it occurred although the donor nation can take credit for for providing the support. However when you are talking about cross-border joint actions then obviously the results do need to be shared between the nations co-operating.
As such I would exclude (a) because it really poses more questions then it answers.
I would also exclude (b). Firstly because it is so poorly written it's taken me close to a day to work out what it means. Also saying that in order to co-operate the results must be greater then if no co-operation had taken place you are discouraging co-operation. Based on the principle of collective responsibility this agreement is supposed to be doing the opposite and encouraging co-operation.
As such here I would adopt;
"Decides that cooperative arrangements with internationally transferable mitigation outcomes must lead to a net decrease and/or net avoidance of global greenhouse gas emissions."
After all the purpose of the exercise is to reduce emissions.
Paragraph 156 - I consider this to fine provided (a).(iii) is removed because as above it discourages co-operation.
Paragraph 157 - I consider this fine as is because although carbon credits can be used to finance mitigation/adaptation actions I don't think they should be counted as formal climate finance because the purchaser is buying the right to emit more carbon rather then making a donation.
Paragraph 158 - I consider this to be fine as is.
Paragraph 159 - I consider this fine provided the deadline of COP22 is removed because I think it will take more time then that.
Paragraph 160 - I consider this fine as is. It simply affirms that the technical experts on finance can help set the accounting rules.
17:30 on 10/11/15 (UK date).
http://watchitdie.blogspot.co.uk/2015/11/adp-text-11615-revision-section-i.html
Paragraph 152 - This is fine provided it reads;
"The governing body shall elaborate modalities, standards and guidelines to ensure mitigation outcomes traded internationally and used against commitments are Real, Permanent and Verifiable."
If the terms "Real," "Permanent" and "Verifiable" need to be defined further that can be done in the definitions section.
Paragraph 153 - This is fine provided it doesn't mandate the 1st session - instead simply stating that the governing body will establish those rules.
Paragraph 154 - This is a very difficult area because obviously there needs to be common accounting and tracking rules. However it is not an area that is particularly well developed.
For example there are really three types internationally transferable mitigation outcomes - carbon credits, Additional/Conditional joint projects and cross-border projects such as forestry management. I think that these all need to be treated differently and the Additional/Conditional projects have yet to be formally adopted let alone put into practice
Therefore rather then trying to define all the rules here it is better to state that rules are to be established and allow them to be developed separately from the agreement itself. So;
"Decides that a common accounting and tracking rules system is to be established for the purpose of safeguarding environmental integrity and avoiding double counting of internationally transferable mitigation outcomes of cooperative arrangements. That is to include the comprehensive recording of activities covered by cooperative arrangements resulting in internationally transferable mitigation outcomes, either at the UNFCCC level or at the national level, with transparent, comprehensive and publicly available information in English, ensuring synergies with existing UNFCCC tools and processes;
As you can see I've merged (b) into the paragraph because it just establishes that the rules to be created are to include comprehensive recording that will be publicly available and the system will work with other UNFCCC processes. I've excluded (c) and (d) they are too specific at this point.
The problem of the subject area not currently being advanced enough is rather highlighted by (a). Double-entry bookkeeping is something that I actually am qualified to talk about. As such while I understand that it is a good starting point for a discussion it is not sophisticated enough for the task. In fact it seems like a bit of a joke at my expense.
Paragraph 155 - Again this issue of sharing is a complicated by the type of transferable outcome you're talking about.
It is of course impossible for the outcome of carbon credits to be shared - the principle being that an emission in one place is off-set by a carbon sink elsewhere. Likewise although it's a new idea I don't think that Additional/Conditional joint project should be shared. Instead the reduction should only be counted in the nation it occurred although the donor nation can take credit for for providing the support. However when you are talking about cross-border joint actions then obviously the results do need to be shared between the nations co-operating.
As such I would exclude (a) because it really poses more questions then it answers.
I would also exclude (b). Firstly because it is so poorly written it's taken me close to a day to work out what it means. Also saying that in order to co-operate the results must be greater then if no co-operation had taken place you are discouraging co-operation. Based on the principle of collective responsibility this agreement is supposed to be doing the opposite and encouraging co-operation.
As such here I would adopt;
"Decides that cooperative arrangements with internationally transferable mitigation outcomes must lead to a net decrease and/or net avoidance of global greenhouse gas emissions."
After all the purpose of the exercise is to reduce emissions.
Paragraph 156 - I consider this to fine provided (a).(iii) is removed because as above it discourages co-operation.
Paragraph 157 - I consider this fine as is because although carbon credits can be used to finance mitigation/adaptation actions I don't think they should be counted as formal climate finance because the purchaser is buying the right to emit more carbon rather then making a donation.
Paragraph 158 - I consider this to be fine as is.
Paragraph 159 - I consider this fine provided the deadline of COP22 is removed because I think it will take more time then that.
Paragraph 160 - I consider this fine as is. It simply affirms that the technical experts on finance can help set the accounting rules.
17:30 on 10/11/15 (UK date).
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